Augustine's Ethics of Belief and AvoidingViolence in Religious Disputes

This article is a study of how Augustine's ethics of belief shaped his arguments against unbelief and its legacy in using coercion to settle disputes. After considering the arguments for belief presented by Augustine, the article studies how these were shaped by his understanding of the problem of evil and how the Fall influenced free will. What is noted to be of benefit in Augustine is that he offers arguments in favor of belief, and is convinced that he has shown unbelief to be based on unsound reasoning. By way of contrast, a number of theologians (such as Tertullian, John Calvin, and those under the heading of Reformed Epistemology) are considered who do not believe that arguments are necessary to support belief or reject unbelief. These are contrasted with Augustine and it is argued that they have significant shortcomings in this respect. However, the article concludes that Augustine could have gone farther in supporting the claim that it is clear that God exists, and his own shortcomings have been used to justify coercion in religious belief. If common ground is to be achieved this problem must be corrected and an adequate foundation for clarity must be established.     

Filioque,Theosis, and Ecclesia: Augustine in Dialogue with Modern Orthodox Theology

By bringing recent developments in Augustine scholarship into conversation with modern Orthodox criticisms of Augustine, this article challenges the polemical Orthodox claim that Augustinian pneumatology logically undermines the doctrine of theosis. Indeed, in Augustine's own case, I argue that just the opposite is true: Augustine's “filioquist” pneumatology is precisely what leads him, ahead of his contemporaries, to advance a robustly ecclesial and trinitarian account of deification. Augustine should therefore be seen not as an opponent but as a crucial conversation partner for Orthodox theology, addressing in advance many of the ecclesiological and trinitarian questions with which the latter has engaged in recent centuries.     

Shooting for the Moon: How Academicians Could Make Management Research <Emphasis Type="Italic">Even Less</Emphasis> Irrelevant

By publishing a special issue on “The State of Practice,” JBP takes an important step to bridge the science/practice gap, but it is only a step and will not alone span this gap. On the academic side, currently dominant cultures and incentive systems all but guarantee the irrelevance of most scholarly work to anyone except other scholars. On the practice side, managers rarely frame their dilemmas and decisions in ways that lend themselves to scholarly inquiry, find little reason to subject their own research to the peer review process, and rarely look to academia for practical insights. The present article focuses on why this gap persists, and the kinds of fundamental shifts that would be required to address it. It begins by framing the structural nature of the current science/practice gap in business psychology, and then promoting the study of this gap as critical in its own right. From there a framework of research questions is provided that can inform efforts to bridge the science-practice gap.     

The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: MT. 5:8 in Augustine's Trinitarian Theology of 400

The essay is an analysis of Augustine's solution to what I identify as the Homoian subordinationist understanding of the Son's visibility. This solution lies in Augustine's (re-)interpretation of Old Testament theophanies, and his doctrine of the vision through Christ of the Trinity at the end-time which Augustine supports by an exegesis of Mt. 5:8. Historically, the issue for Augustine is the connection made between doctrines of the Son's inherent "visibility" before the Incarnation and arguments made both against modalism and in support of subordinationism on the basis of that visibility. For Augustine's own Trinitarian theology, any consideration of a sight or vision of God in, e.g., Old Testament theophanies or the Incarnation necessarily raises questions about "sight" as both sensible and noetic knowledge, the structure of our way(s) of knowing, and the role of faith as the means for purifying the knowing capacity in humanity. The question of the vision of God which Augustine addresses in those early books of de Trinitate which are written around the year four hundred is connected to Augustine's epistemological concerns addressed in a variety of writings written before or contemporary to books I-IV of de Trinitate .     

