On using what we know about ourselves in thinking about others: Not so fast

Abstract

We argue that the frequently assumed privileged role of the self as a habitual reference point in social judgments is often hindered by the fact that, unlike other persons, the self is typically represented primarily in terms of internal, unobservable characteristics. This idiosyncratic feature of self-representations may render them incompatible with many other social representations. Yet, such limitations are not universal. In particular, incompatibility is less of a problem when (1) the judgment target is someone psychologically close; (2) accessible self-representations involve distant (rather than recent) self-memories; (3) accessible self-representations are relatively abstract, (semanticized) rather than event-specific; or, (4) social judgements concern not a specific other person but more abstract social concepts such as traits.     

Das verkörperte Selbst und der Andere

Bodily experience and mentalization cannot be attributed to separate experiential fields, they are interrelated. Many twentieth and twenty-first century concepts of the embodied self in philosophy and psychosomatics have gone beyond dualistic models of mind and body. In accordance with these modern theories, a dialectical concept is presented that seems to be more adequate, highlighting two dialectical relationships. The first is between mentalization and bodily experience. On the one hand bodily experience always reaches beyond mentalization and on the other hand mentalization is constantly working on bodily experience and trying to represent it mentally. The second is between mentalization and intercorporeality. The embodied self is by no means a solipsistic self; rather, the mutual relatedness in a bodily encounter comes prior to all mentalization, which in turn remodels it into self-representations, e.g. the body image. These two dialectical relationships are important to take into account when trying to understand clinical phenomena, such as hypochondriasis, ideas of reference in schizophrenia or the psychological sequelae of Parkinson’s disease.     

自我建构理论的发展与评价

出现于20世纪90年代初的自我建构理论是自我图式理论的一个分支,致力于从个体看待自我和他人关系的角度探讨个体自我表征的构成。本文回顾了该领域从"独立型与依存型自我建构理论"到"三重自我建构理论"的发展脉络,较为详细地介绍了这两种理论的基本观点以及不同研究者围绕三重自我建构相互间关系所进行的争论。最后,本文从个体自我表征系统的结构、关系自我与集体自我的内涵以及三重自我建构之间关系的角度提出了后续研究的方向。     

The Present of the Past: Dialogues With Memory Over Time

ABSTRACT This study analyzes the self-constructing meanings of an autobiographical episode in the life of one woman told at repeated intervals over 35 years. It demonstrates the ways in which the present constructs the past and shows how autobiographical memory may be used dialogically to create and contrast with current self-constructions, to disavow intolerable aspects of self, and to preserve disused but valued self-representations. Memories, in this sense, operate as texts whose meaning changes as the dialogue within self changes. The meanings of past memories, rather than their contents, are reshaped to hold aspects of a layered, multiple self.     

Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views

Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature--e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language.     

Representations of the self in the near and distant future

Seven studies provide evidence that representations of the self at a distant-future time point are more abstract and structured than are representations of the self at a near-future time point and that distant-future behaviors are more strongly related to general self-conceptions. Distant-future self-representations incorporate broader, more superordinate identities than do near-future self-representations (Study 1) and are characterized by less complexity (Study 2), more cross-situational consistency (Study 3), and a greater degree of schematicity (Study 4). Furthermore, people's behavioral predictions of their distant-future (vs. near-future) behavior are more strongly related to their general self-characteristics (Study 5), distant-future behaviors are seen as more self-expressive (Study 6), and distant-future behaviors that do not match up with acknowledged self-characteristics are more strongly rejected as reflections of the self (Study 7). Implications for understanding both the nature of the self-concept and the way in which distance may influence a range of self-processes are discussed.     

Parental Representations,Self-View,and Interpersonal Functioning of Older Adolescents

This study examines the relationship between parental object representations, self-representations, and interpersonal relations in a nonclinical sample of older adolescents. It was hypothesized that individuals with parental representations that are conceptually low, hostile, and rejecting would be significantly related to a negative view of self and poor interpersonal relations. The results suggest that parental benevolence, ambitiousness, and conceptual level are significantly related to interpersonal functioning. Parental representations that are qualitatively poor were found to be associated with a negative view of self. However, a high conceptual level of mother was noted to be significantly related to a negative self-representation. The findings generally confirm the nature of the relationship between object representations and self, but also suggest that the structural component of parental representations may reflect a cognitive component of the self rather than an affective one. The difficulties of controlling for depression and method variance issues are also discussed.     

Identity and Immigrant Stereotypes: A Study Based on the Ego-Ecological Approach

Based on the ego-ecological approach, which views identity as deeply interconnected with the social environment via group memberships, this study reconstructed the psychosocial identity of a group of Sri Lankan immigrants who settled in Naples, Italy, with the aim of detecting resonances between their self-representations and the stereotypes circulating in the receiving society. Fifty-one Sri Lankan immigrants completed a shortened version of the Multistage Investigator of Social Identity (MISI) with the following two stimulus groups: “Sri Lankans” (i.e., ethnocultural identity) and “immigrants.” Analyses revealed an implication of the self in both groups (i.e., Sri Lankans and immigrants), with the represented immigrant self more negatively connoted than the ethnocultural self. The contents of the self-representations showed resonances with both the stereotypes associated with immigrants in Italian society and the specific stereotype associated with the Sri Lankan community, thereby empirically confirming that in the immigrant experience identity feels the effect of the attitudes of the receiving context.     

