Science as a justification for psychology as a social institution

Psychology seeks to justify its claims to privilege as a social institution largely on the basis of its scientific knowledge claims. These knowledge claims tend to be based on, and to reflect a particular view about the nature of science which is under increasing challenge. This situation is discussed and some of its implications examined.     

Reasoning as a source of justification

In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.     

Wide reflective equilibrium as a method of justification in bioethics

Carson Strong has recently argued that wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) is an unacceptable method of justification in bioethics. In its place, Strong recommends a methodology in which certain foundational moral judgments play a central role in the justification of moral beliefs, and coherence plays a limited justificatory role in that the rest of our judgments are made to cohere with these foundational judgments. In this paper, I argue that Strong??s chief criticisms of WRE are unsuccessful and that his proposed alternative is in fact just another version of WRE. In the course of doing so, I specify which theses are central to WRE and which are not, and thus, provide a response to an additional objection, advanced by Peter Singer, that WRE is vacuous. I conclude by arguing that there may be better prospects for advancing the debate regarding methodology in bioethics if we focus on restricted epistemic and methodological theses rather than broad approaches, such as WRE, that come in many different varieties.     

Belief-content justification for cases of a priori justification: A neo-Haackian model

I differentiate justification of the subject (S-justification) from justification of the content of a belief (C-justification) and note the questions associated with truth conduciveness of justification. I employ Susan Haack’s analysis of empirical justification and show how, with certain adaptations, it can account for justification from non-experiential sources, if there are any. I give at least one example from mathematical visual thinking.     

Sikh historical memory as an ideological justification for Khalistan

The Khalistan movement was an armed secessionist struggle carried out by the Sikhs of Punjab, northern India, which spanned the period between 1981 and 1993. In parallel with other such insurgencies around the world, it is evident that the Khalistan movement had a strong ideological underpinning which not only helped to fuel its rise, but also helped to sustain it throughout its tenure. In this regard, the reference point for ideological justification was very much the past experiences and episodes of the Sikh community, or, to be precise, their ‘historical memory’ of these. This article focuses its attention on identifying, describing and interrogating the strength of the ideological justifications that were extracted from Sikh historical memory in support of Khalistan.     

The physician as fortune teller: a commentary on "The ethical justification for minimal paternalism

...I shall summarize my argument to this point. 1) A new technology -- medicalizing life choices -- introduces additional sources of uncertainty into the physician-patient relationship. The implications for the authority-autonomy tension of that relationship are not fully worked out, as is evidenced by differing views on professional obligations. 2) The warrants for paternalism are complex, ranging from a pragmatic response in the face of uncertainty to a proactive, highly directive determination of the patient's best interests. 3) Although some proponents of autonomy argue that it entails positive rights to intervention and information, the "strong sense" of autonomy is not the prevailing view. 4) The as yet unclear benefits of knowledge about one's genetic makeup are even less clear in the case of HD. Strong circumstantial evidence of risks of harm from disclosure of unfavorable test results have not been dispelled by early experience with use of the HD test. 5) A cautious approach in the use of HD test seems warranted, even at the cost of restricting autonomy. Legitimating that approach by reference to traditional ethical theory is a necessary element in the transfer of the new technology to the wider clinical setting. 6) While PMP [the principle of minimal paternalism] attempts to offer such an approach, some questions do not appear to have been resolved or fully addressed by this formulation.     

A moral justification for killing in self-defence

In the first part of this paper I will argue that for a case to be one of killing in self-defence at least the following three important conditions need to be met: (i) the defender's death must seem to him/her to be imminent; (ii) there must be a choice forced upon the defender between being killed or killing his/her attacker; (iii) the responsibility for (i) and (ii) must be the attacker's. I go on to point out that a lethal use of force which meets conditions (i)—(iii) is thought by most people to be morally permissible. However we believe also that everyone has the right to life and this cannot be taken away under any circumstances. But if this is so, how can we justify one person intentionally killing another? Or to put the point differently: what, in our moral assessment of such cases, are we to claim an attacker has done that is so morally wrong we are prepared to argue that if one of them has to be killed, it is the attacker? I hope to answer this question in the second part of my paper by developing a strand of ethical thought, associated with Kant.     

Retraction and testimonial justification: a new problem for the assurance view

The Assurance View, as advanced by Angus Ross and Richard Moran, makes the epistemology of testimony a matter of interpersonal commitments and entitlements. More specifically, I argue, their position is best understood as claiming that for someone’s belief to be testimonially justified is for some speaker to bear illocutionary responsibility for its truth (while background conditions are met). With this understanding in hand, I present a problem for the view that has so far escaped attention, a problem deriving from the wide freedom we have to retract our assertions. Retraction dissolves the illocutionary responsibilities that were set up by preceding speech acts; but in some circumstances the epistemic significance of a retraction is effectively nil. We can therefore construct cases in which the responsibilities undertaken in testimony have been canceled, while the justification for belief based on it remains in place—and that shouldn’t be possible, if the Assurance View has things right. I present one such case and press its implications.

     

Epistemic justification in the context of pursuit: a coherentist approach

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards—consistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system.     

Our'other history': poetry as a meta-metaphor for narrative therapy

This paper explores certain distinctions betwen narrative and poetry as metaphors for the consciously authored life. It is suggested that such phenomena as 'self,', 'authorship', 'knowledge' and'time' are experienced differently within the narrative discourse and the discourse associated with poetry. Five aspects of'poetic' knowledge are explored: form (or containment); aesthetic knowing; non-identity with self (participatory creation), nothingness (and not knowing); and radiance. Two examples from couple therapy are then given to illustrate these aspects and the interface between this way of knowing and the lived life.     

Sexual abuse as a theme in group-analytic therapy

The group-analytic approach, which emphasises the individual in a network of group relationships, is described with reference to the subject of sexual abuse in childhood. Three different National Health Service psychotherapy groups run by the author provide contrasting examples of how the theme, originating in an individual participant, was manifested in the dynamics of the group-as-a-whole. The therapeutic significance to the individual and the group is explored.     

'Holding' as a therapeutic manoeuvre in family therapy

This paper describes the use of planned parental physical 'holding' as part of family therapy in a Child and Family Guidance Clinic. It is used when the child is overactive or out of parental control, or is not attached to its parents. Direct or indirect suggestions that parents hold their children are made by the therapist.     

Simulation as a tool in family therapy research

The efficacy and validity of simulation for purposes of training and evaluation are well established. Simulation has proven valuable in human behaviour research as well. However, based on the belief that families and other small groups behave differently, many family theorists have concluded that simulation may not be valid for family research despite the fact that some empirical studies showed little difference between simulated and actual families, suggesting that the disparity may not be as great as commonly believed. Ongoing and future studies controlling for 'time together', a dimension presumed to be critical in comparing simulated with actual families, may demonstrate that differences are not sufficiently large to preclude the use of simulated families in family research. Methodological problems are addressed and directions for future research proposed.