Learning to cooperate without awareness in multiplayer minimal social situations

Experimental and Monte Carlo methods were used to test theoretical predictions about adaptive learning of cooperative responses without awareness in minimal social situations—games in which the payoffs to players depend not on their own actions but exclusively on the actions of other group members. In Experiment 1, learning occurred slowly over 200 rounds in a dyadic minimal social situation but not in multiplayer groups. In Experiments 2–4, learning occurred rarely in multiplayer groups, even when players were informed that they were interacting strategically and were allowed to communicate with one another but were not aware of the game’s payoff structure. Monte Carlo simulation suggested that players approach minimal social situations using a noisy version of the win–stay, lose–shift decision rule, deviating from the deterministic rule less frequently after rewarding than unrewarding rounds.     

The Role of Subsidies in Coordination Games with Interconnected Risk

Can subsidies promote Pareto‐optimum coordination? We found that partially subsidizing the cooperative actions for two out of six players in a laboratory coordination game usually produced better coordination and higher total social welfare with both deterministic and stochastic payoffs. Not only were the subsidized players more likely to cooperate (choose the Pareto‐optimum action), but the unsubsidized players increased their expectations on how likely others would cooperate, and they cooperated more frequently themselves. After removal of the subsidy, high levels of coordination continued in most groups with stochastic payoffs but declined in deterministic ones. This carry‐over disparity between the deterministic and stochastic settings was consistent with the economic theories that agents were more likely to keep the status quo option under uncertainty than without uncertainty. Hence, players with stochastic payoffs were more likely to keep the high coordination level (status quo) brought by the subsidy in the previous subsidy session. A post‐game survey also indicated that with stochastic payoffs, players focused on risk reduction. Temporary subsidies promoted lasting coordination because even after subsidy was removed, players still assumed that others players would prefer reduced risks from cooperation. With deterministic payoffs, however, the subsidy might crowd out other rationales for coordination, with many players indicating that the subsidy was the only reason for anyone to cooperate. Hence, the coordination level dropped when the subsidy was removed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Formalising a hypothesis for the development of anticipatory skill in time-constrained interceptive actions: Implications for the design of junior sport

When professional athletes strike a ball in tennis, cricket or baseball, the high temporal demands often necessitate the need to exploit pre-ball-flight information in order to anticipate the ball's trajectory. Despite the wealth of research probing anticipatory behaviour in sport, our understanding of when, how or why anticipatory skill develops is limited. In this article, we sought to formalise a hypothesis on the development of anticipatory skill. Using empirical temporal data from tennis, cricket and baseball, we propose that the temporal demands of the task dictate an athlete's propensity to anticipate. We then outline the implications of this hypothesis as it relates to junior sport. Notably, we question whether current playing dimensions in junior sport impose temporal demands that are sufficient to elicit anticipatory behaviour. Using tennis, cricket and baseball as examples, we illustrate differences in temporal demands between the junior and professional game and present implications for anticipation. Our discussion challenges the current junior sport experience as it relates to developing anticipatory skill.     

Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

Individuals often make decisions that affect groups, yet the propensities of group representatives are not as well understood than those of independent decision makers or deliberating groups. We ask how responsibility for group payoffs—in the absence of group deliberation—affects the choice. The experiment utilizes the Interdependent Security Dilemma paradigm. In its deterministic version, the game is identical to a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In the stochastic version, potential losses are larger but uncertain, occurring with a predefined probability when one or both players choose to forgo investment in protection. Participants were assigned to play either as individuals, or as representatives of three‐person groups, with each member's choices equally likely to determine the group's payoffs. In the deterministic condition, individuals were more likely to invest (cooperate) than group representatives (80% vs. 62% of rounds). In the stochastic condition, the pattern was reversed as representatives were slightly, but not significantly, more likely to invest than individuals (46% vs. 40%). The significant interaction effect suggested that group representatives were not only less cooperative but also more risk averse than individuals. A follow‐up study supported this account by showing participants who construed the invest strategy as low‐risk than those who perceived this strategy to be high risk. Overall, group representatives exhibited a tendency to act more competitively and more cautiously than individuals acting alone. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal classifier feedback improves cost-benefit but not base-rate decision criterion learning in perceptual categorization

Unequal payoffs engender separate reward- and accuracy-maximizing decision criteria; unequal base rates do not. When payoffs are unequal, observers place greater emphasis on accuracy than is optimal. This study compares objective classifier (the objectively correct response) with optimal classifier feedback (the optimal classifier's response) when payoffs or base rates are unequal. It provides a critical test of Maddox and Bohil's (1998) competition between reward and accuracy maximization (COBRA) hypothesis, comparing it with a competition between reward and probability matching (COBRM) and a competition between reward and equal response frequencies (COBRE) hypothesis. The COBRA prediction that optimal classifier feedback leads to better decision criterion leaning relative to objective classifier feedback when payoffs are unequal, but not when base rates are unequal, was supported. Model-based analyses suggested that the weight placed on accuracy was reduced for optimal classifier feedback relative to objective classifier feedback. In addition, delayed feedback affected learning of the reward-maximizing decision criterion.     

