Unification: What is it,how do we Reach and why do we Want it?

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

What is conditionalization,and why should we do it?

Philosophical Studies - Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to...     

What is terrorism and can psychology do anything to prevent it?

Terrorism has a long history, which continues to unfold, and takes many forms. Notwithstanding these facts, there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism. I set forth the definitional issues that underlie the current debate about terrorism. By comparing terrorism with various forms of violence, I argue that it is plausible to construe terrorism as crime and, in support of this, I demonstrate why terrorism cannot be morally justified. Next, I cluster various immediate and long-term approaches intended to prevent terrorism, highlighting psychologically based strategies, such as behavioral profiling, teaching tolerance and citizenship, modifying media images of terrorism, and building peace. In order to understand and respond more effectively to 21st-century terrorism, I advocate adoption of a multidisciplinary, contextually sensitive approach.     

Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.

What can it mean to know?

This paper offers a critique of the prevailing epistemological assumptions which undergird modern Pastoral Care and Counseling education. By drawing upon emerging insights in Transpersonal Psychology and Consciousness disciplines, along with the ontological perspectives of Martin Heidegger and John Macquarrie, the attempt is made to reclaim the modes of knowing of William James and Anton Boison. This paper includes practical and concrete examples of how one supervisor is attempting to put a new paradigm into practice.     

What can we mean by “cognition,” and does it make any sense?

Practitioners of Rational-Emotive Therapy easily identify themselves with the broad camp of cognitive behavior therapy. However, the meaning of the term cognition is often unclear. Six possible meanings are outlined: (1) mental event, (2) symbolic overt behavior, (3) symbolic covert behavior, (4) pragmatic convention, (5) unreportable behavior and (6) hypothetical construct. This paper aims to: (1) clarify what we can mean when we talk about cognition, and (2) identify which meanings keep us in the tradition of empirical science and which take us to the realm of spooks and nonsense.Hank Robb works as a private practitioner. He is an Associate Fellow and approved Supervisor of the Institute of Rational-Emotive Therapy, New York, as well as a Diplomate in Counseling Psychology of the American Board of Professional Psychology.     

Reimagining gender in psychology: What can critical psychology offer?

In this article, I argue that gender is a complex sociocultural construct, yet how gender is accounted for in psychological research is limited. Specifically, psychologists conflate sex with gender, rely on quantifying gender differences and, by implication, conceptualise gender as merely a participant characteristic. To illustrate, I apply this viewpoint to the topic of gender differences in tobacco use/cessation using on a feminist quality appraisal tool. I show how these three issues promote the narrow study of sex/gender differences, despite problems surrounding this inquiry, and reduce insights into the intersection of gender and behaviour. To offer a way forward for psychology, I describe how a critical psychology perspective attends to the complexities of gender and its influence on behaviour. I showcase diverse ways of attending to gender as a sociocultural construct, inviting psychologists to engage with, and reflect on, their gender analyses.     

What do we owe co-nationals and non-nationals? why the liberal nationalist account fails and how we can do better

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism—namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values—is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled.     

Age and ageing: What do they mean?

This article provides a philosophical overview of different approaches to age and ageing. It is often assumed that our age is determined by the amount of time we have been alive. Here, I challenge this belief. I argue that there are at least three plausible, yet unsatisfactory, accounts to age and ageing: the chronological account, the biological account, and the experiential account. I show that all of them fall short of fully determining what it means to age. Addressing these problems, I suggest the Two‐tier principle of age: whenever the three accounts of age contradict, combine the two accounts that differ the least, and reject the third. However, while this principle does solve some difficulties, it is itself vulnerable to problems; therefore I propose we should jettison it. I conclude that there are no accounts to ageing that are satisfactory; they all come with a bullet to bite.     

Assessing aggression in adolescent romantic relationships: can we do it better?

Almost all research on aggression in adolescent romantic relationships makes use of 1-time, retrospective assessment methods. In the present research, the authors compared data on the experience of adolescent relationship aggression (physical aggression and threatening behavior) collected from 125 high school students via 2 methods: (a) a 1-time, 2-month retrospective assessment and (b) a cumulative method based on four 2-week retrospective assessments, each spaced 2 weeks apart. For the cumulative method, data from the 4 assessments were aggregated to cover the same time period as the single, 2-month retrospective assessment. A greater proportion of the sample (48.0%) reported experiencing physical aggression using the cumulative method compared with the single, 2-month retrospective method (27.0%). The prevalence of threatening behavior was also higher using the cumulative method (48.8% vs. 24.8%). Adolescent trauma and anxiety symptoms correlated more strongly with physical aggression data derived from the cumulative method than from the 1-time assessment method.     

Rater bias in psychological research: when is it a problem and what can we do about it?

Rater bias is a substantial source of error in psychological research. Bias distorts observed effect sizes beyond the expected level of attenuation due to intrarater error, and the impact of bias is not accurately estimated using conventional methods of correction for attenuation. Using a model based on multivariate generalizability theory, this article illustrates how bias affects research results. The model identifies 4 types of bias that may affect findings in research using observer ratings, including the biases traditionally termed leniency and halo errors. The impact of bias depends on which of 4 classes of rating design is used, and formulas are derived for correcting observed effect sizes for attenuation (due to bias variance) and inflation (due to bias covariance) in each of these classes. The rater bias model suggests procedures for researchers seeking to minimize adverse impact of bias on study findings.     

What is episodic memory and how do we use it?

What are the neural and computational principles that give rise to episodic memory? Although memory is probably the most studied topic in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, most research has focused on learning at the micro-level. I outline the limitations of this approach and propose a ‘molar’ approach to tackle episodic memory at the scale of life.