ON THE TRANSDISCIPLINARY NATURE OF THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISCOVERY

Abstract. Despite the by now historical tendency to demarcate scientific epistemology sharply from virtually all others, especially theological "epistemology ," it has recently been recognized that both enterprises share a great deal in common, at least as far as the epistemology of discovery is implicated. Such a claim is founded upon a psychological analysis of figuration, where, it is argued, metaphor plays a crucial role in the mediation of discovery, in the domains of science and religion alike. Thus, although the conventionally conceived scientific method is crucial to the enterprise, primacy must nonetheless be accorded to discovery , which drives virtually all disciplines.     

We are driven

Is metapsychology out-or in again? Is it a millstone tied around our necks-or is it an intriguing Freudian witch whom we can even dance with? Is the concept of drives an outmoded oddity-or an indispensable companion, inspiring our understanding of the patient's material and even opening new windows for further development? Can we proceed with the concept of structures and object relationships alone -or do we need the concept of drives in order to understand what these object relationships are all about? The author clearly opts for the second option in each of these pairs of alternatives. Musing on the sophisticated metapsychology debate that unsettled psychoanalysis in the United States for many years, she reviews some of the most frequently quoted objections to the concept of drives. Further, she offers an introduction to modern drive theory with the new duality of sexual and preservative drives, as well as a different concept of aggression, and explains how drives relate to structures-specifically, to the representations of self and object.     

Order effects in contingency learning: The role of task complexity

Dennis and Ahn (2001) found that during contingency learning, initial evidence influences causal judgments more than does later evidence (a primacy effect), whereas López, Shanks, Almaraz, and Fernández (1998) found the opposite (a recency effect). We propose that in contingency learning, people use initial evidence to develop an anchoring hypothesis that tends to be underadjusted by later evidence, resulting in a primacy effect. Thus, factors interfering with initial hypothesis development, such as simultaneously learning too many contingencies, as in López et al., would reduce the primacy effect. Experiment 1 showed a primacy effect with learning contingencies involving only one outcome but no primacy effect with two outcomes. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the magnitude of the primacy effect correlated with participants' verbal working memory capacity. It is concluded that a critical moderator for exhibition of the primacy effect is task complexity, presumably because it interferes with initial hypothesis development.     

From Drive to Affectivity: Contextualizing Psychological Life

It is the thesis of this article that the shift in psychoanalytic thinking from the primacy of drive to the primacy of affectivity moves psychoanalysis toward a phenomenological contextualism and a central focus on dynamic intersubjective systems. Unlike drives, which originate deep within the interior of a Cartesian isolated mind, affect—that is, subjective emotional experience—is something that from birth onward is regulated, or misregulated, within ongoing relational systems. Therefore, locating affect at the center automatically entails a radical contextualization of virtually all aspects of human psychological life.     

Object Relations,Affects, and Drives: Toward a New Synthesis

This paper summarizes my efforts to develop a contemporary psychoanalytic theory of drives, integrating this theory with contemporary affect theory and with psychoanalytic object relations theory. It proposes, in essence, that affects are the primary motivations of behavior, that they include a fundamental communicative function in the infant/caregiver relationship, and that it is the integration of, respectively, positive and negative affects that will crystallize libido and aggression as supraordinate motivational systems or drives. At the same time, insofar as peak affect states organize the internalization of the relationship between self and objects in the form of affect-invested self and object representations, affects are also contributing fundamentally to the organization of an internalized world of object relations, eventually consolidated in the tripartite structure of the mind.

This proposed interrelationship of affects, self- and object representations, and drives rejects the assumption of incompatibility of drive theory and object relations theory and provides potential bridging functions with the neurobiology of affects.     

Understanding the object benefit in visual short-term memory: the roles of feature proximity and connectedness

Past research has identified visual objects as the units of information processing in visual short-term memory (VSTM) and has shown that two features from the same object can be remembered in VSTM as well (or almost as well) as one feature of that object and are much better remembered than the same two features from two spatially separated objects. It is not clear, however, what drives this object benefit in VSTM. Is it the shared spatial location (proximity), the connectedness among features of an object, or both? In six change detection experiments, both location/proximity and connectedness were found to be crucial in determining the magnitude of the object benefit in VSTM. Together, these results indicate that location/proximity and connectedness are essential elements in defining a coherent visual object representation in VSTM.     

Toward a general theory of motivation: Problems,challenges, opportunities,and the big picture

Motivation theories have tended to focus on specific motivations, leaving open the intellectually and scientifically challenging problem of how to construct a general theory of motivation. The requirements for such a theory are presented here. The primacy of motivation emphasizes that cognition, emotion, agency, and other psychological processes exist to serve motivation. Both state (impulses) and trait (basic drives) forms of motivation must be explained, and their relationship must be illuminated. Not all motivations are the same, and indeed it is necessary to explain how motivation evolved from the simple desires of simple animals into the complex, multifaceted forms of human motivation. Motivation responds to the local environment but may also adapt to it, such as when desires increase after satiation or diminish when satisfaction is chronically unavailable. Addiction may be a special case of motivation—but perhaps it is much less special or different than prevailing cultural stereotypes suggest. The relationship between liking and wanting, and the self-regulatory management of motivational conflict, also require explanation by an integrative theory.     

The role of self-esteem in the experience of envy

It is the thesis of this paper that although analysts have always recognized that narcissistic injury may trigger envious feelings, the significance of self-esteem as both a motivator and response to envious feelings has not yet been sufficiently explored. Traditional drive-defense or object instinctual explanations tend to diminish awareness of the importance of self-esteem in the experience of envy. The focus on drives or repetition of early patterns of object relations does not always take into account the significance of the cycle in which damaged self-esteem leads to envy, the component parts of which may cause further damage to self-esteem, leading to more envy, and so on. I am suggesting that it is often an attempt to avoid painful injury to one's self-esteem, as well as the related attempt to maintain a positively colored sense of self, and not a repression of drives or a repetition of some aspect of early object relationships which must be understood in order to fully comprehend both feelings of envy and the need to keep such feelings out of conscious awareness.     

Object Relations Psychoanalysis as Political Theory

This article examines the political contents of object relations psychoanalysis, a theory that perceives dependence as the natural state of all humans. Unlike the views advanced by the classical state-of-nature models of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, object relations perceives humans in their original state as already grouped and driven by an urge to associate. Company (rather than privacy, property, or political participation) stands out as the basic right, and all the other rights follow on it as instruments for fulfilling it. The primacy of care lends itself to the justification of distributive measures meant to bolster family cohesion and individual confidence at the expense of the open market. The theory is therefore compatible with the premises of the social-democratic welfare state.     

A model of the development of the early infant object concept

A computational model is proposed for the early stages of development of the object concept in infancy. Stages in development are represented as a sequence of grammars or rewrite rules that parse a set of perceptual phenomena. The infant's changes between developmental stages can be described by differences between the grammar rules that model each stage. The program replicates five studies by Bower et al on the development of the object concept and reaffirms the primacy of rest and motion parameters as explanatory invariants in early object-concept development.     

Perceptual distinctiveness and proactive interference in the primacy effect

When subjects monitor a list of verbal items for one item which is to be selected and remembered, they are more likely to recall the critical item if it is the first member of the list than if it is presented towards the centre of the list. The present experiment examined the possibility that this primacy results from an accumulation of proactive interference from incidentally processed early members of the list which would cause a decrement in the recall of later members. By changing the semantic category of the list members before presentation of the critical item any accumulated interference would have been released, but this procedure produced no weakening of the primacy effect and so the interference theory of primacy was not supported. An alternative explanation of the effect was discussed in which it is assumed that the first member of a series is perceptually distinct from central members.     

Infantile sexuality, gender identity, and obstacles to oedipal progression

Contrary to when it was first proposed, infantile sexuality nowadays is accepted as an important part of child development. However, Freud's views on masculine primacy and feminine inferiority are seen to be incomplete and inaccurate not only because they over-emphasize sexuality and sexual anatomy, but also because they neglect aggression, object relations, ego and superego functioning, and the sense of self. Infantile sexuality is therefore reconsidered within the broader perspective of gender identity. Within this broader perspective, normal and aberrant sexual development is discussed, and new ideas are offered about familiar concepts such as castration anxiety and penis envy.     

The role of item-specific information for the serial position curve in free recall

The serial position curve in free recall of a list of action phrases differs depending on whether the phrases were memorized by listening/reading (verbal task; VT) or by additionally enacting the denoted actions (subject-performed task; SPT). In VTs there is a clear primacy effect and a short recency effect. In SPTs there is no primacy effect but an extended recency effect. H. D. Zimmer, T. Helstrup, and J. Engelkamp (2000) assumed that SPTs provide excellent item-specific information, which leads to an automatic pop-out of the items presented last. In the present study, the authors assumed that good item-specific encoding generally enhances the recency effect and that it hinders rehearsal processes and thereby reduces the primacy effect. This assumption was confirmed. An item-specific orienting task leads to parallel serial position curves in VTs and SPTs with no primacy effect but a clear recency effect. Moreover, the same serial position effects were shown with nouns as learning material. An item-specific orienting task changes the classical U-shaped serial position curve with verbal material and leads to the disappearance of the primacy and the enhancement of the recency effect.     

