Introduction to the special issue on formal modeling of semantic concepts

We introduce the special issue on formal models of semantic concepts. After outlining the research questions that motivated the issue, we summarize the rich set of data provided by the Leuven Natural Concepts Database, and provide an overview of the seven research articles in the special issue. Each of these articles applies a formal modeling approach to one or more parts of the database, attempting to further our understanding of how people represent and use semantic concepts.     

Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling

Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy (see Augustine in Treatises on various subjects, New York, Fathers of the Church, 1952; Kant in Practical philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Chisholm and Feehan in J Philos 74: 143–159, 1977; Mahon in Int J Appl Philos 21: 181–194, 2007; Carson in Lying and deception, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers (e.g., Sober, From a biological point of view, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994; Hauser in: Whiten, Byrne (eds) Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The evolution of animal communication, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005; Skyrms, Signals, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) have endorsed the broader view that deception only requires that a deceiver benefit from sending a misleading signal. Moreover, in order to facilitate game-theoretic study of deception in the context of Lewisian sender-receiver games, Brian Skyrms has proposed an influential formal analysis of this view. Such formal analyses have the potential to enhance our philosophical understanding of deception in humans as well as animals. However, as we argue in this paper, Skyrms’s analysis, as well as two recently proposed alternative analyses (viz., Godfrey-Smith in Review of signals: evolution, learning, and information by Brian Skyrms, Mind, 120: 1288–1297, 2001; McWhirter in Brit J Philos Sci 67: 757–780, 2016), are seriously flawed and can lead us to draw unwarranted conclusions about deception.

     

The many faces of counts-as: A formal analysis of constitutive rules

The paper proposes a logical systematization of the notion of counts-as which is grounded on a very simple intuition about what counts-as statements actually mean, i.e., forms of classification. Moving from this analytical thesis the paper disentangles three semantically different readings of statements of the type “X counts as Y in context c”, from the weaker notion of contextual classification to the stronger notion of constitutive rule. These many ways in which counts-as can be said are formally addressed by making use of modal logic techniques. The resulting framework allows for a formal characterization of all the involved notions and their reciprocal logical relationships.     

The scope of formal explanation

The existence of multiple modes of explanation means that a crucial step in the process of generating explanations has to be selecting a particular mode. The present article identifies the key conceptual, as well as some pragmatic and epistemological, considerations that license the use of the formal mode of explanation, and thus that enter into the process of selecting and generating a formal explanation. Formal explanations explain the presence of certain properties in an instance of a kind by reference to the kind of thing it is (e.g. That has four legs because it is a dog). As such, this mode of explanation is intrinsically tied to kind representations and is applicable domain-generally. Although it is possible for formal explanation to apply domain-generally, for any given kind it is selective in its application, in that it can explain some, but not all, properties of the instances of a kind. It also appears that different types of properties can receive formal explanations across different domains. This article provides a sketch of a theory of the selectivity of formal explanation that results from the manner in which kinds of different types are distinguished. The present discussion also suggests how the mechanisms underlying formal explanations may contribute to the illusion of explanatory depth Keil (Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 368–373,2003), the operation of the inherence heuristic Cimpian & Salomon (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 461–480, 2014a; Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 506–527,2014b), and psychological essentialism (Gelman, 2003).     

The concept of formal justice

Conclusion In Greek mythology, Themis, the goddess of justice, is blindfolded so that she may not see those who stand before her, and consequently, so that she can administer justice consistently and impartially. The imagery provides an apt illustration of the formal dimension of justice. Yet it serves only to blind us to the actual workings and character of the practice of doing justice. I have argued here that we must take seriously the full implications of material principles of jusitce. And when we do, there is no longer any conceptual space left in our reflections on justice for the virtue of formal justice. Of course, the just treatment of relevantly similar subjects does result in the equal treatment of these subjects; this, after all, is a logical consequence of acting upon a material principle of justice in similar cases. But this, let me emphasize, is only a consequence of doing justice and as such it reveals only a contingent feature of doing justice. The proponents of the formal dimension of justice have, so to speak, failed to see the trees through the forest. Impressed by the consequence of equality of treatment between cases, they have generalized their observations into specific claims about what it means to do justice to certain subjects. These generalizations, in turn, have led to the unfortunate and misleading reification of the concept of formal justice.Moreover, by exposing the myth of formal justice, the image of justice as an austere, rationalistic, and abstract virtue is also called into question. Justice is not blind to particular subjects. Quite the contrary, it looks to those who stand before her and demands from us the response which is appropriate for them. The practice of doing justice, this is to say, signals the need to respect the rights and deserts of particular subjects. Or rather, we comprehend and express this need by means of the practice of doing justice.     

