A representational account of mutual belief

Although the notion of common or mutual belief plays a crucial role in game theory, economics and social philosophy, no thoroughly representational account of it has yet been developed. In this paper, I propose two desiderata for such an account, namely, that it take into account the possibility of inconsistent data without portraying the human mind as logically and mathematically omniscient. I then propose a definition of mutual belief which meets these criteria. This account takes seriously the existence of computational limitations. Finally, I point out that the epistemic logic (or theory) needed to make the definition work is subject to the Kaplan/Montague Paradox of the Knower. I argue that this is not a defect of the account, and I discuss briefly the bearing of recent work on the paradox of the Liar upon this problem.Much of this work was carried out with the support of a grant from the National Science Foundation to the Center for Cognitive Science at the University of Texas at Austin (Grant No. IRI-8719064). Much thanks to Tyler Burge, Nicholas Asher, and Brian Skyrms for their criticisms and suggestions.     

MetrIntMeas a novel metric for measuring the intelligence of a swarm of cooperating agents

We propose a novel metric called MetrIntMeas (Metric for the Intelligence Measuring) for an accurate and robust measurement of the difficult problem-solving intelligence of a swarm system. The metric allows the classification if a swarm system belongs to the same class with the systems which have a specific reference intelligence value. For proving the efficiency of the proposed metric we realized a case study on a swarm system specialized in solving a NP-hard problem. As an application of the proposed metric, we present the measurement of the swarm systems’ evolution in intelligence. We gave a new definition to the intelligent evolving systems. The evolution of intelligent systems can be verified using the proposed MetrIntMeas metric.     

Scoring Depression on a Common Metric: A Comparison of EAP Estimation,Plausible Value Imputation,and Full Bayesian IRT Modeling

There are a growing number of item response theory (IRT) studies that calibrate different patient-reported outcome (PRO) measures, such as anxiety, depression, physical function, and pain, on common, instrument-independent metrics. In the case of depression, it has been reported that there are considerable mean score differences when scoring on a common metric from different, previously linked instruments. Ideally, those estimates should be the same. We investigated to what extent those differences are influenced by different scoring methods that take into account several levels of uncertainty, such as measurement error (through plausible value imputation) and item parameter uncertainty (through full Bayesian IRT modeling). Depression estimates from different instruments were more similar, and their corresponding confidence/credible intervals were larger when plausible value imputation or Bayesian modeling was used, compared to the direct use of expected a posteriori (EAP) estimates. Furthermore, we explored the use of Bayesian IRT models to update item parameters based on newly collected data.     

Temporal reproductions are influenced by an internal reference: Explaining the Vierordt effect

Several findings from duration perception literature suggest that when making decisions about time, participants rely on an internal reference memory for time rather than merely on the current physical stimuli. According to a recent account, such an internal reference is formed by a continuous dynamic updating process that integrates duration information from previous trials and the current trial. In the present work, we show how such a dynamic mechanism can account for the classical yet unresolved Vierordt effect, which refers to the overestimation of relatively short and the underestimation of relatively long temporal intervals. We conducted an experiment to examine this and related predictions by means of a temporal reproduction task. Specifically, participants were presented with two successive time intervals — a standard s with constant duration and a comparison c with variable duration. Instead of performing a comparison judgment, however, the participants were subsequently cued to reproduce one of the two presented stimuli. Reproductions were affected not only by the temporal position of the to-be-reproduced stimulus, but also by the stimuli presented on earlier trials. These results support the notion of a dynamically updated internal reference underlying our judgments about the time elapsed, which might also be the basis of the Vierordt effect.     

The Meno's Metaphilosophical Examples

I propose that an ill‐appreciated contrast between the examples Socrates gives Meno, to show him how he ought to philosophize, is the key to understanding the Meno. I contend that Socrates prefers his definitions of shape to his account of color because the former are concerned with what shape is, while the latter is concerned with how color comes to be. This contrast suggests that Plato intends an analogous contrast between the (properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' definition of knowledge as “true belief tied down with an account” and the (not properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' account of how knowledge comes to be, that is, the “theory of recollection.”     

Psychologue dans le champ scolaire : une pratique sous le sceau du paradoxe

Starting from an experiment she coordinated among a group of educational psychologists, the author reflects on psychological intervention programmes. Following the group's questions, she organises her reflection along three main lines: the function of the institution, the function of the reference theories, and the nature of the process involved in those programmes. As far as the first two points are concerned, the clinical psychologist's practice appears paradoxical. The first paradox is that the institution does not acknowledge him or her as a promoter of subjectivity; the second concerns the lack of articulation of the relationship with theory, i.e. psychoanalytical theory. After questioning those paradoxes, which cannot be resolved, the author shows that the specific action of clinical psychologists can have a legitimate place, providing they ponder deeply on the meaning of their intervention, and ground their reflection on transitional analysis, as it has been defined by several French authors, in reference to Winnicott: the transition period as well as the transitional area.     

