共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Moral dilemmas and moral rules 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits. 相似文献
2.
Philosophical Studies - This paper introduces and defends a new position regarding the question of whether it is possible to have conflicting moral obligations. In doing so, it focuses on what I... 相似文献
3.
Rosalind Hursthouse 《Argumentation》1995,9(4):617-632
The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on. 相似文献
4.
Peter Vallentyne 《Erkenntnis》1989,30(3):301-318
In recent years the question of whether moral dilemmas are conceptually possible has received a fair amount of attention. In arguing for or against the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas authors have been almost exclusively concerned with obligation dilemmas, i.e., situations in which more than one action is obligatory. Almost no one has been concerned with prohibition dilemmas, i.e., situations in which no feasible actions is permissible. I argue that the two types of dilemmas are distinct, and that a much stronger case can be made against the conceptual possibility of obligation dilemmas than against the conceptual possibility of prohibition dilemmas. 相似文献
5.
Seay G 《Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal》2002,12(3):279-298
Moral-theory skepticism is not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficulty cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that will provide guidance in action, and, so, seems not to succeed as a fully coherent account of moral reasoning. 相似文献
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
John F. Horty 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1994,23(1):35-65
Conclusion From a philosophical standpoint, the work presented here is based on van Fraassen [26]. The bulk of that paper is organized around a series of arguments against the assumption, built into standard deontic logic, that moral dilemmas are impossible; and van Fraassen only briefly sketches his alternative approach. His paper ends with the conclusion that the problem of possibly irresolvable moral conflict reveals serious flaws in the philosophical and semantic foundations of orthodox deontic logic, but also suggests a rich set of new problems and methods for such logic. My goal has been to suggest that some of these methods might be found in current research on nonmonotonic reasoning, and that some of the problems may have been confronted there as well.I have shown that nonmonotonic logics provide a natural framework for reasoning about moral dilemmas, perhaps even more useful than the ordinary modal framework, and that the issues surrounding the treatment of exceptional information within these logics run parallel to some of the problems posed by conditional oughts. However, there is also another way in which deontic logic might benefit from a connection to nonmonotonic reasoning. A familiar criticism among ethicists of work in deontic logic is that it is too abstract, and too far removed from the kind of problems confronted by real agents in moral deliberation. It must be said that similar criticisms of abstraction and irrelevance are often lodged against work in nonmonotonic reasoning by more practically minded researchers in artificial intelligence; but here, at least, the criticisms are taken seriously. Nonmonotonic logic aims at a qualitative account of commonsense reasoning, which can be used to relate planning and action to defeasible goals and beliefs; and at least some of the theories developed in this area have been tested in realistic situations. By linking the subject of deontic logic to this research, it may be possible also to relate the idealized study of moral reasoning typical of the field to a more robust treatment of practical deliberation. 相似文献
11.
Dr. Caroline Whitbeck 《Science and engineering ethics》1995,1(3):299-308
In this paper I outline an “agent-centered” approach to learning ethics. The approach is “agent-centered” in that its central
aim is to prepare students toact wisely and responsibly when faced with moral problems. The methods characteristic of this approach are suitable for integrating
material on professional and research ethics into technical courses, as well as for free-standing ethics courses.
The analogy I draw between ethical problems and design problems clarifies the character of ethical problems as they are experienced
by those who must respond to them. It exposes the mistake, common in ethics teaching, of misrepresenting moral problems as
multiple-choice problems, especially in the form of ‘dilemmas’, that is, a forced choice between two unacceptable alternatives.
Furthermore, I clarify the importance for responsible practice of recognizing any ambiguity in the problem situation.
To foster in students the skills they need, teaching examples should preserve the open-ended, multiply-constrained, and ambiguous
character of problem situations as experienced by the agent. I give guidelines for constructing open-ended scenarios that
present moral problems much as an agent would experience them — guidelines which strongly influenced the construction of ‘cases’
in the latest edition of “On Being a Scientist” — and I discuss how to present historical cases and cases from the instructor’s
own experience to best foster agent-centered learning.
This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the AAAS Seminar “Teaching
Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993. 相似文献
12.
Commonsense moral thinking holds that people have doxastic, contemplative, and expressive duties, that is, duties to or not to believe, seriously consider, and express certain ideas. This paper argues that moral and political philosophers face a high risk of violating any such duties, both because of the sensitivity and difficult of the subject matter, and because of various pernicious biases and influences philosophers face. We argue this leads to a dilemma, which we will not try to solve. Either philosophers should reduce their risk by avoiding sensitive issues where they are likely to violate such duties or, for one reason or another, philosophers are to some degree exempt from such duties when doing their work. Either horn of the dilemma, we argue, has unpalatable implications. 相似文献
13.
14.
15.
Moral dilemmas, by definition, demand trade-offs between competing moral goods (e.g., causing one harm to prevent another). Although moral dilemmas have served as a methodological pillar for moral psychology, surprisingly little research has explored how individual differences in moral values influence responses to dilemmatic trade-offs. In a cross-sectional study (N = 307), we tested competing claims regarding the relationship between the endorsement of foundational moral values and responses to sacrificial dilemmas, in which one judges the moral acceptability of causing fatal harm to one person to save multiple others. Inconsistent with Moral Dyad Theory, our results did not support the prediction that Harm concerns would be the unequivocally most important predictor of sacrifice endorsement. Consistent with Moral Foundations Theory, however, multiple moral values are predictive of sacrifice judgments: Harm and Purity negatively predict, and Ingroup positively predicts, endorsement of harmful action in service of saving lives, with Harm and Purity explaining similar amounts of unique variance. The present study demonstrates the utility of pluralistic accounts of morality, even in moral situations in which harm is central. 相似文献
16.
17.
18.
Luke Robinson 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):289-309
What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena “falling within their scope,” support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary connections” between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral laws, or “lawlike” moral generalizations. 相似文献
19.
Frederik Kaufman 《Erkenntnis》1992,36(1):103-112
For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment. 相似文献
20.
John J. Drummond 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(1):35-49
This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense
(drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology
cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds
by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it
notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes
with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “phenomenology” serves to provide a more precise sense of what
we might mean by “moral phenomenology.”
相似文献
John J. DrummondEmail: |