Individual differences in forced-choice recognition memory: Partitioning contributions of recollection and familiarity

In forced-choice recognition memory, two different testing formats are possible under conditions of high target–foil similarity: Each target can be presented alongside foils similar to itself (forced-choice corresponding; FCC), or alongside foils similar to other targets (forced-choice noncorresponding; FCNC). Recent behavioural and neuropsychological studies suggest that FCC performance can be supported by familiarity whereas FCNC performance is supported primarily by recollection. In this paper, we corroborate this finding from an individual differences perspective. A group of older adults were given a test of FCC and FCNC recognition for object pictures, as well as standardized tests of recall, recognition, and IQ. Recall measures were found to predict FCNC, but not FCC performance, consistent with a critical role for recollection in FCNC only. After the common influence of recall was removed, standardized tests of recognition predicted FCC, but not FCNC performance. This is consistent with a contribution of only familiarity in FCC. Simulations show that a two-process model, where familiarity and recollection make separate contributions to recognition, is 10 times more likely to give these results than a single-process model. This evidence highlights the importance of recognition memory test design when examining the involvement of recollection and familiarity.     

Modes of cognitive control in recognition and source memory: Depth of retrieval

Recognition memory is usually regarded as a judgment based on trace strength or familiarity. But recognition may also be accomplished by constraining retrieval so that only sought after information comes to mind (source-constrained retrieval). We introduce amemory-for-foils paradigm that provides evidence for source-constrained retrieval in recognition memory (Experiment 1) and source memory (Experiment 2). In this paradigm, subjects studied words under deep or shallow encoding conditions and were given a memory test (recognition or source) that required them to discriminate between new items (foils) and either deep or shallow targets. A final recognition test was used to examine memory for the foils. In both experiments, foil memory was superior when subjects attempted to retrieve deep rather than shallow targets on the earlier test. These findings support a sourceconstrained retrieval view of cognitive control by demonstrating qualitative differences in the basis for memory performance.     

流畅性对再认的影响:实验证据及理论解释

流畅性可以影响再认,而且仅影响熟悉性加工的观点已得到大量研究的证实。近年一些研究者采用掩蔽启动范式并结合修改的R/K范式、独立判断的R/K范式等实验范式,操控测验项目的流畅性,发现流畅性影响的可能是猜测或者回想加工,因而质疑这个结论。为解释流畅性对再认的影响,流畅性归因理论侧重对流畅性的归因、冲突-归因理论侧重期待流畅性和实际流畅性之间的冲突、预激活-适应模型侧重启动刺激引起的神经活动激活或适应、线索-学习理论侧重流畅性线索的有效性。未来研究应关注流畅性对来源和联结记忆的影响,并考察流畅性对再认的影响在不同年龄人群或遗忘症人群中的表现是否一致。     

Data-driven recognition memory: a new technique and some data on age differences

In this study, we investigate the effect on recognition memory of having target and distractor stimuli consisting of different combinations of low-level elements (letters), relative to when targets and distractors consist of combinations of the same elements (nonoverlap and overlap conditions, respectively). It was found that recognition memory was enhanced in the nonoverlap condition, even though subjects reported being unaware of this experimental manipulation. This confirms the importance of perceptually driven processing in the implicit memory component of recognition memory. The extent to which this effect occurs is found to be age dependent, with elderly subjects benefiting more from having targets and distractors consisting of nonoverlapping elements. This is consistent with the notion that elderly subjects show less reliance on item-specific/contextual detail to support recognition memory.     

Familiarity changes as a function of perceptual shifts

This experiment compares the yes-no and forced recognition tests as methods of measuring familiarity. Participants faced a phase of 3 study-test recognition trials in which they studied words using all the letters of the alphabet (overlapping condition, O), and an additional phase in which targets and lures did not share any letters (non-overlapping condition, NO). Finally, subjects performed a forced-choice task in which they had to choose one of two new words, each from one of the subsets (Parkin et al., 2001). Results in the NO condition were better than in the O condition in the yes-no recognition test, while the forced-choice rate was significantly higher than .50, showing their sensitivity to familiarity. When the letter set of the words for study in the third list of the NO condition was switched, the difference between NO and O conditions disappeared in yes-no test, while the force-choice rate was not higher than .50. We conclude that both the yes-no test and the forced-choice test are valid and equivalent measures of familiarity under the right conditions.     

