Wishful thinking and the unconscious

Abstract

This paper gives a sketch for a reconstruction of the Freudian unconscious, and an argument for its existence. The strategy followed attempts to side-step the extended debates about the validity of Freud’s methods and conclusions, by basing itself on the desire/belief schema for understanding and explaining human behaviour - a schema neither folk psychology nor scientific psychology can do without. People are argued to have, as ideal types, two fundamental modes of fulfilling their desires: engaging with reality, and wishful thinking. The first mode tries to acknowledge the constraints reality imposes on the satisfaction of desires, while the second mode tries to ignore, deny or disguise these constraints, inasmuch as they threaten to make such satisfaction impossible or unfeasible. Crucially, wishful thinking can be used so as to ignore or deny any desire that is incompatible with other strong desires. Thus we end up unaware of the existence or nature of some of our desires, of the fact that they are influencing our thought and behaviour, and of the process our own mind has used to thwart awareness of them. Once we acknowledge this possibility, we are already seriously entertaining the possibility of the Freudian unconscious, or something fairly close to it. The more aware the subject is that her wishful thinking is just that, the less effective it becomes. Wishful thinking thus requires an unconscious; it is inimical to a clear, complete and unambiguous acknowledgement of its own status. Next, various aspects of my account (and Freud’s) that allow a conception of the unconscious in non-Cartesian terms are emphasised: the unconscious is largely constituted by semantic phenomena of a particular type: forms of representation which would conceal their meaning even if the full light of ‘attention’, Cartesian ‘consciousness’ or ‘introspection’ were cast upon them. If wishful thinking is an integral part of mental life, philosophers and others wishing to “educate humanity” will have to proceed differently from what would have been appropriate had rational thought and action been the only available option for satisfying desires.     

Wishful thinking in the prediction of competitive outcomes

In each of two experiments, college students were assigned to two ad hoc groups (Team A and Team B) that competed in a dart-throwing contest. On each trial, one contestant from each team threw a single dart at a standard dart board, trying to come as close as possible to hitting the bull's-eye. Also on each trial, the other participants judged the likelihood that both the Team A contestant and the Team B contestant would come closer to hitting the bull's-eye. In both experiments (N=36 in Experiment 1; N=35 in Experiment 2), participants exhibited a strong wishful thinking effect. They judged the likelihood that their own team members would come closer to be greater than the likelihood that the opposing team members would come closer. Experiment 2 suggested that it was participants' desires, as opposed to some other variable associated with team membership, that influenced their predictions. Experiment 2 also showed that the size of the effect did not depend on whether participants believed that their predictions had been influenced by their team membership. These results help bridge the gap between previous experimental laboratory studies, which have produced inconsistent results, and correlational field studies of sports fans and voters, which have consistently produced large effects.     

Self-relevance and wishful thinking: Facilitation and distortion in source monitoring

When making source attributions, people tend to attribute desirable statements to reliable sources and undesirable statements to unreliable sources, a phenomenon known as the wishful thinking effect (Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005). In the present study, we examined the influence of wishful thinking on source monitoring for self-relevant information. On one hand, wishful thinking is expected, because self-relevant desires are presumably strong. However, self-relevance is known to confer a memory advantage and may thus provide protection from desire-based biases. In Experiment 1, source memory for self-relevant information was contrasted against source memory for information relevant to others and for neutral information. Results indicated that self-relevant information was affected by wishful thinking and was remembered more accurately than was other information. Experiment 2 showed that the magnitude of the self-relevant wishful thinking effect did not increase with a delay.     

Developments in source monitoring: the role of thinking of others

Adults' source judgments are more accurate when they focus on speakers' emotions than when adults focus on their own emotions. Focusing on speakers may lead to better source memory because it encourages processing of the perceptual characteristics of the source and binding of that information to the content of what is being said. The purpose of the current work was to evaluate whether young children's source memory similarly benefits from this outward encoding focus and whether this effect changes developmentally. In Experiment 1, when 4- and 5-year-olds heard an audiotape of two dissimilar speakers, only the 5-year-olds showed better source memory when asked to adopt an other-focus. In Experiment 2, when 4- and 5-year-olds watched a videotape of two similar speakers, the same pattern was found. However, in Experiment 3, when 4-year-olds watched a videotape of two dissimilar speakers (a more optimal encoding condition in which 5-year-olds showed ceiling performance), 4-year-olds benefited from taking an other-focus during encoding. Overall, the data suggest that the benefit for source memory of focusing on another person develops over the preschool years.     

Monitoring the source monitoring

The hypothesis that the retrieval of correct source memory cues, those leading to a correct source attribution, increases confidence, whereas the retrieval of incorrect source memory cues, those leading to a source misattribution, decreases confidence was tested. Four predictions were derived from this hypothesis: (1) confidence should be higher for correct than incorrect source attribution except; (2) when no source cues are retrieved; (3) only the source misattributions inferred from the retrieval of incorrect source cues will be rated with low confidence; and (4) the number of source cues retrieved, either correct or incorrect, will affect the confidence in the source attributions. To test these predictions, participants read two narratives from two witnesses to a bank robbery, a customer and a teller. Then, participants completed a source monitoring test with four alternatives, customer, teller, both, or neither, and rated their confidence in their source attribution. Results supported the first three predictions, but they also suggested that the number of correct source monitoring cues retrieved did not play a role in the monitoring of the accuracy of the source attributions. Attributions made from the recovery of incorrect source cues could be tagged as dubious or uncertain, thus leading to lowered confidence irrespective of the number of incorrect source cues or whether another correct source cue was also recovered. This research has potential applications for eyewitness memory because it shows that confidence can be an indicator of the accuracy of a source attribution.     

