Is alcoholism a disease? A critical review of a controversy

Commentators have repeatedly attacked the traditional view that alcoholism is a disease. Their arguments that alcoholism is a central aspect of life, a deviant life style, or a form of learned behavior are examined in the light of the history and philosophy of medicine as well as current bio-behavioral research. Our conclusion is that alcoholism, as a lawful pattern of observable signs and symptoms that deviate significantly from a norm of health, is a bio-psychosocial disease.     

Functioning of cognitive codes in autobiographical memory and the self—Is the self visual?

The main goal was to test the relationship between types of cognitive codes (perceptual–imaginative and verbal–propositional) and autobiographical memory. The purpose of this research was to evaluate whether there are independent processes serving the self, depending on separate cognitive codes. Sixty adult participants completed the NEO-FFI inventory using two kinds of procedure: perceptual–imaginative code or verbal–propositional code. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for analysis. The study has shown the dynamic of the self, depending on two cognitive perspectives. The results indicate that the reflection of the self in autobiographical memory brings different knowledge about the self and its motives.     

Is there something special about the self? A neuropsychological case study

One of the most exciting trends in psychology has been the increasing use of data and conceptual tools derived from the study of patients with neuropsychological syndromes to address questions about normal mental function. To date, however, personality theorists seldom have considered neuropsychological case material (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998). In this paper we show how neuropsychological evidence can afford new insights for personality theorists. In particular, we show how examination of persons suffering from amnesia and autism can shed light on the way in which knowledge about self is represented in memory. We first review the literature on clinical amnesia and then present evidence from a new case study exploring the relation between personal and nonpersonal knowledge in a patient with autism. We conclude that the mind may have learning systems that are specialized both for acquiring and retrieving information about one's own personality.     

Is there a special association between self judgements and conscious recollection?

Dual‐process models of recognition memory posit a rapid retrieval process that produces a general sense of familiarity and a slower retrieval process that produces conscious recollections of prior experience. The Remember–Know paradigm has been used to study the subjective correlates of these two processes with Remember judgements assumed to index conscious recollection and Know judgements assumed to index familiarity. In this paper we examine Conway and Dewhurst's recent finding that judgements of self during encoding produce more Remember responses than alternative semantic judgements. While one might interpret this result to suggest a special association between self judgement and conscious recollection, we consider the possibility that it occurs because of greater discriminability in this condition. The results of four experiments demonstrate that a self judgement condition produces more, fewer, or an equal number of Remember responses relative to a control condition depending on whether overall discriminability in the self judgement condition is greater than, less than, or equal to that in the control condition. The implications of these results for conceptions of self judgement and the use of the Remember–Know paradigm are detailed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What explains the relationship between spatial and mathematical skills? A review of evidence from brain and behavior

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - There is an emerging consensus that spatial thinking plays a fundamental role in how people conceive, express, and perform mathematics. However, the underlying...     

Is manipulation of mood a critical component of cognitive bias modification procedures?

This paper investigates whether changes in mood state are an important component of cognitive bias modification (CBM) procedures. In a novel CBM procedure participants read either positive or negative statements relating to social issues for 5 min. Interpretation bias was measured by means of a scrambled sentence test, which was presented both before and after the CBM procedure. Participants who read the positive statements made more positive resolutions to the scrambled sentences, while participants who read the negative statements made more negative resolutions. Thus, the appropriate positive and negative interpretative biases were induced by the CBM procedure. However, significant mood changes also occurred following CBM. In Experiment 2, a musical mood induction procedure was presented with depressing or elating music. As before, a scrambled sentence test was presented both before and after the musical mood induction. Mood changed in accordance with the valence of the music to the same extent as with CBM. Critically however, performance on the scrambled sentence task did not change for both groups. This demonstrates that a change in mood state is not sufficient for a change in cognitive bias to occur.     

Where has all the psychology gone?: A critical review of evidence-based psychological practice in correctional settings

Evidence-Based Practice (EBP) represents the gold standard for effective clinical psychological practice. In this review, we examine ways in which EBP tenets are being neglected by correctional psychologists worldwide. We examine three key aspects of EBP currently being neglected: (a) individualized and flexible client focus, (b) the therapeutic alliance, and (c) psychological expertise. We also highlight two highly related issues responsible for correctional psychologists' neglect of EBP. The first relates to policy makers' and correctional psychologists' overreliance on the Risk–Need–Responsivity Model to guide correctional practice. We argue that the narrow focus and implementation of this model has resulted in a severe identity problem for correctional psychologists that has severely exacerbated the dual relationship problem. That is, the tension psychologists experience as a result of engaging in psychological practice while also obliging the risk and security policies of correctional systems. The second issue concerns psychologists' response to the dual relationship problem. In short, psychology, as a discipline appears to have acquiesced to the dual-relationship problem. In our view, this constitutes a ‘crisis’ for the discipline of correctional psychology. We offer several recommendations for injecting EBP back into correctional psychology for the individual, psychology as a discipline, and correctional policy makers.     

