冲突情境下幼儿的选择性信任和信念修正

幼儿如何选择性地采信他人提供的信息、获取知识, 是幼儿社会认知发展研究的重要问题。除客观的信息内容外, 信息传递者的特征也影响幼儿的选择性信任。另外, 在不确定情境下, 他人证言与幼儿已有信念可能存在冲突, 在二者冲突的情境下, 幼儿是否可以采信他人的证言, 并最终改变幼儿的已有判断是以往研究忽略的问题。本研究考察了当母亲证言与幼儿已有信念冲突时, 不同程度的冲突情境(面对不同比例的合成动物时)对幼儿选择性信任和信念修正的影响。研究采用冲突信息源范式, 向74名4~6岁幼儿呈现对不同比例合成动物(50%-50%任务 vs 75%-25%任务)命名的证言, 考察幼儿对信息提供者的询问意愿、对证言的信任情况和在证言前后对合成动物的判断(信念修正)。信息提供的一方为母亲(提供相似度低的动物名称), 另一方为陌生人(提供相似度高的动物名称)。结果发现, 幼儿的选择性信任和信念修正受到母亲证言与已有信念冲突程度的影响。在低冲突情境下, 幼儿对母亲证言的询问意愿和外显信任均高于高冲突情境。幼儿的信念修正存在年龄差异, 在低冲突情境下, 年长幼儿比年幼幼儿更倾向于改变已有信念, 在高冲突情境下, 年长的幼儿比年幼幼儿更不愿意改变已有信念。本研究结果表明, 当母亲的证言与幼儿已有信念冲突时, 中国幼儿可以区分不同程度的冲突情境, 并且可以根据冲突的程度进行选择性信任和信念修正。     

儿童社会认识论:儿童对信息提供者的选择性信任

个体掌握的知识很多来自于他人的传授。从4岁起,儿童就意识到不同的信息提供者在可靠性上存在差异。他们根据与提供者间的熟悉程度、提供者过往陈词的准确性、以及来自他人的线索等策略对于信息提供者的可靠性进行评估,从而决定谁更值得信任。未来关于儿童对于信息提供者选择性信任的研究应从扩展探究的知识领域、对于信息提供者其他特征的操纵、以及潜在文化差异检验等方面进行。     

儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习

儿童的选择性学习是目前认知发展领域的热点问题。儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习(即选择性因果学习)对于回答儿童如何获取知识这个经典问题具有重要意义。儿童的选择性因果学习表现在对他人解释的辨别、评估与采纳上。他们会主动向可靠的信息提供者寻求解释, 并在接收回答后表现出选择性跟进反应。对于他人的回答, 年幼儿童不仅能根据言语线索辨别出解释性陈述, 还能依据解释的结构特征选择更好的陈述加以采纳, 年长儿童甚至可以从不同模式的解释中灵活地学习更适宜的因果知识。未来研究应深入关注解释的其它特征在儿童选择性因果学习中的作用, 进一步探讨选择性因果学习的认知机制。     

面孔二态性对学前儿童信任行为的影响——来自人格标签的解释

面孔二态性是指成熟男性和女性经过青春期第二性征的发展后逐步形成了面孔上的性别特征,男性化与女性化是这一维度的两个水平。本研究探索面孔二态性是否会对学龄前儿童信任行为产生影响,并从幼儿对二态性面孔的人格标签角度来解释。实验1修订信任博弈任务（Trust game）,考察学前儿童信任行为是否会因搭档面孔的二态性（男性化和女性化）而不同,经历负性反馈后被试在下轮游戏中信任选择率是否会下降;实验2让学前儿童选择人格形容词来描述不同性别化的面孔,探讨幼儿对不同二态性面孔是否已形成不同的人格标签。结果表明学前儿童对女性化面孔信任选择率最高;在遭遇负性反馈后的下一轮游戏中,幼儿对他人的信任率显著下降;学前儿童认为女性化面孔更具有积极人格,而更多将男性化面孔与消极人格词汇匹配。由此,二态性面孔影响学前儿童的信任行为,在于他们对二态性面孔已形成不同的人格标签。     

3～6岁幼儿对智能语音助手在不同领域的知识性信任

基于双信息源实验范式,考察3～6岁幼儿和成人对智能语音助手(Digital Voice Assistants, DVAs)的知识性信任,并验证准确性在其信任中的作用。实验1,操纵了信息源类型(DVAsvs人类)和知识领域(自然vs社会)。结果显示,与人类相比,幼儿和成人对DVAs的知识性信任更强。对DVAs的信任程度, 6岁幼儿高于4、5岁幼儿,成人高于幼儿。与社会领域相比,幼儿和成人均更倾向于询问DVAs自然领域的问题。基于实验1,实验2操纵了两种信息源提供证言的准确性条件,结果发现,当DVAs不准确时,幼儿和成人均不再信任其证言,且3岁幼儿对准确性的敏感性较低。研究结果表明,信息源类型、知识领域和证言准确性都会影响幼儿的知识性信任,准确性是评估DVAs可靠性的重要标准。     