Wishful Thinking—Against All Odds

Wishful thinking (WT)—defined as predicting a more favorable outcome for a preferred team—was investigated in soccer stadia and betting stations in Israel. High levels of WT were found in all contexts investigated. As hypothesized, the intensity of WT varied between contexts as a function of the "legitimacy" of emotionalism and subjectivity, and within each context as a function of self-defined levels of fanhood and preference. An explicit instruction to be objective did not reduce WT in predicting game outcomes. Paid betting forms represented an ecologically valid voluntary behavior most contradictory of wishful thinking, since bettors are strongly motivated to be objective and impartial. The results showed that fans could not overcome their wishful thinking, betting emotionally and against their financial interest.     

Process dissociation as source monitoring

A 2-high-threshold model source-monitoring model (U. J. Bayen, K. Murnane, & E. Erdfelder, 1996) was applied to both source-monitoring and process-dissociation data collected varying source and distracter similarity. The model fit both sets of data using identical parameter values. The values of the detection parameter, D, and the source-discrimination parameter, d, varied in the manner expected. Also, neither the process-dissociation (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) nor the extended process-dissociation model (A. Buchner, E. Erdfelder, & B. Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, 1995) fit either type of data. The memory processes involved in recognition judgments are the same when using the process-dissociation or the source-monitoring procedure. The 4 cognitive processes in both procedures can be interpreted as item detection, source identification, recognition guessing, and source guessing. The potential role of unconscious memory influences via the 2 guessing processes is discussed.     

Theory-of-mind development influences suggestibility and source monitoring

According to the mental-state reasoning model of suggestibility, 2 components of theory of mind mediate reductions in suggestibility across the preschool years. The authors examined whether theory-of-mind performance may be legitimately separated into 2 components and explored the memory processes underlying the associations between theory of mind and suggestibility, independent of verbal ability. Children 3 to 6 years old completed 6 theory-of-mind tasks and a postevent misinformation procedure. Contrary to the model's prediction, a single latent theory-of-mind factor emerged, suggesting a single-component rather than a dual-component conceptualization of theory-of-mind performance. This factor provided statistical justification for computing a single composite theory-of-mind score. Improvements in theory of mind predicted reductions in suggestibility, independent of verbal ability (Study 1, n = 72). Furthermore, once attribution biases were controlled (Study 2, n = 45), there was also a positive relationship between theory of mind and source memory, but not recognition performance. The findings suggest a substantial, and possibly causal, association between theory-of-mind development and resistance to suggestion, driven specifically by improvements in source monitoring.     

Imagery perspective and source monitoring in imagination inflation

The present experiments suggest that imagery perspective—first person (own) versus third person (observer’s)—influences source-monitoring judgments. Imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, &; Sherman, 1996) occurs when imaginary experience with events is mistaken for real experience. In Experiment 1, the perspective used to visualize real past events depended on memory test wording (“remember doing?” vs. “happened to you?”). Experiment 2 manipulated the perspective used to visually imagine counterfactual events and showed that the effect on imagination inflation depended on memory test wording. Imagination inflation was most likely when memory test wording encouraged participants to visualize real events from the same perspective as they had used to imagine counterfactual ones. Imagination inflation may result not simply from having created imaginary representations of events, but also from having created representations that match the decision criteria used in source monitoring.     

Positive and negative generation effects in source monitoring

Research is mixed as to whether self-generation improves memory for the source of information. We propose the hypothesis that positive generation effects (better source memory for self-generated information) occur in reality-monitoring paradigms, while negative generation effects (better source memory for externally presented information) tend to occur in external source-monitoring paradigms. This hypothesis was tested in an experiment in which participants read or generated words, followed by a memory test for the source of each word (read or generated) and the word's colour. Meiser and Bröder's (2002) multinomial model for crossed source dimensions was used to analyse the data, showing that source memory for generation (reality monitoring) was superior for the generated words, while source memory for word colour (external source monitoring) was superior for the read words. The model also revealed the influence of strong response biases in the data, demonstrating the usefulness of formal modelling when examining generation effects in source monitoring.     

Positive and negative generation effects in source monitoring

Research is mixed as to whether self-generation improves memory for the source of information. We propose the hypothesis that positive generation effects (better source memory for self-generated information) occur in reality-monitoring paradigms, while negative generation effects (better source memory for externally presented information) tend to occur in external source-monitoring paradigms. This hypothesis was tested in an experiment in which participants read or generated words, followed by a memory test for the source of each word (read or generated) and the word's colour. Meiser and Br?der's (2002) multinomial model for crossed source dimensions was used to analyse the data, showing that source memory for generation (reality monitoring) was superior for the generated words, while source memory for word colour (external source monitoring) was superior for the read words. The model also revealed the influence of strong response biases in the data, demonstrating the usefulness of formal modelling when examining generation effects in source monitoring.     

A comparison of recollective memory and source monitoring

Participants in recognition memory experiments are often asked for additional information about their memories after each positive recognition response. Two experiments were conducted that were identical, except that the first asked participants to make remember/familiar judgments about the items they recognized, and the second asked them to make source judgments. The similarity between the recollection and source judgment data has implications for measurement issues and theory development.     

Test modality affects source monitoring and event-related potentials

Two experiments investigated the effect of test modality (visual or auditory) on source memory and event-related potentials (ERPs). Test modality influenced source monitoring such that source memory was better when the source and test modalities were congruent. Test modality had less of an influence when alternative information (i.e., cognitive operations) could be used to inform source judgments in Experiment 2. Test modality also affected ERP activity. Variation in parietal ERPs suggested that this activity reflects activation of sensory information, which can be attenuated when the sensory information is misleading. Changes in frontal ERPs support the hypothesis that frontal systems are used to evaluate source-specifying information present in the memory trace.