Graham Ward’s Poststructuralist Christian Nominalism

In his Cities of God, Graham Ward advocates for what he calls an ‘analogical worldview’. On the one hand, he suggests that this analogical worldview has its roots in pre-modern theology and philosophy, especially in Augustine and Aquinas. On the other hand, Graham Ward draws heavily on contemporary critical theory to express this view. The thesis defended in this paper is that by reading the concept of analogy from Augustine and Aquinas in terms of contemporary critical theory, especially that of Jacques Derrida, Ward develops an analogical worldview that has strikingly nominalist ramifications. These ramifications imply that, in the end, there is no longer an adequacy between the perceiving mind and the reality perceived. The argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, Ward’s reading of contemporary critical theory, especially with respect to Derrida, is introduced. In the second step, the theological appropriation of Derrida in the analogical worldview is analyzed. In the third step, the nominalist implications of this application are shown in terms of Ward’s critique of privileging heterosexual relationships. In this third section, I will also deal more extensively and precisely with the question of what I mean by labeling his work as ‘nominalism’ as well as outlining the specific form of nominalism that I am here invoking. In the penultimate section, I will attempt to show that Ward’s nominalism can also be found in the works of Milbank and Pickstock, as it has to do with the specific way in which they take up the Platonic tradition. In my concluding remarks, I will come back to the discussion about the ontological status of sexual relations, indicating my own view on this issue.     

Interpretation as a misunderstanding

In the following article ‘who’ as the agent in the clinical session becomes questioned. By speaking we are introduced in the world of misunderstanding, where we are not merely speaking but being spoken to. Listening to what is being said and in this way misunderstanding what the patient is trying to say helps us in order to locate where the subject of the unconscious places himself in relation to the desire of the Other. In the article, it is conveyed how interpretation is not something that clarifies or explains to the patient his difficulties, but instead locates them by letting them take part in the session. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, locating the subject of the unconscious is crucial as this gives the patient a clue about where they place themselves in relation to the Other. This is why cutting the session is an essential element of its technique, as it stops in this way something that can disturb or hide where the subject of the unconscious has appeared. This allows patients to experience where they are gratifying themselves in their own difficulty. Interpretation is not speaking about the truth but instead, making the truth present in the session.     

In place of the Other

This paper outlines the basic traits of a responsive phenomenology by focusing on the issue of originary substitution. On the one hand, a phenomenology of alienness or otherness and an ethics of the other in the sense of Levinas will prove to be closely bound up with this sort of substitution. On the other side, this substitution can be concretised by transitional figures such as the advocate, the therapist, the translator, the witness, or the field researcher; they all intervene from the position of a Third without closing the fissure which opens between ourselves and the Other, between the own and the alien. Precisely by focussing on the issue of substitution, we have the opportunity to outline the basis traits of a responsive phenomenology and to discuss some of its institutional consequences.     

A Response to Sollereder and Allen

In this brief response to the papers of Sollereder and Allen in this issue, Southgate considers the state of the debate on evolutionary theodicy, and specifically the source of the disvalues in creation. He responds to Allen’s Augustinian suggestions by reference to a recent article on Augustine and theodicy by Stan Rosenberg. He ends by reflecting on the journey in his own thinking in relation to suffering.     

Excellence‐Prior Eudaimonism

Eudaimonism is often regarded as egoistic. If it recommends that agents pursue their own good because it is their own good, it is guilty as charged. But excellence‐prior eudaimonism offers a non‐egoistic alternative to this welfare‐prior eudaimonism. Excellence‐prior eudaimonism recommends that an agent live in a way that is in fact good for the agent, but it does not regard the agent’s own good as necessarily that for the sake of which the agent acts, nor does it regard living well as justified by the fact that it is good for the agent, but simply because it is good. The Christian eudaimonisms of Augustine and Aquinas are best understood as deepened forms of excellence‐prior eudaimonism.     

REPUBLICS AND THEIR LOVES: REREADING CITY OF GOD 191

In City of God 19.24, Augustine rejects Cicero's definition of res publica as a society founded on justice for a new definition focused on common objects of love. Robert Markus, Oliver O'Donovan, and a host of Augustinian political theologians have depicted this move as a positive gesture toward secular society. Yet this reading fails to account for why Augustine waited so long to address Cicero's definition, first discussed in Book 2, and for the radical dualism Augustine sets forth between the two cities throughout his text. I argue, in line with Rowan Williams and John Milbank, for a minority reading of Book 19 that draws upon the narrative structure of City of God. In Books 3–5, Augustine recounts the history of the earthly city according to Rome's penchant for violence and idolatry, both a function of love for temporal goods. In Book 18, Augustine traces the history of the earthly city before Rome according to the same themes, completing a narrative argument that humanity has always been divided according to differing loves. Book 19 advances the idea that such idolatry is injustice—a failure to grant God the worship he is due. With the new definition of 19.24, Augustine retains Cicero's emphasis on the importance of virtue in civic society while characteristically shifting the terms of discussion from justice to love. While such a definition means that Rome can be called a res publica, it also prompts a negative judgment upon her history according to her objects of love. Given her violence and idolatry, Rome is no better than Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, and Greece—all subject to withering critique in Book 18. Thus, Augustine's new definition does not retract but extends the polemic of City of God.     