Explanation and the theory of questions

In The Scientific Image B. C. van Fraassen argues that a theory of explanation ought to take the form of a theory of why-questions, and a theory of this form is what he provides. Van Fraassen's account of explanation is good, as far as it goes. In particular, van Fraassen's theory of why-questions adds considerable illumination to the problem of alternative explanations in psychodynamics. But van Fraassen's theory is incomplete because it ignores those classes of explanations that are answers not to why-questions but to how-questions. In this article I provide a unified theory of explanatory questions that comprehends both how-questions and why-questions, and I show that a question-theoretic approach to explanation can be defended independently of van Fraassen's programme of Constructive Empiricism.     

Measurement equivalence in the conduct of a global organizational survey across countries in six cultural regions

This study examined the measurement equivalence of a global organizational survey measuring six work climate factors as administered across 25 countries (N = 31,315) in all regions of the world (West Europe, East Europe, North America, Latin America, South America, Middle East, Africa and Asia‐Pacific). Across all countries, the survey instrument exhibited ‘form equivalence’ and ‘metric equivalence’, suggesting that respondents completed the survey using the same frame‐of‐reference and interpreted the rating scale intervals similarly. Schwartz's (1994, 1999, 2004) cultural value theory was then used for grouping the countries in cultural regions, and to anticipate measurement equivalence of the data from the survey within and between these regions. Results showed partial support for Schwartz's theory. The English‐speaking region was the only region where empirical evidence for ‘scalar equivalence’ was found. No support was found for the prediction that measurement equivalence would be higher among countries that are part of cultural regions with a small cultural distance than among countries that are part of cultural regions with a large cultural distance. However, the use of a common language in a particular cultural region reduced the bias present in the cross‐country comparison within that region.     

Spinoza's Thinking Substance and the Necessity of Modes

How should ‘the physical’ be defined for the purpose of formulating physicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is that physicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer‐functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson's no fundamental mentality constraint. In §2 I set out my preferred definition of ‘the physical’ and make my case that physicalism requires functionalism. In §3 I defend my proposal by attacking the leading alternative account of ‘the physical,’ the theory‐based conception. Finally, in §4 I draw on my definition, together with Jaegwon Kim's account of intertheoretic reduction, to defend the controversial view that physicalism requires a priori physicalism.     

线性时态逻辑的决策问题复杂性

不同的时态逻辑能够适应不同的推理任务。为了符合应用,关于时间的模型从离散的自然数和整数,延伸到稠密的线性实数,甚至扩展到区间代数和树代数。如果简单的时态连接词的表达力已经足够,就只需使用这些简单的时态连接词来构造的时态逻辑。在能够承担降低运算速度的风险下,我们可以为实现更强的表达力而使用更多的连接词,也可以加上度量信息或者固定点。作者近期提出了一个令人惊讶的结论:建立在实数时间上的具有足够表达力的语言和基于自然数离散时间流的传统简单算子,它们推理的计算复杂性是一样的。在这篇论文中,作者试图对建立在标准时态连接词和线性时间流的普通类上的时态逻辑中所有决策问题的计算复杂性作新的说明。尤其是,文中指出,所有标准逻辑在PSPACE中都存在决策问题。     

On the Ollivier–Poulin–Zurek Definition of Objectivity

The Ollivier–Poulin–Zurek definition of objectivity provides a philosophical basis for the environment as witness formulation of decoherence theory and hence for quantum Darwinism. It is shown that no account of the reference of the key terms in this definition can be given that does not render the definition inapplicable within quantum theory. It is argued that this is not the fault of the language used, but of the assumption that the laws of physics are independent of Hilbert-space decomposition. All evidence suggests that this latter assumption is true. If it is, decoherence cannot explain the emergence of classicality.     

Solving Wollheim's Dilemma: A Fix for the Institutional Definition of Art

Richard Wollheim threatened George Dickie's institutional definition of art with a dilemma which entailed that the theory is either redundant or incomprehensible and useless. This article modifies the definition to avoid such criticism. First, it shows that the definition's concept of the artworld is not vague when understood as a conventional system of beliefs and practices. Then, based on Gaut's cluster theory, it provides an account of reasons artworld members have to confer the status of a candidate for appreciation. An authorised member of an artworld has a good reason to confer the status on an object if it satisfies a subset of criteria respected as sufficient within this artworld. The first horn of the dilemma is averted because explaining the reasons behind conferral cannot eliminate references to the institution, and the second loses its sharpness, as accepting partial arbitrariness of the conferral does not deprive the theory of its explanatory power.     