儿童基于不同线索的所有权判断及其文化差异

对所有权的认知依赖于不同的线索。儿童很早就能通过不同的线索判断所有权。3岁幼儿能够基于先占、劳动、证言、许可控制、刻板印象等线索判断所有权。社会经济和文化因素会影响幼儿对所有权线索的利用, 如社会经济发展不发达地区儿童对先占线索的利用在发展上会有所延迟, 集体主义文化中的幼儿在进行所有权判断时更保守一些, 表现为当先占线索和劳动线索冲突时更倾向于判断物品属于先占者。未来研究应重视通过冲突线索范式探索不同线索在儿童所有权判断中的权重, 探索儿童基于不同线索判断所有权背后的内部心理机制, 同时尝试利用眼动技术等手段对2岁以下幼儿的所有权认知进行研究。     

影响儿童选择性信任的社会性线索研究新进展

选择性信任是指儿童根据不同线索对信息提供者的可信度进行判断,从而有选择性地相信其所提供的信息。研究影响儿童选择性信任的因素对于儿童社会化发展具有重要意义,已有研究表明,这些因素可分为认识性线索和社会性线索两类,近些年的研究重在社会性线索。为探讨社会性线索对儿童选择性信任的影响,研究者对选择性信任研究的基本范式作了补充和改进,本研究概括为两类:一类是用其他任务替代物品命名任务,另一类是在熟悉阶段增加信息提供者对寻找者行为结果的反馈环节。采用这些变式,近年来学者们对信息提供者的意图、可信度特质、亲社会特质和群体认同等社会性线索对儿童选择性信任的影响进行了探讨。未来关于儿童选择性信任的研究可从探寻新的研究范式或改善现有研究范式、"知""行"分离机制、群体认同与信息正确性的影响、意图与可信度特质的关系,以及选择性信任对儿童社会化进程的影响等方面进行。     

焦虑对社会决策行为的影响

焦虑是在人类日常生活中常见的一种负性情绪。探讨焦虑情绪在个人生活和工作中扮演的角色, 是生理学界和心理学界的一项重要课题。过往研究显示焦虑水平的提高会对社会能力和社交技巧造成显著的影响。在社会决策领域中, 这种影响的具体表现是高焦虑者比低焦虑者更倾向于采取回避风险的策略。但是, 过往研究主要关心包含经济因素的社会决策, 而对其他类型的社会行为的探索存在不足。以下问题值得未来研究者们关注：在个体层面上, 高焦虑者是否会更容易受到外界信息的影响, 表现出更强的从众行为和权威依从倾向, 与他人进行社会比较或社会竞争的动机是否会被削弱？在群体层面上, 高焦虑者是否更容易表现出人际信任, 以及是否会表现出更强的服从集体倾向？考察这些问题将会为针对焦虑情绪的认知研究和临床研究起到促进作用。     

愿望采择发展水平对幼儿情感决策的影响

选取148名4岁儿童, 运用实验法考察了幼儿的愿望采择发展水平对其情感决策的影响。结果表明: (1) 幼儿的愿望采择水平对其情感决策具有显著影响。情境中他人愿望信息充足时, 幼儿会采择他人愿望并以此为线索为他人决策, 但对线索的利用程度受其愿望采择水平的制约。(2) 在无关于他人愿望信息提示的条件下, 4岁儿童为他人与为自己的情感决策不存在显著差异。(3) 4岁儿童能够采择他人的单一愿望, 但其冲突愿望采择能力还不成熟。     

学前儿童对“知道”和“会”的认知

72名3至5岁儿童接受了陈述性知识和程序性知识的学习任务,探查他们在获得新知识前后对自己是否“知道”和 “会”的认知和知识获取方式的认知 。结果显示,有部分学前儿童在不知道或不会的情况下报告自己“知道”或“会”,对自己的判断倾向于作出肯定回答;在学习新知识之后,学前儿童对自己是否“知道”的认识要比是否“会”的认知准确;儿童对陈述性知识的获取方式的认识好于程序性知识,3岁儿童对知识获取方式的认识存在困难。     

The role of epistemic and social characteristics in children’s selective trust: Three meta‐analyses

Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children’s selective trust. Three meta‐analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children’s selective trust in an informant based on the informant’s epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children’s selective trust decisions. The first and second meta‐analyses found that children displayed medium‐to‐large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4‐year‐olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3‐year‐olds. The third meta‐analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3‐year‐old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta‐analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant’s testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children’s selective trust are discussed.     

Preschoolers’ Theory-of-Mind Knowledge Influences Whom They Trust About Others’ Theories of Mind

Two experiments examined whether particular aspects of social-cognitive knowledge predicted how preschoolers would treat informants who displayed a more or less developed understanding of that knowledge. In Experiment 1, children's own success on false-belief measures correlated with the extent to which they endorsed information generated by a confederate with a more developed sense of false belief over a confederate with a less developed sense of false belief. In Experiment 2, preschoolers were assessed for whether they possessed a more action-based or mental state-based understanding of pretense. They were then presented with informants who displayed each kind of knowledge. Children's own knowledge again correlated with which informant they believed was a reliable source of knowledge about novel pretend actions. These results not only extend findings in the “trust in testimony” literature beyond word learning, but also potentially reveal another mechanism by which children learn from others—they might trust others’ information about a specific piece of knowledge based on examination of their own knowledge of that domain.     

