Bimanual response grouping in dual-task paradigms

In three experiments we measured response time (RT) and peak force (PF) to investigate the grouping of left- and right-hand key press responses in a dual-task paradigm involving two independent go/no-go tasks. Within each task, a go stimulus within one of two modalities (i.e., visual versus auditory) required a response by one hand. In Experiment 1 with simultaneous go stimuli in the two tasks, responses appeared to be grouped in approximately 75–80% of trials, compared with nearly 100% grouping in a single-task condition requiring bimanual responses to the onset of any stimulus in either modality. In Experiment 2 with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 0–400 ms between the two go stimuli, response grouping clearly declined as SOA increased, although some grouping was still evident even at the longest SOA. The same pattern was observed in Experiment 3 with the same range of SOAs but unpredictable stimulus order, suggesting that grouping is not strongly dependent on prior knowledge of the likely response order. These results emphasize the pervasiveness of response grouping in bimanual dual-task RT paradigms and provide useful clues as to its nature.     

Bimanual response grouping in dual-task paradigms

In three experiments we measured response time (RT) and peak force (PF) to investigate the grouping of left- and right-hand key press responses in a dual-task paradigm involving two independent go/no-go tasks. Within each task, a go stimulus within one of two modalities (i.e., visual versus auditory) required a response by one hand. In Experiment 1 with simultaneous go stimuli in the two tasks, responses appeared to be grouped in approximately 75-80% of trials, compared with nearly 100% grouping in a single-task condition requiring bimanual responses to the onset of any stimulus in either modality. In Experiment 2 with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 0-400 ms between the two go stimuli, response grouping clearly declined as SOA increased, although some grouping was still evident even at the longest SOA. The same pattern was observed in Experiment 3 with the same range of SOAs but unpredictable stimulus order, suggesting that grouping is not strongly dependent on prior knowledge of the likely response order. These results emphasize the pervasiveness of response grouping in bimanual dual-task RT paradigms and provide useful clues as to its nature.     

Modulation of motor area activity during observation of unnatural body movements

We investigated the processes underlying stimulus-response compatibility by using a lateralized auditory stimulus in a simple and choice reaction time (RT) paradigm. Participants were asked to make either a left or right key lift in response to either a control (80 dB) or startling (124 dB) stimulus presented to either the left ear, right ear, or both ears. In the simple RT paradigm, we did not find a compatibility effect for either control or startle trials but did find a right-ear advantage which we attribute to anatomical asymmetry of auditory pathways. In the choice RT paradigm, we found compatibility effects for both startle and control trials as well a high incidence of error for contralateral stimulus-response mapping. We attribute these results to automatic activation of the ipsilateral response, which must then be inhibited prior to initiation of the correct response. The presence of compatibility effects for startle trials also suggest that similar pathways are being used to initiate movements in a choice RT situation, as opposed to involuntary triggering that is thought to occur in a simple RT situation.     

After-effects of goal shifting and response inhibition: a comparison of the stop-change and dual-task paradigms

In the present study, we tested three hypotheses that account for after-effects of response inhibition and goal shifting: the goal-shifting hypothesis, the reaction time (RT) adjustment hypothesis, and the stimulus-goal association hypothesis. To distinguish between the hypotheses, we examined performance in the stop-change paradigm and the dual-task paradigm. In the stop-change paradigm, we found that responding on no-signal trials slowed down when a stop-change signal was presented on the previous trial. Similarly, in the dual-task paradigm, we found that responding on no-signal trials slowed down when a dual-task signal was presented on the previous trial. However, aftereffects of unsuccessful inhibition or dual-task performance were observed only when the stimulus of the previous trial was repeated. These results are consistent with stimulus--goal association hypothesis, which assumes that the stimulus is associated with the different task goals on signal trials; when the stimulus is repeated, the tasks goal are retrieved, and interference occurs.     