Recognition,recollection, familiarity and executive function in medicated patients with moderate Parkinson's disease

There is conflicting evidence about whether Parkinson's disease (PD) is associated with deficiencies in recognition memory (RM) and the processes which underlie it, namely recollection (a form of recall) and familiarity (a feeling of memory in the absence of recall). The aims of the current study were to examine forced‐choice verbal RM (assessed with the Warrington Recognition memory Test), yes‐no RM, recollection, familiarity and executive functioning in 17 patients with moderate PD and 17 healthy volunteers matched for age and premorbid intelligence. We predicted that patients with moderate PD would display a significant recollection deficit on the yes‐no RM test, because their strategic memory processing that depends on executive functioning and is necessary for efficient encoding and/or retrieval, was disrupted. In contrast, familiarity memory, which is not dependent on these processes, and forced‐choice RM (which is largely dependent on familiarity) should show higher levels of preservation. We also predicted that recollection should be correlated with severity of executive dysfunction. Our findings revealed that the PD patients were as likely to accurately discriminate between targets and distractors as the healthy volunteers on both RM tests. However, the PD patients were significantly less reliant on recollection‐driven recognition decisions on the yes‐no RM test when compared with the healthy control group. The patients also displayed executive function deficits, but these were not correlated with recollection. The extent to which the PD patients' reliance on familiarity at the expense of recollection is explained by impairments in strategic memory processes/executive function and/or medial temporal lobe retrieval processes needs further exploration.     

The contribution of familiarity to recognition memory is a function of test format when using similar foils

Patient Y.R., who suffered hippocampal damage that disrupted recollection but not familiarity, was impaired on a yes/no (YN) object recognition memory test with similar foils. However, she was not impaired on a forced-choice corresponding (FCC) version of the test that paired targets with corresponding similar foils (Holdstock et al., 2002). This dissociation is explained by the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) neural-network model (Norman & O'Reilly, 2003) if recollection is impaired but familiarity is preserved. The CLS model also predicts that participants relying exclusively on familiarity should be impaired on forced-choice noncorresponding (FCNC) tests, where targets are presented with foils similar to other targets. The present study tests these predictions for all three test formats (YN, FCC, FCNC) in normal participants using two variants of the remember/know procedure. As predicted, performance using familiarity alone was significantly worse than standard recognition on the YN and FCNC tests, but not on the FCC test. Recollection in the form of recall-to-reject was the major process driving YN recognition. This adds support to the interpretation of patient data, according to which hippocampal damage causes a recollection deficit that leads to poor performance on the YN test relative to FCC.     

What makes recognition without awareness appear to be elusive? Strategic factors that influence the accuracy of guesses

