The Measurement of Principled Morality by the Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Questionnaire

The four stages preceding the postconventional level in the Kohlberg (1958, 1971, 1976) system of moral development are described as involving moral judgments that conform to external conditions of punishment, reward, social expectation, and conformity to the law. No special level of self-control seems necessary to behave in keeping with these conditions of external reinforcement. In contrast, the two stages of postconventional (principled) morality involve defiance of majority opinion and defiance of the law-actions that would seem to require greater self-control. This study was concerned with whether postconventional moral reasoning, as measured by the Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Questionnaire (MDQ), can be associated with higher self-control. If so, prediction of principled moral behavior from the MDQ would be based not only on postconventional moral reasoning but bolstered by the necessary level of self-control as well. College students who came the closest to postconventional moral reasoning showed better self-control than college students who were more conventional or preconventional in their moral judgments. These results support the validity of the MDQ for predicting principled moral behavior.     

What does principled versus conventional moral reasoning convey to others about the politics and psychology of the reasoner?

The well‐documented relationship between political orientation and moral reasoning has most often been interpreted in terms of the influence of level of moral development (cf. Kohlberg, 1984) upon an individual's political inclinations: those who have reached the conventional level (or stage 4) in Kohlberg's terms will as a result tend to favour the political right, whereas those who progress to the principled level (stage 5) shift their political preferences to the left. An alternative, ‘social communication’ view is that these different forms of moral reasoning are expressions of contrasting political identities, and differ in ideological content rather than developmental level. We compared the inferences that American and British students (n=211) drew about the political, moral and cognitive attributes of a target who, in response to moral dilemmas, used either stage 4A, stage 4B or stage 5 moral arguments as defined by Kohlberg. Perception of the target's political attributes varied consistently and significantly as a function of the target's moral reasoning, but there were no corresponding effects on perception of moral or cognitive attributes. The results are interpreted as supporting a social communication view of moral reasoning and its relation to political orientation, and at the same time questioning the claim that conventional (stage 4) and principled (stage 5) moral reasoning are distinct levels of socio‐cognitive development. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A re-investigating of the religious orientation-moral reasoning relationship: a relational developmental systems perspective

This study re-investigates the relationship between religious orientation and Kohlberg’s moral reasoning among students at a midwestern (USA) university. Multiple regression analyses revealed that quest-oriented religiosity was significantly positively related to principled moral reasoning, as consistently found in previous studies, while intrinsic religious orientation showed no relation to principled moral reasoning. We discuss our findings through a lens of relational developmental systems theory, suggesting that a more integrative measure is needed to better understand the complex relationship between religious orientation and moral reasoning.     

Carol Gilligan's theory of sex differences in the development of moral reasoning during adolescence

Gilligan's work, which focuses on sex differences in moral reasoning, the perception of violence, the resolution of sexual dilemmas and abortion decisions, poses a major challenge to Kohlberg's theory by introducing a feminist perspective of moral development. Kohlberg had shown that the average female attained a moral judgment rating of stage three (good boy-nice girl), while adolescent males score at level four (law and order) and are more likely to move on to postconventional levels. Gilligan suggests that these findings reveal a gender bias, not that females are less mature than boys. Men and women follow different voices. Men tend to organize social relationships in a hierarchical order and subscribe to a morality of rights. Females value interpersonal connectedness, care, sensitivity, and responsibility to people. Kohlberg's scoring criteria give the interpersonal care orientations of females lower ratings than the principled justice orientation. Hence, Gilligan identifies different developmental stages for females. However, she does not claim that one system is better; both are equally valid. Only by integrating these complementary male (justice) and female (care) orientations will we be able to realize our full human potential in moral development.     

Moral development and behavior.

The study of moral development as well as the relation of moral development and behavior has been of great interest to many over the past half a century. While some studies have shown no association between one's moral development and behavior, some evidence indicates level of moral reasoning influences behavior. Over 16 selected studies postconventional principles of justice are likely to be more prosocial and law-abiding than those appropriate at the lower stages of moral development.     

Possible Environmental Causes of Stages in Moral Reasoning

Both children (6-, 10-, and 14-year-olds) and their mothers were interviewed. The children's responses to moral dilemmas were classified into Kohlberg's three main categories—preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. The mothers were presented with a variety of hypothetical situations—e.g., they had just found out that their child had stolen something, and were asked to tell what they would say or do to their child in each situation. The mothers' hypothetical responses to such situations were divided into either the preconventional, conventional, or postconventional category depending on the level or moral reasoning such responses would imply to their children. The results indicated that as the age of the children increased, both the level of moral reasoning used by the children and the level of moral reasoning implied by the mothers' treatment of the children increased. Even with age partialed out, there was a significant positive relationship between the mothers' implied level of moral reasoning and the children's level of moral reasoning. Thus, although causality cannot be established, the results indicate that there is at least the possibility that environmental changes—i.e., changes in the way the mother treats the child—may be responsible for the appearance of stages in the child's development of moral reasoning.     

