Imagining the Truth. Discussion of Prince's “The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony”

The discussion highlights the significant role played by imagination in representing the horrors that resist representation. It is Dr. Tylim's position that imagination assists patient and analyst in overcoming the limitations of memory. Imagination is the gateway to truth. In working with survivors, the therapeutic encounter may become a stage where unspeakable experiences attain presence in their absence. The silence or the gaps are then the victim's testimony.     

Which Horse do You Ride? Trauma from a Relational Perspective. Discussion of Prince's “The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony”

Discussing Dr. Robert Prince's clinical case example, the author presents a relational psychoanalytic perspective on working with the traumatized patient. She considers the presentation of his work with a Holocaust survivor from a relational perspective with particular attention to the dyadic interaction, the intersubjectivity and co-creations of patient and analyst, and finally, addresses the role of the “witness” in psychoanalytic work. The idea of the witness has particular currency in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. The author briefly examines the dimensions of the “witness” from a relational point of view. Consideration is also given to the necessary distinction between adult onset and childhood onset trauma and the repercussions of each for the analytic couple.     

The Paradox of Howard Becker’s Intellectual Identity

Howard S. Becker, best known as a sociologist of deviance, claims that he “never really did work on deviance as such.” Why does he say this? The fortuitous nature of his entry into the field, his belief that deviance is not an analytic category, and the amount of time, energy, and commitment he has invested in this as opposed to other fields, play a role in this stance. In all likelihood, contrary to his wish, Howard Becker will always be regarded as a deviance researcher.     

The Paradox of Wuwei? Yes (and No)

This essay considers P. J. Ivanhoe's critical challenge to Slingerland's analysis of wuwei(‘effortless action’). While I agree with Ivanhoe that we should do more work to embody and understand the concept of wuwei, I will defend Slingerland's notion that wuwei involves paradox—particularly in the cases of Zhuangi and Laozi. The present essay is not a defense of the specifics of Slingerland's analysis. Nonetheless, this essay focuses on defending the notion of paradox. Ivanhoe offers an alternative view of wuwei, one that sees the paradox as a riddle. I argue that this kind of formulation would frame the problem of wuwei in an unhelpful manner. I offer several novel ways of overcoming, or at least qualifying, the experience of paradox that seems to be at play in nondoing.     

The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.

The Potential of Paradox in States of Exile: Discussion of “States of Exile and Marginalization”

This commentary paper engages with Gillian Straker’s “States of Exile and Marginalization,” (this issue) in which she analyzes Tracey Moffatt’s film Night Cries through a Lacanian register. In addition, it surfaces certain aspects of Moffatt’s interpretation of her social world through the representational medium of her film. Tracing Straker’s themes of marginality and continued trauma as exilic consequences of colonization and coloniality, it also suggests that there are generative possibilities in the multiple states of exile that occur under such conditions, where the unknowability and irresolvability of trauma and its many associated states of exile are precisely what paradoxically allow for the emergence of productive alternatives to trauma repetition.     

“The Ravens Paradox” is a misnomer

I argue that the standard Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox— generally accepted as the most successful solution to the paradox—is insufficiently general. I give an instance of the paradox which is not solved by the standard Bayesian solution. I defend a new, more general solution, which is compatible with the Bayesian account of confirmation. As a solution to the paradox, I argue that the ravens hypothesis ought not to be held equivalent to its contrapositive; more interestingly, I argue that how we formally represent hypotheses ought to vary with the context of inquiry. This explains why the paradox is compelling, while dealing with standard objections to holding hypotheses inequivalent to their contrapositives.     

Russell＇s Paradox of Predicates

Russell＇s letter to Frege of June 16, 1902 contains the famous paradox of the class of all classes which are not members of themselves as well as a second paradox of the predicates that cannot be predicated of themselves. The latter paradox arises out of Russell＇s theory of classes and class concepts in Principles of Mathematics.     

The Modern Construction of Childhood: What Does It Do to the Paradox of Modernity?