Attachment theory and psychoanalysis Some remarks from an epistemological and from a Freudian viewpoint1

The author examines Bowlby's attachment theory and more recent versions of it from an epistemological viewpoint and subjects it to questioning on whether they are in line with central concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis. He argues that Bowlby's basic tenets regarding attachment theory, which later attachment theorists never seriously questioned, do not conform to scientifi c standards, and that psychoanalytic issues such as the dynamic unconscious, internal confl icts, interaction of drive wishes and the role of defence in establishing substitutive formations are either ignored or not treated in suffi cient depth. In the light of this, Fonagy's assertion that psychoanalytic criticism of attachment theory arose from mutual misunderstandings and ought nowadays to be seen as outdated is reversed: psychoanalytic criticism can only be regarded as outdated if either basic tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis, or attachment theory or both are misunderstood.     

Optimal and Most Exact Confidence Intervals for Person Parameters in Item Response Theory Models

The common way to calculate confidence intervals for item response theory models is to assume that the standardized maximum likelihood estimator for the person parameter θ is normally distributed. However, this approximation is often inadequate for short and medium test lengths. As a result, the coverage probabilities fall below the given level of significance in many cases; and, therefore, the corresponding intervals are no longer confidence intervals in terms of the actual definition. In the present work, confidence intervals are defined more precisely by utilizing the relationship between confidence intervals and hypothesis testing. Two approaches to confidence interval construction are explored that are optimal with respect to criteria of smallness and consistency with the standard approach.     

Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account

In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might be formulated. For example, we can claim that value is a property that provides us with reasons to choose an option that has this property. I argue that none of these four other options can ultimately be defended, and therefore the buck-passing account is the one we ought to accept as the correct one. The case for the buck-passing account becomes even stronger, when we examine the weak points of the most pressing criticism against this account thus far.     

Underdetermination and Rational Choice of Theories

The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists are reasonable in expecting one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for theory choice.

Frege's Content-Principle and Relevant Deducibility

Given the harmony principle for logical operators, compositionality ought to ensure that harmony should obtain at the level of whole contents. That is, the role of a content qua premise ought to be balanced exactly by its role as a conclusion. Frege's contextual definition of propositional content happens to exploit this balance, and one appeals to the Cut rule to show that the definition is adequate.We show here that Frege's definition remains adequate even when one relevantizes logic by abandoning an unrestricted Cut rule. The proof exploits the fact that in the relevantized logic, which abandons the unrestricted rule of Cut, any failure of the transitivity of deduction is offset by the epistemic gain involved in learning that a stronger-than-expected result holds.     

Application of Personality Theories and Counseling Strategies to Clients With Physical Disabilities

This article describes how certain relevant theoretical concepts, intervention methods, and criteria for determining therapeutic change, which are borrowed from several personality theories and counseling approaches, can be useful in counseling people with physical disabilities. The clinical utility of each discussed personality theory is explored in the context of the efforts directed at (a) gaining insight into the psychosocial impact of physical disability, (b) counseling for personal adjustment to the disability, and (c) becoming familiar with theory-specific guidelines for assessing therapeutic changes. It is argued that counselors who serve clients with disabilities ought to choose those interventions most congruent with their own theoretical orientation, academic training, work setting, and nature of the disability condition.     

Context change and retention interval can have additive, rather than interactive, effects after taste aversion extinction

Spontaneous forgetting is often attributed to retrieval failure caused by natural changes in the background context that occur over time. However, some investigators have argued that the context-change account of forgetting is paradoxical, because context-change effects themselves decrease over time. To resolve the paradox, we have suggested that organisms may merely forget the physical context as the temporal context in which it is embedded changes; this explanation accepts a fundamental similarity between time and physical context. The present experiment tested an implication of this analysis by examining the interaction between retention interval and context change in rats after a taste aversion was conditioned and then extinguished. Importantly, subjects tested at the longer (24-day) retention interval received reminder exposure to the physical contexts before testing. Under these conditions, retention interval and context change both caused relapse of the extinguished aversion (spontaneous recovery and renewal, respectively), and the strongest overall relapse was observed when the two treatments were combined. Such additivity (rather than interactivity) is consistent with a context-change account of forgetting and sets the stage for resolution of the context-forgetting paradox.     

Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How (not) to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has often been understood as a theory that concerns itself first and foremost with the rightness of actions; but many other things (e.g., moral rules, motives, laws, etc.) are also properly subject to moral evaluation, and utilitarians have long understood that the theory must be able to provide an account of these as well. In a landmark article from 1976, Robert Adams argues that traditional act utilitarianism faces a particular problem in this regard. He argues that a on a sensible utilitarian account of the rightness of an agent’s motives, right motives will sometimes conflict with right actions, leaving the theory internally incoherent. The puzzle Adams raises has received a good deal of attention but few proposed solutions. Fred Feldman, however, has offered a solution that seems to be gaining adherents. In this paper I argue that Feldman’s approach cannot succeed. At bottom, it relies on a version of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’—and subsequently an account of an agent’s alternatives—that is far too restrictive to be plausible. Despite the failure of this solution, however, I argue that the conflict Adams develops is not as theoretically troubling as he suggests. While traditional act utilitarianism may fail for other reasons, it will not fail due to the conflict between acts and motives.