Making sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg: the case of the child's moral competence

This study attempts to make conceptual and empirical sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg concerning the child's moral competence. Forty-eight children from two age-levels (24 6-year-olds, and 24 8-year-olds; Experiment 1), and 20 young adults aged between 17 and 21 years (Experiment 2) were confronted with hypothetical situations in which two apparently immoral acts (stealing and lying) were right if a principled or reversible exchange of perspectives were adopted. Contrary to what would be expected from Turiel's claim about the child's sophisticated moral competence, children, but not young adults, judged the acts at hand more in accord with a pattern of pseudo-moral necessity or fuzzy traces of morality than with a pattern of a developing idea of principled morality or “necessary” moral knowledge. The paper also argues that one is in a better position to make sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg when one becomes aware of (a) Wittgenstein's idea of grammatical investigations, (b) Piaget's distinction between false, true, and necessary (cognitive) knowledge, and (c) Kohlberg's distinction between pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional moral reasoning as a distinction that, to an extent, corresponds in the moral domain to Piaget's epistemic types of knowledge in the cognitive domain.     

Moral reasoning and emphasis on different kinds of moral content

A test designed to differentiate between conventional and postconventional moral reasoning was completed by 56 university students, who also rated positive and negative items in four general moral content areas. Postconventionality was related to relatively greater stress on social and especially on international moral content. Overall and within-area differences were discussed with reference to the structural characteristics of each type of moral orientation, especially the consequences of the postconventional capacity to apply ideal role-taking in moral reasoning.     

Culture and moral judgment: how are conflicts between justice and interpersonal responsibilities resolved?

A 2-session study examined Indian and American adults' and children's (N = 140) reasoning about moral dilemmas involving conflicts between interpersonal and justice expectations. Most Indians gave priority to the interpersonal expectations, whereas most Americans gave priority to the justice expectations. Indians tended to categorize their conflict resolutions in moral terms. In contrast, when Americans gave priority to the interpersonal alternatives, they tended to categorize their resolutions in personal terms. Results imply that Indians possess a postconventional moral code in which interpersonal responsibilities are seen in as fully principled terms as justice obligations and may be accorded precedence over justice obligations. Findings also suggest that a personal morality of interpersonal responsiveness and caring is linked to highly rights-oriented cultural views, such as those emphasized in the United States.     

Islamic Personal Religion and Moral Reasoning in Social Justice and Equality: The Evidence From Indonesian College Students

Researchers have long been concerned with the relationship between religion and social justice and equality. Hoping to understand this association at the individual level, researchers have taken on the psychological models of personal religion and Kohlberg's moral reasoning. This article extends this line of inquiry to Islam, using Muslim college and graduate students in Indonesia. Specifically, it explores the extent to which religious orientations and Islamic doctrinal orthodoxy relate to Kohlbergian principled reasoning in justice and equality. In view of the results, the Muslim respondents are skewed toward the nonprincipled mode of Kohlbergian moral reasoning. In addition, those with greater intrinsic religiosity are likely to respond in an increasingly principled manner to moral dilemmas, whereas personal extrinsic religiosity tends to increase conventional practice of moral reasoning. Quest religiosity and doctrinal orthodoxy have little to do with Kohlbergian principled reasoning. The implications of these findings are discussed by giving attention to the accent of personal mediation, Islam as a belief system, and congregational worship to principled reasoning in social justice.     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

The effects of interpersonal relationship and character gender on adolescents' resolutions of moral dilemmas

An experimental study using two forms of the Defining Issues Test [Rest, J. R. (1979). Revised manual for the Defining Issues Test. Minneapolis: Moral Research Project, University of Minnesota.], modified to present either a high degree of relationship among characters or a low degree of relationship among characters, was conducted with 114 college students. The gender of the characters in the dilemmas was also systematically varied. Both male and female students evidenced principled (Stages 5 and 6) reasoning more often when dilemma characters were male than when story characters were female. Participant gender and relationship condition were significant factors in the frequency of Stage 4 reasoning. Male students in the low-relationship condition evidenced Stage 4 (“Law and order”) reasoning most often when story characters were male, while male students, like female students in all conditions, showed Stage 4 reasoning more often when female characters were presented in the high-relationship condition. The degree to which moral decisions were supportive of an affected character revealed more support when story characters were female than when they were male. Results indicate that even in hypothetical situations, moral judgments vary with the gender of the person being judged and to some degree with the relationships among those involved in the dilemma. These findings are consistent with a view that multiple, equally valid approaches to moral judgment might exist and affect the development of male and female students differently.     

