Multiple timing and the allocation of attention

Two experiments were designed to examine the effects of multiple timing tasks on prospective time judgment performance. In experiment 1, subjects were required to monitor the durations of one, two, three, or four concurrent target stimuli which began and ended at different times, and then reproduce one of those durations subsequently chosen at random. Time judgment accuracy deteriorated as the number of target stimuli increased. In experiment 2, subjects used the production method to generate specified durations for one, two, three, or four partially overlapping stimuli. Timing was less accurate in conditions involving more target stimuli. In the multiple-target conditions, time judgments were less accurate for the later- rather than earlier-onset targets. The results support an attentional model of timing, and suggest that timing is an effortful process which draws from limited attentional resources.     

Are absolute frequencies,relative frequencies,or both effective in reducing cognitive biases?

Biases in probabilistic reasoning are affected by alterations in the presentation of judgment tasks. In our experiments, students made likelihood judgments that an event was produced by various causes. These judgments were made in terms of probability, relative frequency or absolute frequency on a full or a pruned list of causes. When they had little personal experience of the event (causes of death), the pruning bias was smaller with relative frequencies than with absolute frequencies or probabilities. When they had more personal experience of the event (missing a lecture), the bias was less with both types of frequency than with probability but still lowest with relative frequency. We suggest that likelihood information is usually stored as relative frequencies when it has been obtained from public sources but that it is based on event counts when it is derived from personal experience. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Remembrance of sounds past: memory and psychophysical scaling

What is the role of long-term memories of previous stimulus-response mappings, and of previous sensory and perceptual experiences generally, in psychophysical scaling judgments? I conducted four experiments in an attempt to provide some preliminary answers to this question. In each experiment, subjects made judgments of the loudness of sounds on 3 successive days. Stimulus intensities were drawn randomly from the same set on Days 1 and 3 but from a different set, either all 12 dB higher or all 12 dB lower, on Day 2. Four different types of psychophysical scaling judgments were studied: category judgment without an experimenter-induced identification function, ratio magnitude estimation with a variable standard, absolute magnitude estimation, and cross-modality matching. The first two methods required completely relative judgment, the last two completely absolute judgment. Data from all methods reveal profound effects of stimulus-response mappings experienced on previous days (long-term memory) and immediately previous stimuli and responses (short-term memory) on responses to current stimuli. Responses were typically a compromise between absolute and relative judgment. Individual differences were dramatic.     

Frequency judgements: the problem of defining a perceptual event

In four experiments the conditions under which frequency judgments reflect the relative frequency of complex perceptual events were explored. Subjects viewed a series of 4 x 4 grids each containing seven items, which were letters and numbers in one of four typefaces. Later judgments of the relative frequency with which particular letters appeared in particular typefaces were unaffected by a warning about an upcoming frequency judgment task, but were affected by both the time available for processing the stimuli and the nature of the cover task subjects engaged in while viewing the grids. Frequency judgments were poor when exposure durations were less than 2 s and when the cover task directed subjects' attention merely to the locations of the items within the grids. Frequency judgments improved when the cover task directed subjects' attention to the identity of the stimuli, especially to the conjunction of letter and typeface. The results suggest that frequency estimation of complex stimuli may be possible only for stimuli that have been processed as phenomenal objects.     

The contribution of judgment scale to the unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon: How evaluating others can exaggerate over- (and under-) confidence

The unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon occurs when low performers tend to overestimate their performance on a task, whereas high performers judge their performance more accurately (and sometimes underestimate it). In previous research, this phenomenon has been observed for a variety of cognitive tasks and judgment scales. However, the role of judgment scale in producing the unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon has not been systematically investigated. Thus, we present four studies in which all participants judged their performance on both a relative scale (percentile rank) and an absolute scale (number correct). The studies included a variety of performance tasks (general knowledge questions, math problems, introductory psychology questions, and logic questions) and test formats (multiple-choice, recall). Across all tasks and formats, the percentile-rank judgments were less accurate than the absolute judgments, particularly for low and high performers. Furthermore, in Studies 1–3, the absolute judgments were highly accurate, even when the percentile-rank judgments were not. Thus, differences in the accuracy of percentile-rank judgments across skill levels do not always represent differences in self-awareness, but rather they may arise from difficulties that performers have at evaluating how well others are performing. Most importantly, the unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon on a relative scale does not guarantee inaccurate self-evaluations of absolute performance.     

