共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
The motif of the ‘drama of being’ is a dominant thread that spans the entirety of Levinas's six decades of authorship. As
we will see, from the start of his writing career, Levinas consciously frames the tension between ontology and ethics in a
dramatic form. A careful exposition of this motif and other related theatrical metaphors in his work–-such as ‘intrigue,’
‘plot,’ and ‘scene’–-can offer us not only a better appreciation of the evolution of Levinas's thought, but also of his proper
place within the western philosophical tradition. Levinas accuses western philosophers of being exclusively attuned to what
he calls the ‘drama of existence.’ And even then, philosophers have eluded the implications of the tragic fatalism that define
this drama. Philosophers are generally unaware of an ‘other scene’ that radically alters the fatalistic logic of the ontological
drama. Levinas calls this other scene the ‘ethical intrigue.’ 相似文献
2.
B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2006,152(1):47-79
Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’
argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by
Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then
the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust
Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that
it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even
though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely
denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires
a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting
concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked. 相似文献
3.
Bryan Pickel 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):193-211
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue
that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe
propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore
pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’,
such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity
to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument. 相似文献
4.
William L. Rowe 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):87-92
By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’ to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully
presents Anselm’s ontological argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God (a maximally
great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists; his argument begs the question of the existence
of God. 相似文献
5.
This paper considers two differenttones of voice in philosophy and theology (‘liberal pluralism’ in contrast to ‘radical orthodoxy’) and relates it to a discussion about
the theology of religions. ‘Tone of voice’ in this context is intended to denote the affective potency (or not) of a theological
perspective as it impacts and influences religious attitudes. In addition, at a related level, ‘tone of voice’ is used when
speaking of first-order or second-order perspectives: for example, a first-orderconfessional tone in contrast to a second-ordernotional tone. The paper proceeds to critically engage with John Hick’s pluralism and John Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy particularly
from the point of view of considering thetone adopted by both perspectives. The conclusion is that both views are inadequate: Hick’s pluralism—as a second-order meta-theory—lacks
the first-order power that is needed to affect ‘hearts and minds’, Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy has rhetorical power but is
an ‘unfounded’ narrative which lacks the ability to rationally engage with thereal world. In the end, the suggestion is that the ‘right tone of voice’, in a religious context, ought to combine a realistic
enquiry concerning the order-of-things with a first-order rhetorical strength. 相似文献
6.
Sascia Pavan 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):145-163
In the first exposition of the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation, Quine asserted that the individuation and translation
of truth-functional sentential connectives like ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’ are not indeterminate. He changed his mind later on, conjecturing
that some sentential connectives might be interpreted in different non-equivalent ways. This issue has not been debated much
by Quine, or in the subsequent literature, it is, as it were, an unsolved problem, not well understood. For the sake of the
argument, I will adopt Quine’s background assumption that all the semantic features of a language can be reduced to the speakers’
dispositions toward assent and dissent, as far as only the truth-conditional core of the meaning of sentences is concerned.
I will put forward an argument to the effect that the speech dispositions of most, if not all, English (French, Italian, etc.)
speakers constrain a unique translation of their connectives. This argument crucially relies on an empirical conjecture concerning
the behaviour of these operators. 相似文献
7.
Tobias Rosefeldt 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):301-333
This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions).
In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism.
The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result
in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses
are singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause
position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms,
but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and
it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification. 相似文献
8.
David Botting 《Argumentation》2012,26(2):213-232
From Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations the following classifications are put forward and defended through extensive excerpts from the text. (AR-PFC) All sophistical
refutations are exclusively either ‘apparent refutations’ or ‘proofs of false conclusions’. (AR-F) ‘Apparent refutations’
and ‘fallacies’ name the same thing. (ID-ED) All fallacies are exclusively either fallacies in dictione or fallacies extra dictionem. (ID-nAMB) Not all fallacies in dictione are due to ambiguity. (AMB-nID) Not all fallacies due to ambiguity are fallacies in dictione. (AMB&ID-ME) The set of fallacies due to ambiguity and fallacies in dictione together comprise the set of arguments said to be “dependent on mere expression”. Being “dependent on mere expression” and
“dependent on language” are not the same (instances of the latter form a proper subset of instances of the former). (nME-FACT)
All arguments that are not against the expression are “against the fact.” (FACT-ED) All fallacious arguments against the fact
are fallacies extra dictionem (it is unclear whether the converse is true). (MAN-ARG) The solutions of fallacious arguments are exclusively either “against the man” or “against the argument.” (10) (F-ARG) Each (type of) fallacy
has a unique solution (namely, the opposite of whatever causes the fallacy), but each fallacious argument does not. However,
each fallacious argument does have a unique solution against the argument, called the ‘true solution’ (in other words, what
fallacy a fallacious argument commits is determined by how it is solved. However, if the solution is ‘against the man’ then
this is not, properly speaking, the fallacy committed in the argument. It is only the ‘true solution’—the solution against
the argument, of which there is always only one—that determines the fallacy actually committed). 相似文献
9.
