Attentional priming releases crowding

Views of natural scenes unfold over time, and objects of interest that were present a moment ago tend to remain present. While visual crowding places a fundamental limit on object recognition in cluttered scenes, most studies of crowding have suffered from the limitation that they typically involved static scenes. The role of temporal continuity in crowding has therefore been unaddressed. We investigated intertrial effects upon crowding in visual scenes, showing that crowding is considerably diminished when objects remain constant on consecutive visual search trials. Repetition of both the target and distractors decreases the critical distance for crowding from flankers. More generally, our results show how object continuity through between-trial priming releases objects that would otherwise be unidentifiable due to crowding. Crowding, although it is a significant bottleneck on object recognition, can be mitigated by statistically likely temporal continuity of the objects. Crowding therefore depends not only on what is momentarily present, but also on what was previously attended.     

Object segmentation by top-down processes

In cluttered scenes, some object boundaries may not be marked by image cues. In such cases, the boundaries must be defined top-down as a result of object recognition. Here we ask if observers can retain the boundaries of several recognized objects in order to segment an unfamiliar object. We generated scenes consisting of neatly stacked objects, and the objects themselves consisted of neatly stacked coloured blocks. Because the blocks were stacked the same way within and across objects, there were no visual cues indicating which blocks belonged to which objects. Observers were trained to recognize several objects and we tested whether they could segment a novel object when it was surrounded by these familiar, studied objects. The observer's task was to count the number of blocks comprising the target object. We found that observers were able to accurately count the target blocks when the target was surrounded by up to four familiar objects. These results indicate that observers can use the boundaries of recognized objects in order to accurately segment, top-down, a novel object.     

In and out of consciousness: Sustained electrophysiological activity reflects individual differences in perceptual awareness

Although significant advances in our understanding of the cognitive and neural processes involved in conscious awareness have occurred in recent years, the precise mechanisms that support consciousness remain elusive. Examining the neural correlates associated with the moment a stimulus enters or exits conscious awareness is one way to potentially identify the neural mechanisms that give rise to consciousness. In the present study, we recorded neural activity using electroencephalography (EEG) while participants observed a bilateral shape-from-motion (SFM) display. While the display is in motion, the observer perceives an object that is immediately segregated from a noisy background. After the motion stops, the observer's experience of the object remains momentarily in awareness, before it eventually fades out of consciousness back into the noisy background. Consistent with subjective reports of perceptual experience, we observed a prominent sustained posterior contralateral negativity known as the contralateral delay activity (CDA). This activity was sustained only in conditions associated with sustained awareness. Interestingly, the amplitude of the CDA was correlated with individual differences in visual awareness, suggesting that this activity plays a significant role in the maintenance of objects in consciousness. The CDA is typically associated with visual short-term memory (VSTM), suggesting that conscious visual awareness may be mediated by the same neural and cognitive mechanisms that support VSTM. Our results demonstrate that the CDA may reflect the contents of conscious awareness, and therefore can provide a measure to track when information moves in and out of consciousness.     

Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events

With each eye fixation, we experience a richly detailed visual world. Yet recent work on visual integration and change direction reveals that we are surprisingly unaware of the details of our environment from one view to the next: we often do not detect large changes to objects and scenes ('change blindness'). Furthermore, without attention, we may not even perceive objects ('inattentional blindness'). Taken together, these findings suggest that we perceive and remember only those objects and details that receive focused attention. In this paper, we briefly review and discuss evidence for these cognitive forms of 'blindness'. We then present a new study that builds on classic studies of divided visual attention to examine inattentional blindness for complex objects and events in dynamic scenes. Our results suggest that the likelihood of noticing an unexpected object depends on the similarity of that object to other objects in the display and on how difficult the priming monitoring task is. Interestingly, spatial proximity of the critical unattended object to attended locations does not appear to affect detection, suggesting that observers attend to objects and events, not spatial positions. We discuss the implications of these results for visual representations and awareness of our visual environment.     

Object-based attentional selection and awareness of objects

This study examined whether object-based attentional selection depends on the observer's awareness of objects, using objects defined by perceptual completion. As an indicator of object-based attention, we studied the same-object advantage, where observers respond faster to a target within a cued object than within a noncued object. The same-object advantage was not found in the condition where observers were unaware of the objects (inattentional blindness). On the other hand, the same-object advantage was observed in the condition where observers were aware of the objects. These results suggest that the intensity of object representations can be influenced by observers’ awareness of objects, which affects the occurrence of object-based effects. We propose that attention/inattention (or awareness/unawareness) is graded and observers’ awareness of the objects might serve to boost an otherwise noisy/low signal representation for obtaining object-based effects.     

Viewpoint dependence in visual and haptic object recognition

On the whole, people recognize objects best when they see the objects from a familiar view and worse when they see the objects from views that were previously occluded from sight. Unexpectedly, we found haptic object recognition to be viewpoint-specific as well, even though hand movements were unrestricted. This viewpoint dependence was due to the hands preferring the back "view" of the objects. Furthermore, when the sensory modalities (visual vs. haptic) differed between learning an object and recognizing it, recognition performance was best when the objects were rotated back-to-front between learning and recognition. Our data indicate that the visual system recognizes the front view of objects best, whereas the hand recognizes objects best from the back.     