Confidence-accuracy calibration in absolute and relative face recognition judgments

Confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration was examined for absolute and relative face recognition judgments as well as for recognition judgments from groups of stimuli presented simultaneously or sequentially (i.e., simultaneous or sequential mini-lineups). When the effect of difficulty was controlled, absolute and relative judgments produced negligibly different CA calibration, whereas no significant difference was observed for simultaneous and sequential mini-lineups. Further, the effect of difficulty on CA calibration was equivalent across judgment and mini-lineup types. It is interesting to note that positive (i.e., old) recognition judgments demonstrated strong CA calibration whereas negative (i.e., new) judgments evidenced little or no CA association. Implications for eyewitness identification are discussed.     

How cognitive load affects duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analysis of 117 experiments evaluated the effects of cognitive load on duration judgments. Cognitive load refers to information-processing (attentional or working-memory) demands. Six types of cognitive load were analyzed to resolve ongoing controversies and to test current duration judgment theories. Duration judgments depend on whether or not participants are informed in advance that they are needed: prospective paradigm (informed) versus retrospective paradigm (not informed). With higher cognitive load, the prospective duration judgment ratio (subjective duration to objective duration) decreases but the retrospective ratio increases. Thus, the duration judgment ratio differs depending on the paradigm and the specific type of cognitive load. As assessed by the coefficient of variation, relative variability of prospective, but not retrospective, judgments increases with cognitive load. The prospective findings support models emphasizing attentional resources, especially executive control. The retrospective findings support models emphasizing memory changes. Alternative theories do not fit with the meta-analytic findings and are rejected.     

Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments

People more frequently select norm-violating factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms. We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this effect for prospective causal judgments—that is, judgments about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments show that people more frequently select norm-violating factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection effects are not primarily explained by the perception of agency (Experiment 4). We discuss these results in relation to recent efforts to model causal judgment.     

Absolute identification by relative judgment

In unidimensional absolute identification tasks, participants identify stimuli that vary along a single dimension. Performance is surprisingly poor compared with discrimination of the same stimuli. Existing models assume that identification is achieved using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes. The authors propose an alternative relative judgment model (RJM) in which the elemental perceptual units are representations of the differences between current and previous stimuli. These differences are used, together with the previous feedback, to respond. Without using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes, the RJM accounts for (a) information transmission limits, (b) bowed serial position effects, and (c) sequential effects, where responses are biased toward immediately preceding stimuli but away from more distant stimuli (assimilation and contrast).     

Prospective and retrospective duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analytic review compared prospective and retrospective judgments of duration, or duration judgment paradigm. Some theorists have concluded that the two paradigms involve similar cognitive processes, whereas others have found that they involve different processes. A review of 20 experiments revealed that prospective judgments are longer and less variable than are retrospective judgments. Several theoretically important variables moderate these effects, especially those concerned with information processing activities. Therefore, somewhat different cognitive processes subserve experienced and remembered duration. Attentional models are needed to explain prospective judgments, and memory-based models are needed to explain retrospective judgments. These findings clarify models of human duration judgment and suggest directions for future research. Evidence on duration judgments may also influence models of attention and memory.     

Accounting for occurrences: a new view of the use of contingency information in causal judgment

When people make causal judgments from contingency information, a principal aim is to account for occurrences of the outcome. When 2 causes are under consideration, the capacity of either to account for occurrences is judged from how likely the cause is to be present when the outcome occurs and from the rate at which the outcome occurs when that cause alone is present, which gives an estimate of the strength of the cause. These propositions are formalized in a weighted averaging model, which successfully predicted several judgmental phenomena not predicted by other models of causal judgment. These include a tendency for judgment of one cause (A) to be reduced as the number of occurrences of when only the other one (B) increases and a tendency for A to receive higher judgments than B if A is better able to account for occurrences than B is even if B has a higher contingency with the outcome than A does. Overshadowing, a tendency for judgments of B to be depressed if A has a higher contingency, is weak or absent when B is better able to account for occurrences than A. Results of several experiments support these and related predictions derived from the accounting for occurrences hypothesis.     

Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: sadder but wiser?

