正当性与合法性

证成国家即确立国家的正当性,就是要表明至少存在着道德上可接受的国家或者从明智角度而言可取的国家。国家的合法性指国家所持有的一套针对其具体公民的复合道德权利,这种意义上的合法性概念不同于非常成问题的韦伯式合法性概念。评价国家的洛克式进路严格区分了国家的正当性与合法性,并将二者建立在不同的基础之上,认为这两种评价都很重要。相反,康德式进路则用同样的论证来支持国家的正当性与国家的合法性,它根据人们所应该选择的东西而非人们的实际选择来评价制度,是一种非个人性的评价方式。康德主义者对自愿主义的忠诚是半心半意的,他们试图把对国家的一般性评价作为唯一的制度评价范畴。所有现存国家都是不合法的,但国家却有可能是正当的。国家的正当性与合法性不同于国家具体行为的正当性,现存国家不具有合法性也不意味着公民对国家的任何行为都是正当的。     

John Rawls and the Social Minimum

ABSTRACT Welfare states are often urged to secure a social minimum for citizens—a level of material well-being beneath which no-one should be permitted to fall. This paper examines the justification for such a claim. It begins by criticising John Rawls's rejection of the social minimum approach to justice in A Theory of Justice : the argument Rawls uses to justify the Difference Principle, based on what he calls 'the strains of commitment' in the 'original position', actually provides a better justification for a social minimum principle. The paper then examines the substance of that argument outside the context of Rawls's contractarianism, showing that there is a general case for seeing to it that desperate need does not go unmet in a liberal society.     

“社会镶嵌”:变迁社会中宗教行为分析的新视角

当前佛教发展的一个显著特点就是佛教与佛教文化旅游经济同步发展,佛教文化旅游经济在为佛教提供发展机遇的同时,也促进了社会关系的"镶嵌"。由于社会市场机制的过度镶嵌,虽然不必然导致宗教的式微,但"去神化"意味着僧人不再是地区群体认同的基础,无法再以其所持有的价值观赋予世俗事务神圣意义。也许"过度镶嵌"并没有造成宗教组织的没落或消失,反而在消费市场中取得流行的风尚,但问题在于现代社会这种外在的消费心态使得一些佛教组织不惜利用"媚俗"或"庸俗"的手段迎合市场社会,而失去原有的信仰面貌,以至引起很大争议。     

The Anarchist's Myth: Autonomy,Children, and State Legitimacy

Philosophical anarchists have made their living criticizing theories of state legitimacy and the duty to obey the law. The most prominent theories of state legitimacy have been called into doubt by the anarchists' insistence that citizens' lack of consent to the state renders the whole justificatory enterprise futile. Autonomy requires consent, they argue, and justification must respect autonomy. In this essay, I want to call into question the weight of consent in protecting our capacity for autonomy. I argue that if we care about all of the preconditions for autonomy, then we have good reasons to leave the state of nature. This leaves the philosophical anarchist with a dilemma. If she truly cares about autonomy, then she must welcome the state. But if she wants to deny the legitimacy of the state because of the value of consent, then she needs to downplay the moral significance of autonomy in people's lives. If autonomy matters, the state does too. If it doesn't, then consent doesn't. The philosophical anarchist can't have it both ways.     

World Government,Social Contract and Legitimacy

Abstract

The notion of world government is anathema to most political theorists. This is the case due to the arguments that a world government is infeasible, undesirable and unnecessary. This threefold argument is partly predicated on the assumption that in world politics the larger a geographical and political entity is, the greater the chance of it becoming unstable, ungovernable and, ultimately, illegitimate. On the one hand, if this assumption is correct, then a world government is likely to be illegitimate. On the other hand, if the assumption is wrong, then it is not far-fetched to consider a world government to be legitimate. Considering a world government that emerges from a global social contract, this paper contends that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a world government and the extent to which it is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the kind of social contract that produces it and the extent to which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the conditions of the social contract.     

Justification and the Social Nature of Knowledge

In this paper I shall closely examine some of Gilbert Harman's cases that purport to show that one can have a justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge because of the social environment. I shall provide an account of these cases that helps us not only understand why the people in these situations lack knowledge, but also why philosophers have a difficult time evaluating these cases. More specifically, I shall argue that in these cases we should conclude that the cognizers lack justification. I shall also show how this account sheds some light on certain aspects of the internal-ism/externalism debate.     