‘With healing in her wings…’: Integration and repair in a self-destructive adolescent

This paper describes certain Jungian concepts related to integration and repair. Fundamental to this is Jung's concept of the self, which Fordham has made the basis of his model of development. To Jung's notion of the self as an integrator and organizer of experience, Fordham has added the idea that the self divides up, or deintegrates. Three corollaries of Fordham's model, pertaining to whole and part objects and the depressive position, are amplified through infant studies.

Clinical material from the treatment of a pigeon-phobic adolescent is presented, which attempts to demonstrate that a significant part of what the phobia represented was an infantile state of projective and introjective identification with an anxious mother. Treatment facilitated actions of the self that contributed to the integration of the experiences represented by the pigeons, so that what had been split off became a deintegrate capable of being reintegrated.

The focus of this paper is on the developmental as well as the pathological. Both are conceived in relation to the treatment.     

Multiple Identities and the Integration of Personality

ABSTRACT Life-history interviews show narrators to shift among multiple, often contradictory self-representations. This article outlines a model that accounts for how a relatively small set of self-symbols and metaphors can form a grammar-like system that simultaneously defines and integrates multiple identities. Drawing on generative theories from linguistics, anthropology, and music, the model proposes that this system provides a unitary deep structure that can be configured in various arrangements to yield multiple surface structures. Each “surface” identity constructs an individual's emotions and social relations–and what he or she accepts as “Me” and rejects as “not-Me”—into a distinct pattern, with identity per se appearing as a dialogic or fugue-like structure of opposed voices. Study-of-lives interviews conducted by the author in urban America and rural Morocco are used to present the model and to demonstrate the pivotal role played by multistable or “structurally ambiguous” symbols in anchoring reversible self-representations which integrate personality as a system of organized contradiction. The musical analogy is emphasized in order to build a bridge toward current research in cognitive science and toward efforts to formulate a “state integration” theory of personality development.     

The Self as a Relational Structure A Dialogue with Multiple-Self Theory

This paper addresses the postmodern critique of unified-self theories that argues that the self is not unified but multiple, not a static entity but in constant flux, not a separate center of initiative but intersubjectively constituted. The author proposes that there are two kinds of division in self-experience: the dissociative divisions of multiple-self theory, and a division, akin to the divisions between Freud's structural agencies, between what are here termed the “intersubjective self” and “primary subjective experience.” In contrast to dissociated self-states, which occur in different moments in time, these two dimensions of self-experience occur simultaneously; indeed, what is most important about them is their relationship. The author suggests that it is this intrapsychic relationship, as it occurs in a given psychological moment, that determines the qualities of self-experience that are emphasized in unified-self theories: such qualities as cohesiveness versus fragmentation; authenticity vs. falseness; vitality versus depletion; optimal versus nonoptimal self-regulation; and agency versus feeling one is at the mercy of others. Furthermore, a major organizer of the intersubjective self is early identifications, especially “identifications with the other's response to the self.” The implications of these concepts for therapeutic action are discussed and illustrated with an extended account of an analytic case.     

Representation and self-awareness in intentional agents

Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have full-blown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context.     

Mind, Self, and Personality: Dynamic Interactions from Late Childhood to Early Adulthood

This paper aims to integrate research on mind, personality, and self-development using a general model which hypothesizes that mind and personality are organized in 3 levels. The first level includes environment-oriented, domain-specific systems that specialize in the representation of and interaction with particular types of relationships in the environment in both the cognitive and the social realms. The second level comprises self-oriented monitoring and representation processes that build maps of the environment-oriented systems. Self and identity derive from the interaction between these 2 levels, which is subject to the constraints and the system's processing capacity at the successive ages. These constraints may be taken as the third level of the self. Efficiency in overcoming these constraints is determined by the self-oriented processes, generating feelings and self-representations of self-worth. These feelings are idiosyncratic, and function as a personal constant, which is applied on self-evaluation and self-representations. This constant is rescaled and differentiated with development. Thus, we have simultaneously both modular and transmodular constructs in the mind and the self, which change with relative independence of each other under the constraints of the general processing capabilities and the personal constant. A series of studies are presented to support this model, and its implications for life-span theories of development are discussed.     

What is the self? A psychobiological perspective

Philosophers have long struggled with questions about the nature of personal identity and of the self, with some viewing the self as a transcendent entity, and others arguing that the self is a constructed fiction. An approach based in cognitive-affective neuroscience emphasizes that self-related structures and processes are based in the brain-mind, and emerge within the social processes of human development. Alterations in such structures and processes are present in a wide range of neurological and psychiatric disorders, and neuropsychiatric lesion and functional brain imaging studies have led to more detailed awareness of the precise neuronal circuitry underlying self-representations. A cognitive-affective neuroscience approach provides a conceptual basis from which clinical research can further explore how best to assess and treat a wide range of disruptions to the self.     

The self as a central tenet of our psychology: New perspectives on the self

Abstract

The self is fundamental to psychology and yet it is as broad as it is foundational. Numerous concepts fall into the examination of the self and has resulted in many reviews of those individual aspects but few of the self as a whole. In this special issue, we offer an avenue for authors to engage in reviews of those such individual aspects to try to draw attention to new and novel approaches to what is an integral component of our psychology.     

Discriminative stimulus properties of drugs: a brief history and a selective review

A brief history of the background of drug discrimination research is given, focusing on the concepts of "drug dissociation" or state-dependent learning; an alternative explanation to the state dependency concept is to view the drug as a discriminative stimulus. In drug discrimination learning both a qualitative and a quantitative dimension is identified as governing the discrimination, examples of which are provided in the text. Examples of how drug discrimination techniques may assist in future research are outlined.