Research-Based Knowledge in Psychology: What,if Anything,is Its Incremental Value to the Practitioner?

This essay reflects an ongoing dialogue between a clinician versed in mainstream psychological research and theory, and a social psychologist with experience both as a researcher and contributor to applied undertakings in various domains about the “incremental value” of research-based knowledge—that is, its value beyond that provided by the other sources of knowledge available to the practitioner. These sources include knowledge about the needs and coping strategies of all human beings, as well as knowledge both about the specific life circumstances of those one is seeking to help, and knowledge about language and culture. Examples from the clinical practice of the first author are offered, coupled with in-principle arguments about the underspecified and contingent nature of research-based generalizations. By way of rebuttal, examples of arguably useful findings are provided by the second author—especially findings that serve as correctives to biases in lay psychology (notably unwarranted “dispositionism”) and to widespread shortcomings in judgment and decision-making (particularly, Kahneman and Tversky’s work on “prospect theory” ). Both authors agree on the value of a “bricoleur” treatment strategy that relies on careful attention to the specifics of the case at hand and avoids one-size-fits-all applications of theory and prior research, and both agree that research-based findings are more useful in predicting behavior and designing intervention strategies that apply to groups and large samples of individuals rather than single actors. A concluding discussion focuses on necessary criteria and strategies for increasing the usefulness of laboratory and field research for the practitioner.     

What is improved if a mental rotation task is repeated – the efficiency of memory access, or the speed of a transformation routine?

The present study contrasts 3 theories which provide explanations for performance improvement in mental rotation tasks. Wallace and Hofelich conjectured that the process as such may be executed more rapidly after training, while Bethell-Fox and Shepard attributed practice effects to the fact that images may be transformed first elementwise, but later as a Gestalt. In contrast, Tarr and Pinker assumed that a transformation of an image will no longer be computed after training but simply be retrieved from memory. Thirty-seven subjects participated in 3 test sessions in which they had to decide on the parity of 3-D block figures presented from different perspectives. Experimental group subjects underwent 4 additional practice sessions in which a subset of the figures and a subset of perspective views were used. Tests adapted to the predictions of the 3 theories revealed specific learning effects but no transfer, neither to old objects presented in new perspectives nor to new objects. This supports an instance-based explanation of practice effects which states that objects are represented in multiple perspective views. Received: 7 May 1997 / Accepted: 6 August 1997     

Persuasion in school-aged children: How does it change if the persuadee is the mother or the peer?

The present study was designed to verify how school-aged children’s persuasive tactics changed if the persuadee was the mother or the peer. One hundred and forty-nine children at two grade levels (4th and 5th) were enrolled in the study. Persuasive strategies were investigated using pictures representing two common situations in which each child had to convince his/her playmate and his/her mother to obtain a toy. As predicted, with mothers children engaged more frequently in strategies aimed at encouraging cognitive reappraisal of the situation and offering guarantees. Conversely, with the peers, children adopted a greater variety of persuasive strategies, engaging in lower-order tactics. Implications and limitations of the study were discussed.     

People think about what is true for conditionals,not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of “if”

We report the results of two priming experiments that examine the comprehension of conditionals—for example, “if there are apples then there are oranges”—and biconditionals—for example, “if and only if there are apples then there are oranges”. The first experiment showed that participants read a biconditional faster when it was primed by a true possibility, “there were apples and there were oranges” than when it was primed by a false possibility, “there were no apples and there were oranges”; a conditional was primed equally by both possibilities. The second experiment showed that participants read the negated-antecedent conjunction faster when it was primed by a conditional than when it was primed by a biconditional; the affirmative conjunction was primed equally by both connectives. The experiments show that (a) when people understand “if A then B”, they access the true possibilities, “A and B”, and “not-A and B”, and (b) when they understand “if and only if A then B” they access “A and B”, but they do not access “not-A and B”. We discuss their implications for current theories of reasoning.     

Damned if they do,Damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religion from Attack

The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to cases of religiously offensive expression is inconsistent and unsatisfactory. A critical analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on blasphemy, religious insult and religious hatred identifies three problems with its approach in this field. These are: the embellishment and over-emphasis of freedom of religion, the use of the margin of appreciation and the devaluing of some forms of offensive speech. Nevertheless, it is possible to defend a more coherent approach to the limitation of freedom of expression under the European Convention of Human Rights, designed to protect religious liberty in a narrower category of cases.     

What if there is an ethical dimension in psychoanalysis?

