论文化研究的三大渊源与三条路径

本组文章为"文化哲学视野下的符号--从卡西尔出发"研讨会会议论文.在本组文章中,各位作者就符号文化哲学以及卡西尔哲学的特征及贡献进行了探讨.邴正讨论了现代文化研究的三大渊源和三条路径,陆杰荣讨论了文化哲学的现实功能,石福祁讨论了卡西尔符号哲学的得失,霍桂桓讨论了卡西尔在文化哲学研究中的地位,邹广文对卡西尔<语言与神话>在文化哲学中的影响,李鹏程对卡西尔符号哲学的哲学史意义进行了分析.     

Three Dogmas of Normativity

In this article, I identify and critically examine 3 dogmas of normativity that support a commonly accepted ‘Passivist View' of rational agency. I raise some questions about these dogmas, suggest what we should believe in their place, and moot an alternative ‘Activist View' of what it is to be a rational agent that grows out of rejection of the 3 dogmas. Underwriting the dogmas and the Passivist View, I suggest, is a deeply held but mistaken assumption that the normative domain is fundamentally akin to the nonnormative domain. Once we allow that the normative may be fundamentally unlike the nonnormative in certain key ways, a shift in our thinking about what it is to be rational becomes possible. I end by considering some implications of this paradigm shift in rationality from the passive to the active for various applied matters.     

Three Views of Otherness

In this article, I retrace a development in psychoanalytic conceptions of the experience of otherness from narcissistic loss to enjoyment of difference and argue that the latter conception of otherness in terms of difference involves a subtle but important ambiguity. In one sense, difference remains compatible with the objectification of the other; I therefore propose that the experience of otherness is an experience of the freedom of the other, which is not compatible with objectification. And I show how certain basic affective interpersonal attitudes (such as feeling jealous or feeling self-conscious) presuppose an experience of others as free.     

Three kinds of reliabilism

Abstract

The distinction between acting and suffering underlies any theory of agency. Among contemporary writers, Fred Dretske is one of the few who has attempted to explicate this distinction without restricting the notion of action to intentional action alone. Aristotle also developed a global account of agency, one which is deeper and more detailed than Dretske's, and it is to Aristotle's account (with some modifications) that the bulk of this paper is devoted. Dretske's sketchier theory faces at least two ground-level problems. It is shown in the course of the paper how these can be handled by the Aristotelian account, in a way which is friendly to Dretske's approach.     

Three components of individualism

In this article, following an assumption that individualism and collectivism are separate factors, we have further established that three central components of individualism can be distinguished. In the first part of the article we examined whether the three proposed components of individualism—autonomy, mature self‐responsibility, and uniqueness—can be distinguished from each other in one cultural context, Estonia. A new scale was developed to measure the three aspects of individualism which demonstrated both the reasonable internal‐consistency reliability as well as convergent and divergent validity with several other measures of individualism and collectivism and related constructs. In the second part of the article we studied whether individualism generalizes across specific contexts or domains of social relationships, namely, across relations with family and close others; friends and peers; state and nation. The results of the three‐mode principal component analysis showed that the individualistic tendencies of the respondents did not differ much while measured toward the three types of social relation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Three dimensions of expertise

Psychologists and philosophers tend to treat expertise as a property of special individuals. These are individuals who have devoted much more time than the general population to the acquisition of their specific expertises. They are often said to pass through stages as they move toward becoming experts, for example, passing from an early stage, in which they follow self-conscious rules, to an expert stage in which skills are executed unconsciously. This approach is ‘one-dimensional’. Here, two extra dimensions are added. They are drawn from the programme known as Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) and its ‘Periodic Table of Expertises’. SEE, which is sociological, and/or Wittgensteinian, in inspiration, takes expertise to be the property of groups; there are ‘domains’ of expertise. Under SEE, level of expertise grows with embedding in the society of domain experts; the key is the transmission of domain-specific tacit knowledge. Thus, one extra dimension is degree of exposure to tacit knowledge. Under SEE, domains can be big or small so there can be ‘ubiquitous tacit knowledge’, such as natural-language-speaking or other elements of general social behaviour, which belong to every member of a society. The second extra dimension is, therefore, ‘esotericity’. The resulting three-dimensional ‘expertise-space’ can be explored in a number of ways which reveal the narrowness of the analysis and the mistakes that have been made under the one-dimensional model.