Illusory control as a function of the motivation to avoid randomly determined aversive outcomes

Previous research has provided evidence that the need to attain appetitive outcomes positively affects the certainty of winning that outcome in purely chance-based games. Three experiments were conducted to test the notion that the need to avoid an aversive outcome affects winning confidence in the same fashion. In Experiment 1, participants were given the opportunity to avoid having to give an introductory remark (low need) or an impromptu speech (high need) to a group of peers by winning a chance-based card-drawing game. As predicted, confidence-in-winning ratings were found to be a positive function of outcome need. In Experiment 2, participants faced a similar card-drawing procedure but this time could avoid ostensibly having their arms submersed in either room temperature water (low need) or cold water (high need) need. Again as expected, results showed that participants in the high need condition not only displayed greater winning confidence but also believed more skill was involved in playing the purely chance-based game. In Experiment 3, the methodology of Experiment 1 was replicated incorporating a skill measure. The results of this experiment mirrored those of Experiment 2. Results of these investigations are discussed in terms of control theory.

Decision criteria do not shift: Commentary on Mueller and Weidemann (2008)

The effects of base rates and payoffs on the shapes of rating receiver operating characteristic curves are inconsistent with the basic assumptions of signal detection theory (SDT), in particular the notion of a shifting decision criterion. Mueller and Weidemann (2008) propose that these unexpected phenomena are not due to problems with the decision- criterion construct but are instead due to two compounded effects: instability of the decision criterion across trials, and even greater instability in the flanking criteria that determine which confidence rating will be reported. There are several problems with the authors’ decision-noise hypothesis. First, even if their hypothesis about decision noise were taken for granted, the key feature of the ratings data that rejects the SDT model would remain a mystery. Second, the same violations of SDT that are exhibited in the ratings paradigm are also exhibited in the yes-no detection task when response time is substituted for confidence as a basis for analysis. Finally, the decision-noise hypothesis predicts that sensitivity will increase when one source of this variation-the response on a previous trial-is controlled for. This prediction was consistently violated in both the yes-no and ratings conditions of Mueller and Weidemann’s experiment. In an Addendum, we respond to Weidemann and Mueller’s (2008) reply to this Comment.     

A minimal ingroup advantage in emotion identification confidence

Emotion expressions convey valuable information about others’ internal states and likely behaviours. Accurately identifying expressions is critical for social interactions, but so is perceiver confidence when decoding expressions. Even if a perceiver correctly labels an expression, uncertainty may impair appropriate behavioural responses and create uncomfortable interactions. Past research has found that perceivers report greater confidence when identifying emotions displayed by cultural ingroup members, an effect attributed to greater perceptual skill and familiarity with own-culture than other-culture faces. However, the current research presents novel evidence for an ingroup advantage in emotion decoding confidence across arbitrary group boundaries that hold culture constant. In two experiments using different stimulus sets participants not only labeled minimal ingroup expressions more accurately, but did so with greater confidence. These results offer novel evidence that ingroup advantages in emotion decoding confidence stem partly from social-cognitive processes.     

I wish I were a warrior: the role of wishful identification in the effects of violent video games on aggression in adolescent boys

This study tested the hypothesis that violent video games are especially likely to increase aggression when players identify with violent game characters. Dutch adolescent boys with low education ability (N=112) were randomly assigned to play a realistic or fantasy violent or nonviolent video game. Next, they competed with an ostensible partner on a reaction time task in which the winner could blast the loser with loud noise through headphones (the aggression measure). Participants were told that high noise levels could cause permanent hearing damage. Habitual video game exposure, trait aggressiveness, and sensation seeking were controlled for. As expected, the most aggressive participants were those who played a violent game and wished they were like a violent character in the game. These participants used noise levels loud enough to cause permanent hearing damage to their partners, even though their partners had not provoked them. These results show that identifying with violent video game characters makes players more aggressive. Players were especially likely to identify with violent characters in realistic games and with games they felt immersed in.     