Various factors could conceivably promote the accuracy of guesses during a recognition test. Two that we identified in previous studies are forced-choice testing format and high perceptual similarity between the repeat target and novel foil. In restricted circumstances, the relative perceptual fluency of the target can be compared with that of the foil and used as a reliable cue to guide accurate responses that occur without explicit retrieval—a phenomenon we referred to as “implicit recognition.” In this issue, Jeneson and colleagues report a failure to replicate accurate guesses and also a tendency on the part of subjects to hazard guesses infrequently, even though testing circumstances were very similar to those that we used. To resolve this discrepancy, we developed a simple manipulation to encourage either guessing or confident responding. Encouraging guessing increased both the prevalence of guesses and the accuracy of guesses in a recognition test, relative to when confident responding was encouraged. When guessing was encouraged, guesses were highly accurate (as in our previous demonstrations of implicit recognition), whereas when confident responding was encouraged, guesses were at chance levels (as in Jeneson and colleagues'' data). In light of a substantial literature showing high accuracy despite low confidence in certain circumstances, we infer that both the prevalence and accuracy of guessing can be influenced by whether subjects adopt guessing-friendly strategies. Our findings thus help to further characterize conditions likely to promote implicit recognition based on perceptual fluency.In several prior experiments, we reported findings indicative of recognition without awareness (Voss et al. 2008; Voss and Paller 2009). The experiments involved recognition tests for colorful and complex geometric shapes (kaleidoscope images). Subjects attempted to discriminate repeat stimuli (targets) from novel stimuli (foils). In some of our experiments, subjects made recognition responses and also rated the quality of their recognition experience or their confidence in their decision. For example, recognition often occurred with awareness of memory retrieval and with some level of confidence. On the other hand, correct recognition of a target sometimes occurred with no discernable awareness of memory retrieval or confidence; essentially, subjects felt that their response was merely a guess—and yet they were correct.Of course, the reason that a guess might be correct in a recognition test might have nothing at all to do with the subject having retrieved relevant information; the response might be merely a “lucky guess.” Our results, however, provided evidence that processes of implicit memory were operative in producing at least a subset of the correct guesses. In recognition tests using a forced-choice format, targets and foils shared a high degree of perceptual similarity and were displayed side-by-side, and we found that, for guess responses, the repeat stimulus was correctly selected remarkably often. With no stored information (and given that the target occurred equally often on the left side and the right side, and that targets and foils were counterbalanced across subjects), the repeat stimulus should be selected correctly 50% of the time in the long run. In our original report, we found that 82% of the guess responses were correct, which was more accurate than responses when trials with high- or low-confidence responses were pooled together (56%; data combined for all study conditions) (Experiment 2 of Voss et al. 2008). We referred to this phenomenon as recognition without awareness or implicit recognition. For the present discussion, we will use the latter term.Indeed, our results provided several additional reasons for linking implicit memory with this phenomenon of implicit recognition. In one experiment, each trial was classified as either (1) a recognition experience in which subjects recollected episodic information from their initial experience with the target; (2) recognition with familiarity for the target, but no other recall of prior information concerning the target; or (3) a guess with no confidence in the accuracy of the response (Voss and Paller 2009). We found that guesses were approximately as accurate as recollection responses (73% vs. 79%, respectively, averaged across encoding conditions), and that guesses were more accurate than decisions based on familiarity (59%, averaged across encoding conditions).Another feature of these experiments was that we contrasted two types of learning conditions. In one condition, to-be-remembered stimuli were viewed while subjects simultaneously performed a verbal working memory task. This task required that the subject listen to a spoken digit on each trial and respond according to whether the digit on the prior trial was odd or even (i.e., a one-back task). In the other condition, there were no spoken digits, and attention could be allocated fully to viewing the to-be-remembered stimuli. In several different experiments, recognition accuracy was higher with divided-attention study than with full-attention study. Although this is a highly unusual outcome for recognition performance, it was clear that divided attention during the study led to relatively less confidence during the recognition test, such that guessing was more prevalent, and these guess responses were highly accurate.Notably, these two key results—highly accurate guessing, and a recognition advantage for divided over full attention at study—were not obtained when recognition was tested with a yes–no format (targets and highly similar foils randomly intermixed and shown one stimulus at a time), or when a forced-choice test was prepared such that each target was paired with a random foil rather than a highly similar foil (Voss et al. 2008). On the basis of these findings, as well as additional results from electrophysiological recordings (described below in the Discussion section), we argued that subjects were able to weigh the relative perceptual fluency of the target and the foil only for forced-choice tests with high target/foil similarity, and then they could use this fluency cue to guide accurate selection of the target (Voss and Paller 2009).We aim to develop a line of reasoning to clarify why implicit recognition might tend to operate preferentially in certain circumstances, such as when the relative perceptual fluency of targets versus foils is likely to serve as a useful cue, and when the ability to remember specific stimulus details does not provide a useful cue (as is the case when these details are largely shared between the target and the foil). In many situations, however, perceptual fluency may not be a good basis for making recognition judgments. Often, accurate recognition reflects conceptual elaboration about the meaning of an event, and the conceptual features are typically remembered more robustly than the set of stimulus features perceived during the course of the event. Thus, implicit recognition may be less likely to guide a response in a recognition test in the presence of confident memory for the target. Dividing attention during encoding resulted in lower confidence during the recognition test, and this may have been one factor that promoted reliance on signals of relative perceptual fluency. Of course, there may be other factors that also promote or inhibit this type of strategy in a recognition test.     

