Facilitation and analogical transfer in the THOG task

This study was concerned with Wason's THOG task, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning problem for which performance is typically very poor (<20% correct). Recently, however, Needham and Amado (1995) and Koenig and Griggs (2004) have observed both facilitation and spontaneous analogical transfer effects for the Pythagoras version of this task. Based on their findings, Koenig and Griggs concluded that in addition to the separation of the data (the properties of the designated THOG) from the hypotheses that need to be generated (the possible combinations of properties written down), an explicit request to generate these hypotheses is necessary to obtain significant analogical transfer. In the present study we extended the generalisability of this conclusion in three experiments with 214 undergraduate participants using O'Brien et al.'s (1990) Blackboard version of the task. We discuss the relationship of the results to dual process theories of reasoning and propose that analogical transfer may be a better criterion than task facilitation for judging participants' task understanding.     

Facilitation and transfer with narrative thematic versions of the THOG task

This article reports two experiments investigating the use of narrative form in the presentation of thematic versions of Wason's (1977) THOG problem. Experiment 1 demonstrated that narrative thematic versions that use actions of characters to present the elements of the problem are easier to solve than the classic version. This result was found both for a problem that used thematic examples and for a problem that used the same geometric figures as the classic THOG. Results also suggested that the presence of a character who creates the comparison properties to be used in applying the disjunction rule was useful in separating those properties from the properties of the positive example. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the solution of a narrative thematic version of the THOG could lead to improved performance on the classic abstract THOG, but only when the examples in the narrative version were the geometric figures. Issues of transfer with the THOG problem are discussed.     

Sources of difficulty in deductive reasoning: The THOG task

The THOG task presents four designs constructed from two shapes and two colours. Subjects are told that the experimenter has written down one of the shapes and one of the colours and are provided the rule that if, and only if, any design has either the shape or the colour, but not both, written down, then it is a THOG. Finally, they are given an exemplar and are asked to classify the remaining designs. Successful solution requires construction of hypotheses, reasoning under each hypothesis, and comparison of the results under each to reach a final conclusion. Few subjects are able to provide adequate responses on the standard version of the task. We present the results of four experiments, with 160 undergraduates each presented with one of eight versions of the task. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that (1) some subjects think that the properties that are written down are identical to those of the exemplar, although these are not the same subjects who exhibit the modal error pattern, (2) many subjects correctly understand the disjunction of the rule but fail to consider the hypotheses, and (3) poor initial encoding of the problem is not easily corrected. Experiment 3 investigates the sufficiency of the claim of Griggs and Newstead (1982) that appropriate problem solution follows from explicit presentation of all problem information (including use of positive labels for properties that are not written down), and Experiment 4 investigates the necessity of the claim. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 show that presenting positive category labels does increase the frequency of correct solution; however, positive category labels are not necessary for such improvement. Separation of the labels of the THOG rule from those of the exemplar, or informing subjects that only one other design is a THOG, also increases the frequency of successful solution. The results suggest that many people have some fairly sophisticated reasoning skills. but application of these skills is easily discouraged when the features of the task lead to poor initial encoding.     

Analogical transfer in perceptual categorization

Analogical transfer is the ability to transfer knowledge despite significant changes in the surface features of a problem. In categorization, analogical transfer occurs if a classification strategy learned with one set of stimuli can be transferred to a set of novel, perceptually distinct stimuli. Three experiments investigated analogical transfer in rule-based and information-integration categorization tasks. In rule-based tasks, the optimal strategy is easy to describe verbally, whereas in information-integration tasks, accuracy is maximized only if information from two or more stimulus dimensions is integrated in a way that is difficult or impossible to describe verbally. In all three experiments, analogical transfer was nearly perfect in the rule-based conditions, but no evidence for analogical transfer was found in the information-integration conditions. These results were predicted a priori by the COVIS theory of categorization.     

Working memory limitation as a source of confusion in the abstract THOG task

Limitations of working memory are proposed as a major determinant of problem difficulty in the THOG task. This task is a logical reasoning task which uses an exclusive disjunction and requires hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Four experiments with students of mathematics or psychology were used to test the hypotheses that, first, guiding participants' attention facilitates the task and, second, the use of paper and pencil as external problem representation reliefs working memory load. Focusing participants' attention upon a critical aspect of the task does not improve solution rates. Students of mathematics were better than students of psychology, but only if they were allowed to use paper and pencil or to work on the task repeatedly. These results partially support the working memory hypothesis. They point toward the importance of training and practice in relatively simple meta-cognitive skills in logical reasoning. Received: 20 March 2000 / Accepted: 22 January 2001     

