Sequential effects in absolute judgments of loudness

The effects of preceding stimuli on the judgments of current stimuli were examined in a study using absolute judgments of loudness with feedback. It was found that the response on a given trial was dependent on the stimuli in the preceding sequence of at least five trials. Both assimilation and contrast effects were observed. The form of the dependency of a response on a prior stimulus was a function of the ordinal position of the stimulus in the preceding sequence of trials. The stimulus on the immediately preceding trial had an assimilative effect on the response and preceding stimuli two to five trials removed all showed a contrast effect on a given response. The extent to which these preceding stimuli contributed to the contrast effect was an increasing function of their recency. The reversal of the dependency of the response, from assimilation to the stimulus one trial back, to contrast with the stimuli two and more trials back, indicates a unique function of the immediately preceding stimulus in this task. Since there was a reduction in the variance of responses to those stimuli similar in value to the immediately preceding stimulus, it is proposed that the stimulus and feedback on the last trial were remembered and used asa standardin judging the presented stimulus. A model is presented in which it is assumed that the memory of the magnitude of the immediately preceding stimulus is contaminated in specified ways by prior stimuli in the series. The empirical findings of assimilation and contrastare expected consequences of the proposed memorial processes.     

Sensory and cognitive factors in judgments of loudness

One thousand Hertz tones were presented at equal or unequal intensities to the two ears. In a binaural-summation experiment, the presentation of components was simultaneous, the auditory system integrated the components automatically, and the subjects judged the loudness of the unitary sensation. In two cognitive-summation experiments, the presentation of components was successive, and the subjects had to integrate the two sensations consciously to judge their "total loudness." Results of all three experiments are consistent with models of linear summation of "loudness," but the loudness scales differ in the two tasks: The scales that underlie binaural summation and cognitive summation are nonlinearly related. This outcome suggests two nested processes: First, the auditory system transduces stimulus energy to loudness sensations by means of a nonlinear function; second, tasks that require subjects to judge combinational relations between sensations may impose additional nonlinear transformations on the sensations before the latter are combined.     

Semantic congruity effects in judgments of loudness

This research uses comparative judgments of the relative loudness of sounds to make a critical test of one theory of the mental representation of continuous physical attributes. The first two experiments find a semantic congruity effect, which is an interaction such that subjects can pick the louder of two loud sounds faster than the softer, and the softer of two quiet sounds faster than the louder. According to the theory under test, physical quantities are stored as points on a representational continuum, with a variance as well as a mean placement on it. The theory predicts the semantic congruity effect by assuming that the variance of placement of intensities on the representational continuum is a function of the direction of judgment: a soft sound will have less variance than a loud one when judged for softness and more when judged for loudness. Since the speed of making a judgment increases as variance decreases, the theory predicts a semantic congruity effect. However, for loudness, it can be shown that variance does not change in the manner assumed. The finding of a semantic congruity effect therefore disconfirms the theory. Alternative models are discussed. This research was supported by NSF Grant BNS 78-17442.     

Response requirements and the contrast effect in loudness judgments

Ss responded to a series of soft tones via category judgments, reaction time responses, or simple nonquantitative discrimination judgments. An evaluation was then made of the contrast effects obtained in the category judgments of these same soft tones when subsequently presented along with a series of loud tones. A control group was also used which did not receive the initial trials with the soft tones. The results indicated: (1) equivalent contrast effects for all four groups for the soft tones and (2) significantly greater judgments of the loud tones in the group that had used category judgments on the initial trials with soft tones. These results, alonR with a trend analysis, were used to argue for a joint semantic shift and equalization of category usage process underlying the contrast effect when Ss are required to denote the stimuli initially by means of category judgments.     

The perceptual basis of loudness ratio judgments

In Experiment 1, subjects were required to estimateloudness ratios for 45 pairs of tones. Ten 1,200-Hz tones, differing only in intensity, were used to generate the 45 distinct tone pairs. In Experiment 2, subjects were required to directly compare two pairs of tones (chosen from among the set of 45) and indicate which pair of tones had the greaterloudness ratio. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the subjects’ judgments were used to rank order the tone pairs with respect to their judged loudness ratios. Nonmetric analyses of these rank orders indicated that both magnitude estimates of loudness ratios and direct comparisons of loudness ratios were based on loudnessintervals ordifferences where loudness was a power function of sound pressure. These experiments, along with those on loudness difference judgments (Parker & Schneider, 1974; Schneider, Parker, & Stein, 1974), support Torgerson’s (1961) conjecture that there is but one comparative perceptual relationship for ioudnesses, and that differences in numerical estimates for loudness ratios as opposed to loudness intervals simply reflect different reporting strategies generated by the two sets of instructions.     

The effect of verbal size information upon visual judgments of absolute distance

When an 0 views a blank triangle of light under completely reduced conditions, he is able to make use of verbally conveyed information about the size of this stimulus when he is attempting to judge the absolute distance of the stimulus. Although between-Os variance is rather large in this situation, group mean distance estimates are highly veridical. This is further evidence for the view that, when the 0 is given a retinal subtense, any kind of information about size enables him to make a judgment of absolute distance, just as information about distance enables him to make a judgment of absolute size.     

The influence of haptic size information upon visual judgments of absolute distance

When O views a blank triangle of light under completely reduced conditions, he is able to use information about the size of this visual stimulus conveyed via the haptic modality when he is attempting to judge the absolute distance of the visual stimulus. However, distance is consistently underesti-mated in this situation. When haptically-indicated size is held constant, judged distance varies inversely with retinalsubtense, even though the different retinal subtenses are viewed by different Os. A variant of the size-distance invariance hypothesis also appears to hold in these circumstances.     

Prospective and retrospective judgments of time as a function of amount of information processed.

The subjects, 120 college students, sorted cards for 42 sec with instructions to process 0, 1, or 2 bits of information per card (response uncertainty) and then were asked to make an absolute judgement of the interval's duration. Half of the subjects knew this judgement would be required before the interval (prospective paradigm); half did not (retrospective paradigm). Judged time was an inverse linear function of response uncertainty under the prospective paradigm, whereas no significant function was obtained under the retrospective paradigm.     

Effects of range on category scaling of loudness judgments

In two experiments subjects judged the loudness of a 1000-Hz tone within a range of three loudnesses. The first used a within-subjects design with ranges of 1-2 sones, 1-4 sones, and 1-8 sones. The second used a between-subjects design with ranges of 1-2 sones, 1-8 sones, and 1-16 sones. Except for two values in the 1- to 2-sone range the two experiments produced comparable results. As range was increased the tendency to round away from the end points increased and the judged mid-point occurred at a higher value. Comparisons are made with rounding patterns that occur in studies of linear scales. The present results are interpreted to support Poulton's (1975) position, that the mid-point of subjective estimates depends on the range of stimuli judged, rather than that of Stevens (1975), that the mid-point on a prosthetic scale is assigned to a value that is lower than the mid-point on the subject's subjective scale.     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

Some new hypotheses on the mediation of loudness judgments 1

A new solution to the problem of relating equal-interval and ratio scales is proposed. It is shown that it is also possible, with the type of theory proposed, to predict results of cross-modality matching experiments.