Age-related Differences in Episodic Odour Recognition: The Role of Access to Specific Odour Names

This study addressed the relationship between semantic memory variables and episodic odour recognition across the adult lifespan. Young (19–34 years), young-old (60–69 years), and old women (70–79 years) were tested in a number of measures of semantic memory: letter fluency, category fluency, vocabulary, odour familiarity, and odour naming. Odour recognition memory was assessed on two occasions: immediately after and 48 hours after inspection. Young women outperformed both groups of older women in odour recognition and odour naming, although the two older age groups did not differ. For all age groups, performance declined from immediate to delayed testing. Individual differences in fluency and vocabulary did not predict performance in odour recognition. Rather, odour recognition was related to the subjects' specific semantic knowledge of the odour, as indexed by familiarity and accuracy in odour naming. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that age and odour naming were the most potent variables in predicting performance in both immediate and delayed odour recognition. Controlling for odour naming resulted in the effect of age disappearing, indicating the pivotal role of accessibility of odour names for successful episodic odour recognition, and for age-related differences in odour recognition.     

The effects of word frequency and similarity on recognition judgments: the role of recollection

K. J. Malmberg, J. Holden, and R. M. Shiffrin (2004) reported more false alarms for low- than high-frequency words when the foils were similar to the targets. According to the source of activation confusion (SAC) model of memory, that pattern is based on recollection of an underspecified episodic trace rather than the error-prone familiarity process. The authors tested the SAC account by varying whether participants were warned about the nature of similar foils and whether the recognition test required the discrimination. More false alarms for low-frequency similar items occurred only when participants were not warned at study about the subtle features to be discriminated later. The differential false-alarm rate by word frequency corresponded to the pattern of remember responses obtained when the test instructions did not ask for a subtle discrimination, supporting the SAC account that reversed false-alarm rates to similar foils are based on the recollection process.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the contribution of perceptual fluency and priming to recognition memory

Repetition priming has been shown to be independent of recognition memory. Thus, the severely amnesic patient E.P. has demonstrated intact stem completion priming and perceptual identification priming, despite at-chance performance on recognition memory tasks. It has also been shown that perceptual fluency can influence feelings of familiarity, in the sense that items perceived more quickly tend to be identified as familiar. If studied items are identified more fluently, due to perceptual priming, and fluency leads to familiarity, why do severely amnesic patients perform no better than chance on recognition memory tasks? One possibility is that severely amnesic patients do not exhibit normal fluency. Another possibility is that fluency is not a sufficiently strong cue for familiarity. In two experiments, 2 severely amnesic patients, 3 moderately amnesic patients, and 8 controls saw words slowly clearing from a mask. The participants identified each word as quickly as possible and then made a recognition (old/new) judgment. All the participants exhibited fluency, in that old responses were associated with shorter identification times than new responses were. In addition, for the severely amnesic patients, priming was intact, and recognition memory performance was at chance. We next calculated how much priming and fluency should elevate the probability of accurate recognition. The tendency to identify studied words rapidly (.6) and the tendency to label these rapidly identified words old (.6) would result in 36% of the studied words being labeled old. Other studied words were identified slowly (.4) but were still labeled old (.4), resulting in an additional 16% of studied words labeled old. Thus, the presence of fluency increases the probability of accurate recognition judgments to only 52% (chance = 50%). This finding explains why amnesic patients can exhibit both priming and fluency yet still perform at chance on recognition tests.     