After-effects of goal shifting and response inhibition: A comparison of the stop-change and dual-task paradigms

In the present study, we tested three hypotheses that account for after-effects of response inhibition and goal shifting: the goal-shifting hypothesis, the reaction time (RT) adjustment hypothesis, and the stimulus–goal association hypothesis. To distinguish between the hypotheses, we examined performance in the stop-change paradigm and the dual-task paradigm. In the stop-change paradigm, we found that responding on no-signal trials slowed down when a stop-change signal was presented on the previous trial. Similarly, in the dual-task paradigm, we found that responding on no-signal trials slowed down when a dual-task signal was presented on the previous trial. However, after-effects of unsuccessful inhibition or dual-task performance were observed only when the stimulus of the previous trial was repeated. These results are consistent with stimulus–goal association hypothesis, which assumes that the stimulus is associated with the different task goals on signal trials; when the stimulus is repeated, the tasks goal are retrieved, and interference occurs.     

Semantic interference during object naming in agrammatic and logopenic primary progressive aphasia (PPA)

This study examined the time course of object naming in 21 individuals with primary progressive aphasia (PPA) (8 agrammatic (PPA-G); 13 logopenic (PPA-L)) and healthy age-matched speakers (n = 17) using a semantic interference paradigm with related and unrelated interfering stimuli presented at stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of −1000, −500, −100 and 0 ms. Results showed semantic interference (SI) (i.e. significantly slower RTs in related compared to unrelated conditions) for all groups at −500, −100 and 0 ms, indicating timely spreading activation to semantic competitors. However, both PPA groups showed a greater magnitude of SI than normal across SOAs. The PPA-L group and six PPA-G participants also evinced SI at −1000 ms, suggesting an abnormal time course of semantic interference resolution, and concomitant left hemisphere cortical atrophy in brain regions associated with semantic processing. These subtle semantic mapping impairments in non-semantic variants of PPA may contribute to the anomia of these patients.     

Task choice and semantic interference in picture naming

Evidence from dual-task performance indicates that speakers prefer not to select simultaneous responses in picture naming and another unrelated task, suggesting a response selection bottleneck in naming. In particular, when participants respond to tones with a manual response and name pictures with superimposed semantically related or unrelated distractor words, semantic interference in naming tends to be constant across stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) between the tone stimulus and the picture–word stimulus. In the present study, we examine whether semantic interference in picture naming depends on SOA in case of a task choice (naming the picture vs reading the word of a picture–word stimulus) based on tones. This situation requires concurrent processing of the tone stimulus and the picture–word stimulus, but not a manual response to the tones. On each trial, participants either named a picture or read aloud a word depending on the pitch of a tone, which was presented simultaneously with picture–word onset or 350 ms or 1000 ms before picture–word onset. Semantic interference was present with tone pre-exposure, but absent when tone and picture-word stimulus were presented simultaneously. Against the background of the available studies, these results support an account according to which speakers tend to avoid concurrent response selection, but can engage in other types of concurrent processing, such as task choices.     

Determinants of central processing order in psychological refractory period paradigms: central arrival times, detection times, or preparation?

Three psychological refractory period (PRP) experiments were conducted to assess the effect of central arrival times at the bottleneck on task order scheduling. In Experiment 1, a visual first task (plus-minus symbol discrimination) was combined with an auditory second task (left-right tone judgement) in a standard PRP paradigm with constant task order. In Experiment 2, the order of the tasks varied unpredictably. In Experiment 3, visual-auditory dual-task trials were randomly mixed with single-task trials. To dissociate central arrival times from stimulus detection times, the perceptual stage of the visual task was extended using stimulus degradation. Most importantly, no evidence for a first-come, first-served principle at the central bottleneck was found with the employed paradigms. Instead, the results indicated that preparation (Experiment 1) and the detection times of the stimuli (Experiments 2 and 3) were the main determinants of central processing order in the present study. In the light of previous research, the results indicate that central processing order can be influenced by various factors. The interplay between these factors seems to depend highly on the conditions and requirements of the employed experimental paradigm.     