A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs

This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people's truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony.     

Savvy or Haphazard? Comparing Preschoolers’ Performance Across Selective Learning Tasks Based on Different Epistemic Indicators

Children frequently select learning sources based on epistemic cues, or cues pertaining to informants’ knowledge. Previous research has shown that preschoolers preferentially learn from informants who have been accurate in the past, appear confident, or have had visual access to relevant information. The present series of studies aimed to investigate the relation between these 3 types of epistemic selective learning abilities in 176 children ages 3 years to 6 years. Results indicated that children’s performance was mostly uncorrelated across the different selective learning tasks and tasks measuring theory of mind and executive function were not found to predict any selective learning skills. Implications for the reliability and current conceptual understanding of these selective learning tasks are discussed.     

The Building of Epistemic Trust: An Adoptive Family’s Experience of Mentalization-Based Therapy

ABSTRACT

Recently, theorists have posited the development of epistemic trust – the trust in others as reliable sources of information – as an essential aspect of the therapeutic relationship and a mechanism of therapeutic change. Epistemic trust is likely to be disrupted in adoptive children and families and Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT) aims to explicitly promote its development. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how epistemic mistrust is addressed and how epistemic trust is established within the MBT framework. This single-case, exploratory study reports data from in-depth interviews with one adoptive family, which were analyzed qualitatively using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Two superordinate themes are reported: pre-therapy factors contributing to epistemic mistrust and factors contributing to the development of epistemic trust. The findings highlight two critical elements in establishing epistemic trust: the use of certain clinical skills that help build a secure base within therapy and the possibility of trust being transferred from and to other professionals/systems beyond therapy. Hence, this study informs a deeper understanding of how epistemic trust may be built in therapeutic work with adopted children and identifies possible clinical approaches that may be used by clinicians working with this client group.     

The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust

According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p. While the strong view offers a genuinely inter-personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p only if the speaker is reliable. While the weaker view offers an epistemic account of testimony, it faces a problem about redundancy: how can trust play any epistemic role when the speaker's reliability seems to pre-empt any contribution that trust may make towards such epistemic reason? This paper argues that neither horn of this dilemma is convincing once proponents of assurance views avail themselves of an epistemic distinction between reasons of rationality as a guide to reasonable belief and reasons of justification as a guide to true belief. Whereas testimonial assurance grounds rational reasons, which need not make probable the beliefs they make reasonable, testimonial reliability grounds justificatory reasons, which need not make reasonable the beliefs they make probable.     

The Right Stuff: Preschoolers Generalize Reliability Across Communicative Domains When Informants Show Semantic (Not Episodic) Knowledge

ABSTRACT

Although preschoolers have strong expectations about the pedagogical nature of pointing gestures (Csibra & Gergely, 2006), more recent work has shown that preschoolers prefer to use informants’ spoken language, not their pointing gestures, to make judgments about their reliability (Palmquist & Jaswal, 2015). Here, we explored children’s inferences about pointers using a standard selective trust paradigm. Specifically, we asked whether 4- and 5-year-olds generalize reliability across communicative domains (from pointing ability to speaking ability). We found that children preferred to make generalizations about pointers’ reliability when they had conveyed semantic, but not episodic, knowledge. Individual differences in theory of mind also predicted children’s willingness to make generalizations about pointers’ reliability. Both sets of results suggest that multiple factors (i.e., the type of knowledge an informant shares and individual differences in children’s cognitive development) affect whether preschoolers generalize others’ reliability across domains.     

Gender and Trust in Science

It is now recognized that relations of trust play an epistemic role in science. The contested issue is under what conditions trust in scientific testimony is warranted. I argue that John Hardwig's view of trustworthy scientific testimony is inadequate because it does not take into account the possibility that credibility does not reliably reflect trustworthiness, and because it does not appreciate the role communities have in guaranteeing the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.     

线索冲突情境下幼儿对不同领域知识的选择性信任特点

探讨幼儿在准确性线索和共识线索冲突情境下对自然与社会领域知识的选择性信任特点。实验1探究幼儿在线索冲突情境下对自然领域知识的选择性信任,选取88名4~6岁幼儿,采用对物品命名的方法,结果发现4岁幼儿依据共识线索进行信任判断,而5~6岁幼儿依据准确性线索进行信任判断;实验2探究幼儿在线索冲突情境下对社会领域知识的选择性信任,选取94名4-6岁幼儿,采用对人格特质命名的方法,结果发现4岁幼儿依据共识线索进行信任判断,5岁幼儿对两类线索没有做出偏向性选择,6岁幼儿依据准确性线索进行信任判断。实验3采用被试内设计,探讨5岁幼儿对两个领域知识的选择性信任,验证了实验1和实验2的相关结果。结论:在线索冲突情境下幼儿对不同领域知识的选择性信任具有不同的年龄发展特点。     

The puzzle of philosophical testimony

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief.