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Edwin D. Mares 《Erkenntnis》2002,56(2):229-246
This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come tobelieve in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision,in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replacesconsistency with a weaker property called coherence. In addition to herbelief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets arecoherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence. 相似文献
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Hans van Ditmarsch 《Studia Logica》2013,101(6):1185-1214
Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result. 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information... 相似文献
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Robert Stalnaker 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):189-209
This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem
of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising
one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about
the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples
to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The paper emphasizes the importance
of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints
on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.
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Robert StalnakerEmail: |
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Infinitary Belief Revision 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state. 相似文献
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Studia Logica - This article investigates the properties of multistate top revision, a dichotomous (AGM-style) model of belief revision that is based on an underlying model of probability revision.... 相似文献
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本文考察了评价算子,即刻画认知主体如何借助评价依据来理性评价新信息的算子,它放弃新信息中部分不可信信息,但是与传统收缩算子不同,它不指定收缩的信息而只要求评价结果与评价依据相一致。S.O.Hansson认为以单个句子作为新信息的非优先信念修正具有三种模式:决策–修正(Decision-Revision)、整合选择(Integrated Choice)和膨胀–巩固(Expansion-Consolidation)。评价算子单独刻画了非优先复合修正决策–修正模式的决策模块,对于修正模块这里不作探讨。我们先按AGM信念修正模式对评价算子进行了公理性刻画,接着通过不一致核心集和一致保留集分别构造了核心评价算子和部分交评价算子,然后分别证明了这两种算子与公理性刻画之间的表达定理,最后对评价算子和其他相关工作进行了比较。 相似文献
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We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple
axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this
logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision
are also discussed.
Giacomo Bonanno: I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments. A first draft of this paper
was presented at the Sixth Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT6), Leipzig, July 2004. 相似文献
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Stephen Murray Glaister 《Erkenntnis》1998,49(1):21-56
This paper continues the recent tradition of investigating iterated AGM revision by reasoning directly about the dynamics
for total pre-order (“implausibility ordering”) representations of AGM revision functions. We reorient discussion, however,
by proving that symmetry considerations, almost by themselves, suffice to determine a particular, AGM-friendly implausibility
ordering dynamics due to Spohn 1988, which we call “J-revision”. After exploring the connections between implausibility ordering
dynamics and the social choice theory of Arrow 1963, we provide symmetry arguments in the social choice-theoretic framework
for an interesting generalization of J-revision due to Nayak 1994. We conclude by arguing that the symmetry principles that
uniquely favor J-revision and its generalizations are importantly expressive of the purely qualitative framework for representing
beliefs that distinguishes the AGM program. Our results therefore comprehensively vindicate Spohn's 1988 conjecture that essentially
J-revision is the best that can be done by way of a purely qualitative model of belief revision.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Renata Wassermann 《Erkenntnis》1999,50(2-3):429-446
The AGM paradigm for belief revision provides a very elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about idealized agents. The paradigm assumes that the modeled agent is a perfect reasoner with infinite memory. In this paper we propose a framework to reason about non-ideal agents that generalizes the AGM paradigm. We first introduce a structure to represent an agent's belief states that distinguishes different status of beliefs according to whether or not they are explicitly represented, whether they are currently active and whether they are fully accepted or provisional. Then we define a set of basic operations that change the status of beliefs and show how these operations can be used to model agents with different capacities. We also show how different operations of belief change described in the literature can be seen as special cases of our theory. 相似文献
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Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen that the belief revision operators on which the postulational theories are based are ill-defined. It is further argued that there is no way to repair the definitions so as to retain the spirit of those theory. Belief revision is better studied from within an independently motivated epistemological theory. 相似文献
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Studia Logica - We study the learning power of iterated belief revision methods. Successful learning is understood as convergence to correct, i.e., true, beliefs. We focus on the issue of... 相似文献
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What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision. 相似文献
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Sebastian Enqvist 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(3):315-335
In the paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change”, Olsson and Westlund have suggested that the notion
of epistemic state employed in the standard framework of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985; G?rdenfors 1988) should be extended to include a representation of the agent’s research agenda (Olsson and Westlund 2006). The resulting framework will here be referred to as interrogative belief revision. In this paper, I attempt to deal with the problem of how research agendas should change in contraction, a problem largely left open by Olsson and Westlund. Two desiderata of an appropriate solution are suggested: one is a principle of continuity, stating that changes in the research agenda should somehow reflect that certain long term research interests are kept fixed. The other desideratum, which is based on part of Olsson and Westlund’s motivation for
adding research agendas to the epistemic states, is that we should be able to account for how contraction may serve to open
up new, fruitful hypotheses for investigation. In order to achieve these desiderata, I base my solution on a revised version of Olsson and Westlund’s notion of epistemic state. 相似文献
16.
Byeong Lee 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1998,79(4):314-328
The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. In this paper I offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. This theory is in many respects an application of Gupta's and Belnap's revision theory of truth. They argue that the Liar paradox arises because our notion of truth is circular. I offer a similar proposal for handling the paradox of belief instability. In particular, I argue that our notion involved in the paradox of belief instability is circular, and this circularity of belief is the source of the paradox. 相似文献
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In this paper we propose a conditional logic called IBC to represent iterated belief revision systems. We propose a set of postulates for iterated revision which are a small variant of Darwiche and Pearl's ones. The conditional logic IBC has a standard semantics in terms of selection function models and provides a natural representation of epistemic states. We establish a correspondence between iterated belief revision systems and IBC-models. Our representation theorem does not entail Gärdenfors' Triviality Result. 相似文献
18.
Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Sebastian Enqvist 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(5):527-548
The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis, 65, 165–183, 2006). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision. While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision
has only been dealt with in the metalanguage approach in which AGM was originally presented. In this paper, I show how to
model interrogative belief revision in a modal object language using a class of operators for questions. In particular, the
solution I propose will be shown to capture the notion of K-truncation, a method for agenda update in the case of expansion constructed by Olsson & Westlund. Two case studies are conducted: first,
an interrogative extension of Krister Segerberg’s system DDL, and then a similar extension of Giacomo Bonanno’s modal logic
for belief revision. Sound and complete axioms will be provided for both of the resulting logics. 相似文献
19.
信念修正问题是一个富有活力的,正在发展的研究主题。这个主题包括了一大批背景不同、形态各异的理论。阿尔罗若(C.E.Alchourron)、加德福斯(P.Gardenfors)和梅金森(D.Markinson)共同建立的信念修正理论(简称AGM理论)是其中形成比较早的、影响最大的理论。本文说明信念修正的基本概念,并且对AGM理论进行述评. 相似文献