Stephen Carr 《Sophia》2001,40(2):31-45
This article critically examines some of the theological and Neo-Orthodox readings of Foucault. An exploration of some key
texts reveals limitations in, e.g., Milbank’s account, and is developed further through an examination of Sharon Welch’s discussion
of feminist liberation theology. A deeper engagement with Foucault’s work emerges, clarifying issues of power, disclosure,
truth and ‘agonism’. The paper proposes that Foucault’s work is not an expression of ‘nihilism’ but rather is important for
the self-critique and integrity of theology. 相似文献
10.
Christians commonly speak of and to God as ‘a person’. The propriety of such talk depends on how the concept of a person is
being used and understood, and that concept is much contested in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this article, I note
the presuppositions of one current debate about what it is to be a human person, and then propose an alternative approach
to persons—both human and divine—that draws upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological tradition. In this tradition,
‘person’ is neither an essence-determining kind term, nor a merely nominal or functional kind term, but is applicable analogously
to entities of various ‘kinds’ (e.g. humans, angels and God). The origins of this account in Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity
will be examined, and I will conclude by noting a recent development of Thomas’ thought in relation to what it is to be a
human person. 相似文献
11.
J. Ritola 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):237-244
In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation
18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis
31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis
56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis
57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. 相似文献
12.
Ezio Di Nucci 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(2):207-213
In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the
actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given
the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated
by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does
not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario.
This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’. 相似文献
13.
The present study explored several dispositional factors associated with individual differences in lay adult’s interpretation
of when an arguer is, or is not, committed to a statement. College students were presented with several two-person arguments
in which the proponent of a thesis conceded a key point in the last turn. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent
to which that concession implied a change in the proponent’s attitude toward any of the previous statements in the argument.
Participants designated as ‘liberal’ used the concession to infer substantial change in commitment to earlier statements in
the argument. A group designated as ‘conservative’ were reluctant to make any such inferences. A discriminant analysis indicated
that variables assessing participants’ attitudes toward argument as well as their cognitive and communication styles jointly
predicted their liberal or conservative status. The discriminant function and follow-up group comparisons indicated that liberals
were more likely than conservatives to engage in argument. This included a greater tendency to use argument as a source of
knowledge. Liberals also employed a more sophisticated message design logic than conservatives on a communication task. The
groups did not clearly differ with respect to participants’ implicit theory of argument, though trends were present that merit
attention in future research. Implications of these findings for future research on lay interpretations of commitment are
discussed. 相似文献
14.
Mark Moyer 《Synthese》2006,148(2):401-423
Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the
same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing
a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum,
‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride
on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence
is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different
sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary
equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges
a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its
sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible. 相似文献
15.
Andrea Guardo 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):195-209
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions
to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The
first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of
meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on
Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions
that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call ‘Actuality Constraint’. The third section of the
paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional
analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian).
This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a
possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show
(1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible
to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not
exist. 相似文献
16.
Joel Kenton Press 《Synthese》2008,161(1):119-139
Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific
application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable,
we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.
Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current
theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids
explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection
fatal to that theory.
My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific
explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’
by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion
of function.
However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant
contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’
must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to
determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function
may in many cases assist them in this task. 相似文献
17.
This paper contributes towards a lay ethics of nanotechnology through an analysis of talk from focus groups designed to examine
how laypeople grapple with the meaning of a technology ‘in-the-making’. We describe the content of lay ethical concerns before
suggesting that this content can be understood as being structured by five archetypal narratives which underpin talk. These
we term: ‘the rich get richer and the poor get poorer’; ‘kept in the dark’; ‘opening Pandora’s box’; ‘messing with nature’;
and ‘be careful what you wish for’. We further suggest that these narratives can be understood as sharing an emphasis on the
‘giftedness’ of life, and that together they are used to resist dominant technoscientific and Enlightenment narratives of
control and mastery which are encapsulated by nanotechnology. 相似文献
18.
Wilfrid Hodges 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(6):589-606
In a recent paper Johan van Benthem reviews earlier work done by himself and colleagues on ‘natural logic’. His paper makes
a number of challenging comments on the relationships between traditional logic, modern logic and natural logic. I respond
to his challenge, by drawing what I think are the most significant lines dividing traditional logic from modern. The leading
difference is in the way logic is expected to be used for checking arguments. For traditionals the checking is local, i.e.
separately for each inference step. Between inference steps, several kinds of paraphrasing are allowed. Today we formalise
globally: we choose a symbolisation that works for the entire argument, and thus we eliminate intuitive steps and changes
of viewpoint during the argument. Frege and Peano recast the logical rules so as to make this possible. I comment also on
the traditional assumption that logical processing takes place at the top syntactic level, and I question Johan’s view that
natural logic is ‘natural’. 相似文献
19.
Many theists believe that the so-called ‘free will defence’ successfully undermines the antitheist argument from moral evil.
However, in a recent issue of this journal Joel Thomas Tierno provides the ‘adequacy argument’ in order to show an alleged
difficulty with the free will defence. I argue that the adequacy argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of moral
evil. 相似文献
20.
In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’.
According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable
stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I
seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes
compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise. 相似文献