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Manuel García-Carpintero 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2017,60(3):253-276
AbstractInspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ – first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se – call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new ‘effect’ – new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges – first and foremost, concerning action explanations – aiming to make the case that the ‘De Se effect’ is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views. 相似文献
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Continental Philosophy Review - 相似文献
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Mark Yarborough 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》1990,11(4):325-331
A recent editorial in this journal calls for more philosophical work in the areas of philosophy of medical science and research methodology [1]. The purpose of the present paper is to bring to light and discuss some obstacles and opportunities for development in these areas. In section I, barriers to increased philosophical work in medicine outside ethics are discussed. In sections II and III, additional areas in medicine ripe for philosophical work are identified and discussed: (a) improving the epistemic fitness of much current clinical reasoning, (b) defining the conditions under which greater epistemic fitness can be achieved, and (c) technology assessment. 相似文献
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《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):550-551
Book Information The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle. The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann, ed. Gordon Baker, London : Routledge, 2003, 528, US$100 (cloth) Edited by Gordon Baker. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. and Friedrich Waismann. Routledge. London. Pp. 528. US$100 (cloth:), 相似文献
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Reviewed by Guy Stock 《Philosophical Investigations》2005,28(1):80-82
Book reviewed:
The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle – Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann (Transcribed, Edited and with an Introduction by Gordon Baker; Translated by Gordon Baker, Michael Mackett, John Connolly and Vasilis Politis); Routledge; London and New York, 2003 (Pp xlviii + 558. German and English Texts on Facing Pages.) 相似文献
The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle – Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann (Transcribed, Edited and with an Introduction by Gordon Baker; Translated by Gordon Baker, Michael Mackett, John Connolly and Vasilis Politis); Routledge; London and New York, 2003 (Pp xlviii + 558. German and English Texts on Facing Pages.) 相似文献
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Jeremy Allen Byrd 《Synthese》2007,157(1):47-58
In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what
matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity
with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion,
one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that accepting
that the R-relation is what matters for both survival and moral responsibility leads to a contradiction. My goal, however,
is not merely to point out a problem in Parfit’s account. Instead, I believe that once we understand the basic intuitions
which lead to this contradiction, it is clear that there is no fully satisfactory way to account for what matters with respect
to survival and moral responsibility. 相似文献
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Adeshina Afolayan 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(2-3):223-237
This essay deploys the existence of epistemic vices in the trajectory of Western philosophy to map the erasures and complicities that accompanied the emergence of contemporary African philosophy (CAP1). It argues that the complicity of CAP1 in the hyperspecialization and academic self-absorption that marked the professionalization of Western philosophy, makes it difficult to attend to the conditions for its own possibility. CAP1 arguably needs to make a critical turn into critical African philosophy (CAP2), understood as a metatheoretical and metaphilosophical framework for an internal transformation that is emancipatory. CAP2 is envisioned, first, as a critique of postcoloniality that rehumanizes the autonomous African subject; and, second, as an ethicopolitical project that explores the cracks between philosophy as theoretical practice and philosophy as praxis in opening up the spaces for postcolonial emancipation. The essay identifies three conditions that instigate the emancipatory possibility of philosophizing on the continent: the spatial/platial, demosophic, and political. 相似文献
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