The examination of the modern construction of subject is not over yet. Although many thinkers have exhausted its conceptual ambiguities and practical consequences, its impact is far from fully understood without an analysis of the construction of childhood for the future subject. In this essay, I problematize five constructions of childhood that emerged in the modern time and scrutinize the impasses of logic or conceptual ambiguities within, along with the practical consequences thereof. I explore how the modern construction of childhood is problematic in and of itself, as well as the light it sheds on the deeply embedded ambiguities and aporia (Wagner in A sociology of modernity: liberty and discipline. Routledge, New York 1994; Zhao in Educ Theory 57(1):75–88 2007) in the construction of the modern subject. This paper will untangle the problems associated with each of these constructs and their respective implications for the making of the modern subject.     

The Paradox of Public Service Jefferson, Education, and the Problem of Plato��s Cave

Plato noticed a sizeable problem apropos of establishing his republic??that there was always a ready pool of zealous potential rulers, lying in wait for a suitable opportunity to rule on their own tyrannical terms. He also recognized that those persons best suited to rule, those persons with foursquare and unimpeachable virtue, would be least motivated to govern. Ruling a polis meant that those persons, fully educated and in complete realization that the most complete happiness comprises solitary study of things unchanging, would have to compromise their happiness for the wellbeing of their polis and of the people in it. Plato??s solution, in effect that the aristoi would merely recognize their duty to sacrifice personal happiness for the happiness of the polis, has perplexed and continues today to perplex scholars. Like Plato, Jefferson recognized that there was always a pool of eager sharks, ready to govern. His republicanism, comprising a ward system and general education, was founded on the fullest participation of its citizenry, suitably educated and a governing aristoi. The true aristoi, the ??natural aristoi??, are the intelligent and virtuous and that government is best which allows for a ??pure selection?? of the natural aristoi into the governing offices. Nonetheless, as Jefferson??s own life shows, non-parochial governing meant being rent from domestic tranquility, being forced to leave behind one??s personal affairs to decay, and being tossed willy-nilly into the coliseum of nonstop political wrangling. Why would anyone, particularly one wanting to be happy, wish to govern? Thus, Jefferson faced the same problem that Plato faced. How could a state be structured so that the wisest and most virtuous would be motivated to rule? In this paper, I argue that Jefferson, in full recognition of the problem of encouraging the most intelligent and virtuous to govern, the problem of public service, offers a solution that is remarkably Platonic.     

The Diversity Paradox: Opportunities and Challenges of “Contact in Context” Across Development

As the United States diversifies, we review research on both the benefits and challenges of diversity in developmental science. Taking a “contact in context” approach, we focus on how structural and interpersonal diversity influence ethnic/racial developmental processes and outcomes from early childhood to adolescence. We also consider how a child’s own ethnicity/race may shape diversity experiences. We offer this review with the ultimate goal of optimizing benefits and minimizing challenges. We offer a “contact in context” conceptual model that integrates diversity at multiple levels, child ethnicity/race, and developmental changes over time. We conclude with recommendations for future research.     

Simone Weil’s Passion Mysticism: The Paradox of Chronic Pain and the Transformation of the Cross

Simone Weil’s theology is deeply connected to her experiences with chronic pain. Pain is paradoxical in that it is an essentially private phenomenon yet it simultaneously demands to be shared with another. Weil’s life and thought exemplify both aspects of this paradox, demonstrating how her pain alienated her from her own body and from others, and how her thought found full expression as she attempted to share experiences with pain. Weil’s experience of pain was transformed in her passion mysticism, the deep connection she felt with the crucified Christ. In this connection, the most unbearable aspect of her pain, the threat, which it presented to her very self through annihilation, was absorbed into the cross and transformed by God’s love. While this did not necessarily diminish Weil’s pain, the meaning it had for her as a person was transformed through an encounter with Christ crucified, in which she experienced God’s suffering along with her.     