Implicit /explicit memory versus analytic/nonanalytic processing: Rethinking the mere exposure effect

In studies of the mere exposure effect, rapid presentation of items can increase liking without accurate recognition. The effect on liking has been explained as a misattribution of fluency caused by prior presentation. However, fluency is also a source of feelings of familiarity. It is, therefore, surprising that prior experience can enhance liking without also causing familiarity-based recognition. We suggest that when study opportunities are minimal and test items are perceptually similar, people adopt an analytic approach, attempting to recognize distinctive features. That strategy fails because rapid presentation prevents effective encoding of such features; it also prevents people from experiencing fluency and a consequent feeling of familiarity. We suggest that the liking-without-recognition effect results from using an effective (nonanalytic) strategy in judging pleasantness, but an ineffective (analytic) strategy in recognition. Explanations of the mere exposure effect based on a distinction between implicit and explicit memory are unnecessary.     

Recognition memory and the hippocampus: A test of the hippocampal contribution to recollection and familiarity

It has been suggested that the hippocampus selectively supports recollection and that adjacent cortex in the medial temporal lobe can support familiarity. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the hippocampus supports both recollection and familiarity. We tested these suggestions by assessing the performance of patients with hippocampal lesions on recognition memory tests that differ in the extent to which recollection and familiarity contribute to the recognition decision. When targets and foils are highly similar, prior evidence suggests that, on a forced-choice test in which targets are presented together with highly similar, corresponding foils (the FC-C format), performance is supported primarily by familiarity. By contrast, when targets are presented together with foils that are similar to other targets (the FC-NC format) or when memory is tested in a yes/no (Y/N) format, performance is based much more strongly on recollection. Accordingly, a finding that hippocampal damage impaired both Y/N recognition and FC-NC recognition but spared FC-C recognition would suggest that the hippocampus selectively supports recollection. We administered Y/N, FC-C, and FC-NC tests to five memory-impaired patients with circumscribed hippocampal lesions and 14 controls. The patients were impaired on all three types of recognition test, and there was no indication that the patients were disproportionately benefited or disproportionately impaired on any test. This pattern of performance suggests that the hippocampus supports both recollection and familiarity.The medial temporal lobe (the hippocampus plus the entorhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices) is essential for the recognition of past experience. The capacity for recognition is widely thought to depend on two distinct processes, recollection and familiarity (Mandler 1980; Yonelinas et al. 2002; Wixted 2007). Recollection involves remembering specific details about the episode in which an item was encountered. Familiarity involves simply knowing that an item was presented, even when no additional information can be retrieved about the learning episode itself. This distinction has been prominent in recent discussions about memory, particularly in relation to its possible anatomical basis. One proposal is that recollection depends on the hippocampus and that familiarity depends on the adjacent medial temporal lobe cortex (Brown and Aggleton 2001; Mayes et al. 2002; Yonelinas et al. 2002). Alternatively, it has been suggested that the hippocampus is important for both recollection and familiarity and that the distinction between these two processes does not illuminate the functional differences between the hippocampus and adjacent cortex (Rutishauser et al. 2006; Wais et al. 2006; Squire et al. 2007; Wixted 2007).To clarify the role of the hippocampus in recognition memory, the performance of memory-impaired patients with hippocampal damage has often been compared to that of controls on tests that differ in the extent to which recollection and familiarity contribute to the