简论里贝特的意识理论

里贝特是人类意识和自由意志的实验研究领域的一个卓越的、先驱性的神经科学家。里贝特的意识研究工作涉及如下四个方面：（1）关于意识研究的认识论原则;（2）对意识现象本性的界定;（3）意识机制的时控理论;（4）对自由意志的阐释和有意识的心智场理论。里贝特的意识研究独树一帜,其时控理论具有坚实可信的实验证据,它从时间维度揭示了有意识的主观体验以及无意识的心智功能与神经活动之间的时间机制。     

Dynamics of mental activity

Motivated by neuronal modeling, our development of the mathematical foundations of consciousness in [W. Miranker, G. Zuckerman, Mathematical Foundations of Consciousness, J. Appl. Logic (2009)] (M-Z) was characterized by an axiomatic theory for consciousness operators that acted on the collection of all sets. Consciousness itself was modeled as emanating from the action of such operators on the labeled decoration of a graph, the latter set theoretic construct given the characterization of experience. Since mental activity (conscious and unconscious) is a time dependent process, we herein develop a discrete time dependent version of the theory. Specification of the relevant mental dynamics illuminates and expands the development of the mathematical framework in (M-Z) upon which our study of consciousness rests. This framework is an abstraction of neural net modeling.We review the Aczel theory for decorating labeled graphs, in particular that theory's application to the (M-Z) foundations. The relevant neuronal modeling concepts and terminology are also reviewed. A number of examples are presented. Then an extension of our considerations from graphs to multigraphs is made, since the latter represent a more accurate model of neuronal circuit connectivity. The dynamics are crafted for non-well-founded constructs by development of a hierarchy of systems, starting with the McCulloch–Pitts neuronal voltage input–output relations and building to a dynamics for the cognitive notions of memes and themata; these latter corresponding to aspects of decorations of labeled graphs associated with neural networks. We conclude with a summary and discussion of the semantics of the cognitive features of our development: memes, themata, qualia, consciousness operators, awareness field.     

Mathematical foundations of consciousness

We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.     

Leibniz on Memory and Consciousness

In this article, I develop a higher-order interpretation of Leibniz's theory of consciousness according to which memory is constitutive of consciousness. I offer an account of Leibniz's theory of memory on which his theory of consciousness may be based, and I then show that Leibniz could have developed a coherent higher-order account. However, it is not clear whether Leibniz held (or should have held) such an account of consciousness; I sketch an alternative that has at least as many advantages as the higher-order theory. This analysis provides an important antecedent to the contemporary discussions of higher-order theories of consciousness.     

Goal Setting Theory,Job Feedback,and OCB: Lessons From a Longitudinal Study

This study examines the relationships among goal setting, job feedback, and employees' formal and informal performance. We argue that the knowledge gained in the field of goal setting may be useful in understanding organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), beyond formal performance. A longitudinal design based on two points in time (T1, T2) and four research stages (A-D) was developed to test a series of hypotheses among student-employees. 176 participants provided data on goal setting (goal specificity and goal difficulty) and on work attitudes (job satisfaction, organizational justice, job commitment) at T1 (stage A). 23 supervisors provided additional data on formal performance and OCB at T1 (stage B) and at T2 (stage D). Employees were given feedback regarding their formal and informal work performance between T1 and T2 (stage C). The results generally support a positive relationship between goal setting, formal performance, and altruistic OCB at T1 but not at T2. Furthermore, job feedback was related to formal performance and to altruistic and compliance OCB at T2. Implications of these findings are discussed in both the context of goal setting theory and the ongoing study of OCB.     

情绪面孔的意识神经相关物及其无意识自动加工：来自事件相关电位的证据

意识的神经相关物尚有争议, 且个体能否无意识自动检测视觉环境变化尚不清楚。本研究采用非注意视盲范式操控视觉意识, 并引入具有社会信息的情绪面孔, 探讨意识的神经相关物以及视觉意识与自动检测变化机制的关系。在A阶段, 部分被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于无意识水平; 在B阶段, 所有被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于意识水平; 在C阶段, 所有被试对任务相关的情绪面孔处于意识水平。结果显示, 任务无关的情绪面孔的意识过程诱发视觉意识负波(visual awareness negativity, VAN)、晚期正成分(late positivity, LP)和晚期枕区正成分(late occipital positivity, LOP)。此外, 无意识的情绪面孔能诱发视觉失匹配负波(visual mismatch negativity, vMMN), 且其幅值不受意识影响, 但是受任务相关性调制。这些结果提示对情绪面孔的视觉意识在不同的时间进程上有不同的ERP指标——VAN反映早期知觉经验, 而LP和LOP反映晚期意识过程, 而且面孔情绪信息的自动加工独立于视觉意识, 但是受视觉注意调制。     

Using group consciousness theories to understand political activism: case studies of Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Ingo Hasselbach

I describe and integrate several theories of group consciousness and collective action, along with 3 case studies of political activists. I have 2 goals: (1) to use the theories to help us understand something puzzling about each life and (2) to use the cases to complicate and expand the theories. Barack Obama's case raises the question of how someone with a politicized Black identity evolved into a politician working for all oppressed people and complicates racial identity development theory. Hillary Clinton's case raises the question of how a middle-class White girl raised in a conservative family became a prominent Democratic Party politician and complicates group consciousness theories by demonstrating the importance of generation and personality. Ingo Hasselbach's (a former German neo-Nazi leader) case illustrates relative deprivation theory and raises the question of whether theories developed to explain subordinate group consciousness can be applied to movements of dominant group consciousness.     