The shield of pallas: The virtual contemplation of the human soul: The aesthetic of Fr. Arthur Little S.J. (1887–1949)

This paper explores the extreme but well-argued-for thesis that the indirect object of an aesthetic experience of serious art is the human soul of the person having the experience. The author of the thesis was Fr. Arthur Little S.J. a mid twentieth-century Irishman, professional philosopher and philosophical popularizer. The paper treats Little’s thesis seriously: comparisons are drawn with Kant, which may be of interest even to those hostile to Little’s central assertion. Little makes a brilliant analysis of a ‘free-beauty’, making the sharpest contrast between this and the most serious art, tragedy. Tragedy, Little holds Kant not able to cope with. One agrees. The people who cry before my pictures are having the same religious experience I had when I painted them. Mark Rothko This book is a development of a series of lectures given to the Study Club of the Central Catholic Library in Dublin. The view of art that it proposes is, for reasons explained in the book, more exactly called Aristotelean than Thomistic. But where it has been necessary to base conclusions in aesthetics on philosophical presuppositions outside of that science the philosophy presupposed will be Thomism. Even so, however, the Thomistic doctrine, that must be accepted by anyone who will assent to the book’s thesis, is consistent with most philosophical positions that are not openly or latently materialistic. Anyone who believein the spirituality of the soul can accept that thesis… Arthur Little S.J.     

Henry A. Murray. The making of a psychologist?

The work of Henry A. Murray at the Harvard Psychological Clinic played a major role in shaping the face of American psychology. In particular, he was instrumental in broadening the scope of academic psychology to include such topics as personality, abnormal, and clinical psychologies as viable areas of research. However, by reason of his background and education, Murray had virtually nothing in common with his specialist-trained professional colleagues. This article details Murray's education and conversion to psychology and briefly analyzes the controversies surrounding the establishment of the Harvard Psychological Clinic and its relationship with the Department of Psychology.     

Can the Paradox of Forgiveness Be Dissolved?

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness.     

Changing the Definition of Education. On Kant’s Educational Paradox Between Freedom and Restraint

Ever since Kant asked: “How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?” in his lecture on education, the tension between necessary educational influence and unacceptable restriction of the child’s individual development and freedom has been considered an educational paradox. Many have suggested solutions to the paradox; however, this article endorses recent discussions in educational philosophy that pursue the need to fundamentally rethink our understanding of education and upbringing. In this article it is argued that it is incomprehensible to describe an intervention of an educator as a constraint on a child’s actions and that such an intervention would be in need of justification; as Kant and many others after him have done. Educational intervention should not be understood as a restriction of a child’s endeavour to learn, because any educational intervention is educational. Furthermore, it is argued that the notion of restraint is based on the concept of human beings as radically separated which lead to the assumption that education is restrictive per se. In contrast, this article argues that indoctrination, manipulation, and coercion are rather phenomena within our educational forms of life. Recognizing the interrelations between human beings should play a constitutive part in the conceptualisation of individual freedom. A bond with others is the foundation upon which a child develops its own identity and an understanding of itself as an agent who can express its own will and takes responsibility for its words and actions.     

The Politics of Paradox: Leo Strauss’s Biblical Debt to Spinoza (and Kierkegaard)

The political philosopher Leo Strauss is famous for contending that any synthesis of reason and revelation is impossible, since they are irreconcilable antagonists. Yet he is also famous for praising the secular regime of liberal democracy as the best regime for all human beings, even though he is well aware that modern philosophers such as Spinoza thought this regime must make use of biblical morality to promote good citizenship. Is democracy, then, both religious and secular? Strauss thought that Spinoza was contradictory in teaching that reason and revelation should be separated from each other while also insisting that a secular democratic politics still requires the biblical morality of charity (love thy neighbor as thyself). The paradox that liberal democracy is both religious and secular, which is central to Spinoza, was dismissed by Strauss as a Machiavellian subterfuge or the cynical attempt to use religion for political purposes. In order to adhere to his dualistic separation of reason and revelation, Strauss turned to ancient Greek political philosophy, particularly the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, as the true ground of liberal democracy since this classical tradition was never exposed to biblical revelation. Yet, the illiberal and hierarchical implications of Greek political thought, which clash with Strauss’s modern views on human individuality and dignity, ultimately take him back to the biblically based philosophies of Spinoza and Kierkegaard, who teach the paradox that the Bible is the true foundation of human freedom.