recognition memory decision. One such approach involves the use of highly similar targets and foils tested using a yes/no (Y/N) format and a forced-choice corresponding (FC-C) format (Holdstock et al. 2002; Westerberg et al. 2006; Bayley et al. 2008). In the case of the Y/N format, participants see a list of targets intermixed with foils (each similar to one of the targets) and are asked to respond “yes” to the targets and “no” to the foils. In the FC-C format, participants see a target presented together with its corresponding, similar foil and are asked to identify the target. According to an idea advanced by Norman and O''Reilly (2003), familiarity can support FC-C recognition because one can make effective use of small but consistent differences between the familiarity signals triggered by the target and foil items. That is, when targets and foils are highly similar and are presented together in the FC-C format, familiarity for the target is likely to slightly and reliably exceed that of the similar foil, allowing the target to be correctly chosen on the basis of familiarity. By contrast, in the Y/N format, slight differences between the familiarity signals of target items and their corresponding foils no longer provide useful information, because the targets and their corresponding foils are not presented together at test. Accordingly, good performance with the Y/N format is more dependent on recollection than with the FC-C format.The same explanation may account for why performance on FC-C tests sometimes exceeds performance on forced-choice noncorresponding (FC-NC) tests (e.g., Hintzman 1988). In the FC-NC format, target items are presented together with a noncorresponding foil that is similar to another target item from the study list (Fig. 1). Thus, the FC-C and FC-NC tests differ only in that the similar targets and foils are presented together in the former but not in the latter. When the corresponding targets and foils are presented together (in the FC-C format), participants can make effective use of consistent differences in familiarity values (as discussed above). When the corresponding targets and foils are not presented together, participants cannot make use of the small differences that they might detect through a side-by-side comparison.Open in a separate windowFigure 1.Test format and materials for the three kinds of recognition test. For each test, 12 images, either objects (A) or silhouettes (B), were presented at study, and memory was tested in one of three ways. For the forced-choice corresponding test (FC-C), each target (a studied item) was presented together with a highly similar foil (a new item). For the forced-choice noncorresponding test (FC-NC), each target was presented together with a foil that was highly similar to a different target from the study list. Participants were asked to point to exactly the same image they had seen during study. For the yes/no test (Y/N), the 12 targets and the 12 foils (each similar to one of the targets) were intermixed and presented one at a time. Participants were asked to respond “yes” if they had seen exactly the same image before and “no” if they had not. Asterisks identify the target items.A recent study (Migo et al. 2009) provides empirical support for the suggestion that familiarity primarily contributes to the recognition decision in the FC-C format, whereas recollection contributes more strongly in the Y/N format and in the FC-NC format. In the Migo et al. (2009) study, healthy participants received FC-C, FC-NC, and Y/N tests after receiving either standard instructions to make their decisions based on familiarity or recollection or modified instructions to base their decisions on familiarity only. On the FC-NC test and on the Y/N test, performance using familiarity alone was significantly worse than under standard instructions. On the FC-C test, performance using familiarity alone was nearly as good as under standard instructions. This result supports the earlier suggestion that FC-C is primarily supported by familiarity, whereas recollection plays a larger role in FC-NC and Y/N recognition (Norman and O''Reilly 2003).If the hippocampus is critical for recollection but not for familiarity, and if good performance on the FC-C format can be achieved using familiarity alone, then patients with focal hippocampal lesions should be differentially