Jerome on Sinlessness: a Via Media between Augustine and Pelagius

This article will explore Jerome's understanding of sinlessness and will argue that he saw himself just as opposed to Augustine as to Pelagius. I begin by exposing Jerome's context in the Pelagian Controversy. I then expose his understanding of sinlessness. Next, I turn to his arguments in Ep. 133 and the first two books of his Dialogi contra Pelagianos. In book three of that text, we notice a change in his arguments which indicates that Jerome is no longer arguing only against Pelagius; he now disagrees with Augustine as well. I then examine a variety of issues besides sinlessness in the third book of the Dialogi that reveal that Jerome disagreed with Augustine on multiple topics, showing that his opposition to Augustine's position on sinlessness was not exceptional. Finally I turn to statements by Jerome that seem to indicate a positive appreciation for the Bishop of Hippo, but which on closer inspection are seen to contain latent criticisms.     

Putting Religion Back Into Religious Ethics

This essay on Richard Miller’s Friends and Other Strangers (2016) locates its arguments in the context of how the practice of religious ethics bears upon debates about normativity in the study of religion and the cultural turn in the humanities. After reviewing its main claims about identity and otherness, I focus on three areas. First, while commending Miller’s effort to analogize virtuous empathy with Augustine’s ethics of rightly ordered love, I raise questions about his use of Augustine and his distinctive formulation of Augustinian “iconic realism.” Second, I suggest his discussion of public reason is at odds with the dialogical spirit of the book and may distract from the democratic solidarity required by our political moment. Third, more briefly, I highlight the practical implications of Miller’s vision for higher education at both the graduate and undergraduate level.     

A Contemporary (Catholic) Appropriation of Augustine's massa damnata Theory of Predestination

Over the centuries, especially since the Jansenist controversy, much ink has been spilled defending and criticizing Augustine’s contentious interpretation of the revealed doctrines of predestination and reprobation. Instead of attempting to trace the entire debate or adjudicate the exegetical questions, I attempt the more modest task of analyzing how Augustine’s massa damnata theory of election has been re‐received in modern Catholic scholarship. Thus, leaving aside the historical and exegetical complexity of the issue, I argue for a particular conceptual appropriation of Augustine’s theory in line with a contemporary Catholic theology of grace and predestination.     

Using Augustine in contemporary sexual ethics. A response to Gilbert Meilaender

In response to Gilbert Meilaender's innovative interpretation of Augustine and of Roman Catholic teaching, the author suggests (1) that Meilaender attributes to Augustine a more positive view of sexual pleasure than the texts will support, (2) that modern Roman Catholic teaching suggests that love should have priority over procreation as a meaning of sex; and (3) that the moral logic of Meilaender's argument does not require a rejection of all reproductive technologies. Nonetheless, the author agrees that a more critical attitude should be adopted toward the reasons for which technologically assisted reproduction is promoted and undertaken, as well as toward its social impact.     

Fons Iustitiae: Justice in the City of God

This article seeks to account for the nature of human justice in the City of God. I argue that finite justice, for Augustine, is participatory; it always ‘refers’ itself to the font of justice from which it overflows; it is always received by participation in Christ’s justice. This claim implicates both of Augustine’s central adversaries in the City of God, namely, imperial paganism and Pelagianism. Attention to how Augustine weaves the two major polemical antagonists of the City of God, imperial paganism and Pelagianism, into the same cloth reveals a unified claim about justice in the City of God. Both of Augustine’s antagonists are guilty of claiming a self‐referential and self‐manufactured conception of justice. Pagans and Pelagians do not confess justice as a gift received; they instead treat it as something constructed on the tottering foundation of collective or personal virtue. Justice in both cases fails and finds its end in self‐glorification and pride. Finally, I propose that Augustine’s participatory account of justice has implications for a vexed twentieth‐century debate about the City of God, namely the question of what allegiance, responsibilities and loves citizens of the heavenly city ought to have towards the earthly city in which they live as pilgrims.     

