Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein

My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a central line of argument in Wittgenstein that problematizes this question by establishing the basis our ability to follow rules in our spontaneous responses. I argue that Kierkegaard not only strongly anticipates this line of argument but also offers a distinctive story about what, at bottom, makes the difference between human rule‐following and behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. In a word, on Kierkegaard's story, what makes the difference is: anxiety.     

Containment and ‘rational health’: Moran and psychoanalysis

The paper focuses on Richard Moran's account (in Authority and Estrangement) of the distinction between attitudes that meet, and alternatively fail to meet, his transparency criterion for what he calls rational health, and compare this with the psychoanalytic distinction between contained and uncontained states of mind. On the face of it, Moran's distinction appears to be a useful theoretical deepening of the psychoanalytic distinction. On closer examination, however, it appears that (a) rational health is a more demanding standard than containment, so the rationally unhealthy contains much that is mentally (quite) healthy; and (b) more seriously, some states that meet the “transparency” condition are manifestly mentally unhealthy. So transparency needs to be supplemented by an independently understood notion of containment to approach a realistic norm of mental health/ill health.     

Espace phobo-obsessionnel : le paradigme du taijin kyofusho

Taijin kyofusho, frequent in Japan, is a trouble characterized by fear of offending others by an inappropriate behavior or a physical appearance. We bring out three puzzles that are raised by the clinical elements and the cultural factors involved in this trouble: 1) the anxiety is for other persons and not for the Self; 2) the anxiogenic situations are concerned with a presence of acquaintances and never of complete strangers; 3) those situations are related to the spatialized image of the Self given to the others. To cast light on these puzzles, we use the conceptual framework of representational spaces, which allow to describe the subjective universe that can be displayed from memory. We underline the transcultural value of some aspects of taijin kyofusho.     

The ‘circumstances’ of gestures: Proto-interrogatives and private gestures

The later Wittgenstein's emphasis on the social usage of language has been very influential in psychology, particularly in language acquisition research. This move toward a pragmatic position should also be applied to gestures in pre-linguistic children and to objects in the everyday contexts of use. The shared ‘forms of life’ presupposed by language involve pre-linguistic gestures and material ‘things’.Research on early communication has focused on proto-declarative and proto-imperative gestures. I extend this focus and propose further types of gestures: ‘proto-interrogatives’ - in which children “ask” for help or regulation from adults, and three types of ‘private gestures’ - ostensive, indexical and symbolic - in which children regulate their own behaviour. This diversity of gestures becomes apparent when objects are taken seriously. Wittgenstein's ‘language-games’ necessarily apply to games with objects and gestures as well: social meaning in all cases is emergent within the context of these ‘sign games’ and ‘circumstances.’     

Feeling and thinking: An affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback account

Despite the abundance of evidence demonstrating a dedicated link between positive and negative affect and specific ways of thinking, not all findings are consistent with this view. New research suggests that the relationship between affect and thinking can be altered and often reversed, by varying the mental context in which affect is experienced. The affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback account can explain a wide range of phenomena, including both prior findings and this more recent research, and generate new predictions. According to this account, affective reactions confer value on accessible information processing strategies (e.g., global vs. local processing) and other mental content that happens to be accessible at the time. This view underscores that the relationship between affect and cognition is not fixed but instead is highly malleable. We present evidence that supports this account, along with new findings that suggest a malleable influence of specific affective states on cognition.     

‘Feeling for’ and ‘feeling with’: developmental and neuroscientific perspectives on intersubjectivity and empathy

This paper discusses research by Beatrice Beebe, Bessel van der Kolk and others, exploring the interpersonal processes that underpin early relational trauma and how this contributes to adult psychopathology. An essential feature of early relational trauma, the infant's experience of being unable to evoke an empathic response from the caregiver and the feelings of shame this gives rise to, is discussed and its implications for psychotherapy are considered. The neuroscience that underpins two forms of empathy in the therapeutic relationship, of ‘feeling for’ and ‘feeling with’ the patient is discussed and explored in relation to the concordant and complementary countertransference. I argue that when therapists respond to the projection on to them of the abuser by an increasingly determined adherence to analytic technique, this may become a complementary countertransference identification with the abuser and an enactment of the abusive relationship.