Two studies examining the negative effect of self-efficacy on performance

Although hundreds of studies have found a positive relationship between self-efficacy and performance, several studies have found a negative relationship when the analysis is done across time (repeated measures) rather than across individuals. W. T. Powers (1991) predicted this negative relationship based on perceptual control theory. Here, 2 studies are presented to (a) confirm the causal role of self-efficacy and (b) substantiate the explanation. In Study 1, self-efficacy was manipulated for 43 of 87 undergraduates on an analytic game. The manipulation was negatively related to performance on the next trial. In Study 2, 104 undergraduates played the analytic game and reported self-efficacy between each game and confidence in the degree to which they had assessed previous feedback. As expected, self-efficacy led to overconfidence and hence increased the likelihood of committing logic errors during the game.     

Distributive judgments under uncertainty: Paccioli's game revisited

Many decision biases arise from the inability to ignore past events. The coherence of decisions is also compromised by the inability to fully use information related to the future. In Paccioli's game, a stake of money goes to the first player to score a certain number of wins. When the game is prematurely interrupted, they may divide the stake according to the proportions of wins relative to rounds played. Alternatively, they may assess the probability that a player would reach the criterion number of wins first if the game were continued. The first decision rule (ratio), which is past-oriented, leads to contradictions across games. The second rule (probability), which is future-oriented, does not. In seven studies, use of the ratio rule emerges across testing methods, in games of chance and games of skill, and independently of extraneous factors (such as random responding, lack of awareness, or proneness to other past-oriented biases).     

The timing effect in public good games

In public good situations, expectations concerning other persons’ moves are important and subtle cues can affect these expectations. In Experiment 1, participants in a public good game who moved simultaneously made high contributions and expected their opponents to make high contributions. However, participants who moved pseudo-sequentially (one after the other, but without knowledge of the other’s decision) expected their opponents to make medium-sized contributions, but made almost no contribution themselves. In Experiment 2, we manipulated expectations experimentally. Participants who moved simultaneously reciprocated what they expected their partners to do. Participants who moved pseudo-sequentially defected, regardless of what they expected from their opponents. Furthermore, we found that simultaneous movers were more likely than pseudo-sequential movers to conceptualize themselves and the other player as a group. This sense of groupness seemed to account partly for their inclination to reciprocate anticipated behavior.     

A further test of sequential-sampling models that account for payoff effects on response bias in perceptual decision tasks

Recently, Diederich and Busemeyer (2006) evaluated three hypotheses formulated as particular versions of a sequential-sampling model to account for the effects of payoffs in a perceptual decision task with time constraints. The bound-change hypothesis states that payoffs affect the distance of the starting position of the decision process to each decision bound. The drift-rate-change hypothesis states that payoffs affect the drift rate of the decision process. The two-stage-processing hypothesis assumes two processes, one for processing payoffs and another for processing stimulus information, and that on a given trial, attention switches from one process to the other. The latter hypothesis gave the best account of their data. The present study investigated two questions: (1) Does the experimental setting influence decisions, and consequently affect the fits of the hypotheses? A task was conducted in two experimental settings--either the time limit or the payoff matrix was held constant within a given block of trials, using three different payoff matrices and four different time limits--in order to answer this question. (2) Could it be that participants neglect payoffs on some trials and stimulus information on others? To investigate this idea, a further hypothesis was considered, the mixture-of-processes hypothesis. Like the two-stage-processing hypothesis, it postulates two processes, one for payoffs and another for stimulus information. However, it differs from the previous hypothesis in assuming that on a given trial exactly one of the processes operates, never both. The present design had no effect on choice probability but may have affected choice response times (RTs). Overall, the two-stage-processing hypothesis gave the best account, with respect both to choice probabilities and to observed mean RTs and mean RT patterns within a choice pair.     

Competitive Dynamics in Forecasting: The Interaction of Skill and Uncertainty

The outcomes in many competitive tasks depend upon both skill and luck. Behavioral theories on risk taking in tournaments indicate that low‐skilled individuals may have incentives to take more risks than high‐skilled ones. We build on these theories and suggest, in addition, that when luck is more important in determining outcomes, the increase in risk taking is larger for low‐skilled than high‐skilled individuals. We test this hypothesis by analyzing stock analysts' forecasts of companies' earnings per share under market conditions that vary in volatility and thus imply different levels of luck in outcomes. Specifically, noting that forecasts that deviate widely from the consensus—which is observable by the analyst—potentially carry career‐related rewards but also reputational risks, we examine the degree of deviation from consensus exhibited by analysts of different skill levels (measured by both past forecasting accuracy and education) in different market conditions. We find that average deviations from consensus increase as markets become more volatile. At the same time, under conditions of high volatility, low‐skilled analysts exhibit larger increases in deviations from consensus than high‐skilled analysts. These field data results support our hypothesis based on of risk taking in tournaments. We discuss alternative interpretations such as, for example, self‐serving attributions and indicate directions for future research. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time-dependent gambling: odds now,money later