Elementary, my dear Wason: The role of problem representation in the THOG task

The present study was concerned with Wason's THOG problem, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task for which performance over the past 20 years has typically been very poor (<20% correct). We examined the hypothesis that incorporating a quasi-visual context into the problem statement would make both the binary, symmetric tree structure and solution principle of the THOG task clearer and thus facilitate performance. A version of O'Brien et al.'s (Q J Exp Psychol 42A:329–351) Blackboard THOG problem, that specifies each branch of the tree by describing a specific location for each possible color-shape combination, was used to test this hypothesis. Substantial facilitation was both observed (68% correct) and replicated (73% correct), and it was also shown that it is necessary to provide a representation of both sides of the tree to obtain this level of facilitation. The implications of these results for human deductive reasoning are considered. Received: 1 November 2000 / Accepted: 4 May 2001     

Analogical transfer and expertise in legal reasoning

Analogical transfer and its relation to expertise is examined in a legal context. Three experiments were conducted comparing the performance of novices (introductory tax students) and of experts (experienced tax practitioners from multinational public accounting firms) on tasks involving the application of tax laws. In Experiment 1 subjects completed a target problem after reading a decided case that was either analogous or not analogous to a target problem. A limited amount of transfer was observed, with no differential rate of transfer across experience levels. In Experiments 2 and 3 attempts were made to facilitate transfer of knowledge by inducing transfer-appropriate processing of the source analog and by providing multiple source analogs. The results of both experiments indicate an interaction between treatment and expertise. Unexpectedly, the facilitating treatments reduced the transfer of knowledge for experts while increasing the transfer for novices. Subsequent analysis of the responses of the expert subjects indicates that for the more experienced expert subjects a highly proceduralized rule interfered with the knowledge transfer when that rule was made salient by the facilitating treatments. The less experienced expert subjects behaved in a manner consistent with the hypotheses. This poor performance of the more experienced experts results from the inflexibility in expert problem solving due to the proceduralization of information processing. Frensch and Sternberg (1989) demonstrate that this type of inflexibility is one of the costs of expertise and results from the development of a large and highly complex knowledge base containing numerous well developed strategies.     

Analogical encoding facilitates knowledge transfer in negotiation

Information learned in one situation often fails to transfer to a similarly structured situation. However, prior findings suggest that comparing two or more instances that embody the same principle can promote abstraction of a schema that can be transferred to new situations. In two lines of research, we examined the effects of analogical encoding on knowledge transfer in negotiation situations. In Experiment 1, undergraduates were more likely to propose optimal negotiation strategies and less likely to propose compromises (a suboptimal strategy) when they received analogy training. In Experiment 2, graduate management students who drew an analogy from two cases were nearly three times more likely to incorporate the strategy from the training cases into their negotiations than were students given the same cases separately. For both novices and experienced participants, the comparison process can be an efficient means of abstracting principles for later application.     

Analogical transfer from a simulated physical system

Previous research has consistently found that spontaneous analogical transfer is strongly tied to concrete and contextual similarities between the cases. However, that work has largely failed to acknowledge that the relevant factor in transfer is the similarity between individuals' mental representations of the situations rather than the overt similarities between the cases themselves. Across several studies, we found that participants were able to transfer strategies learned from a perceptually concrete simulation of a physical system to a task with very dissimilar content and appearance. This transfer was reflected in better performance on the transfer task when its underlying dynamics were consistent rather than inconsistent with the preceding training task. Our data indicate that transfer in these tasks relies on the perceptual and spatial nature of the training task but does not depend on direct interaction with the system, with participants performing equally well after simply observing the concrete simulation. We argue that participants generated a spatial, dynamic, and force-based mental model while interacting with the training simulation and tended to spontaneously interpret the transfer task according to this primed model. Unexpectedly, our data consistently show that transfer was independent of reported recognition of the analogy between tasks: Although such recognition was associated with better overall performance, it was not associated with better transfer (in terms of applying an appropriate strategy). Together, these findings suggest that analogical transfer between overtly dissimilar cases may be much more common--and much more relevant to our cognitive processing--than is generally assumed.     

Analogical transfer, problem similarity, and expertise

When we encounter a new problem, we are often reminded of similar problems solved earlier and may use the solution procedure from an old problem to solve a new one. Such analogical transfer, however, has been difficult to demonstrate empirically, even within a single experimental session. This article proposes a framework for conceptualizing analogical problem solving that can account for the conflicting findings in the literature. In addition, the framework leads to two predictions concerning the transfer behavior of experts and novices. These predictions concern both positive and negative transfer and are based on the different types of features included in the problem representations of experts and novices. First, when two problems share structural features but not surface features, spontaneous positive transfer should be more likely in experts than in novices. Second, when two problems share surface but not structural features, spontaneous negative transfer should be stronger for novices than for experts. These predictions were supported by the results of three experiments involving college students solving a complex arithmetic word problem.     