impaired on the Y/N and FC-NC recognition test formats compared with the FC-C format. Three recent studies investigated this issue by assessing the effects of hippocampal damage (or presumed hippocampal damage) on Y/N and FC-C tests that used highly similar targets and foils (the FC-NC format was not used in these earlier studies). All three studies used black-and-white silhouette images of objects, and the FC-C test involved the target item and three similar foils (i.e., multiple-choice with four alternatives). In one study, a single patient with bilateral hippocampal damage (patient Y.R.) was impaired on the test of Y/N recognition but was unimpaired on the test of FC-C recognition (Holdstock et al. 2002). A similar result was reported in patients with a diagnosis of mild cognitive impairment (MCI) (Westerberg et al. 2006). These findings have been taken to support the suggestion that the hippocampus selectively supports recollection. However, the study by Holdstock and colleagues (2002) involved a single patient (Y.R.), and findings from a single patient need not agree with findings obtained from a group of patients (see Discussion). In addition, the Westerberg et al. (2006) study involved individuals with a diagnosis of MCI for whom anatomical data were not available. It is therefore not clear what the status of the hippocampus was in these patients. Moreover, a standard Y/N procedure involving 12 study items and 24 test items (as opposed to the 12 study test items and 60 test items used in previous studies [Holdstock et al. 2002; Westerberg et al. 2006; Bayley et al. 2008]) might be better suited to address the question of whether Y/N recognition is selectively impaired in hippocampal patients. Bayley et al. (2008) tested five patients with circumscribed hippocampal damage using the same test materials and procedure as in Holdstock et al. (2002). When all 60 test items of the Y/N test were scored, the patients were found to be more impaired on the Y/N test than on the FC-C test. However, when only the first 24 test items of the Y/N test were scored (according to the standard Y/N procedure), the patients were found to be impaired on both the Y/N and FC-C tests to a similar degree.The earlier studies (Holdstock et al. 2002; Westerberg et al. 2006; Bayley et al. 2008) compared Y/N recognition to four-alternative FC-C recognition in which each target was presented along with three corresponding foils. None of the earlier studies investigated how patients with hippocampal lesions performed on FC-NC recognition. As Migo et al. (2009) point out, FC-C and FC-NC tests are better matched than the FC-C and Y/N tests because they are both forced-choice tests, and both use the same number of test trials. As such, they argue, it would be more useful to compare FC-C recognition performance to FC-NC recognition performance to determine whether patients with hippocampal lesions are intact or impaired on familiarity-based tests.The present study assessed Y/N, two-alternative FC-C, and two-alternative FC-NC recognition, using highly similar targets and foils. The tests were given to five patients with circumscribed hippocampal damage and 14 matched controls. The Y/N test involved an equal number of targets and foils (unlike the design used in the prior studies), and a two-alternative format was used for the forced-choice tests to make them comparable to the Y/N test (i.e., all three tests involved the same number of targets and foils). The FC-C and FC-NC tests were identical except with respect to how the targets and their corresponding foils were paired on the recognition test.To extend our findings beyond the stimuli used in prior studies, we also used color photographs of objects in addition to black-and-white silhouettes. Using these three test formats, we asked the following questions: (1) Does hippocampal damage impair Y/N recognition memory but spare, or disproportionately benefit, FC-C recognition (as suggested by the view that the hippocampus supports recollection and not familiarity)? Or does hippocampal damage impair Y/N and FC-C recognition similarly (as suggested by the view that the hippocampus supports both recollection and familiarity)? (2) Does hippocampal damage disproportionately benefit FC-C recognition relative to FC-NC recognition, or does hippocampal damage impair FC-C and FC-NC recognition similarly?     