Social Identity, System Justification, and Social Dominance: Commentary on Reicher, Jost et al., and Sidanius et al.

The articles by Reicher (2004 ), Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004 ), and Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin (2004 ) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of social identity theory ( Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ), system justification theory ( Jost & Banaji, 1994 ), and social dominance theory ( Sidanius, 1993 ). The latter two theories grew out of a critique of social identity theory, but this critique relates more to deficiencies in social identity research than to deficiencies in the theory itself. More balanced and comprehensive social identity research is required in order to allow a fair assessment of the theory's limitations. In addition, Reicher (2004 ) and Huddy (2004 ) are correct that only social identity theory offers the potential for explaining social change and social stability.     

Three Paths to Legal Legitimacy: African Diaspora Religions and the State

What are the routes by which African diaspora religious groups gain legal legitimacy in modern nation-states of the Americas? African diaspora religions, once prohibited under slave laws, remain predisposed to conflict with the ‘culture of legality’ that is constitutive of the contemporary modern world-system. In negotiating this conflict, different legitimating tactics are called upon in different nation-states, depending on the type of national mythology and level of legal-rational development present. Two legitimating tactics exercised by African diaspora religions are described here: ‘simulation’ in the United States, and ‘sedition’ in Honduras. A third path toward legitimacy, which I call the strategy of ‘seduction’, occurs when states appropriate African diaspora religions as a form of symbolic capital communicating depth and authenticity. Examples of this path are drawn from Brazil and Haiti.     

It Takes Two: The Interplay of Individual and Group Theology on Social Embeddedness

Prior research argues that religious homophily in social networks is a product of overlapping interests and activities unintentionally leading to relationships or the intentional seeking of relationships with people of similar religious beliefs. This article advances research on religious homophily by including the role that exclusive theological beliefs play in explaining religious homophily among friends. We lay out three propositions for individual-, congregational-, and cross-level effects on the relationship between exclusive theology and embeddedness within one's congregation. Using multilevel models and data from the U.S. Congregational Life Survey (USCLS), we find support for our three propositions. We discuss our findings in terms of how exclusive theologies may contribute to bonding forms of social capital, but limit exposure to diverse social perspectives and bridging forms of social capital.     

Interpreting Rawls: An Essay on Audard,Freeman, and Pogge

This review essay on three recent books on John Rawls’s theory of justice, by Catherine Audard, Samuel Freeman, and Thomas Pogge, describes the great boon they offer serious students of Rawls. They form a united front in firmly and definitively rebuffing Robert Nozick’s libertarian critique, Michael Sandel’s communitarian critique, and more generally critiques of “neutralist liberalism,” as well as in affirming the basic unity of Rawls’s position. At a deeper level, however, they diverge, and in ways that, this essay suggests, go astray on subtle questions of interpretation: Freeman overemphasizes reciprocity, Pogge miscasts Rawls as a consequentialist, and Audard exaggerates the Kantian aspect of Rawls’s core, continuing commitment to “doctrinal autonomy.”     

Tamir, Rawls and the Temple Mount

abstract What gives ethical and political validity to a state? This is to ask what a state is for and to provide a means to determine whether or not a constitution is just. In this paper I compare the account given by Tamir in Liberal Nationalism with that of Rawls, in order to clarify the decisive differences. Although both recognize the importance of particular associations and the moral imperative to be fair, Tamir places priority on the first and Rawls on the second. I explore their practical implications in regard to the ethical defensibility of Israel's self‐identification as a Jewish state and to conflicting nationalistic territorial claims for the Temple Mount (Haram esh‐Sharif) in Jerusalem. I suggest that if Tamir is correct in her analysis of nationalism, the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict is a problem that is without the sort of solution that is sought by those who are both interested parties and rational agents of good will.     

Locke, Martin and Substance

I raise three questions concerning Locke's doctrine of substratum , in the light of his correspondence with Stillingfleet: (1) What was his doctrine?(2) Is it philosophically defensible?(3) Is it consistent with his empiricist epistemology? I defend answers which represent Locke's doctrine as being only partially successful but amenable to improvement in certain ways. C.B. Martin has proposed an alternative interpretation of Locke's position. I examine this and find it to be admirable in many respects but implausible in others.