Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.     

Informational versus functional theories of scientific representation

Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘informational’ views, which emphasize objective relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams, etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘functional’ views, which emphasize cognitive activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. The main sources of the impression of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation, and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that, as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary.     

Reasoning and mental representation

Four experiments exploring the effects of the coherence of a mental representation of material on reasoning performance are presented. Each employs a simple task that allows most subjects at some stage to solve the problem. We postulate that the crucial factor influencing performance is a unified representation of the material. In Experiment 1 we use an authorization of a kind familiar in daily life, and in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 we use sentences describing simple objects in different ways. In each case performance was enhanced when the material could be given a unified representation.     

The mental representation of countries

Three studies were conducted to describe adults' knowledge of the countries of the world. Undergraduates from a selective liberal arts college recognised nearly two-thirds of nations, and about one-third were produced in a free-recall task. The use of information related to countries' locations was an important determinant of order of recall. Contiguity in free-recall output, responses in a free-association task, and the prediction of recall from recognition also provided evidence of other relations between countries, including semantic and phonetic links and membership in groups of countries. The number of times a country was mentioned in the news was a consistent predictor of recognition and recall. The relative prosperity, population density, and geographic area of countries also influenced recall.     

The mental representation of countries

Three studies were conducted to describe adults’ knowledge of the countries of the world. Undergraduates from a selective liberal arts college recognised nearly two-thirds of nations, and about one-third were produced in a free-recall task. The use of information related to countries’ locations was an important determinant of order of recall. Contiguity in free-recall output, responses in a free-association task, and the prediction of recall from recognition also provided evidence of other relations between countries, including semantic and phonetic links and membership in groups of countries. The number of times a country was mentioned in the news was a consistent predictor of recognition and recall. The relative prosperity, population density, and geographic area of countries also influenced recall.     

Gaze orientation interferes with mental numerical representation

Number comparison tasks are characterized by distance and size effects. The distance effect reveals that the higher the distance is between two numbers, the easier their magnitude comparison is. Accordingly, people are thought to represent numbers on a spatial dimension, the mental number line, on which any given number corresponds to a location on the line. The size effect, instead, states that at any given distance, comparing two small numbers is easier than comparing two large numbers, thus suggesting that larger numbers are more vaguely represented than smaller ones. In the present work we first tested whether the participants were adopting a spatial strategy to solve a very simple numbers comparison task, by assessing the presence of the distance and the magnitude effect. Secondarily, we focused on the influence of gaze position on their performance. The present results provide evidence that gaze direction interferes with number comparisons, worsening the vague representation of larger numbers and further supporting the hypothesis of the overlapping between physical and mental spaces.     

Surface construal and the mental representation of scenes

What distinguishes scenes from nonscenes? Photographs of objects on both naturalistic and blank backgrounds yielded boundary extension (BE: memory for unseen spatial expanse outside the picture's boundaries). However, line-drawn objects on blank backgrounds did not (Experiment 1). Perhaps the blank background was construed as depicting a real-world surface in the photograph condition but was construed as depicting nothing in the line-drawn condition. To change background construal, the authors used objects cut out of photographs; these were placed on blank backgrounds while viewers watched (Experiments 2 and 3). BE was eliminated. The authors propose that amodal continuation is a fundamental aspect of scene perception. However, not all pictures are scenes--only pictures construed as depicting a truncated view of a continuous world.     

The mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps

Recognition priming and distance estimation were used to investigate the mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps. In Experiment 1, recognition priming showed that cities close in route distance primed each other more than cities far in route distance, even when Euclidean distance was equated. Experiment 2 showed that this finding was robust and not an artifact of the way subjects learned the maps. Distance estimations in Experiment 1 supported the priming results. These results indicated that psychological distance in cognitive maps is primarily dependent on route distance rather than Euclidean distance.     

Mind games: the mental representation of conflict

Perception and misperception play a pivotal role in conflict and negotiation. We introduce a framework that explains how people think about their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation and how their views shape their behavior. Seven studies show that people's mental representations of conflict are predictably constrained to a small set of possibilities with important behavioral and social consequences. Studies 1 and 2 found that, when prompted to represent a conflict in matrix form, more than 70% of the people created 1 of 4 archetypal mixed-motive games (out of 576 possibilities): Maximizing Difference, Assurance, Chicken, and Prisoner's Dilemma. Study 3 demonstrated that these mental representations relate in predictable ways to negotiators' fixed-pie perceptions. Studies 4-6 showed that these mental representations shape individuals' behavior and interactions with others, including cooperation, perspective taking, and use of deception in negotiation, and through them, conflict's outcomes. Study 7 found that the games that people think they are playing influence how their counterparts see them, as well as their counterparts' negotiation expectations. Overall, the findings document noteworthy regularities in people's mental representations of outcome interdependence in conflict and illustrate that 4 archetypal games can encapsulate fundamental psychological processes that emerge repeatedly in conflict and negotiation.     

Improved mental representation of space in beginner orienteers

The purpose of the present study was to monitor any improvement in orienteering skills attributable to acquiring a better mental representation of space. Two groups were examined: the experimental group, who attended 6 mo. of orienteering lessons, versus the control group, who did jogging training instead. Each group, consisting of 20 children, was tested on the Corsi Block-tapping Test, run Forward and Backward, and the Star-Butterfly Test. Pre- and post-tests were administered. In the experimental group, scores increased in mean complexity from pre- to post-test on the Forward and the Backward Corsi tests, while on the Star-Butterfly Test both time and mistakes had decreased after the training. In the control group, mean complexity and Star-Butterfly Test scores were unchanged from pre- to post-test. These results showed that after continual training in orienteering techniques, the orienteering group was able to remember and repeat sequences of events with greater precision than before the training, while these skills were unchanged in the control group after training in jogging.     

The mental representation of causal conditional reasoning: mental models or causal models

In this paper, two experiments are reported investigating the nature of the cognitive representations underlying causal conditional reasoning performance. The predictions of causal and logical interpretations of the conditional diverge sharply when inferences involving pairs of conditionals—such as if P₁then Q and if P₂then Q—are considered. From a causal perspective, the causal direction of these conditionals is critical: are the P_icauses of Q; or symptoms caused byQ. The rich variety of inference patterns can naturally be modelled by Bayesian networks. A pair of causal conditionals where Q is an effect corresponds to a “collider” structure where the two causes (P_i) converge on a common effect. In contrast, a pair of causal conditionals where Q is a cause corresponds to a network where two effects (P_i) diverge from a common cause. Very different predictions are made by fully explicit or initial mental models interpretations. These predictions were tested in two experiments, each of which yielded data most consistent with causal model theory, rather than with mental models.     

The mental representation of music notation: notational audiation

This study investigated the mental representation of music notation. Notational audiation is the ability to internally "hear" the music one is reading before physically hearing it performed on an instrument. In earlier studies, the authors claimed that this process engages music imagery contingent on subvocal silent singing. This study refines the previously developed embedded melody task and further explores the phonatory nature of notational audiation with throat-audio and larynx-electromyography measurement. Experiment 1 corroborates previous findings and confirms that notational audiation is a process engaging kinesthetic-like covert excitation of the vocal folds linked to phonatory resources. Experiment 2 explores whether covert rehearsal with the mind's voice also involves actual motor processing systems and suggests that the mental representation of music notation cues manual motor imagery. Experiment 3 verifies findings of both Experiments 1 and 2 with a sample of professional drummers. The study points to the profound reliance on phonatory and manual motor processing--a dual-route stratagem--used during music reading. Further implications concern the integration of auditory and motor imagery in the brain and cross-modal encoding of a unisensory input.