Determinants of object choice in adulthood: a test case of object-relations theory

A clinical example of the effects of the absence of the father during the early childhood of a male analysand and its consequences for his later object choice is presented. This patient's biological father left the household when the patient was only a few months old, and his mother did not remarry until he was five years of age. Unconscious fantasies of the lost father, with whom the patient had no contact in reality, and longing for him organized the patient's drives and determined his self-identity as well as his later object choice. The patient developed both a positive and negative identification with the lost father. The identification was with a fantasy object not a real one. The case highlights the need to use a precise term in talking of the object, namely the mental representation of the object which may or may not be built up out of experiences with the real object.     

Sosa on the normativity of belief

Sosa takes epistemic normativity to be kind of performance normativity: a belief is correct because a believer sets a positive value to truth as an aim and performs aptly and adroitly. I object to this teleological picture that beliefs are not performances, and that epistemic reasons or beliefs cannot be balanced against practical reasons. Although the picture fits the nature of inquiry, it does not fit the normative nature of believing, which has to be conceived along distinct lines.     

Immediate recognition memory for wine

We describe a preliminary investigation concerning the short-term recognition memory function for gustatory stimuli (wines). In Experiment 1A, 24 non-expert wine drinkers completed a yes/no recognition task for 3-wine sequences. For the raw recognition scores, the serial position function comprised both primacy and recency. Recency did not, however, achieve significance for the d′ scores. In Experiment 1B, 24 participants completed the same yes/no recognition task for 3-visual matrix sequences. In contrast to Experiment 1A, the serial position function comprised recency and an absence of primacy. We argue that the presence of primacy for the wine sequences cannot be interpreted via a verbal labelling strategy, nor can it be interpreted via proactive interference from the first wine in the list on subsequent list items. The result suggests qualitative differences in the memory processing for gustatory and non-verbal visual stimuli.     

Perceptual reasons

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.     

Primacy effects in self-attribution of ability1

Primacy effects in self-attribution of ability were investigated in an experiment. Subjects' performance on a 30-item test was experimentally manipulated to reflect one of three patterns: ascending, descending, or random success. It was predicted that there would be a primacy effect in self-attribution of ability regarding the task when subjects had no previous expectation or anchor to which performance could be assimilated, but that the primacy effect would be attenuated when a previous anchor existed. The presence or absence of a prior anchor was manipulated by describing the task as either a test related to intelligence or a test of an unsual ability, unrelated to previous experience. Results supported the hypothesis that there is a primacy effect in self-attribution of ability, and that this effect occurs most strongly where an individual has no prior anchor or expectation regarding his ability.     

Encoding geometric and non-geometric information: a study with evolved agents

Vertebrate species use geometric information and non-geometric or featural cues to orient. Under some circumstances, when both geometric and non-geometric information are available, the geometric information overwhelms non-geometric cues (geometric primacy). In other cases, we observe the inverse tendency or the successful integration of both cues. In past years, modular explanations have been proposed for the geometric primacy: geometric and non-geometric information are processed separately, with the geometry module playing a dominant role. The modularity issue is related to the recent debate on the encoding of geometric information: is it innate or does it depend on environmental experience? In order to get insight into the mechanisms that cause the wide variety of behaviors observed in nature, we used Artificial Life experiments. We demonstrated that agents trained mainly with a single class of information oriented efficiently when they were exposed to one class of information (geometric or non-geometric). When they were tested in environments that contained both classes of information, they displayed a primacy for the information that they had experienced more during their training phase. Encoding and processing geometric and non-geometric information was run in a single cognitive neuro-representation. These findings represent a theoretical proof that the exposure frequency to different spatial information during a learning/adaptive history could produce agents with no modular neuro-cognitive systems that are able to process different types of spatial information and display various orientation behaviors (geometric primacy, non-geometric primacy, no primacy at all).     

Phenomenology and Perceptual Content

Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, that is, “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone”. However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to follow, Horgan and Tienson would first have to establish the covariation of phenomenology and intentional content, but even so, phenomenal intentionality would still emerge as less plausible than its converse, representationalism. I will address these two challenges by appeal to Husserlian ideas. A consideration of perceptual phenomenology (i.e., phenomenal character) shows that there is a kind of perceptual content that is, indeed, determined by phenomenal character. Such content is conceived in terms of fulfillment conditions, or what it takes to bring aspects of objects and scenes to different, and more complete, ways of givenness. We can establish the primacy of phenomenology, relative to such fulfillment‐conditional content, by tracing it back to the basic phenomenology of visual and other sensations.