自闭症儿童非言语错误信念任务的实验研究

心理理论是指对自己和他人心理状态(如需要、信念、意图、动机、感觉等)的认识,并由此对相应行为做出因果性的预测和解释。国内外心理理论研究较多关注一般儿童的心理理论能力,而对自闭症儿童领域的心理理论的研究不够。本研究在原有的错误信念任务的基础上,对任务进行完全“非言语”改进,以意外内容任务为主要测试内容,将智力落后儿童作为对照组纳入到实验当中,进一步探索自闭症儿童心理理论发展情况。研究结果表明：改编后的非言语意外内容任务适用于自闭症和智力落后儿童;包括低言语能力个体在内的所有自闭症儿童的心理理论能力显著低于智力落后儿童;智力落后儿童的心理理论能力与以往研究结果相一致;相对于智力落后儿童,自闭症儿童在物品转移和调换的注意方面存在更大障碍。     

儿童心理理论的模块论:假设、方法与模型

模块论是儿童心理理论研究领域中主要理论取向之一。这一观点认为,儿童的心理理论能力是一种天赋的、领域特殊的心理结构,个体出生时便以模块的形式存在于神经系统,其发展是一个内部生物机能逐渐展开的过程。该文试图对儿童心理理论模块论的基本假设(天赋性和领域特殊性)、主要实验方法、重要模型(ToMM-SP模型)等进行评述,并就心理理论的天赋性与发展性、领域特殊性与领域普遍性、实验研究的方法与结果等引发争鸣的问题进行简评。     

儿童科学概念的认知发展

综述了作者在儿童科学概念认知领域的研究,其中包括儿童的朴素生物学、朴素物理学认知及其与心理理论发展关系的研究。作者研究了儿童在生命科学领域的自发概念,包括对生长、衰老、疾病和死亡等生命现象的认知,探查儿童对日常生活中物理学概念（如力等）的朴素认知,力图发现儿童早期认知中的潜力,同时探明他们相应的错误概念,并采用教育干预实验,促进儿童科学概念的转化。还探查影响儿童科学概念发展的因素,包括外部教育条件以及个体认知能力（如心理理论发展水平,推理能力等）。研究发现,儿童在接受正规的科学教育前就对人类重要的科学领域形成了自己的“朴素理论”,他们用这种理论来解释现实世界的现象。作者主张儿童的科学教育（包括健康教育）应该以儿童的“朴素理论”为基础,从而真正做到因材施教     

心理理论研究的毕生取向

心理理论经典研究范式主要关注的是3～5岁年龄的儿童。随着研究的不断深入,学者们开始逐渐把眼光投向人的生命全程,表现在：开始考察4岁以前儿童有关心理理论的问题;尝试对自5岁直到老年期的心理理论发展情况进行探讨;提出了心理理论的毕生发展观。心理理论研究的毕生(life-span)取向已初露端倪,该取向将是今后心理理论领域研究的重要发展方向之一。     

任务切换理论争议新证据

任务切换是研究认知控制的主要范式之一。大量研究发现切换试次比重复试次的反应时更长,错误率更高,这种差异称为切换代价。任务切换时所产生切换代价的理论解释主要有惯性论、重构论和联结论。近十年来,这些理论均获得新的实验支持和发展,但其争议依旧,没有哪一理论能成功解释任务切换的所有效应。未来研究可以建立整合模型,以准确描述切换代价产生的认知机制。     

儿童“心理理论”发展的“理论论”（The theory—theory）述评

“儿童心理理论”(children’s theory of mind)的发展研究是西方80年代以来发展心理学最重要的一个研究领域,也是一个迄今已取得长足进展并前景看好的热点探索领域。本来,“心理理论”这一术语最初常常不过是指称儿童发展着的“常识心理学”(folk psychology)的一种试探法(heuristic)。但后来有许多发展心理学家进一步提出儿童对心理生活的认识真的是一种“理论”,这就形成了所谓“理论论”(The theory—theory)。     

成人心理理论的研究回顾与展望

成人心理理论领域的研究自20世纪90年代受到关注。成人心理理论在发展模式和水平上与儿童存在差异,高级的心理理论任务被广泛使用,但各种研究范式的有效性受到质疑。正常成人心理理论能力伴随个体老化而下降的趋势已得到多数研究证实,而更多的研究者关注特殊成人的心理理论发展。成人的心理理论亦与执行功能、语言、社会能力等因素密切相关。未来研究应注意在提高成人心理理论任务效度的基础上,拓展研究的年龄范围,重视特殊成人心理理论研究的应用价值,从干预和治疗角度出发,拓宽研究领域。     

