BRONFENBRENNER'S MORAL DILEMMAS IN BRITAIN: CHILDREN,THEIR PEERS AND THEIR PARENTS

Le test des dilemmes moraux d'Urie Bronfenbrenner met les enfants en ptésence d'un certain nombre de situations naturelles dans lesquelles le choix des réponses possibles représente un conflit entre les normes de conduite qui sont approuvées par les adultes, altruistes et “correctes” et les normes de conduite qui relèvent de L'intérêt personnel ou de L'affiliation et qui sont “incorrectes”. Les sujets répondent au test dans trois conditions: une condition de base ou neutre, dans laquelle on leur dit que seuls les expérimentateurs auront connaissance de leurs réponses, et deux conditions expérimentales dans lesquelles on leur dit que les résultats seront portés à la connaissance de leurs parents ou de leurs camarades de classe. Cette méthode permet d'estimer dans une certaine mesure à quel niveau se situent les enfants dans le domaine “moral” ainsi que L'influence relative qu'exercent la pression des pairs ou celle des adultes dans les processus de socialisation, et la direction de cette influence. Les données recueillies en URSS et aux Etats-Unis ont montré que les deux types de pressions extérieures entrent en conflit aux Etats-Unis, mais qu'il existe en URSS un accord entre les normes. Devereux et Bronfenbrenner ont suggéré L'idée qu'en Grande-Bretagne le niveau des normes de conduite approuvées par les adultes était moindre et la pression des pairs particulièrement forte et source de situations conflictuelles. Deux cent soixante-quatorze enfants anglais de douze ans, choisis dans un large éventail d'écoles, ont subi les tests. Les résultats ont été analysés dans une perspective de comparaison inter-nation d'une part et de comparaisons entre les différents types d'écoles d'autre part. i. Les résultats ne confirment pas L'hypothése selon laquelle la conduite serait en général moins influencée par les adultes; 2. La comparaison entre type de pressions sociales confirme que les enfants britanniques ont en commun une “culture de pairs”, plutôt autonome et qu'ils ne répondent pas à la pression des adultes d'une manière simple et prévisible.     

THE MYSTIQUE OF MORAL DILEMMAS

The paper is concerned with the question of the existence of moral dilemmas, conceived of as situations involving a subject in a conflict of non‐overridden moral obligations. I reject some of the presuppositions underlying discussions of this question and argue that certain morally relevant choices cannot be evaluated in relation to an all‐things‐considered moral obligation as permissible or impermissible, right or wrong. In arguing for the inadequacy of our ordinary moral predicates for fully capturing the nature of such choices, I argue that they are, in certain respects, inexpressible.     

ESOTERIC CONFUCIANISM,MORAL DILEMMAS,AND FILIAL PIETY

Two controversial cases in Confucian literature present the demands of filial piety as conflicting with those of impartial justice. Let us call them the Case of Concealment (Analects 18.13) and the Case of Evasion (Mencius 7A53). A dogmatic reading of the texts indicates that both Confucius and Mencius give more weight to filial piety than to justice. This essay, however, provides an alternative reading of the cases: the liberal reading. I argue that the Confucian teachers used the cases as moral dilemmas that force Confucian students to learn how to use a cluster of Confucian virtues, including practical wisdom, discretion, and straight determination, under difficult circumstances. The liberal reading views these moral dilemmas as rhetorical tools; they guide Confucian students in meditative exercises and ultimately transform students’ mode of seeing and being.     

AUGUSTINE ON MORAL CONSCIENCE

There are widely differing accounts of Augustine's place in the early history of the notion of conscience. While some regard his contribution as groundbreaking, others consider that he only stressed interiority more than earlier authors. Starting with a contrast with Jerome, the present article aims at clarifying Augustine's specific contribution and the place of conscience in his moral thought.     

SLOTE ON RATIONAL DILEMMAS AND RATIONAL SUPEREROGATION

The so-called optimising conception of rationality includes (amongst other things) the following two claims: (i) that it is irrational to choose an option if you know there is a better one, and (ii) there are no situations in which an agent, through no practical fault of her own, cannot avoid acting irrationally. As part of his ongoing attempt to explain why we need to go beyond the optimising conception, Michael Slote discusses a number of examples in which it seems that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent. According to Slote, these situations seem to involve the existence of rational supererogation (a denial of (i)), or rational dilemmas (a denial of (ii)). The purpose of this paper is to examine Slote's arguments for these claims, and to propose an alternative solution to the problem he presents.     

GERT ON UNRESOLVABLE MORAL DEBATES

Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that, while the moral system contains a procedure for resolving most moral disagreements, it does not allow for such resolution in all cases. For example, it does not allow for the resolution of disputes about whether animals and human fetuses should be included within the scope of those to whom the moral rules apply. I agree with Gert that not all moral debates can be resolved, but I believe that Gert does not use all the argumentative resources available to philosophers to resolve them. I argue that considerations outside the moral system proper can be used to provide argumentative support favoring some positions over their rivals in moral controversies that Gert regards as intractable. I illustrate this with reference to the abortion debate. I also argue that reaching such conclusions about the superiority of one position over rivals need not result in moral arrogance.