Going With the Flow: Preschoolers Prefer Nondissenters as Informants

ABSTRACT— In two experiments, 3- and 4-year-olds were tested for their sensitivity to agreement and disagreement among informants. In pretest trials, they watched as three of four informants ( Experiment 1 ) or two of three informants ( Experiment 2 ) indicated the same referent for an unfamiliar label; the remaining informant was a lone dissenter who indicated a different referent. Asked for their own judgment, the preschoolers sided with the majority rather than the dissenter. In subsequent test trials, one member of the majority and the dissenter remained present and continued to provide conflicting information about the names of unfamiliar objects. Children remained mistrustful of the dissenter. They preferred to seek and endorse information from the informant who had belonged to the majority. The implications and scope of children's early sensitivity to group consensus are discussed.     

Children's Conformity When Acquiring Novel Conventions: The Case of Artifacts

Prior research focused on children's acquisition of arbitrary social conventions (e.g., object labels) has revealed that both 3- and 4-year-old children conform to majority opinion. Two studies explored whether children show similar conformist tendencies when making category-based judgments about a less socially arbitrary domain that offers an objective basis for judgment: object functions. Three- and 4-year-old children watched a video in which two informants disagreed with a lone dissenter on the function of a novel artifact. Children were asked to categorize the object by stating with whom they agreed. The plausibility of the majority's response was manipulated across test trials. Results demonstrated that children were more likely to agree with the majority when majority and minority opinions were equally plausible, especially when the majority demonstrated an overt consensus. However, 4-year-olds actively eschewed the majority opinion when it was implausible in context of the artifact's functional design. The current results indicate that expertise in a domain of conventional knowledge reduces conformist tendencies.     

Recollection, fluency, and the explicit/implicit distinction in artificial grammar learning

In this article, the authors propose that both implicit memory and implicit learning phenomena can be explained by a common set of principles, in particular via participants' strategic use of recollective and fluency heuristics. In a series of experiments, it was demonstrated that manipulating processing fluency had an impact on classification decisions in an artificial grammar learning task (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 7), showing that participants were using a fluency heuristic. Under identical conditions, however, this manipulation had no effect on recognition decisions (Experiments 3 and 5), consistent with a greater default reliance on recollection. Most significant, the authors also showed that a fluency effect can be induced in recognition (Experiments 4-6) and can be eliminated in classification (Experiment 7).     

On the nature of interactions between the past and the present.

We conceptualize the past and the present as dimensions of experience and ask whether past processing must affect decisions about the present and whether present processing must affect decisions about the past. The paradigm is speeded classification: Ss classified a stimulus's past spatial position and tried to ignore information about present position (Experiments 1-4), or classified present position, while attempting to ignore past position (Experiments 5-6). We found that in classifying the past, Ss were unable to ignore present position, unless it was processed apart from the retrieval cue. In classifying the present, subjects could ignore past position completely. We conclude that a processing asymmetry exists, reflecting perhaps a logical asymmetry in the information required to make past or present decisions.     

The effect of nondirective questioning on women's decisions whether to undergo bone density screening: an experimental study.

This study investigated the effects of nondirective counseling on health screening decisions. Ninety women (mean age = 51 years) received information about bone density screening and osteoporosis. They were then randomly allocated to 1 of 4 groups and were encouraged to focus on positive issues about bone density screening (positive group), on negative issues (negative group), on both positive and negative issues (all-focusing group), or on issues relating to the common cold (control group). Women were asked to rate how likely they would be to opt for bone density screening if they saw it available. After being informed that they could have bone density screening, actual uptake was assessed. It was found that the issues on which individuals focused significantly influenced their rate likelihood of opting for the scan. Rated likelihood of testing was significantly associated with whether individuals actually did opt for testing when it was subsequently offered to them.     

