共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
José L. Zalabardo 《Synthese》2006,148(1):135-169
In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived
the transition from his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given: his construal of
the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an internalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is
devoted to a critical assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put real pressure on
externalism, as they rely on a highly questionable conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility. Then, more briefly,
I take issue with BonJour’s endorsement of the irrelevance thesis—the claim that even if externalism were true it would not offer a satisfactory solution to the epistemic regress problem.
I contend that he is not entitled to subscribe this thesis unless he is prepared to abandon his construal of the problem.
*I have presented some of this material at UCL, Trinity College Dublin and the 10th Italo-Spanish meeting of Analytic Philosophy,
held in Pamplona. I am grateful to these audiences. 相似文献
2.
Kalle Puolakka 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):29-41
This article considers the validity and strength of Richard Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation in the light of two
ethical issues related to literature and interpretation. Rorty’s theory is rejected on two grounds. First, it is argued that
his unrestrained account of interpretation is incompatible with the distinctive moral concerns that have been seen to restrict
the scope and nature of valid approaches to artworks. The second part of the paper claims that there is no indispensable relationship
between supporting Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation and the important place that is attached to literature in the
liberal society outlined by him. A reading of Donald Davidson’s texts on literary language and interpretation implies that
an intentionalist theory of interpretation can accommodate those features that Rorty values in literature as well.
相似文献
Kalle PuolakkaEmail: |
3.
Benjamin S. Cordry 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(1):61-83
While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was
a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper,
I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess.
His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive.
I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing
on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that
his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft”
and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces
a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several
ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions. 相似文献
4.
Ian Kidd 《Philosophia》2012,40(2):365-377
This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the
twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical
claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces
Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part
two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the Divine Names. Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide
a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for
our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. 相似文献
5.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Synthese》2011,178(1):37-48
The philosophy of science has produced numerous accounts of how scientific facts are generated, from very specific facilitators
of belief, such as neo-Kantian constitutive principles, to global frameworks, such as Kuhnian paradigms. I consider a recent
addition to this canon: van Fraassen’s notion of an epistemic stance—a collection of attitudes and policies governing the
generation of factual beliefs—and his commitment to voluntarism in this context: the idea that contrary stances and sets of
beliefs are rationally permissible. I argue that while scientific inquiry inevitably favours a high degree of consensus in
our choices of stance, there is no parallel constraint in the case of philosophical inquiry, such as that concerned with how
scientific knowledge should be interpreted. This leads, in the latter case, to a fundamental and apparently irresolvable mystery
at the heart of stance voluntarism, regarding the grounds for choosing basic epistemic stances. 相似文献
6.
Kenneth Wain 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(2-3):103-114
Alasdair MacIntyre and Richard Rorty, in their different ways, have represented the tension between acculturation and individuation,
truth and freedom, as central to modern education systems, a tension which, both agree, they have failed to resolve. The paper
argues that an additional complication is that in the contemporary postmodern landscape, which prioritises the notion of lifelong
learning in its policy discourse, the very notion of education is threatened, and asks whether we should care. It considers
MacIntyre’s suggestion that the notion of the educated public can solve the former tension and concurrently re-launch the
notion of education in the postmodern world—central to MacIntyre’s plan is the reform of the university. And against it Rorty’s
suggestion that acculturation and individuation be regarded as different but connected processes, with individuation conceived
as self-creation and located in the non-vocational university. 相似文献
7.
Jacek Uglik 《Studies in East European Thought》2010,62(1):19-28
In this paper we attempt to prove that it was Ludwig Feuerbach’s anthropology that influenced Bakunin’s philosophical path.
Following his example Bakunin turned against religion which manipulates, as Hegelianism does, the only priority human being
has—another human being. Although Feuerbach’s philosophy did not involve social problems present at Bakunin’s works, we would
like to show that it was Feuerbach himself who laid foundation for them and that Bakunin’s criticism of the state was the
natural consequence of Feuerbach’s struggle for the individual. Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin proved that Feuerbach’s attempts
to rise anthropology to the rank of theology are not sufficient to free the individual from the power of abstractions as in
his opinion it is not only God (religion) that should be overthrown but also the state. 相似文献
8.
Daniel M. Johnson 《Synthese》2011,182(3):433-447
Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain
epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus
specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent
proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of
warrant. The epistemic features I’m concerned about are experiences that should generate a believed defeater but don’t. I’ll
argue that proper functionalism as it stands cannot account for the epistemic effects of these defeating experiences—or, at
least, that it can only do so by embracing a deeply implausible view of our cognitive faculties. I’ll conclude by arguing
that the only plausible option Bergmann has for modifying his theory undercuts the consideration that motivates proper functionalism
in the first place. 相似文献
9.
Richard Rorty’s notion of ironism has been widely criticized for entailing frivolity and light-mindedness, for being inimical
to moral commitment and, perhaps most importantly, for its putative incompatibility with his vision of liberalism. This paper
suggests that these criticisms are misplaced, stemming from a misunderstanding of ironism that Rorty’s presentation has itself
in part encouraged. The paper goes on to argue that ironism is not only consistent with the liberal society which Rorty favours,
but that it can serve such a society by helping to illustrate the ways in which those societies contain unrecognized injustices. 相似文献
10.