How are humans' subjective judgments of contingencies related to objective contingencies? Work in social psychology and human contingency learning predicts that the greater the frequency of desired outcomes, the greater people's judgments of contingency will be. Second, the learned helplessness theory of depression provides both a strong and a weak prediction concerning the linkage between subjective and objective contingencies. According to the strong prediction, depressed individuals should underestimate the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes relative to the objective degree of contingency. According to the weak prediction, depressed individuals merely should judge that there is a smaller degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes than nondepressed individuals should. In addition, the present investigation deduced a new strong prediction from the helplessness theory: Nondepressed individuals should overestimate the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes relative to the objective degree of contingency. In the experiments, depressed and nondepressed students were present with one of a series of problems varying in the actual degree of contingency. In each problem, subjects estimated the degree of contingency between their responses (pressing or not pressing a button) and an environmental outcome (onset of a green light). Performance on a behavioral task and estimates of the conditional probability of green light onset associated with the two response alternatives provided additional measures for assessing beliefs about contingencies. Depressed students' judgments of contingency were surprisingly accurate in all four experiments. Nondepressed students, on the other hand, overestimated the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes when noncontingent outcomes were frequent and/or desired and underestimated the degree of contingency when contingent outcomes were undesired. Thus, predictions derived from social psychology concerning the linkage between subjective and objective contingencies were confirmed for nondepressed students but not for depressed students. Further, the predictions of helplessness theory received, at best, minimal support. The learned helplessness and self-serving motivational bias hypotheses are evaluated as explanations of the results. In addition, parallels are drawn between the present results and phenomena in cognitive psychology, social psychology, and animal learning. Finally, implications for cognitive illusions in normal people, appetitive helplessness, judgment of contingency between stimuli, and learning theory are discussed.     

基于事件的前瞻性记忆的年老化

采用类别判断任务作为正在进行任务,采用Einstein的研究范式探讨了前瞻性记忆是否随年龄的老化而出现年老化现象。结果表明,当前瞻性记忆任务和当前进行的任务要求的认知过程一致时,前瞻性记忆成绩不会随增龄下降;当前瞻性记忆任务和当前进行的任务要求的认知过程不一致时,前瞻性记忆出现了年老化现象;前瞻性记忆成绩和自由回忆成绩无显著相关     

Depression and Judgment of Control: Impact of a Contingency on Accuracy

In this study we sought to determine whether mild depressives and nondepressives could respond adaptively and self-correct their judgments of contingency when it was clearly advantageous to do so. Ninety-six undergraduates were given four contingency-learning tasks involving pressing or not pressing a key to turn on a light and to judge the degree of control their responses had over light onset. On the first task, which included a monetary contingency only on light onset, mild depressives were relatively accurate in their judgments of control. Tasks 2 through 4, which also included a monetary contingency and feedback on accuracy of judgment of control, showed a Mood x Task interaction. Mild depressives, but not nondepressives, became more accurate, and by the last task, mild depressives were more accurate than nondepressives. Results were discussed in terms of incentive, feedback, and task exposure.     

Purely relative models cannot provide a general account of absolute identification

Unidimensional absolute identificatio—identifying a presented stimulus from an ordered set—is a common component of everyday tasks. Laboratory investigations have mostly used equally spaced stimuli, and the theoretical debate has focused on the merits of purely relative versus purely absolute models. Absolute models incorporate substantial knowledge of the complete set of stimuli, whereas relative models allow only partial knowledge and assume that each stimulus is compared with recently observed stimuli. We test and refute a general prediction made by relative models, that accuracy is very low for some stimulus sequences when the stimuli are unequally spaced. We conclude that, although relative judgment processes may occur in absolute identification, a model must incorporate long-term referents to explain performance with unequally spaced stimuli. This implies that purely relative models cannot provide a general account of absolute identification.     

Nested models of relative judgment: Applications to a similarity averaging model

A theoretical analysis of the Eisler and Ekman (1959) model of similarity judgments for unidimensional continua is presented, based on a general model of relative judgment. This general model assumes that judgments are mediated by perceived relations of pairs of stimuli, that there exists a transformation of the judgmental response that is a function of the sensory ratio of the two stimuli, and that response bias operates in a multiplicative manner. Three structural conditions are presented, each imposing constraints on the structure of observed judgments. The structural conditions define threenested models of relative judgment, with the second a weakened version of the first, and the third a weakened version of the second. The special virtue of the general model is that it is applicable to a variety of judgmental tasks (e.g., ratio estimation, similarity, pair comparison), the key being derivation of theresponse transformation conforming to the structural conditions. The structural conditions thus constitute necessary conditions for several different judgmental models. The theory was first applied with success to ratio estimation judgments (Fagot, 1978), and this paper applies the general model to the Eisler and Ekman similarity “averaging” model. Empirical tests were carried out on published data for pitch, darkness, visual area, and heaviness judgments. Although the strong form of the model presented by Eisler and Ekman was rejected, weakened versions were generally supported by the data. These results were similar to those obtained for ratio estimation (Fagot, 1978), and are interpreted to be very promising for the general model of relative judgment.     