Mental budgeting versus marginal decision making: training,experience and justification effects on decisions involving sunk costs

Many studies have shown that individuals make economically irrational decisions by using, rather than ignoring, sunk cost information. In this study, the effects of relevant academic training, financial experience and decision justification on investment decisions involving sunk costs were examined. Data on both the process (strategy) and outcome of the decisions were collected. The results indicate that practicing Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), Masters of Business Administration students (MBAs) and undergraduate accounting students perform better than undergraduate psychology students. The level of training, as measured by the number of college courses in managerial accounting, was found to be positively correlated with performance, while the level of experience, as measured by years of financially‐related work, was not. Justification was found to improve decisions only for those participants with significant work experience (MBAs and CPAs). Strategies used in this type of decision were examined with the surprising finding that economically rational decisions can be made even if sunk costs are not ignored. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Playing dice with criminal sentences: the influence of irrelevant anchors on experts' judicial decision making

Judicial sentencing decisions should be guided by facts, not by chance. The present research however demonstrates that the sentencing decisions of experienced legal professionals are influenced by irrelevant sentencing demands even if they are blatantly determined at random. Participating legal experts anchored their sentencing decisions on a given sentencing demand and assimilated toward it even if this demand came from an irrelevant source (Study 1), they were informed that this demand was randomly determined (Study 2), or they randomly determined this demand themselves by throwing dice (Study 3). Expertise and experience did not reduce this effect. This sentencing bias appears to be produced by a selective increase in the accessibility of arguments that are consistent with the random sentencing demand: The accessibility of incriminating arguments was higher if participants were confronted with a high rather than a low anchor (Study 4). Practical and theoretical implications of this research are discussed.     

The influence of rumination and defensiveness on negative affect in response to experimental stress

Previous experiments investigating the influence of rumination on negative affect have often manipulated the timing and content of rumination, which may be problematic as rumination is phenomenologically experienced as uncontrollable. In the present experiment, rumination was not manipulated, but measured as an individual tendency before the experiment. Furthermore, it was tested whether defensiveness would reduce the higher degree of negative affect often associated with rumination. Fifty-six participants completed questionnaires measuring rumination and defensiveness and participated in a phrase completion task, rating negative affect before and after the task. Correlational analyses showed that rumination was positively associated (p < 0.05) with affect responses (r range = 0.35-0.61), whereas defensiveness was negatively associated with affect responses (r range =-0.27-0.32). Four groups of high and low rumination and defensiveness scorers were created using median splits. An ANOVA showed that scoring high on defensiveness did not reduce the negative affect experienced by high ruminating participants.     

RECRUITERS' USE OF GPA IN INITIAL SCREENING DECISIONS: HIGHER GPAs DON'T ALWAYS MAKE THE CUT

The relationship between college grade point average (GPA) and recruiters' initial screening decisions was examined using data from 548 job postings in a college recruitment program. Results indicate that in-major grade point average (GPA) is more strongly associated with screening decisions ( p = 0.18, SD_P = 0.200) than is overall GPA ( p = 0.06, SD_P = 0.187), but the magnitudes of the relationships varied across decision sets including a larger number of negative values than would be expected from sampling error alone. Subsequent examination of the bivariate data identified 6 different plot types suggesting that recruiters use a variety of GPA decision rules to initially screen applicants in college recruiting. The most common data plots found in 42% of the decision sets suggests that recruiters do not use GPA in screening decisions. But a surprising 81 of 548 decision sets indicated recruiters selected against applicants with high GPAs. Evidence that organizations recruiting for the same job produced different plot types suggests that the use of GPA data in initial screening decisions may be idiosyncratic to individual recruiters.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers' memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7-10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

Cooperation with leaders in social dilemmas: On the effects of procedural fairness and outcome favorability in structural cooperation

The present research examined the effectiveness of leadership in influencing cooperation in social dilemmas by focusing on the procedural fairness and favorability of leaders’ outcome decisions. We predicted that leader’s influence on cooperation would be determined by the fairness of the procedures used, but only so when received outcomes were unfavorable. Across two experimental studies, support for this hypothesis was found. Both in Study 1 (using accuracy as a manipulation of procedural fairness) and Study 2 (using voice as a manipulation of procedural fairness), it was found that procedural fairness influenced contributions in a public good dilemma only if outcomes were unfavorable (i.e., participants received less than an equal share), whereas procedural fairness did not influence level of contributions when outcomes were favorable (i.e., participants received more than an equal share).     