婴儿心理理论的发展:表现和机制

婴儿心理理论发展研究是探索人类社会认知起源、发生和发展的重要领域.从联合注意、情绪理解、意图理解、愿望理解和错误信念理解等方面分析了几个月至3岁左右的婴儿心理理论发生和发展的研究现状.为了探讨3岁以下婴儿心理理论的发展过程,研究者发展了一些适合婴儿语言和行为发展特征的非言语和言语测试任务,包括非言语自发—反应错误信念任务、言语自发—反应错误信念任务,同时也采用眼动技术和事件相关电位技术来考察心理理论发展水平和发展机制.婴儿心理理论的发生和发展在不同测试任务上表现出一定的年龄特征.这与认知功能(如语言、执行功能)的发展、环境因素(如家庭、同伴、文化)以及神经系统发育有关.也有一些最新研究从心理理论发生和发展的基因、激素水平进行了探讨.最后提出了该领域未来研究可以进一步探讨的问题.     

影响儿童心理理论发展的家庭因素

儿童心理理论 (theoryofmind ,TOM)的研究已经成为近 2 0年来发展心理学的最重要研究领域。心理理论是指个体凭借一定的知识系统对他人的心理状态进行推测 ,并据此对他人的行为做出因果性预测和解释的能力。早期的研究主要集中在对儿童心理理论起始的年龄以及不同任务带来的结果差异等问题的探讨上。近来发展心理学者把研究的注意转移到儿童心理理论发展的差异以及导致差异产生的影响因素上。一般认为 ,儿童在 4岁时就获得了心理理论能力 ,即 4岁儿童就可以根据一个人的愿望、信念等来理解他人的行为。但在研究中 ,研究者也发现同一年龄儿…     

成人期个体心理理论的发展、研究范式与神经机制

成人心理理论的发展有助于个体顺利地进行社会互动,更好地适应社会。个体的心理理论能力会随着个体认知能力的发展以及大脑的发育而呈现出不断发展变化的趋势。研究者采取众多研究范式测量了成人心理理论。在进行心理理论加工时,青春期个体更多的激活了内侧前额叶皮层的后部,而青年期个体更多的激活了右颞上沟。根据研究结果,学者们构建了两成分认知模型、共享回路与中线结构整合模型以及心理理论多层次模型来解释成人心理理论能力。在进一步的研究中,成人心理理论的研究还应开发有效的研究范式来逐步揭示心理理论本身发展的特征、心理理论与外界因素如生活环境的关系以及解读互动心理的特征。     

False belief and language comprehension in Cantonese-speaking children

The current research compared two accounts of the relation between language and false belief in children, namely that (a) language is generally related to false belief because both require secondary representation in a social-interactional context and that (b) specific language structures that explicitly code metarepresentation contribute uniquely to the language-false belief relation. In three studies, attempts were made to correlate Cantonese-speaking children's false belief with their general language comprehension and understanding of certain structures that explicitly express metarepresentational knowledge. Results showed that these structures failed to predict false belief after age, nonverbal intelligence, and general language comprehension were considered. In contrast, general language remained predictive of false belief after controlling for age, nonverbal intelligence, and language structures. The current findings are more consistent with a general language account than a language structure account.     

A developmental shift in processes underlying successful belief-desire reasoning

Young children's failures in reasoning about beliefs and desires, and especially about false beliefs, have been much studied. However, there are few accounts of successful belief-desire reasoning in older children or adults. An exception to this is a model in which belief attribution is treated as a process wherein an inhibitory system selects the most likely content for the belief to be attributed from amongst several competing contents [Leslie, A. M., & Polizzi, P. (1998). Developmental Science, 1, 247-254]. We tested this model with an ‘avoidance false belief task’ in which subjects predict the behavior of a character, who wants to avoid an object but who is mistaken about which of three locations it is in. The task has two equally correct answers—in seeking to avoid the location where she mistakenly believes the object to be, the character might equally go to the location where the object actually is, or to the remaining empty location. However, the model predicts that subjects will prefer one of these answers, selecting the object's actual location over the empty location. This bias was confirmed in a series of five experiments with children aged between 4 and 8 years of age. A sixth experiment ruled out two rival explanations for children's biased responding. Two further experiments found the opposite bias in adults. These findings support one selection model as an account of belief-desire reasoning in children, and suggest that a different model is needed for adults. The process of selecting contents for mental state attributions shows a developmental shift between 8 years of age and adulthood.     

