Looking for laws in all the wrong spaces: Kant on laws,the understanding,and space

Prolegomena §38 is intended to elucidate the claim that the understanding legislates a priori laws to nature (the ‘Legislation Thesis’). Kant cites various laws of geometry as examples and discusses a derivation of the inverse‐square law from such laws. I address 4 key interpretive questions about this cryptic text that have not yet received satisfying answers: (a) How exactly are Kant's examples of laws supposed to elucidate the Legislation Thesis? (b) What is Kant's view of the epistemic status of the inverse‐square law and, relatedly, of the legitimacy of the geometric derivation of that law? (c) Whose account of laws, the understanding, and space is Kant critiquing in the passage? (d) What positive account of the relationship between laws, the understanding, and space is Kant offering in the passage? My answer to (d) depends crucially on my answers to (a)–(c). As I interpret Kant, he holds that a wide range of a priori laws—including geometric laws, the inverse‐square law, and the universal laws discussed in the Analytic of Principles—are ‘grounded’ (a technical term defined in the paper) in categorial syntheses rather than the intrinsic nature of the space given to us in pure intuition.     

Book review section: Freedom,determinism, and the individual

Freedom of the Individual Stuart Hampshire New York, Harper & Row, 1965 pp. 112, $3.95     

Compatibilism,determinism, and the identity theory

Two issues are raised with regard to Ted Honderich's A Theory of Determinism. First, regarding the relation between a token identity theory of mental and physical events and Honderich's ‘psychoneural union theory’, it is suggested that a token identity theory would serve Honderich's purposes while securing a simpler ontology. Second, it is argued that there is a substantive philosophical issue dividing compatibilists and incompatibilists on the question of whether persons possess free will, contrary to Honderich's contention that the compatibilist and incompatibilist differ only in responsive attitude.     

Actions, intentions, and consequences: the doctrine of double effect

One interpretation of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) holds that in situations in which good can be secured for some only if others suffer harm, the pursuit of a good tends to be less acceptable when a resulting harm is intended as a means rather than when it is merely foreseen. The doctrine captures certain moral intuitions about pairs of cases which have the same consequential profiles but in which the character of the intention differs. Quinn examines the DDE using three pairs of contrasting cases, two of which are medical examples: the "Direction of Resources" case and the "Guinea Pig" case, both involving allocation of life-saving resources, and the "Craniotomy" case and the "Hysterectomy" case, both involving fetal vs. maternal life. He concludes that the DDE "embodies our sense that certain forms of forced strategic subordination are especially inappropriate among free and equal agents."     

Intervention,determinism, and the causal minimality condition

We clarify the status of the so-called causal minimality condition in the theory of causal Bayesian networks, which has received much attention in the recent literature on the epistemology of causation. In doing so, we argue that the condition is well motivated in the interventionist (or manipulability) account of causation, assuming the causal Markov condition which is essential to the semantics of causal Bayesian networks. Our argument has two parts. First, we show that the causal minimality condition, rather than an add-on methodological assumption of simplicity, necessarily follows from the substantive interventionist theses, provided that the actual probability distribution is strictly positive. Second, we demonstrate that the causal minimality condition can fail when the actual probability distribution is not positive, as is the case in the presence of deterministic relationships. But we argue that the interventionist account still entails a pragmatic justification of the causal minimality condition. Our argument in the second part exemplifies a general perspective that we think commendable: when evaluating methods for inferring causal structures and their underlying assumptions, it is relevant to consider how the inferred causal structure will be subsequently used for counterfactual reasoning.     

The open future: bivalence,determinism and ontology

In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.     

Brain asymmetry and autonomic conditioning: Sensitization control

In the present experiment we report effects of cerebral asymmetry, or laterality, during classical conditioning to facial emotional stimuli. Twenty-five female subjects were presented with slides of a happy face in one visual half-field (VHF), and simultaneously a slide of an angry face in the other VHF, followed by shock as the unconditioned stimulus (UCS). To control for effects of sensitization, a new stimulus, never associated with the UCS, was introduced in the extinction phase. Dependent measures were phasic heart rate responses (HR) and skin conductance responses (SCR). The HR results showed a significant right hemisphere effect for the CS-UCS association, that was not attributable to UCS sensitization. No significant effects were found for the SCRs. The basic HR finding was a right hemisphere superiority for learning of a conditioned association.     

Divine determinism,human freedom,and the consequence argument

In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom, even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism, I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside of the actor’s control is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism.     

John Dewey's unknown critique of marginal utility doctrine: instrumentalism, motivation, and values.

During the late nineteenth century, marginal utility theory became the dominant ideology of the new academic discipline of economics. This article explicates and discusses previously unexamined lecture notes prepared in 1913 by John Dewey on marginal utility doctrine. After briefly characterizing the state of marginal utility doctrine, Dewey's criticisms are shown to derive from his instrumentalism and general theory of value. In Dewey's view, marginalism privatized value and by doing so induced moral agnosticism, a condition of permanently suspended judgment regarding individual and social needs that was likely to undermine the foundations of a democratic community since it immunizes value against collective appraisal by public bodies. Moreover, while marginal utility theory represented a serious concerted attempt to deal with substantive problems of value in economics and the economy, to Dewey it was ultimately a form of apologetics for the existing mode of social relations.     

War,innocence, and the doctrine of double effect

I am grateful to members of the philosophy departments at the University of Melbourne and Sydney, to students in my Fall 1991 Ethical Theory class at the University of Maryland, especially John Watts, and to David Luban for useful discussions.     

Going beyond heart rate: autonomic space and cardiovascular assessment of mental workload

Psychophysiological assessment of pilot mental workload using heart rate should be augmented with an autonomic space model of cardiovascular function. This model proposes that autonomic nervous system influences on the heart may change with psychological processing in ways that are not evident in heart rate. A method of mental-workload assessment was proposed that used multiple psychophysiological measures of cardiovascular responsivity to derive the underlying sympathetic and parasympathetic information needed to represent the autonomic space for heart rate. Principal-components analysis was used to extract Sympathetic and Parasympathetic components from heart period, residual heart period. respiratory sinus arrhythmia, and Traube-Hering-Mayer wave in three experiments that manipulated perceptual/central processing and physical task demands. This initial evaluation of the method concluded that the autonomic components were valid and that the components had greater diagnosticity, and for some manipulations greater sensitivity, than heart rate. These results support the contention that the Sympathetic and Parasympathetic components provided increased precision for mental-workload assessment.     

Intentions,foreseen consequences and the doctrine of double effect

The difficulty of distinguishing between the intended and the merely foreseen consequences of actions seems to many to be the most serious problem for the doctrine of double effect. It has led some to reject the doctrine altogether, and has left some of its defenders recasting it in entirely different terms. I argue that these responses are unnecessary. Using Bratman’s conception of intention, I distinguish the intended consequences of an action from the merely foreseen in a way that can be used to support the doctrine of double effect.