Dissociating sources of dual-task interference using human electrophysiology

In the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, two unmasked targets are presented, each of which requires a speeded response. Response times to the second target (T2) are slowed when T2 is presented shortly after the first target (T1). Electrophysiological studies have previously shown that the P3 event-related potential component is not delayed during T2 response slowing in the PRP paradigm, but that the lateralized readiness potential is delayed, which suggests a bottleneck on response selection operations but not on stimulus identification. Recently, researchers (Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Jolicoeur & Dell'Acqua, 1999) observed T2 response slowing in an encoding-speeded response (ESR) paradigm where T2 followed a masked T1 that required identification but not a speeded response. T2 response slowing in the ESR paradigm is often indistinguishable from that in the PRP paradigm, prompting some researchers to postulate a common processing bottleneck for the two paradigms. With the use of the ESR paradigm, we observed T2 response slowing and, in contrast to the PRP paradigm, we also observed corresponding P3 delays. The results suggest that dissociable bottlenecks underlie the dual-task costs from the two paradigms.     

Cardiac modulation of startle: Effects on eye blink and higher cognitive processing

Cardiac cycle time has been shown to affect pre-attentive brainstem startle processes, such as the magnitude of acoustically evoked reflexive startle eye blinks. These effects were attributed to baro-afferent feedback mechanisms. However, it remains unclear whether cardiac cycle time plays a role in higher startle-related cognitive processes, as well. Twenty-five volunteers responded first by ’fast as possible’ button pushes (reaction time, RT), and second, rated perceived intensity of 60 acoustic startle stimuli (85, 95, or 105 dB; 50 ms duration; binaural; instantaneous rise time), which were presented either 230 or 530 ms after the R-wave, and eye blink responses were measured by EMG. RT was divided into evaluation and motor response time according to previous research. Increasing stimulus intensity enhanced startle eye blink, intensity ratings, and RT components. Eye blinks and intensity judgments were lower when startle was elicited at a latency of R + 230 ms, but RT components were differentially affected: the evaluative component was attenuated, and the motor component was accelerated when stimuli were presented 230 ms after the R-wave. We conclude that the cardiac cycle affects the attentive processing of acoustic startle stimuli.     

Potentiation of the acoustic startle response by a conditioned stimulus paired with acoustic startle stimulus in rats

The hypothesis that the standard acoustic startle habituation paradigm contains the elements of Pavlovian fear conditioning was tested. In a potentiated startle response paradigm, a startle stimulus and a light conditioned stimulus (CS) were paired. A startle stimulus then was tested alone or following the CS. Freezing behavior was measured to index conditioned fear. The startle response was potentiated on CS trials, and rats froze more in CS than in non-CS periods. In Experiment 1, response to a previously habituated, weak startle stimulus was potentiated. In Experiment 2, response to the same stimulus used as the unconditioned stimulus (US) in training was potentiated. This CS-potentiated response retarded the course of response decrements over training sessions as compared with an explictly unpaired control group. Conditioned fear is a standard feature of this habituation paradigm, serves to potentiate the startle response, and provides an associative dimension lacking in the habituation process per se.     

Interference effects of stimulus–response modality pairings in dual tasks and their robustness