Conscious behavior explained.

Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is argued that research on temporal binding plays no role in a naturalistic theory of consciousness if the gap argument can be solved on internal philosophical grounds or if it turns out to be unsolvable at the time being. But there may be a way to dissolve or deconstruct it, and the accessibility of this way may well depend on scientific progress, including neurobiological research on the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness.     

Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace.     

A motor theory of how consciousness within language evolution led to mathematical cognition: origin of mathematics in the brain

Invariance associated with Pribram's (1971, 1991) motor images-of-achievement (imaged consequences of movement) is proposed to provide the fundamental neurophysiological basis for mathematical cognition [Pribram, K. (1971) Languages of the brain. Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall. Pribram, K. (1991) Brain and perception: holonomy and structure in figural processing Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.] A three-part theory is outlined. First, linguistic representations of self-consciousness were instantiated through the evolutionary process of distinguishing one's own vocalizations from those of others. It is proposed that consciousness was imparted to these linguistic representations from an already corticalized neuromatrix described by Melzack (1992) [Melzack, R. (1992, April) Phantom limbs. Scientific American, 266, 120–126.] Second, language evolved from motoric images-of-achievement associated with vocalization arising in the pre-Rolandic and inferior parietal cortex. Third, abstractive language processing that decomposes higher-order motor engrams into invariant image-schemas provides the basis for the awareness of pattern that constitutes mathematical cognition. It is concluded that mathematical cognition obtained an evolutionary connection with the physical world by way of the brain's somatic systems.     

A physiologically based approach to consciousness

The nature of a scientific theory of consciousness is defined by comparison with scientific theories in the physical sciences. The differences between physical, algorithmic and functional complexity are highlighted, and the architecture of a functionally complex electronic system created to relate system operations to device operations is compared with a scientific theory. It is argued that there are two qualitatively different types of functional architecture: (a) electronic systems have the instruction architecture based on exchange of unambiguous information between functional components, and (b) biological brains have been constrained by natural selection pressures into the recommendation architecture based on exchange of ambiguous information. The mechanisms by which a recommendation architecture could heuristically define its own functionality are described, and compared with memory in biological brains. Dream sleep is interpreted as the mechanism for minimizing information exchange between functional components in a heuristically defined functional system. The functional role of consciousness of self is discussed, and the route by which the experience of that function described at the psychological level can be related to physiology through a functional architecture is outlined.     

‘Infinity Means it Goes on Forever’: Siblings' Informal Teaching of Mathematics

Sibling‐directed teaching of mathematical topics during naturalistic home interactions was investigated in 39 middle‐class sibling dyads at two time points. At time 1 (T1), siblings were 2 and 4 years of age, and at time 2 (T2), siblings were 4 and 6 years of age. Intentional sequences of sibling‐directed mathematical teaching were coded for (i) topics (e.g., number), (ii) contexts (e.g., play with materials/toys), and (iii) type of knowledge (conceptual and procedural). Siblings engaged in teaching number, geometry, and measurement at T1 and demonstrated preliminary evidence of teaching of grouping, relations, and operations at T2. Regarding context, at T1, mathematical teaching occurred most frequently during play with materials/toys, while at T2, games with rules were prominent. Teaching of conceptual or procedural knowledge varied over time and by topic and context. Findings are discussed in light of recent work on understanding children's mathematical knowledge as it develops in the informal family context. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Prior entry explains order reversals in the attentional blink

When two targets are presented in rapid succession, the first target (T1) is usually identified, but the second target (T2) is often missed. A remarkable exception to this "attentional blink" occurs when T2 immediately follows the first T1, at lag 1. It is then often spared but reported in the wrong order--that is, before T1. These order reversals have led to the hypothesis that "lag 1 sparing" occurs because the two targets merge into a single episodic representation. Here, we report evidence consistent with an alternative theory: T2 receives more attention than T1, leading to prior entry into working memory. Two experiments showed that the more T2 performance exceeded that for T1, the more order reversals were made. Furthermore, precuing T1 led to a shift in performance benefits from T2 to T1 and to an equivalent reduction in order reversals. We conclude that it is not necessary to assume episodic integration to explain lag 1 sparing or the accompanying order reversals.     