Auditory attention causes visual inattentional blindness

When engaged in a visual task, we can fail to detect unexpected events that would otherwise be very noticeable. Here we ask whether a common auditory task, such as that of attending to a verbal stream, can also make us blind to the presence of visual objects that we do not anticipate. In two experiments, one hundred and twenty observers watched a dynamic display while performing either a visual or an auditory attention task, or both simultaneously. When observers were listening to verbal material, in order to either understand it or to remember it (auditory task), their probability of detecting an unexpected visual object was no higher than when they were counting bounces of moving items (visual task), although in the former case the observers' eyes and attention could move around the display freely rather than remaining focused on tracked items. Previous research has shown that attending to verbal material does not affect responses to lights flashing at irregular intervals, suggesting that driving performance is not hampered by listening. The lights, however, were expected. Our data imply that listening to the radio while driving, or to a portable audio player while walking or biking, can impair our reactions to objects or events that we do not expect.     

Infants form associations between memory representations of stimuli that are absent

Traditional models of learning assume that an association can be formed only between cues that are physically present. Here, we report that when two objects that had never appeared together were simultaneously activated in memory, young human infants associated the representations of those objects. Neither object was physically present at the time the association was formed. The association remained latent for up to 2 weeks, when the infants used it to perform a deferred imitation task. These findings reveal that what infants merely see "brings to mind" what they saw before and combines it in new ways. In addition to challenging a fundamental tenet of classic learning models, these findings have major theoretical and practical implications for early cognitive development. Every day, in the same manner, young infants probably form numerous associations between activated memories of objects that are physically absent, creating a potential knowledge base of untold dimensions.     

Contour Completion And Relative Depth: Petter's Rule and Support Ratio

The ability to see complete objects despite occlusion is critical to humans' visual success. Human vision can amodally complete visual objects that are partially occluded, and modally complete visual objects that occlude other objects. Previous experiments showed that the perceived strength of a completed contour depends on its support ratio: the ratio of the length of the physically specified contour to the total length of the contour. Other experiments showed that human vision prefers to make modal completions as short as possible, an effect known as Petter's rule. The experiment reported here examined the relationship between Petter's rule and support ratio, showing that both affect modal completion in figures of homogeneous color, but that when they compete Petter's rule dominates. Finally, our results confirm that Petter's rule is an effect of relative gap lengths and not of relative size.     

Matching of visual input to only one item at any one time

When we perform a visual search we know what we are looking for and determine where it is. A representation of the object in our working memory, the ‘search-template’, is compared to the items in the scene until a match is found. So far it is unknown whether observers can search for multiple items at the same time. Here we compare the performance of subjects between a task in which they search for one of two target-items in a stream of visual objects and a task with only a single target. We find that search is effectively limited to one item at a time. This limitation occurs for simple and complex objects and even if the subjects have to look for two features from different domains. We conclude that matching has a fundamental capacity-limitation as the visual input can be matched to only one search-template at a time.     

Action‐oriented Perception

Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch‐able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q‐able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q‐able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually.     

The attentional cost of inattentional blindness

When our attention is engaged in a visual task, we can be blind to events which would otherwise not be missed. In three experiments, 97 out of the 165 observers performing a visual attention task failed to notice an unexpected, irrelevant object moving across the display. Surprisingly, this object significantly lowered accuracy in the primary task when, and only when, it failed to reach awareness. We suggest that an unexpected stimulus causes a state of alert that would normally generate an attentional shift; if this response is prevented by an attention-consuming task, a portion of the attentional resources remains allocated to the object. Such a portion is large enough to disturb performance, but not so large that the object can be recognized as task-irrelevant and accordingly ignored. Our findings have one counterintuitive implication: irrelevant stimuli might hamper some types of performance only when perceived subliminally.     

Integration without awareness: expanding the limits of unconscious processing

Human conscious awareness is commonly seen as the climax of evolution. However, what function-if any-it serves in human behavior is still debated. One of the leading suggestions is that the cardinal function of conscious awareness is to integrate numerous inputs-including the multitude of features and objects in a complex scene-across different levels of analysis into a unified, coherent, and meaningful perceptual experience. Here we demonstrate, however, that integration of objects with their background scenes can be achieved without awareness of either. We used a binocular rivalry technique known as continuous flash suppression to induce perceptual suppression in a group of human observers. Complex scenes that included incongruent objects escaped perceptual suppression faster than normal scenes did. We conclude that visual awareness is not needed for object-background integration or for processing the likelihood of an object to appear within a given semantic context, but may be needed for dealing with novel situations.     