Recent evidence suggests that the degree of interference in dual-task situations depends crucially on the pairings of input- and output modalities of the two component tasks with increased dual-task costs for modality incompatible (i.e., visual–vocal and auditory–manual) compared to modality compatible (i.e., visual–manual and auditory–vocal) dual tasks. These effects of modality pairings in dual tasks have been related to the overlap of non-preferred processing pathways in modality incompatible tasks. Until now, modality compatibility has not yet been related to other sources of interference in a dual-task context, such as stimulus–response (S–R) compatibility or crosstalk. In the present study, we conducted two experiments using the paradigm of the psychological refractory period (PRP) to test the effects of S–R compatibility and crosstalk on the effects of modality compatibility in temporally overlapping task situations. Experiment 1 revealed an overadditive interaction between stimulus onset asynchrony and modality compatibility for tasks with S–R compatible mappings, indicating that modality compatibility effects are present in different task situations, even when S–R mappings are otherwise compatible. In Experiment 2, we aimed at pinpointing the boundaries of the effects of modality compatibility in dual-task situations. We showed that additional sources of dual-task interference in a modality compatible dual task could overwrite the pronounced PRP effect previously shown for modality incompatible tasks. Taken together, these data provide new evidence that the specific types of stimulus–response modality pairings are an additional factor that might interact with other sources of interference in dual-task situations.     

A central capacity sharing model of dual-task performance

The authors present the central capacity sharing (CCS) model and derive equations describing its behaviors to explain results from dual-task situations. The predictions of the CCS model are contrasted with those of the central bottleneck model. The CCS model predicts all of the hallmark effects of the psychological refractory period (PRP) pardigm: -1 slope of the PRP effect at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), underadditivity of precentral Task 2 manipulations, additivity of central or postcentral Task 2 manipulations with SOA, and carry forward to Task 2 of Task 1 precentral or central manipulations at short SOAs. The CCS model also predicts that Task 1 response times increase with decreasing SOA. The model is a viable alternative to the central bottleneck model.     

Response activation in overlapping tasks and the response-selection bottleneck

The authors investigated the impact of response activation on dual-task performance by presenting a subliminal prime before the stimulus in Task 2 (S2) of a psychological refractory period (PRP) task. Congruence between prime and S2 modulated the reaction times in Task 2 at short stimulus onset asynchrony despite a PRP effect. This Task 2 congruence effect was paralleled by a Task 1 congruence effect and emerged exclusively under conditions of cross talk, whereas it did not occur under dual-task conditions preventing cross talk between tasks. This suggests that response activation operates during the PRP in dual tasks and affects the response times in Task 2 via cross talk between common processing elements at prebottleneck stages but not by directly affecting the postbottleneck stages.     

When two actions are easier than one: How inhibitory control demands affect response processing

Numerous studies showed that the simultaneous execution of multiple actions is associated with performance costs. Here, we demonstrate that when highly automatic responses are involved, performance in single-response conditions can actually be worse than in dual-response conditions. Participants responded to peripheral visual stimuli with an eye movement (saccade), a manual key press, or both. To manipulate saccade automaticity, a central fixation cross either remained present throughout the trial (overlap condition, lower automaticity) or disappeared 200 ms before visual target onset (gap condition, greater automaticity). Crucially, single-response conditions yielded more performance errors than dual-response conditions (i.e., dual-response benefit), especially in gap trials. This was due to difficulties associated with inhibiting saccades when only manual responses were required, suggesting that response inhibition (remaining fixated) can be even more resource-demanding than overt response execution (saccade to peripheral target).     

A neuropsychological assessment of dual-task costs in closed-head injury patients using Cohen’s effect size estimation method

A test of whether patients suffering from a severe closed-head injury (CHI) were affected by disproportionate dual-task costs compared to those of healthy control participants was carried out through a direct comparison of CHI effects on dual-task (psychological refractory period, or PRP) performance and on single-task performance. In the dual-task condition of the present experiment, independent choice-responses were required to two sequential stimuli presented at a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). A significant delay of the reaction time (RT) to the second stimulus was reported by both CHI patients and controls at short (SOA) compared to long SOA, i.e., a PRP effect. The PRP effect was more pronounced for CHI patients than controls. In the single-task condition, a single choice-response was required to a stimulus presented in isolation. The RT produced by CHI patients in the single-task paradigm was longer than the RT produced by controls. CHI effects on dual-task performance and on single-task performance were compared following (1) their transformation into Cohen’s ds, and (2) the application of a correction algorithm taking into account the different reliability of single-task and dual-task measures. The analysis of Cohen’s ds revealed that CHI effects on performance were, if anything, smaller in the dual-task condition than in the single-task condition. The results imply that CHI patient’s slower responding in single- and dual-task performance reflects a single common cause—slowing of the central processing.     