This paper addresses recent examples of militant atheism. It considers the theistic reply that describes atheism as deriving
from a “God-shaped hole” in the human soul. The paper will argue that American pragmatism offers a middle path that avoids
militant atheism without suffering from this problem. The paper describes this middle path and considers the problem that
is seen in Rorty’s recent work: how the pragmatist can remain critical of religious fundamentalism without succumbing to a
militant version of atheism. The solution proposed is tolerant acceptance of religion along with melioristic criticism developed
within shared norms of inquiry. 相似文献
11.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献
12.
Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it
makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one
that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of
posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey
conditionalization. We conclude that, under particular circumstances, Reichenbach’s approach and that of the Bayesians amount
to the same thing, thereby presenting us with a new instance in which chance and credence coincide. 相似文献
13.
E. M. Swiderski 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):329-343
Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation.
A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski
appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself.
I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this
account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves
and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought
for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that
is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted
human power. 相似文献
14.
Raymond Plant 《Res Publica》2011,17(1):7-20
This article examines the issues raised by religious adherents’ wish to express their beliefs in the public domain through,
for example, their modes of dress, their performance of public roles, and their response to homosexuality. It considers on
what grounds religion might merit special treatment and how special that treatment should be. A common approach to these issues
is through the notion of religious identity, but both the idea of religious identity and its use to ground claims against
others prove deeply problematic. An alternative and more productive approach is through the notion of harm. People should
enjoy the freedom to express their religious convictions subject to the harm principle, but harm should include the undermining
of people’s status as free and equal citizens. The article concludes by considering the grounds upon which this alternative
approach might recognize religion as special and might justify giving an overriding status to civic equality. 相似文献
15.
Anita Konzelmann Ziv 《Synthese》2011,183(1):27-45
The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements
of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility,
immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge
involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold
attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do so by searching for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the
heart of Bolzano’s notion of knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods that cannot
warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowledge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge.
I argue that the explanatory task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and that it
is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish Bolzanian knowing from a high degree
of Bolzanian believing. 相似文献
16.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(4):411-430
In my companion article on the making of the reliably religious boy (D. Capps, 2006c) I presented my argument that, whereas
the younger boy of three to five is becoming religious as a result of his emotional separation from his mother, the early
adolescent boy (age 11–14) has become reliably religious in that he has developed a religious habit of mind, a habit reflected in his embrace of the religions of honor
and hope. I presented myself as a case study in this regard. I noted, however, that there is a third form of religion, that
of humor, and that it relativizes—and thereby preserves—the religions of honor and hope. I also noted that religion and spirituality
are capable of being differentiated. I suggested that my own spirituality took the form of rebellion and that this spirit
of rebellion fueled and was fueled by the religion of humor. Employing Freud’s writings on humor, I explain in this article
how this works. 相似文献
17.
Antoon Braeckman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):279-296
This article seeks to demonstrate that in his recent reading of the role of religion in the postsecular public realm, Habermas
overlooks a most fundamental dimension of religion: its power to symbolically institute communities. For his part, Gauchet
starts from a vision of religion in which this fundamental dimension is central. In his evaluation of the role of religion
in postsecular society, he therefore arrives at results which are very different from those of Habermas. However, I believe
that Gauchet too underestimates the extent to which religion’s power of symbolic community institution has remained intact
within modern, postsecular society. In support of this position, I show how relatively heterogeneous phenomena within Western
societies, such as the renewed importance of religion in the public realm, the revival of certain forms of nationalism and
the associated demand for recognition of group rights and hence for forms of legal pluralism, may prefigure a new transformation
of the public realm. 相似文献
18.
Michael Hand 《Synthese》2010,173(1):25-39
Truth’s universal knowability entails its discovery. This threatens antirealism, which is thought to require it. Fortunately,
antirealism is not committed to it. Avoiding it requires adoption (and extension) of Dag Prawitz’s position in his long-term
disagreement with Michael Dummett on the notion of provability involved in intuitionism’s identification of it with truth.
Antirealism (intuitionism generalized) must accommodate a notion of lost-opportunity truth (a kind of recognition-transcendent
truth), and even truth consisting in the presence of unperformable verifications. Dummett’s position cannot abide this, while
Prawitz’s can. Antirealism’s epistemic notion of truth derives from general features of its meaning theory, not from a universal
knowability principle. 相似文献
19.
We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models.
Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality
changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to
extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the
epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements)
that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the
game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in
rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness
of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains
why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe
in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality. 相似文献
20.
James DiCenso 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):161-179
This paper engages Freud’s relation to Kant, with specific reference to each theorist’s articulation of the interconnections
between ethics and religion. I argue that there is in fact a constructive approach to ethics and religion in Freud’s thought,
and that this approach can be better understood by examining it in relation to Kant’s formulations on these topics. Freud’s
thinking about religion and ethics participates in the Enlightenment heritage, with its emphasis on autonomy and rationality,
of which Kant’s model of practical reason is in many ways exemplary. At the same time, Freud advances Kantian thinking in
certain important respects; his work offers a more somatically, socially, and historically grounded approach to the formation
of rational and ethical capacities, and hence makes it more compatible with contemporary concerns and orientations that eschew
the pitfalls of ahistorical idealist orientations. 相似文献