Recognition of familiar and unfamiliar melodies in normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease

We tested normal young and elderly adults and elderly Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients on recognition memory for tunes. In Experiment 1, AD patients and age-matched controls received a study list and an old/new recognition test of highly familiar, traditional tunes, followed by a study list and test of novel tunes. The controls performed better than did the AD patients. The controls showed the “mirror effect” of increased hits and reduced false alarms for traditional versus novel tunes, whereas the patients false-alarmed as often to traditional tunes as to novel tunes. Experiment 2 compared young adults and healthy elderly persons using a similar design. Performance was lower in the elderly group, but both younger and older subjects showed the mirror effect. Experiment 3 produced confusion between preexperimental familiarity and intraexperimental familiarity by mixing traditional and novel tunes in the study lists and tests. Here, the subjects in both age groups resembled the patients of Experiment 1 in failing to show the mirror effect. Older subjects again performed more poorly, and they differed qualitatively from younger subjects in setting stricter criteria for more nameable tunes. Distinguishing different sources of global familiarity is a factor in tune recognition, and the data suggest that this type of source monitoring is impaired in AD and involves different strategies in younger and older adults.     

Activation and binding in verbal working memory: a dual-process model for the recognition of nonwords

The article presents a mathematical model of short-term recognition based on dual-process models and the three-component theory of working memory [Oberauer, K. (2002). Access to information in working memory: Exploring the focus of attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28, 411-421]. Familiarity arises from activated representations in long-term memory, ignoring their relations; recollection retrieves bindings in the capacity-limited component of working memory. In three experiments participants encoded two short lists of nonwords for immediate recognition, one of which was then cued as irrelevant. Probes from the irrelevant list were rejected more slowly than new probes; this was also found with probes recombining letters of irrelevant nonwords, suggesting that familiarity arises from individual letters independent of their relations. When asked to accept probes whose letters were all in the relevant list, regardless of their conjunction, participants accepted probes preserving the original conjunctions faster than recombinations, showing that recollection accessed feature bindings automatically. The model fit the data best when familiarity depended only on matching letters, whereas recollection used binding information.     

An evaluation of recollection and familiarity in Alzheimer’s disease and mild cognitive impairment using receiver operating characteristics

There is a need to investigate exactly how memory breaks down in the course of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Examining what aspects of memorial processing remain relatively intact early in the disease process will allow us to develop behavioral interventions and possible drug therapies focused on these intact processes. Several recent studies have worked to understand the processes of recollection and familiarity in patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and very mild AD. Although there is general agreement that these patient groups are relatively unable to use recollection to support veridical recognition decisions, there has been some question as to how well these patients can use familiarity. The current study used receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves and a depth of processing manipulation to understand the effect of MCI and AD on the estimates of recollection and familiarity. Results showed that patients with MCI and AD were impaired in both recollection and familiarity, regardless of the depth of encoding. These results are discussed in relation to disease pathology and in the context of recent conflicting evidence as to whether familiarity remains intact in patients with MCI. The authors highlight differences in stimuli type and task difficulty as possibly modulating the ability of these patients to successfully use familiarity in support of memorial decisions.     

Elaborative processing and conjunction errors in recognition memory

Four experiments were conducted in order to examine the influence of elaborative processing at encoding on recognition memory conjunction lure errors. In these experiments, participants generated cues for compound words as wholes (e.g., haywire) or as separate entities (e.g., hay, wire). Studied words were re-presented in exact form (old) or recombined to form conjunction lures on the recognition test. Participants were asked to make old-new judgments and to indicate whether they had rejected items judged to be new because of recall of a studied item or because of lack of familiarity with an item. The results suggested that recall-to-reject processing and conjunction lure familiarity increased with both types of generation, although generation of cues for compound words as a whole did not influence conjunction lure error rates. An emphasis on processing each constituent of a compound word during encoding increased the familiarity of those constituents more than generation of a compound word as a whole, resulting in an increase in conjunction lure errors. These results suggest that both familiarity and recollection-based monitoring processes influence conjunction lure errors, and therefore support dual-process theories of recognition memory.     

Fluency and response speed in recognition judgments

Previous research has suggested that perceptual fluency can contribute to recognition judgments. In this study, we examined whether fluency in recognition is based upon the speed of preceding operations, as suggested by studies of perceptual fluency. Subjects studied items in both lexical decision and naming tasks, and were then tested on two blocks of lexical decision trials with probe recognition trials. Jacoby’s process dissociation procedure was used, and results from this procedure suggested that recognition judgments in the task were based largely upon familiarity. However, the estimated discriminability available from response time distributions was significantly less than the observed recognition discriminability. Simulated memory operating characteristics confirmed this underdetermination of recognition by response times. The results demonstrate, contrary to previous suggestions, that fluency in recognition is not based upon speed.     

错误记忆的自我参照效应：易化的作用

采用DRM范式,设置三种参照对象条件（自我、他人和中性参照）,考察错误记忆是否存在自我参照效应。结果发现：（1）与正确记忆一样,错误记忆中亦存在自我参照效应;（2）无论是正确记忆还是错误记忆,自我参照条件下的回忆成分均显著多于他人参照和中性参照,但熟悉性成分在三种不同参照对象条件下没有显著差异;（3）当词表中学习项目由分组呈现变为随机呈现时,错误记忆的自我参照效应仍稳定存在。结果揭示,自我参照效在促进正确记忆的同时,亦可易化错误记忆效应。