Attention et jugement temporel

The role of attention in human’s duration judgment processes is analyzed. Empirical evidences which indicate that a dissociation exists between prospective and retrospective duration judgments are presented. Attention is directly involved in prospective duration judgments processes. Attentional-based models, which can explain prospective duration judgments are presented together with empirical evidences which validate the general attentional model on the levels of both regular cognitive processes and high level executive-control processes. Waiting is presented as a natural situation during which prospective duration judgment processes are evoked. The attentional model is used for explaining why a duration spent waiting seems to pass slowly, in contrast to a situation to which one is interested in a book or a movie and in which time flies fast.     

Comparative judgments of distal size: A chronometric analysis

Observers were required to make comparative judgments of the distal sizes of squares at various perceived distances in a pictorial array. It was predicted that observers would normalize distance prior to judgment. Chronometric analyses indicated that the time to make “same” judgments increased systematically with the relative distance of the two stimuli. The time required to make “different” judgments depended on the nature of the difference. When the stimuli differed in proximal size, distal size, and distance, response time increased with distance ratio. However, when the stimuli differed in distal size and distance but not proximal size, response time decreased with distance ratio. In addition, when the stimuli differed in both distal and proximal size but not distance, RT decreased with size ratio. These results are consistent with a class of models that incorporate distance normalization into the comparative size-judging process. These and alternative models are discussed.     

Comparison requirements and attention in identical-nonidentical stimulus discriminations

Perceptual matching data show several puzzling effects. Particularly problematic are the disparities between the processing rates for same and different stimuli--the fast-same effect--and between the processing rates for two same-different judgment tasks that are related as mirror images--the task effect. Current models have difficulty accounting simultaneously for both effects. Central to these models is a stimulus comparison process that derives relative judgments of sameness and difference from tests of the congruence of stimulus representations. A contrasting view holds that same-different judgments can be modeled as absolute, rather than relative, judgments. This latter view is shown to be supported by experimental data. Reaction times for judgments of identical letter strings increase with string length at the same rate whether judgments are based on all the information in the strings or just the information in a single pair of component letters. The data show that stimulus comparisons of the sort described by previous models are not involved in these judgments. An attentional model accounts for the data and for the fast-same and task effects as well.     

Task bias and the accuracy of judgment: Setting a baseline for expected group performance

When a judgment task evokes unbiased estimates (i.e. the errors in individual judgments are distributed randomly around the true value), mathematical aggregation of individual estimates, even by a simple arithmetic mean, often will outperform all group members. However, when a task evokes biased estimates, mathematical aggregation does not perform so well. In this study, simulated data were accumulated to specify the expected' accuracy of mathematical aggregation relative to the accuracy of observed judgment of individual group members under varying conditions of task bias. Three types of judgment tasks were employed: (1) single-estimate, holistic tasks, (2) multiple-estimate, ranking tasks, and (3) multi-cue, decomposed tasks. Findings indicated across all task types that a large percentage of judgment-making group estimates formed strictly by computing the arithmetic mean of individual estimates performed better than their most capable members when a judgment task evoked little or no bias, a result particularly pronounced for ranking tasks. When the task was more greatly bias-evoking, a large percentage of parallel groups performed more poorly than average (or median) members, again a pattern more starkly evident for ranking tasks. These results suggest that the extent to which a judgment task evokes bias in a population of prospective group members is an important explanatory variable deserving much greater attention in the study of group performance. For example, an assertion about the efficacy of a particular group intervention based on a reliable demonstration of group performance as accurate as the most capable members may be unfounded when a task evokes no bias, since the baseline standard under such conditions should be much higher. By selecting tasks and populations that jointly produced highly biased estimates, researchers can lower the performance floor enough to detect (with reasonably small samples of groups) experimental effects should they occur.