Perceiving Empirical Objects Directly

The goal of this paper is to defend the claim that there is such a thing as direct perception, where by direct perception I mean perception unmediated by theorizing or concepts. The basis for my defense is a general philosophic perspective which I call empiricist philosophy. In brief, empiricist philosophy (as I have defined it) is untenable without the occurrence of direct perception. It is untenable without direct perception because, otherwise, one can't escape the hermeneutic circle, as this phrase is used in van Fraassen (1980). The bulk of the paper is devoted to defending my belief in direct perception against various objections that can be posed against it. I discuss various anticipations of my view found in the literature, eventually focusing on Ian Hacking's related conception of `entity realism' (Hacking 1983). Hacking has been criticized by a number of philosophers and my plan is to respond to these criticisms on behalf of entity realism (or more precisely on behalf of the claim that direct perception is a reality) and to then respond to other possible criticisms that can be launched against direct perception.     

Perceiving Multiple Affordances for Objects

Researchers (Gilden &; Proffitt, 1989; Runeson &; Vedeler, 1993; Todd &; Warren, 1982) have tested Runeson's (1977) claim that the relation between a collision . . event's dynamics and kinematics might support perception of the relative mass of colliding objects. Results have been inconsistent; however, these studies employed computer-generated collisions as stimuli. The present research assessed observer's ability to report relative mass in the context of physical objects involved in physical collisions. The results indicate greater sensitivity to relative mass than had been found with animations-based studies. Implications of these data for the kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD) principle of dynamics perception (Runeson &; Frykholm, 1983) and a cue-heuristics theory of dynamics perception (Gilden &; Proffitt, 1989) are discussed.     

Perceiving by Dynamic Touch the Distances Reachable With Irregular Objects

Observers wielded occluded objects and reported the distances reachable with the distal tips of the objects. Each object consisted of a cylindrical stem with two branches attached perpendicularly along its length; stem and branch lengths varied across objects. In Experiment 1, the branches were 180 deg. apart, both attached halfway along the stem. In Experiment 2, the branches were 180 deg. apart, one at one fourth and the other at three fourths of the stem length. In Experiment 3, the branches were 90 deg. apart, one at one fourth and the other at three fourths of the stem length. Observers had no foreknowledge of the objects' shapes. In each experiment, perceived reachable distance was found to be dependent on the maximum eigenvalue of the object's inertia tensor computed about the point of rotation in the wrist. Discussion focused on (a) quantifying shape for dynamic touch through the inertia ellipsoid, (b) the significance of the inertia tensor to the spatial abilities of dynamic touch, and (c) contrasting bases for theories of space perception (Lotze vs. Gibson).     

The Drawback of Sexual Empowerment: Perceiving Women as Emancipated but Still as Sexual Objects

Sex Roles - The belief that sexualization might be used as a source of power for women in Western societies is spreading (Anderson 2014; Erchull and Liss 2013). The present research aims at...     

Aristotle on Predication

A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals.     

Aristotle on Philosophia

Aristotle uses philosophia (and philosophos, philosophein, philosophôs, sumphilosophein, philosophêteon) in at least ten senses across his oeuvre, as this first study of every instance in his writings reveals. Irrespective of the specific approaches of its practitioners, philosophia may be, for example, an exercise of cleverness; or leisurely study; or the desire to know; or the pursuit of fundamental explanation; or a historically extended discipline. This variety allows us to go some way in reconstructing the complex attitude Aristotle had toward a culturally specific practice in which he located himself and soon helped develop into a specialized discipline. Another benefit is that it allows us to clarify the argumentative method in his Protrepticus, which depends on several senses of philosophia. It also puts up obstacles to determining whether, for example, Aristotle believes philosophia is an epistêmê.     

Aristotle on Corrective Justice

This paper argues against the view favored by many contemporary scholars that corrective justice in the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially compensatory and in favor of a bifunctional account according to which corrective justice aims at equalizing inequalities of both goods and evils resulting from various interactions between persons. Not only does the account defended in this paper better explain the broad array of examples Aristotle provides than does the standard interpretation, it also better fits Aristotle’s general definition of what is just. In the last section, the paper argues, again against the standard interpretation, that proportional reciprocity, the kind of justice discussed in Nicomachean Ethics V.5, has two forms and is closely linked to corrective justice. Although corrective justice and proportional reciprocity are conceptually distinct and do different work in Aristotle’s political philosophy, instances of proportional reciprocity are instantiated by instances of corrective justice. This linkage, the paper concludes, helps to explain why Aristotle would assign corrective justice such a prominent place in his theory of justice.     

Perceiving Necessity

In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well‐summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or localized a faculty to register them. We defend the perception of necessity against such Humeanism, drawing on examples from mathematics.     

Aristotle on the Liar

Topoi - The only passage from Aristotle's works that seemsto discuss the paradox of the liar is within chapter 25 of Sophistici Elenchi (180a34–b7). This passage raises several questions:...