TIME AND PLACE FOR PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Writing in continuous gratitude to Gary Matthews's wonderful project of rescuing childhood from its disregard, not to say banishment, in professional philosophy, I relate here certain moments in his considerations of early childhood to moments in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which opens with a scene of childhood from Augustine's Confessions, and also to moments in later stages of childhood (as Matthews also significantly indicates) and, beyond that, to adolescent crises and to what I have called philosophy as “the education of grown‐ups.” I raise the issue of whether we are to see the “odd” questions of early childhood as proto‐science, which will eventually graduate into better science, or as proto‐philosophy, which will be continuously elaborated in philosophical investigation. This raises the question of whether philosophy is to be regarded, early or late, as inseparable from science or, as the later Wittgenstein urges, autonomous with respect to science's glamorous advances.     

GUIDELINES FOR THEORIZING ABOUT REALIZATION

Realization can be roughly understood as a kind of role‐playing, a relationship between a property that plays a role and a property characterized by that role. This rough sketch previously received only moderate elaboration; recently, however, several substantive theories of realization have been proposed. But are there any general constraints on a theory of realization? What is a theory of realization supposed to accomplish? I first argue that a view of realization is viable, in part, to the extent that physical realization under that view explains or accounts for why instances of realized properties are necessitated by how things are physically in a modally strong sense. In this sense, I claim that physical realization should explain physical supervenience. I then call into question two alternative desiderata and raise a challenge for attempts to explicate realization in terms of isomorphism or analogy. Finally, I explain how a causal‐functional account of realization, as well as less demanding accounts, can meet the preferred desideratum.     

简易反应时测定装置

在心理学中經常应用測定反应时的方法作为心理活动的一項指标。卫生学界也常用它作为观察人体疲劳的指标之一。反应时是指从給予刺激到发生反应为止的潛伏时間。这一段时間极为短暫,因此测定反应吋的計时装置必須十分精确。 机械启动的計时器常因其慣性而影响了准确性;較为精密的計时器又甚昂貴。为了滿足教学工作的需要,根据帕尔費諾夫的电解微时測定的原理,試制了一种簡易的反应时测定装置。在使用中觉得它計时准确,极易装配,今将其結构作簡要介紹。     

FLUCTUATIONS IN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR ELEMENTARY DECISIONS

Abstract— The nature of reaction time variability is analyzed in a suite of four experiments involving tasks, methodologies, and types of perceptual judgment commonly encountered in cognitive psychology In every case, a substantial fraction of the trial-by-trial variability in reaction time latency is shown to be well described by a particular type of fluctuation known as l/f noise. These results suggest that the time it takes to make and register a speeded decision reflects a kind of dynamic complexity that is seen in natural systems that self-organize at the boundary between order and chaos.     

时间记忆的理论与实验范型

从时距、时点和参照时间三个方面评述了７０年代至今所提出的９种时间记忆理论,分析了时间记忆实验在操作任务、实验维度和实验指标上的范型,进而提出了分段综合的研究构想。     

INDEFENSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND FOR LOCAL REDUCTIONISM ABOUT TESTIMONY

Local reductionism purports to defend a middle ground in the debate about the epistemic status of testimony-based beliefs. It does so by acknowledging the practical ineliminability of testimony as a source of knowledge, while insisting that such an acknowledgment need not entail a default-acceptance view, according to which there exists an irreducible warrant for accepting testimony. The present paper argues that local reductionism is unsuccessful in its attempt to steer a middle path between reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimonial justification. In particular, it challenges local reductionism 'from within', without appealing to anti-reductionist intuitions. By offering novel arguments to the effect that local reductionism fails by its own standards, the present paper considerably strengthens the case against this version of reductionism. Local reductionism, it is argued, fails for three main reasons. First, it cannot account for the rationality of testimonial rejection in paradigmatic cases, even though the possibility of rational rejection is thought to be of central justificatory importance. Second, it does not provide a sufficiently distinct non-testimonial basis to which testimonial justification can be successfully reduced. Finally, local reductionism is shown to be an intrinsically unstable position, in danger of collapsing into full-fledged 'credulism' of the kind historically associated with Thomas Reid.     

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEWING BOOKS

Abstract: The quality of peer‐reviewed journals is vulnerable to the absence of declared standards for book reviews. Reviewers should agree to several simple rules before undertaking to review books and while writing them. Sensitivity to an author's aims is one requirement; familiarity with an author's previous and relevant publications is another. Critical judgment is always appropriate, but it can be set apart from an account of the ideas reviewed.