Four experiments investigated temporal changes in the influence of probability and payoffs on gambling. Using urn draws, the authors found in Experiment I that temporal distance increased the influence of payoffs and decreased the influence of probability on preferences. The authors found in Experiment 2 that in choosing among the more distant gambles, participants offered more reasons dealing with payoffs and fewer reasons dealing with probability. In Experiments 3 and 4, the authors extended the scope of these findings using a card game and a raffle. The results were interpreted in terms of a temporal construal process that highlights the desirability of outcomes in the distant future and the feasibility of attaining the outcomes in the near future.     

Toward a unified theory of decision criterion learning in perceptual categorization

Optimal decision criterion placement maximizes expected reward and requires sensitivity to the category base rates (prior probabilities) and payoffs (costs and benefits of incorrect and correct responding). When base rates are unequal, human decision criterion is nearly optimal, but when payoffs are unequal, suboptimal decision criterion placement is observed, even when the optimal decision criterion is identical in both cases. A series of studies are reviewed that examine the generality of this finding, and a unified theory of decision criterion learning is described (Maddox & Dodd, 2001). The theory assumes that two critical mechanisms operate in decision criterion learning. One mechanism involves competition between reward and accuracy maximization: The observer attempts to maximize reward, as instructed, but also places some importance on accuracy maximization. The second mechanism involves a flat-maxima hypothesis that assumes that the observer's estimate of the reward-maximizing decision criterion is determined from the steepness of the objective reward function that relates expected reward to decision criterion placement. Experiments used to develop and test the theory require each observer to complete a large number of trials and to participate in all conditions of the experiment. This provides maximal control over the reinforcement history of the observer and allows a focus on individual behavioral profiles. The theory is applied to decision criterion learning problems that examine category discriminability, payoff matrix multiplication and addition effects, the optimal classifier's independence assumption, and different types of trial-by-trial feedback. In every case the theory provides a good account of the data, and, most important, provides useful insights into the psychological processes involved in decision criterion learning.     

Expertise in the Game of Go and Levels of Visuospatial and Pattern Recognition Abilities

The results of existing research indicate higher levels of visuospatial and pattern recognition abilities in experts in the game of Go compared to novices. However, the tasks included in the research have been focused only on Go‐game situations. This study aimed to verify the hypothesis that experts in the game of Go would achieve higher scores, compared to novices, on behavioral tests measuring visuospatial abilities and that pattern recognition tests would be a predictor of group membership (experts, low‐skill players, novices). We consider that the game of Go can be treated as a special case of tasks related to visuospatial abilities and pattern recognition. Sixty men participated in the study, including 17 experts in the game of Go, 13 low‐skill players, and 30 novices. The results of behavioral tests—the advanced version of Raven's Progressive Matrices and the APIS‐Z Test's Visuospatial Abilities subscale, which measure pattern recognition and visuospatial abilities, respectively—confirmed the hypotheses.     

Understanding the influence of outcome valence in bargaining: A study on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior

In this study we investigate how outcome valence affects the importance of self-interest and fairness in ultimatum bargaining. In three experiments we systematically study the effect of outcome valence on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior. Results on all three aspects show strong evidence for the hypothesis that fairness becomes more important and self-interest becomes less important in negative valence bargaining. Fairness accessibility was higher when bargaining involved negative payoffs than when it involved positive payoffs (Experiment 1), the fairness norm was stronger in negatively versus positively valenced bargaining when an identical unequal offer benefiting the allocators was evaluated (Experiment 2), and allocators allocated more to recipients in negative valence bargaining than in positive valence bargaining (Experiment 3). We relate our findings to insights derived from the do-no-harm principle.     

Sadness, suicide, and their association with video game and internet overuse among teens: results from the youth risk behavior survey 2007 and 2009

We investigated the association between excessive video game/Internet use and teen suicidality. Data were obtained from the 2007 and 2009 Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), a high school-based, nationally representative survey (N = 14,041 and N = 16,410, respectively). Teens who reported 5 hours or more of video games/Internet daily use, in the 2009 YRBS, had a significantly higher risk for sadness (adjusted and weighted odds ratio, 95% confidence interval = 2.1, 1.7-2.5), suicidal ideation (1.7, 1.3-2.1), and suicide planning (1.5, 1.1-1.9). The same pattern was found in the 2007 survey. These findings support an association between excessive video game and Internet use and risk for teen depression and suicidality.