Substitution and pooling in crowding

Unless we fixate directly on it, it is hard to see an object among other objects. This breakdown in object recognition, called crowding, severely limits peripheral vision. The effect is more severe when objects are more similar. When observers mistake the identity of a target among flanker objects, they often report a flanker. Many have taken these flanker reports as evidence of internal substitution of the target by a flanker. Here, we ask observers to identify a target letter presented in between one similar and one dissimilar flanker letter. Simple substitution takes in only one letter, which is often the target but, by unwitting mistake, is sometimes a flanker. The opposite of substitution is pooling, which takes in more than one letter. Having taken only one letter, the substitution process knows only its identity, not its similarity to the target. Thus, it must report similar and dissimilar flankers equally often. Contrary to this prediction, the similar flanker is reported much more often than the dissimilar flanker, showing that rampant flanker substitution cannot account for most flanker reports. Mixture modeling shows that simple substitution can account for, at most, about half the trials. Pooling and nonpooling (simple substitution) together include all possible models of crowding. When observers are asked to identify a crowded object, at least half of their reports are pooled, based on a combination of information from target and flankers, rather than being based on a single letter.     

Visual awareness of objects and their colour

At any given moment, our awareness of what we 'see' before us seems to be rather limited. If, for instance, a display containing multiple objects is shown (red or green disks), when one object is suddenly covered at random, observers are often little better than chance in reporting about its colour (Wolfe, Reinecke, & Brawn, Visual Cognition, 14, 749-780, 2006). We tested whether, when object attributes (such as colour) are unknown, observers still retain any knowledge of the presence of that object at a display location. Experiments 1-3 involved a task requiring two-alternative (yes/no) responses about the presence or absence of a colour-defined object at a probed location. On this task, if participants knew about the presence of an object at a location, responses indicated that they also knew about its colour. A fourth experiment presented the same displays but required a three-alternative response. This task did result in a data pattern consistent with participants' knowing more about the locations of objects within a display than about their individual colours. However, this location advantage, while highly significant, was rather small in magnitude. Results are compared with those of Huang (Journal of Vision, 10(10, Art. 24), 1-17, 2010), who also reported an advantage for object locations, but under quite different task conditions.     

Against Emotional Dogmatism

It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis, we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity.     

Failure to detect changes to attended objects in motion pictures

Our intuition that we richly represent the visual details of our environment is illusory. When viewing a scene, we seem to use detailed representations of object properties and interobject relations to achieve a sense of continuity across views. Yet, several recent studies show that human observers fail to detect changes to objects and object properties when localized retinal information signaling a change is masked or eliminated (e.g., by eye movements). However, these studies changed arbitrarily chosen objects which may have been outside the focus of attention. We draw on previous research showing the importance of spatiotemporal information for tracking objects by creating short motion pictures in which objects in both arbitrary locations and the very center of attention were changed. Adult observers failed to notice changes in both cases, even when the sole actor in a scene transformed into another person across an instantaneous change in camera angle (or “cut”).     

Effects of grouping and attention on the perception of causality

Beyond perceiving patterns of motion in simple dynamic displays, we can also perceive higher level properties, such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another object. Although causality is a seemingly high-level property, its perception--like the perception of faces or speech--often appears to be automatic, irresistible, and driven by highly constrained and stimulus-driven rules. Here, in an exploration of such rules, we demonstrate that perceptual grouping and attention can influence the both perception of causality in ambiguous displays. We first report several types of grouping effects, based on connectedness, proximity, and common motion. We further suggest that such grouping effects are mediated by the allocation of attention, and we directly demonstrate that causal perception can be strengthened or attenuated on the basis of where observers are attending, independent of fixation. Like Michotte, we find that the perception of causality is mediated by strict visual rules. Beyond Michotte, we find that these rules operate not only over discrete objects, but also over perceptual groups, constrained by the allocation of attention.     

Working memory biasing of visual perception without awareness

Previous research has demonstrated that the contents of visual working memory can bias visual processing in favor of matching stimuli in the scene. However, the extent to which such top-down, memory-driven biasing of visual perception is contingent on conscious awareness remains unknown. Here we showed that conscious awareness of critical visual cues is dispensable for working memory to bias perceptual selection mechanisms. Using the procedure of continuous flash suppression, we demonstrated that “unseen” visual stimuli during interocular suppression can gain preferential access to awareness if they match the contents of visual working memory. Strikingly, the very same effect occurred even when the visual cue to be held in memory was rendered nonconscious by masking. Control experiments ruled out the alternative accounts of repetition priming and different detection criteria. We conclude that working memory biases of visual perception can operate in the absence of conscious awareness.     

Are things that are hard to physically move also hard to imagine moving?

Are objects that are more difficult to physically manipulate also more difficult to mentally manipulate? In our study, participants interacted with wooden objects modeled after the figures from Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) classic mental rotation experiment. One pair of objects was easy to physically rotate while another pair was difficult. They then completed a standard mental rotation task on images of these objects. Participants were slower to mentally rotate objects that were harder to physically rotate when they engaged in motor imagery. Further, this cost accrued with increasing angles of rotation. We verified this was the result of motor imagery by showing that the costs can be eliminated by using a strictly visual imagery strategy (imagining the objects moving on their own). These results reveal a striking constraint imposed by our real-world motor experiences on mental imagery, and also demonstrate a way that we can overcome such constraints.