Analogical transfer: From schematic pictures to problem solving

A series of experiments was conducted to explore whether individuals can solve problems by transferring conceptual information gained from schematic pictures and to examine the mechanisms involved in this transfer process. Subjects viewed a schematic picture and then attempted to solve an insight problem to which the conceptual information from the picture could be applied. The results indicate that the degree of similarity—specifically, superficial and procedural similarity—between a source schematic picture and the target problem determined transfer performance. Discussion focuses on the relationship between these two types of similarity and the two key cognitive components involved in transferring pictorial analogies to solve problems: accessing the pictorial analogues and executing the solutions. Portions of this research were presented at the 33rd meeting of the Psychonomic Society in St. Louis, November 1992.     

THOG问题促进效应研究

通过选取经典的THOG问题作为实验材料,探讨了大学生解决具体以及抽象选言推理问题的认知机制,结果发现:(1)具体内容的选言推理问题对抽象内容的选言推理问题有明显的促进效应,表现为先解决逃犯问题后解决THOG问题组的正确率显著高于先解决THOG问题后解决逃犯问题组;(2)提供笼统的解题策略对大学生解决THOG问题几乎没有促进作用。     

Analogical transfer in young children: Analogies as tools for communication and exposition

Children's ability to transfer what they learn in one situation to analogous problems was examined in a series of four studies. Subjects ranged in age from 3 to 10 years. The problems involved novel uses of familiar tools or simple biological themes such as mimicry as a method of defence. The data suggest that the apparent transfer reluctance shown by children in previous studies is the result of what they have been required to learn and the conditions under which they have been required to learn it. In the present studies, children as young as 3 years transferred readily if the problem domain was one they understood and engaged in, and if the traditional laboratory paradigm was modified so as to promote transfer rather than just to test for its spontaneous occurrence.     

Training and transfer effects in task switching

Performance on task switching, a paradigm commonly used to measure executive function, has been shown to improve with practice. However, no study has tested whether these benefits are specific to the tasks learned or are transferable to new situations. We report evidence of transferable improvement in a cued, randomly switching paradigm as measured by mixing cost, but we report no consistent improvement for switch cost. Improvement in mixing costs arises from a relative reduction in time to perform both switch and nonswitch trials that immediately follow switch trials, implicating the ability to recover from unexpected switches as the source of improvement. These results add to a growing number of studies demonstrating generalizable improvement with training on executive processing.     

De-confusing the THOG problem: the Pythagorean solution.

Sources of facilitation for Needham and Amado's (1995) Pythagoras version of Wason's THOG problem were systematically examined in three experiments with 174 participants. Although both the narrative structure and figural notation used in the Pythagoras problem independently led to significant facilitation (40-50% correct), pairing hypothesis generation with either factor or pairing the two factors together was found to be necessary to obtain substantial facilitation (> 50% correct). Needham and Amado's original finding for the complete Pythagoras problem was also replicated. These results are discussed in terms of the "confusion theory" explanation for performance on the standard THOG problem. The possible role of labelling as a de-confusing factor in other versions of the THOG problem and the implications of the present findings for human reasoning are also considered.     

THOG: The anatomy of a problem

Summary Three experiments are reported on the attempts to solve a novel hypothetico-deductive problem. Its solution demands both the postulation of hypotheses about its structure and a combinatorial analysis upon the consequences of these hypotheses. The majority of subjects (students) failed to solve the problem because they argued from the properties of stimuli rather than from hypotheses about their conceptual status. The results suggest that a familiarity with the logical structure of the problem and the elicitation of appropriate hypotheses failed to correct this intuitive approach. These findings are discussed in relation to Piaget's theory of formal operations, and (very tentatively) in relation to habitual styles of thought.     

Naming the parents of the THOG: Mental representation and reasoning

It was hypothesized that subjects misrepresent the THOG problem by confusing data and hypotheses. An abstract version of the problem in which the given exemplars and the hypothetical ones were designated by two different labels was used in three experiments. Experiment 1 showed that this version elicits a better performance than the standard version of the problem. Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed these results, by ruling out a possible alternative account of the facilitatory effect obtained in Experiment 1. The present results are discussed in relationship to the general issues of content effects and non-consequentialism in reasoning.     

Analogical Reasoning in Ethics

In this article I am concerned with analogical reasoning in ethics. There is no doubt that the use of analogy can be a powerful tool in our ethical reasoning. The importance of this mode of reasoning is therefore commonly accepted, but there is considerable debate concerning how its structure should be understood and how it should be assessed, both logically and epistemically. In this paper, I first explain the basic structure of arguments from analogy in ethics. I then discuss the diversity of analogical arguments that can be found in ethics. I analyse their structure, assess them from a logical viewpoint, and show how they can be epistemically challenged and defended. The result of this investigation is that, contrary to a commonly held view, analogical reasoning can be a logically valid type of ethical reasoning that can provide reasons for action that are not worse than the reasons provided by any other kind of practical reasoning.