The picture-word interference effect is not a Stroop effect

A psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm was used to isolate the locus of the picture-word interference effect along the chain of processes subtended in name production. Two stimuli were presented sequentially on each trial, separated by a varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The first stimulus, SI, was a tone that required a manual response. The second stimulus, S2, was a picture-word stimulus associated with picture naming. The distractor word was conceptually related to the picture on half of the trials, and unrelated in the other trials. A picture-word interference effect was found at long SOA, but not at short SOA. Such underadditive interaction between SOA and semantic relatedness suggests strongly that the locus of the picture-word interference effect is functionally earlier than the PRP effect locus. The results are discussed in relation to models of word production suggesting the involvement of central mechanisms in the selection of lexical output.     

Forgetting is effortful: Evidence from reaction time probes in an item-method directed forgetting task

Reaction time (RT) was measured in response to visual detection probes embedded within an item-method directed forgetting paradigm. In Experiment 1, study words were presented individually followed by an instruction to remember (R) or forget (F). Probes were presented at stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 1,400, 1,800, or 2,600 msec in relation to the study word or memory instruction. After the study trials, a yes-no recognition task measured retention of R and F words. Experiment 2 added a no-word control condition and no-probe catch trials. In both experiments, post-F probe RTs were longer than post-R probe RTs at early SOAs. Confirming that participants attended to the memory instructions, there was a significant directed forgetting effect, with greater recognition of R than of F words. These findings contradict the view that directed forgetting in the item-method paradigm is due to the passive decay of nonrehearsed F items; instead, they are consistent with the view that intentional forgetting in an item-method paradigm occurs via the operation of an active, potentially inhibitory, cognitive process.     

Can practice eliminate the psychological refractory period effect?

Can people learn to perform two tasks at the same time without interference? To answer this question, the authors trained 6 participants for 36 sessions in a Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) experiment, where Task 1 required a speeded vocal response to an auditory stimulus and Task 2 required a speeded manual response to a visual stimulus. The large PRP effect found initially (353 ms in Session 1) shrank to only about 40 ms over the course of practice, disappearing entirely for 1 of the 6 participants. This reduction in the PRP effect with practice is considerably larger than has been previously reported. The obtained pattern of factor interactions between stimulus onset asynchrony and each of three task difficulty manipulations (Task 1 judgment difficulty, Task 2 stimulus contrast, and Task 2 mapping compatibility) supports a postponement (bottleneck) account of dual-task interference, both before and after practice.     

Does temporal contiguity moderate contingency learning in a speeded performance task?

In four experiments, we varied the time between the onset of distracting nonwords and target colour words in a word–word version of the colour–word contingency learning paradigm. Contingencies were created by pairing a distractor nonword more often with one target colour word than with other colour words. A contingency effect corresponds to faster responses to the target colour word on high-contingency trials (i.e., distractor nonword followed by the target colour word with which it appears most often) than on low-contingency trials (i.e., distractor nonword followed by a target colour word with which it appears only occasionally). Roughly equivalent-sized contingency effects were found at stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 50, 250, and 450 ms in Experiment 1, and 50, 500, and 1,000 ms in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, a contingency effect was observed at SOAs of –50, –200, and –350 ms. In Experiment 4, interstimulus interval (ISI) was varied along with SOA, and learning was equivalent for 200-, 700-, and 1,200-ms SOAs. Together, these experiments suggest that the distracting stimulus does not need to be presented in close temporal contiguity with the response to induce learning. Relations to past research on causal judgement and implications for further contingency learning research are discussed.