Reciprocal relations between cognitive neuroscience and formal cognitive models: opposites attract?

Cognitive neuroscientists study how the brain implements particular cognitive processes such as perception, learning, and decision-making. Traditional approaches in which experiments are designed to target a specific cognitive process have been supplemented by two recent innovations. First, formal cognitive models can decompose observed behavioral data into multiple latent cognitive processes, allowing brain measurements to be associated with a particular cognitive process more precisely and more confidently. Second, cognitive neuroscience can provide additional data to inform the development of formal cognitive models, providing greater constraint than behavioral data alone. We argue that these fields are mutually dependent; not only can models guide neuroscientific endeavors, but understanding neural mechanisms can provide key insights into formal models of cognition.     

Does dyslexia develop from learning the alphabet in the wrong hemisphere? A cognitive neuroscience analysis

A new perspective is described which views developmental dyslexia as the outcome of learning to write the alphabet in the nondominant (right) hemisphere. The letter-level and whole-word subtypes of dyslexia are seen as differing responses adopted to cope with this predicament. Striking similarities between dyslexics and callosotomy patients in the allocation of covert attention to lateralized stimuli provide direction for integrating a diversity of dyslexic research within this framework. This synthesis, together with information from pure alexia, brain activation, and reading research, lends insight into the neural circuitry of the compensatory strategies adopted by the two dyslexic subtypes.     

Can visual cognitive neuroscience learn anything from the philosophy of language? Ambiguity and the topology of neural network models of multistable perception

The Necker cube and the productive class of related stimuli involving multiple depth interpretations driven by corner-like line junctions are often taken to be ambiguous. This idea is normally taken to be as little in need of defense as the claim that the Necker cube gives rise to multiple distinct percepts. In the philosophy of language, it is taken to be a substantive question whether a stimulus that affords multiple interpretations is a case of ambiguity. If we take into account what have been identified as hallmark features of ambiguity and look at the empirical record, it appears that the Necker cube and related stimuli are not ambiguous. I argue that this raises problems for extant models of multistable perception in cognitive neuroscience insofar as they are purported to apply to these stimuli. Helpfully, similar considerations also yield reasons to suggest that the relevant models are well motivated for other instances of multistable perception. However, a different breed of model seems to be required for the Necker cube and related stimuli. I end with a sketch how one may go about designing such a model relying on oscillatory patters in neural firing. I suggest that distinctions normally confined to the philosophy of language are important for the study of perception, a perspective with a growing number of adherents.     

Psychopathic traits from the perspective of self and informant reports: is there evidence for a lack of insight?

It has been suggested that psychopathic individuals are incapable of providing valid reports on their own personality functioning because they are either unwilling (i.e., pathologically lie) or unable (i.e. lack insight) to do so. Despite the long-standing nature of this suggestion, almost no empirical research exists on this topic. In the current study, the authors examined the issue of psychopathy and insight by testing self and informant convergence and mean level differences across 3 indices of psychopathy in a community sample (N=64). Self- and informant-report psychopathy scores were also examined in relation to self and informant reports on traits from the Five-Factor Model (FFM). Convergence was strong across the 3 psychopathy indices and their respective factors (i.e., median r=.64), and there was only modest evidence that individuals rated themselves as less psychopathic than did informants. In addition, the same FFM domains-low Agreeableness and Conscientiousness-characterized individuals with psychopathic traits regardless of reporter. Psychopathic individuals appear capable of reporting accurately on psychopathic traits when there are no direct consequences to accurate reporting (i.e., sentencing). It may be that the lack of concern for the consequences of these traits has been mistaken for a lack of insight into them.     

A house divided? The psychology of red and blue America

Recently it has become commonplace in America for commentators and the public to use the terms "red" and "blue" to refer to perceived cultural differences in America and American politics. Although a political divide may exist in America today, these particular terms are inaccurate and reductive. This article presents research from social psychology demonstrating that the increased use of these terms is likely to increase the conflict between political groups in America by making political conflict salient in nonpolitical contexts, reducing the ability of Americans to form multifaceted complex identities, pushing Americans to misperceive political in-groups and out-groups, and contributing to a "spiral of silence." An alternative model for discussing cultural differences is proposed.