When the alternative would have been better: counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning--asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got--creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that--when controlling for false positives--regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

An association account of false belief understanding

The elicited-response false belief task has traditionally been considered as reliably indicating that children acquire an understanding of false belief around 4 years of age. However, recent investigations using spontaneous-response tasks suggest that false belief understanding emerges much earlier. This leads to a developmental paradox: if young infants already understand false belief, then why do they fail the elicited-response false belief task? We postulate two systems to account for the development of false belief understanding: an association module, which provides infants with the capacity to register congruent associations between agents and objects, and an operating system, which allows them to transform these associations into incongruent associations through a process of inhibition, selection and representation. The interaction between the association module and the operating system enables infants to register increasingly complex associations on the basis of another agent’s movements, visual perspective and propositional attitudes. This allows us account for the full range of findings on false belief understanding.     

When the alternative would have been better: Counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning—asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got—creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that—when controlling for false positives—regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

The ontogeny of intent‐based normative judgments

When evaluating norm transgressions, children begin to show some sensitivity to the agent's intentionality around preschool age. However, the specific developmental trajectories of different forms of such intent‐based judgments and their cognitive underpinnings are still largely unclear. The current studies, therefore, systematically investigated the development of intent‐based normative judgments as a function of two crucial factors: (a) the type of the agent's mental state underlying a normative transgression, and (b) the type of norm transgressed (moral versus conventional). In Study 1, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children as well as adults were presented with vignettes in which an agent transgressed either a moral or a conventional norm. Crucially, she did so either intentionally, accidentally (not intentionally at all) or unknowingly (intentionally, yet based on a false belief regarding the outcome). The results revealed two asymmetries in children's intent‐based judgments. First, all age groups showed greater sensitivity to mental state information for moral compared to conventional transgressions. Second, children's (but not adults') normative judgments were more sensitive to the agent's intention than to her belief. Two subsequent studies investigated this asymmetry in children more closely and found evidence that it is based on performance factors: children are able in principle to take into account an agent's false belief in much the same way as her intentions, yet do not make belief‐based judgments in many existing tasks (like that of Study 1) due to their inferential complexity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a more systematic understanding of the development of intent‐based normative judgment.     

Mindreading with ease? Fluency and belief reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds

For decades, philosophers and psychologists have assumed that children understand other people’s behavior on the basis of Belief Reasoning (BR) at latest by age 5 when they pass the false belief task. Furthermore, children’s use of BR in the true belief task has been regarded as being ontogenetically prior. Recent findings from developmental studies challenge this view and indicate that 4- to 5-year-old children make use of a reasoning strategy, which is cognitively less demanding than BR and called perceptual access reasoning (PAR), in true belief tasks. I appeal to research on fluency to explain these findings. On my account, 4- to 5- year-old children understand other people’s behavior by means of BR if they experience cognitive strain (such as in false belief tasks) but they revert to simpler heuristics PAR when such an experience is missing (such as in true belief tasks).     

Indexical and symbolic referencing: what role do they play in children's success on theory of mind tasks?

Numerous measures have been employed in the last 17 years to assess theory of mind (ToM). The literature reports marked variability in the age at which children succeed on these measures. To account for this variability, researchers have provided explanations ranging from cognitive shifts and voids to the inability to understand the language of the tasks or to social/pragmatic considerations, all of which tell us little if anything about the internal mechanism underlying ToM. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive theoretical account of children's success and the discrepancies found across different ToM tasks. We test the hypothesis that children's understanding of ToM is sensitive to the basic elements of language, that is, to whether the language is indexical or symbolic. Support for this account was found in the analysis of selected test protocols in four published studies of ToM, and new data collected from 53 children (4--6 years) which showed that a higher percentage of children succeeded on tasks with a high ratio of indexical to symbolic references than on tasks with a high ratio of symbolic to indexical references. There was also a main effect of age with older children succeeding at higher rates on both tasks than younger children. Our findings suggest that indexical representation can afford ToM understanding in 4-year-olds, but is not sufficient for a more mature ToM. The latter requires symbolic representation that was demonstrated by the majority of 5--6-year-olds.     

Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

Is a false belief statement a lie or a truthful statement? Judgments and explanations of children aged 3 to 8

Attribution of a false belief is usually taken to indicate that children distinguish between a real world state of affairs and its representation by a subject. But how do they conceive of the properties of such a mental entity? Do they understand that false belief necessarily goes hand in hand with good faith? Our study explores to what extent children conflate false beliefs with lies. Sixty children aged 3 to 8 were presented with an FB situation and then asked whether the character having an FB was lying or not. Results show that up to 6 years, although correctly attributing the FB, children systematically judge the FB statement to be a lie, since it does not correspond to the real world state of affairs. Older children succeed in the lie judgment, invoking the false believer's not knowing the world state. Discussion bears on the relation between false belief and more general epistemic states.