Fears, worries, and scary dreams in 4- to 12-year-old children: their content, developmental pattern, and origins

Investigated anxiety symptoms in normal school children 4 to 12 years of age (N = 190). The percentages of children reporting fears, worries, and scary dreams were 75.8, 67.4, and 80.5%, respectively, indicating that these anxiety symptoms are quite common among children. Inspection of the developmental pattern of these phenomena revealed that fears and scary dreams were common among 4- to 6-year-olds, became even more prominent in 7- to 9-year-olds, and then decreased in frequency in 10- to 12-year-olds. The developmental course of worry deviated from this pattern. This phenomenon was clearly more prevalent in older children (i.e., 7- to 12-year-olds) than in younger children. Furthermore, although the frequency of certain types of fears, worries, and dreams were found to change across age groups (e.g., the prevalence of fears and scary dreams pertaining to imaginary creatures decreased with age, whereas worry about test performance increased with age), the top intense fears, worries, and scary dreams remained relatively unchanged across age levels. An examination of the origins of these common anxiety phenomena showed that for fears and scary dreams, information was the most commonly reported pathway, whereas for worry, conditioning experiences were more prominent.     

Perceptual unit formation in simple motion patterns

The present study investigated the proximal constraints that determine perceptual unit formation under minimal stimulus conditions. Projections of three moving dots, which could form two possible two-dot configurations, were presented to naive observers. In a forced-choice situation, their task was to report which two-dot configuration was perceived as a distinct perceptual unit. The results showed that common motions (arbitrary translations and rigid rotations in the frontoparallel plane) have stronger grouping power as compared to different relative motions (expansions/contractions, or simultaneous expansions/contractions and deformations in the frontoparallel plane). It was found that proximal changes of distances between elements in two-dot structures reduce grouping power. Changes of proximal directions, however, did not affect unit formation in two-dot structures at all. The effect of vector algebraic combinations on grouping power in three-dot strutures was also investigated. Evidently, visual vector analysis splits up motion combinations into their constituents, and in come cases this contributes to additive effects.     

A developmental dissociation between category and function judgments about novel artifacts

Two studies investigated the relative importance of information about intended design and current use on judgments about the function (Experiment 1) or category (Experiment 2) of novel artifacts in preschool children and adults. Adults assigned function and name on the basis of information about design across all conditions, while children’s decisions about function dissociated from decisions about category. Function judgments (in both 4 and 6-year-olds) were neutral between design and current use, both when the current use was idiosyncratic (e.g. performed by just one agent) and conventional (performed by many people; Experiment 1). By contrast, where category judgments were required for the very same objects (Experiment 2), children named according to design intentions - but only if the alternate function was idiosyncratic. Judging function and assigning category are thus cognitive tasks that draw on different information across development, a fact that should be captured by theories of developing artifact concept structure.     

Non-verbal communication enables children’s coordination in a “Stag Hunt” game

This study assessed the role of non-verbal communication in 4-year-old children’s decisions to coordinate with others. During a “Stag Hunt” game, the child and an adult individually and continually collected low-value prizes (hares). Occasionally, an alternative option of collecting a high-value prize (stag) cooperatively with the adult arose, but entailed a risk: a lone attempt on this prize by either player would leave that player empty handed. Children coordinated with the adult to obtain the high-value prize more often when that adult made mutual eye contact and smiled at them than when she attended to the prizes only. This suggests that neither verbal nor gestural communication are necessary for coordination: Minimal, non-verbal communication enables children’s coordination with others towards joint goals.     

Identifying the Lone Wolf: A Team Perspective

Increased use of sales teams reduces salespeople’s latitude to operate as “lone wolves.” A lone wolf prefers to work alone when making decisions and setting goals, has little patience for group process, sees others as less effective, and seldom values others’ ideas. Research investigating lone wolves suggests they lack organizational commitment. However, no current scale exists for identifying lone wolves. Using sales representatives and student samples, we validate a lone wolf scale and demonstrate how lone wolves differ from autonomous individuals. Having good psychometric properties, the scale is useful to practitioners for assessing representatives for sales team contexts.     