Critical ethnography and subjective experience

Conclusion I began this essay by advancing three claims with respect to conducting ethnographic research: the analyst should be disposed to engage Other in a genuinely dialogic fashion so as to produce shared understanding; provision should be made for the analyst to disengage from the dialogue for purposes of self-reflection; and there should be some justificatory grounds for ideology critique. At the same time, I noted the problematic status of these claims on conceptual and methodological grounds and pointed to a need for taking account of the analyst as a subject whose being in the world impinges upon the analysis at each stage of research. This awareness, it seems to me, calls for an ethnography which is phenomenologically instigated. This is to say that the ethnographer needs to be no less sensitive to his or her own subjectivity than to the meanings of Other.In order to get clearer as to what might be involved in making the above claims, I discussed critically Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. Although Gadamer is to be commended for his philosophical inquiry into the bases of self-understanding, we saw that his phenomenological hermeneutics suffered a number of limitations, all of which being linked to his inability to adequately free the subject from the limits of self-understanding. Thus, Gadamer's subject-as-analyst is restricted as a participant in dialogue with Other; engages in self-reflection without a firm footing; and is unable thus to mount a justifiable critique either of Other or the subject's own tradition/culture.This critique of Gadamer suggests that once the phenomenological turn is taken, it then requires an additional turn which joins the subject with Other in shared understanding. In this regard I suggested the possible directions that some conceptual emendations of Gadamer's thesis might take us, and gave special reference to the ways in which such emendations might be implemented in ethnographic work. Both my critique and emendation were meant to underscore the need for a joining of subject and Other not merely as this might represent an occasion for understanding Other, nor merely for the understanding of self, but for a shared understanding that opens up a newly formed terrain upon which self-reflection and ideology critique may find suitable and just intersubjective grounding.     

Against the Moral Powers Test of basic liberty

In Rawlsian political philosophy, “basic liberties” are rights subject to a high degree of protection, such that they cannot easily be overridden for concerns of stability, efficiency, or social justice. For Rawls, something qualifies as a basic liberty if and only if bears the right relationship to our “two moral powers”: a capacity to form a sense of the good life and a capacity for a sense of justice. However, which rights are basic liberties is subject to frequent ideological debate, which Rawlsian libertarians and Rawlsian socialists arguing that Rawls's own view is mistaken or incomplete. I argue that problem is that Moral Powers Test does not quite work. Only a small amount of liberty—not enough to qualify a society as liberal—can clearly be shown to pass the Moral Powers Test. One might attempt to rescue the Moral Powers Test by relaxing or modifying its requirements, but, I will argue, there appears to be no unproblematic and nonquestion‐begging way to do so. The Moral Powers Test must be abandoned or, at least, requires some unknown but radical revision or require supplements from outside Rawls's own theory.     

Margaret Miles and the Platonist’s Daughter

Margaret Miles’ academic memoir Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter uses Augustine as both a guide and an interlocutor as she recounts her own odyssey of the soul. Miles, using a similar framework to that in the Confessions, makes a public account of her own private reflections on herself, her academic life, and her journey in faith. Taking up the implicit invitation to self-reflection and dialogue that this book provides, this review attempts to bring out key philosophical issues inherent in the book, including Miles’ views on education, love, the body, and God’s grace.     

Raising Fees in Group Therapy: Some Ethical and Clinical Implications

Of all money matters in group psychotherapy, one of the most neglected in the literature is the issue of raising the fees. The premise of this paper is that there are ethical and clinical considerations to group fee increases. One consequence of the lack of attention to the subject of raising of fees is that many neophyte group leaders do not learn about its complexity. It will be argued that the raising of fees is not merely a straightforward matter of informing groups about an impending change in the amount of money that they will pay but rather, it is a knotty, emotionally charged issue with both realistic and subjective components for members and leaders alike. Further, it will be argued that the issue of raising fees in group therapy is dissimilar, in significant ways, from raising fees in individual treatment. When leaders use subjective criterion to decide an increase, then the group process may be disrupted. Suggestions for reform will be offered.