Change in values and moral reasoning during higher education

The aim of this study was to examine whether personal value priorities, measured by Schwartz et al.'s method, change during higher education, whether moral reasoning measured by the DIT develops and whether values predict gain in moral development. Moreover, we explored the simultaneous changes in value priorities and moral reasoning. Our sample consisted of 132 students from a university of applied sciences who filled out the value measure and the DIT both at the beginning and at the end of their studies. The results revealed that universalism and security values became more important whereas achievement decreased in importance during the three-year period. We also found significant gain in moral development and that universalism and hedonism values predicted this gain significantly. Significant correlated change was found between moral reasoning and stimulation, conformity and security values. The meaning of the results is discussed in terms of the theories of Schwartz and Kohlberg.     

特质愤怒对大学生网络攻击行为的影响:道德推脱的作用

为探讨特质愤怒、道德推脱及大学生网络攻击行为之间的关系,选取450名大学生,采用特质愤怒量表、道德推脱问卷和网络攻击行为量表进行调查。结果表明：（1）特质愤怒对大学生网络攻击行为有着显著的正向影响,并间接地通过道德推脱对大学生网络攻击行为产生作用,道德推脱起部分中介作用;（2）道德推脱在特质愤怒对大学生网络攻击行为的影响中起显著的调节作用,具体而言,在高道德推脱水平下,特质愤怒能显著的正向预测大学生网络攻击行为,而在低道德推脱水平下,特质愤怒对大学生网络攻击行为的预测作用不显著。     

MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE STUDENTS IN HONG KONG

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral judgment by Rest was administered to 242 Chinese secondary school and university students in Hong Kong. Metric unfolding analysis on the stage scores of different groups of both sexes and various educational levels revealed that the moral development of the Chinese students were in agreement with Kohlberg's major distinctions of preconventional, conventional and postconventional levels. The sequence of stage development within the same level (e.g., between stages 5 and 6), however, was sometimes ambiguous. Results also showed that older university students were morally more mature than the younger secondary school students in their P%, D, and stages 5 and 6 scores. The applicability of DIT in the Chinese culture and the universality of Kohlberg's 6-stage model were generally supported.     

Care and Justice Moral Orientation: A Scale for Its Assessment

A quantitative measure of adult moral orientation, based on the theoretical frameworks of Kohlberg and Gilligan, was developed to measure preference for "justice" or "care"-oriented moral thinking. The Moral Orientation Scale Using Childhood Dilemmas (MOS), a short, objective measure, presents adults with a series of dilemmas frequently faced by children, each followed by two care-oriented and two justice-oriented responses to the dilemma. The procedures for developing and scoring the measure are discussed, and validity and reliability data are presented. Used with both male and female social work and law students, as expected, the MOS shows males to be more justice-oriented in their moral reasoning than females who are shown to be more care-oriented. Moreover, in further agreement with Gilligan's theory that gender and experience, taken together, are related to moral reasoning style, male lawyers and female social workers are shown to have the strongest preferences.     

Type A personality, self-control, and vulnerability to stress

Type A behavior (hard-driving, competitive, time-urgent, hostile-irritable) has been linked to high stress levels and the risk of eventual cardiovascular problems (i.e., coronary heart disease, CHD). However, this pattern of behavior closely resembles the traditional masculine instrumental (goal-oriented) orientation, and, if kept within limits, may be viewed as adaptive in success-oriented, middle-class college students. Hypothetically then, Type A behavior may be displayed by a broad group of individuals, and only in those cases when it is allowed to reach extreme proportions is stress sufficient enough to confer risk. This article considers two lines of reasoning. Is greater self-control required for college women to be Type As, because it involves crossing into traditional male role behavior? Type A women displayed significantly better self-control then Type B women; the opposite result was disclosed for college men with Type As displaying poorer self-control than Type Bs. The question of whether risk-conferring Type A behavior would result from poorer self-control was answered in the affirmative. Self-control assumed moderator status; poorer self-control in both male and female Type As was associated with high levels of day-to-day stress relative to Type As with better self-control. Self-control did not influence stress level in Type Bs. This moderator effect suggests that only Type As who cannot contain their behavior within adaptive limits will be vulnerable to excessive stress and at risk for CHD.