The etymology of basic concepts in the experimental analysis of behavior

The origins of many of the basic concepts used in the experimental analysis of behavior can be traced to Pavlov's (1927/1960) discussion of unconditional and conditional reflexes in the dog, but often with substantial changes in meaning (e.g., stimulus, response, and reinforcement). Other terms were added by Skinner (1938/1991) to describe his data on the rate of lever pressing in the rat (e.g., operant conditioning, conditioned reinforcement, negative reinforcement, and response induction and differentiation) and key pecking in the pigeon (shaping). The concept of drive, however, has largely disappeared from the current literature.     

The origins of concepts

Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts. Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms. I conclude by replying to the objections that these mechanisms cannot produce genuinely new content and cannot be part of genuinely cognitive explanations.

The plurality of concepts

Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, with the particular kind of concept used on an occasion being determined by the context. I argue that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest.     

Economic concepts for the analysis of behavior

A review of the relationship between schedule of reinforcement, response rate, and choice suggests that certain unifying concepts from economics can contribute to a more complete science of behavior. Four points are made: 1) a behavioral experiment is an economic system and its characteristics—open or closed—can strongly determine the results; 2) reinforcers can be distinguished by a functional property called elasticity; 3) reinforcers may interact as complements as well as substitutes; 4) no simple choice rule, such as strict matching, can account for all choice behavior.     

The psychosomatic family model. A critical analysis of family interaction concepts

The psychosomatic family model of Minuchin and his colleagues is one of the best known and influential viewpoints in the field of family therapy. This article critically analyses this model and related concepts, focusing on the lack of clear definitions, especially with regard to the interactional concepts: enmeshment, rigidity, overprotectiveness, and lack of conflict resolution. Each concept is discussed, concluding with the recommendation of a new definition, so that the model can be empirically verified. The authors suggest that Minuchin's model can be reduced to three fundamental interactional dimensions : the intensity of intrafamilial boundaries, the degree of the family's adaptability, and the family's way of handling conflicts. A research method is presented in which the way of assessing these interactional dimensions is demonstrated.     

The situated nature of concepts

For decades the importance of background situations has been documented across all areas of cognition. Nevertheless, theories of concepts generally ignore background situations, focusing largely on bottom-up, stimulus-based processing. Furthermore, empirical research on concepts typically ignores background situations, not incorporating them into experimental designs. A selective review of relevant literatures demonstrates that concepts are not abstracted out of situations but instead are situated. Background situations constrain conceptual processing in many tasks (e.g., recall, recognition, categorization, lexical decision, color naming, property verification, property generation) across many areas of cognition (e.g., episodic memory, conceptual processing, visual object recognition, language comprehension). A taxonomy of situations is proposed in which grain size, meaningfulness, and tangibility distinguish the cumulative situations that structure cognition hierarchically.     

Circularity in the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts

The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts purports to give physicalists a way of understanding phenomenal concepts that will allow them to (1) accept the zombie intuition, (2) accept that conceivability is generally a good guide to possibility, and yet (3) reject the conclusion that zombies are metaphysically possible. It does this by positing that whether phenomenal concepts refer to physical or nonphysical states depends on what the actual world is like. In this paper, I offer support for the Chalmers/Alter objection that the conditional analysis fails to accommodate the true zombie intuition, and develop a new and far more powerful argument against the conditional analysis. I argue that, as stated, the conditional analysis is radically incomplete. But when fully fleshed out, the analysis becomes viciously circular. The only way to avoid this circularity is to adopt a species of analytic functionalism, on which it’s a priori that phenomenal concepts refer to the state (perhaps physical, perhaps nonphysical) that actually plays so-and-so functional role. While this rigidified analytic functionalism is coherent, it is highly unattractive, running contrary to both the intuitions that motivate functionalism and the intuitions that motivated the conditional analysis.     

The structure of lexical concepts

Jerry Fodor (Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) famously argued that lexical concepts are unstructured. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of both the classical approach to concepts and Fodor’s conceptual atomism, I argue that some lexical concepts are, in fact, structured. Roughly stated, I argue that structured lexical concepts bear a necessary biconditional entailment relation to their structural constituents. I develop this account of the structure of lexical concepts within the framework of Pavel Tichy’s (The foundations of Frege’s logic. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1988) theory of constructions. I argue that concepts are constructions which can be combined by way of Tichy’s construction-forming operations of composition and closure and an additional operation, simplification, which I propose in section 6. The last of these construction-forming operations plays a central role in my account of lexical concept structure. Stated generally, structured lexical concepts are a result of simplifying their structural constituents.