The implications of an ethical dimension in psychoanalysis are explored, together with the questions whether and in what sense analysis has anything to contribute to ethical reflection, and whether and in what sense ethical considerations can play a role in analytic theory and process. As regards theory, analytic construction of an ethical agent would require a refocusing of structural and dynamic considerations in order to provide an integrative source of decision-making capacity to serve as the responsible agent in ethical deliberation, choice, and action. Suggestions are made for formulating the nature of the ethical agent in terms of a theory of motivation rather than of drive, and in terms of an integrative theory of the self. To the extent that analysis involves ethical considerations, the way lies open for dialogue and mutually enriching contributions of analysis to ethics and vice versa. Various aspects of the analytic perspective are explored that in themselves carry ethical implications or can be enriched by ethical reflection. Beyond theoretical considerations, the interaction between ethical factors and genetic, structural, and dynamic issues in clinical psychoanalysis loom as matters for future exploration.     

What is chosen first,the hand used for reaching or the target that is reached?

Models of information processing generally assume that stimuli are processed before actions are selected, at least in typical laboratory experiments where stimuli are presented and responses follow. In everyday life, however, there are generally fewer constraints on the ordering of decisions pertaining to stimuli and actions. This raises the question of which sorts of decisions normally precede which others. To address this question, we asked participants to aim for either of two targets with either hand on the basis of whichever combination seemed easiest. We analyzed the choices made in this free condition with choices made when the hand was specified or when the target was specified. We found that a model assuming similar selection processes in the hand-specified condition and the free condition provided the best account for the data. The data accord with the hypothesis that hand was generally chosen first in the free-choice condition.     

Does the Modality Effect Exist? and if So, Which Modality Effect?

The modality effect is a central issue in multimedia learning [see Mayer (Cambridge University Press, 2005a), for a review]. Sweller’s Cognitive Load Theory (CLT), for example, presumes that an illustrated text is better understood when presented visually rather than orally. The predictive power of CLT lies in how it links in to Baddeley’s (1986) model of working memory and Penney’s (Mem Cognit 17:398–442, 1989) Separate-Streams Hypothesis. Ginns’s (Learn Instr 4:313–331, 2005) recent meta-analysis also supports the modality effect (d = 0.72, based on 43 independent effects). This article replicates the meta-analysis of the modality effect based on 86 independent effects (with within-study subgroups as the unit of analysis and with mean of the outcomes as the dependent measure), with results showing a reduction of the overall effect size by almost half (d = 0.38), and even more when Duval and Tweedie’s Trim and Fill method is used to correct publication bias (d = 0.20). This article also widens the scope of the analysis of moderator variables (e.g. Pace of presentation, Type of visualization, Research group) as well as their potentially confounded effects. Finally, it is argued that, for theoretical reasons, the so-called modality effect cannot be based on Penney’s or Baddeley’s theories and must be explained in a different way.     

Actions,contexts, memory—what is the relation?

Whole list contexts have been found to influence action memory differently than item-specific contexts. Usually there is no recall enhancement with item-specific contexts, but considerable improvement with whole-list contexts. Three experiments investigated the effect of both kinds of context upon action memory. The results showed that whole-list contexts gave the beneficial effect, probably through their ability to string together actions within a common frame. Contrary to expectation the effects of item-specific contexts were not found to differ between motor and nonmotor encoding conditions, irrespective of whether these contexts were self-generated or provided by the experimenter. The experimental results suggest that the function of item-specific contexts has more to do with helping item differentiation than relational encoding. Since action events possess a high degree of distinctiveness, there is not much to gain by the addition of item-specific contexts in action memory tasks.     

What is Postnormal When There is no Normal? A Postdichotomous View of the Histories of the Past,Present, and Future

In this paper, I discuss the concept of ‘postnormal times’ and argue that the term postnormal is misrepresentative where applied to describe a state beyond so-called ‘normal’ times. Such normality is characterized by, i) progress towards social, economic and political equilibrium, and ii) future betterment for all. I posit that these conditions represent, at best, misplaced optimism and, at worst, a deliberate veil of untruths. I also argue that the foundation of thinking on normalcy, based on the classical free market economics of Adam Smith, was flawed from the outset. I propose that what are termed postnormal times actually represent an extreme set of long-term ‘normal times’. Importantly, I propose that human responses to a situation of extreme normalcy will be different from responses to the novel and truly postnormal. Action, or lack thereof, to address extreme normalcy requires a different mindset and starting point to that for addressing a new or post-normalcy. As such, I call for fundamental change to economic and political priorities and for a focus on social needs and values in the very near future. Finally, I posit that, whether we live in postnormal, ‘hyper-normal’, abnormal or ‘new normal’ times, we must accept that, for most of humanity and for the planet on which we live, these are not good times, and we must strive to bring about urgent and radical change.     

Learning from explaining: does it matter if mom is listening?