Personal names and the human right hemisphere: an illusory link?

Names are thought to be represented in the brain differently from common nouns. Although this idea is supported by both theoretical and empirical arguments, the brain areas that are relevant for the recognition of personal names-and in particular the extent of right hemisphere involvement-remain controversial. We investigated the hypothesis that, unlike common nouns, personal names are represented preferentially by the right hemisphere (D. Van Lancker, 1991; D. Van Lancker et al., 1991; C. Ohnesorge & D. Van Lancker, 1999). Participants performed lexical decisions to common nouns and pseudowords (Experiment 1) or familiarity decisions to personal names (Experiment 2), which were presented briefly to the left or right visual fields. Asymmetries were small or absent for both pseudowords and unfamiliar names. For familiar names, both reaction times and error rates revealed strong advantages for the right visual field/left hemisphere (RVF/LH), which were comparable to the asymmetries for nouns. Familiar personal names may be represented by brain systems that differ from those representing common nouns, but current evidence does not suggest a distinct contribution of the right hemisphere to these brain systems.     

Linear and nonlinear effects of aging on categorizing and naming faces.

Subjects aged 54-84 performed 5 separate tasks involving various aspects of face processing: structural decisions (1), familiarity decisions (2), semantic decisions (3), first-name decisions (4), and name retrieval (5). For the categorization tasks (1-4), the mean reaction times for the older subjects (over 65) were plotted against the corresponding means for the younger subjects (under 65). This produced a linear function (slope greater than 1, intercept less than 0), providing only partial support for a simple, multiplicative model of cognitive slowing with age. Reaction time distributions were also plotted for each of the 5 tasks (older vs. younger subjects). The resulting functions were almost perfectly linear, with the exception of name retrieval, which was exponential with respect to age. This was attributed to the increased probability of a tip-of-the-tongue state with age caused by insufficient activation at the level of the name information (the final state of face identification).     

消费者购买决定与前额叶脑活动的不对称性——来自EEG的证据

摘要：目前营销科学界对消费者购买决策阶段的神经运作机制仍然缺乏准确的理解,本研究探索了大脑前额叶不对称性是否与消费者购买决策有关。采用田野实验方法,21名受试者在真实的在线购物中,分别对自己购物车里5件物品做出真实的购买决策,他们的EEG脑电图被完整记录了下来,共观察到104次购买决策过程。结果表明,在产品页面观看过程中,受试者的gamma频带前额叶不对称,与随后真实购买行为显著相关。alpha、beta频带额叶不对称与购买决策无关。结果还发现与商品的售价对beta和gamma不对称指数的调节效应,且调节效果正好相反。本研究发现了消费者在购买决策过程中一种独特的EEG成分——前额叶gamma波不对称指数（PAIγ）与肯定的购买意愿和实际购买行为相关性最强。     

决策信心校准水平对元认知监控作用的影响

决策信心是个体对自身决策正确性的主观评价,是对决策过程的元认知体验。决策信心校准指决策信心水平与实际的决策正确率之间的匹配程度,其指标有信心水平和决策正确率的相关系数及Type II信号检测论中的ROC曲线下面积（Aroc）等。已有研究发现进行决策信心评估能够增强对当前或后续决策的元认知监控作用,但目前尚不清楚这种效应是否依赖于个体的决策信心校准水平。本研究通过设置知觉决策后是否进行决策信心评估（有信心评估与无信心评估）两种条件,考察个体决策信心的校准水平（Aroc）对元认知监控作用的影响。结果显示：1）与无信心评估条件相比,有信心评估的决策反应时显著增长,决策正确率显著提高（p<0.005）;2）Aroc与有、无信心评估条件下决策正确率的增加值显著正相关（r=0.25,p=0.034）,且高Aroc组的决策正确率增加值显著高于低Aroc组（p<0.05）。结果表明,在知觉决策过程中加入决策信心评估具有增强元认知监控作用的效应,体现为决策时间的增长和决策正确率的提高。并且,这种效应的大小依赖于个体的决策信心校准水平,校准水平越高元认知监控作用越好。