Objectification Theory as It Relates to Disordered Eating Among College Women

Objectification theory (B. L. Fredrickson & T. A. Roberts, 1997) demonstrates how sociocultural variables work together with psychological variables to predict disordered eating. Researchers have tested models that illustrate how certain constructsof objectification theory predict disordered eating, but a more comprehensive model that integrates a combination of constructs central to the theory (i.e., sexual objectification; self-objectification; body shame; poor interoceptive awareness of hunger, satiety, and emotions) has not yet been examined. In this study, we incorporated these variables within an inclusive model based on the assertions of B. L. Fredrickson and T. A. Roberts (1997) and examined it with 460 college women. Structural equation modeling analyses suggested that the model provided a good fit to the data and supported most propositions set forth by objectification theory and the eating disorders literature.     

Investigating the impact of mindfulness meditation training on working memory: A mathematical modeling approach

We investigated whether mindfulness training (MT) influences information processing in a working memory task with complex visual stimuli. Participants were tested before (T1) and after (T2) participation in an intensive one-month MT retreat, and their performance was compared with that of an age- and education-matched control group. Accuracy did not differ across groups at either time point. Response times were faster and significantly less variable in the MT versus the control group at T2. Since these results could be due to changes in mnemonic processes, speed–accuracy trade-off, or nondecisional factors (e.g., motor execution), we used a mathematical modeling approach to disentangle these factors. The EZ-diffusion model (Wagenmakers, van der Maas, & Grasman, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 14:(1), 3–22, 2007) suggested that MT leads to improved information quality and reduced response conservativeness, with no changes in nondecisional factors. The noisy exemplar model further suggested that the increase in information quality reflected a decrease in encoding noise and not an increase in forgetting. Thus, mathematical modeling may help clarify the mechanisms by which MT produces salutary effects on performance.     

Dreaming

The aim is to discover a principle governing the formation of the dream. Now dreaming has an analogy with consciousness in that it is a seeming-consciousness. Meanwhile consciousness exhibits a tripartite structure consisting of (A) understanding oneself to be situated in a world endowed with given properties, (B) the mental processes responsible for the state, and (C) the concrete perceptual encounter of awareness with the world. The dream analogues of these three elements are investigated in the hope of discovering the source of the kinship between dream and consciousness. The dream world (A) proves to be a logically impossible world, limited by nothing more than sheer narratability. The internal world (B) of the dreamer is notable for the limitlessness of the scope allotted to the imagination (exactly taking over the offices of rational function), together with the presence of two important phenomena encountered in waking consciousness: a measure of interiority, and the positing of a world. Finally (C), the dream further replicates consciousness in so far as we seem in dreaming concretely to experience our physical surrounds in the form of perceptual imagining. These properties play their part in enabling the dream to be a seeming-consciousness. At the same time they are such as to necessitate its not being consciousness. It is proposed that in the light of these properties, and those composing the state of consciousness, the dream simply is the imagining of consciousness.     

Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces

There are strong reasons to believe that our conscious inner life is structured, suggested both by introspection as well as scientific psychology. One of the most salient structural characteristics of conscious experiences is known as unity of consciousness. In this contribution, we wish to demonstrate how features of experience that pertain to the unity of consciousness could be made precise in terms of mathematical relations that hold between phenomenal objects.Based on phenomenological considerations, we first outline three such features. These are (i) environmental embedding, (ii) the mutual constraint between local and global representations, and (iii) a top-down process of object formation in consciousness. We then introduce a formal model based on the notion of phenomenal space, defined in terms of a set of quasi-elementary and extended entities. We describe the structure of phenomenal space by appealing to mereological and topological concepts, and we outline a projector-based calculus to account for the idea that the structure of phenomenal space is ultimately dynamical.Using the above concepts, one could approach the mind-matter problem by relating environmentally embedded agents to topologically well-defined objects that result from decompositions of phenomenal space. We conclude our discussion by putting it into the context of some recent conceptual questions that appear in cognitive science and consciousness studies. We opt for the possibility to regard the phenomenon of consciousness not in terms of a singular transition that happens between “brain” and “mind” but rather in terms of a series of transitions between structured layers of experience.     

双任务情境下心理旋转的并行加工机制

采用心理不应期研究范式,三个反应时实验检测了心理旋转任务和其他认知操作任务能否并行加工的问题。在每个实验中要求被试快速、系列地完成对高低音的辨别任务(T1)和不同旋转角度的正反像辨别任务(T2),T1和T2呈现的时间间隔运用变化的SOA。结果发现：(1)T1的反应选择对T2的反应选择产生了很大的影响,在T2上PRP效应显著。心理旋转的操作成绩随着SOA的缩短而降低。(2)在T1上同样存在随着SOA缩短,反应时增加,正确率下降的趋势。T2的反应选择对T1的反应选择同样产生了显著的影响。(3)T2的反应选择对T1的中枢加工产生了相应的影响,表明当T1的反应选择占据中枢瓶颈时,心理旋转任务和其他认知操作任务在中枢瓶颈中并行得到了有效的加工