The goal of the current study was to examine whether explaining to another person improves learning and transfer. In the study, 4- and 5-year-olds (N=54) solved multiple classification problems, received accuracy feedback, and were prompted to explain the correct solutions to their moms, to explain the correct solutions to themselves, or to repeat the solutions. Generating explanations (to selves or moms) improved problem-solving accuracy at posttest, and explaining to mom led to the greatest problem-solving transfer. The study indicates that explanation prompts can facilitate transfer in children as young as 5 years and reveals that it matters if mom is listening.     

On the Question, “What is Law?”

Res Publica - Re-framing discussion of the question, “What is law?“ in terms of the contexts in which the whole question makes sense allows us to see that jurisprudence is about...     

Synaesthesia,creativity and art: What is the link?

It has been suggested that individuals with synaesthesia may show heightened creativity as a result of being able to form meaningful associations between disparate stimuli (e.g. colour, sound). In this study, a large sample (N=82) of people with various kinds of synaesthesia were given two psychometric tests of creativity (Remote Associates Test, Alternate Uses Test) and were also asked about the amount of time engaged in creative arts (visual art, music). There was a significant tendency for synaesthetes to spend more time engaged in creative arts and this was, at least in part, dependent upon the type of synaesthesia experienced. For example, synaesthetes experiencing vision from music were far more likely to play an instrument than their other synaesthetic counterparts. There was no relationship between this tendency and the psychometric measures of creativity, but synaesthetes did outperform controls on one of the two psychometric measures (Remote Associates). We conclude that the tendency for synaesthetes to be more engaged in art is likely to have a different mechanism to psychometric measures of creativity, and that there is no direct link between them. Although synaesthetes may well perform better on some measures of creativity, we suggest that synaesthetes have better bottom‐up access to certain associations, but are not necessarily better able to use them flexibly (in divergent thinking).     

Priming effect on the exceptive conditional ‘except if’

Here we report the results of one priming experiment that examines the comprehension of exceptive conditionals—for example, ‘Mary will go out tonight except if she has an exam tomorrow’—and indicative conditionals—for example, ‘Mary will not go out tonight if she has an exam tomorrow’. The experiment showed that participants read the true possibility ‘Mary is not going out tonight and she has an exam tomorrow’ faster when it was primed by an exceptive conditional than when it was primed by an indicative; other possibilities (‘Mary is going out tonight and she does not have an exam tomorrow’, ‘Mary is going out tonight and she has an exam tomorrow’ and ‘Mary is not going out tonight and she does not have an exam tomorrow’) were primed equally by both connectives. The experiments showed that (1) when people understand ‘B except if A’, they access the true possibilities ‘not-A & B’ and ‘A & not-B’, and (2) when they understand ‘B, if not-A’ they access ‘not-A & B’, but they do not access ‘A & not-B’. We discuss the implications of this for current theories of reasoning.     

Does learning a skill with the expectation of teaching it impair the skill’s execution under psychological pressure if the skill is learned with analogy instructions?

ObjectiveHaving learners practice a motor skill with the expectation of teaching it (versus an expectation of being tested on it) has been revealed to enhance skill learning. However, this improvement in skill performance is lost when the skill must be performed under psychological pressure due to ‘choking under pressure.’ The present study investigated whether this choking effect is caused by an accrual of declarative knowledge during skill practice and could be prevented if a technique (analogy instructions) to minimize the accrual of declarative knowledge during practice is employed.DesignWe used a 2 (Expectation: teach/test) x 2 (Instructions: analogy/explicit) x 2 (Posttest: low-pressure/high-pressure) mixed-factor design, with repeated measures on the last factor.MethodsOne-hundred fifty-six participants were quasi-randomly assigned (based on sex) to one of four groups. Participants in the teach/analogy and teach/explicit groups practiced golf putting with the expectation of teaching putting to another participant, and analogy instructions or explicit instructions, respectively. Participants in the test/analogy and test/explicit groups practiced golf putting with the expectation of being tested on their putting, and analogy instructions or explicit instructions, respectively. The next day all participants completed low- and high-pressure putting posttests, with their putting accuracy serving as the dependent variable.ResultsWe observed an Expectation x Instructions × Posttest interaction, such that a main effect of expectation was found in the low-pressure posttest, with the teach group exhibiting superior accuracy, and an Expectation × Instructions interaction was revealed for the high-pressure posttest. This interaction resulted from the teach group showing greater accuracy than the test group exclusively when receiving analogy instructions.ConclusionResults show that participants who practiced with the expectation of teaching exhibited superior learning and indicate that they choked under pressure likely due to their accrual of declarative knowledge during practice, since the choking effect was prevented by having them practice with analogy instructions. Accordingly, having learners practice with the expectation of teaching and techniques that minimize the accrual of declarative knowledge is recommended.