The role of action-initiation in young children's causal explanations of action

Four studies examined preschoolers' use of the cue of action initiation to infer another's desired goal. In two studies, children watched as one protagonist self-initiated movement to a target while a second person was propelled there by an external force. Older 3-year-olds (M = 3;10) and 5-year-olds consistently judged only the self-initiated actor's movement as desire based. In the second study, however, younger 3-year-olds (M = 3;3 also participated, and they were equally likely to say that either movement was goal directed, even when the passive mover appeared to resist movement toward the goal. A third study, featuring only one protagonist, yielded no improvement among younger 3-year-olds. A fourth study emphasizing the single protagonist's persistence in approaching a target via repeated self-initiated movements revealed some improvement among younger 3-year-olds; older 3-year-olds were near ceiling performance. Altogether, these results suggest that differences in action initiation play an increasingly important role in 3-year-olds' mentalistic explanations of action. This development may be related to other critical changes occurring in 3-year-olds' developing theory of mind.     

Phoneme Awareness in Children: A Function of Sonority

This study tested the hypothesis that the sonority of phonemes (a sound's relative loudness compared to other sounds with the same length, stress, and pitch) influences children's segmentation of syllable constituents. Two groups of children, first graders and preschoolers, were assessed for their awareness of phonemes in coda and onset positions, respectively, using different phoneme segmentation tasks. Although the trends for the first graders were more robust than the trends for the preschoolers, phoneme segmentation in the two groups correlated with the sonority levels of phonemes, regardless of phoneme position or task. These results, consistent with prior studies of adults, suggest that perceptual properties, such as sonority levels, greatly influence the development of phoneme awareness.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children’s explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N = 24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant “explanation advantage” for children’s reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Visual perspective taking by dogs (Canis familiaris) in a Guesser–Knower task: evidence for a canine theory of mind?

We tested domestic dogs (N = 16) in a Guesser–Knower task in which they chose between possible locations for hidden food indicated by human informants. In four experiments, the perceptual access of the Guesser and Knower to the hidden food baiting was manipulated. When informants had differing perceptual access to the baiting, dogs preferred the location indicated by the Knower from the start of testing (Experiment 1), even when baiting was done by a third experimenter (Experiments 2–3). However, when there was no difference in perceptual access and both informants either knew or did not know the food location, dogs had no preference between the informants (Experiment 4). Controls ruled out alternative explanations in terms of associative learning, unintentional and olfactory cues. Analysis of individual data showed no significant heterogeneity across dogs, and results were not correlated with age or sex. Dogs’ performances were superior to those of nonhuman primates in previous studies. Although a mentalistic explanation is not required, results add to evidence that dogs have a remarkable sensitivity to cues related to humans’ attentional state, which enables them to respond as if they had a functional theory of mind in the Guesser–Knower task with human informants.     

Children's perceptual organisation of hierarchical visual patterns

Abstract

Children's perceptual organisation of hierarchical patterns was investigated in two experiments through similarity judgements. Previous studies with adults demonstrated that the perceptual relations between the global configuration and the local elements of such patterns depend critically on the number of elements embedded in the pattern: Patterns composed of a few, relatively large elements are perceived in terms of global form and figural parts, whereas patterns composed of many relatively small elements are perceived in terms of global form and texture. In Experiment 1 children at three levels of age (preschoolers, first and third graders) were presented with a standard figure and two comparison figures—a proportional and an un proportional enlargement of the standard. The number of elements in the standard figure was varied. When the number of elements was small, children at all age levels concerned judged the proportional enlargement which preserves the global and local forms as well as the relationship between them as more similar. When the number of elements in the standard figure increased, children switched their preference to the un proportional enlargement which preserves both the global form and the textural properties of the standard figure. When the global configuration and the local elements were pitted against each other (Experiment 2), and the number of elements was rather large, preschoolers and third graders judged the comparison figure having the same global configuration as the standard but composed of different elements as more similar to the standard than the comparison figure having the same elements arranged in a different configuration. Overall, these results are similar to the ones obtained with adults: As far as the perceptual organisation of hierarchical patterns changes as a function of the number of elements for the adult perceiver, it changes also for the young child. These results do not support the hypothesis that young children perceive complex visual stimuli as undifferentiated wholes, as some develop mental researchers have proposed. Furthermore, the finding that for children, as for adults, the elements do not function perceptually as parts when the number of elements is large, implies that fewclement patterns are better candidates for testing hypotheses about the relative priority of wholes and parts across development.     

Children's understanding of the transmission of genetic disorders and contagious illnesses

The authors conducted 4 studies suggesting that children attribute different modes of transmission to genetic disorders and contagious illnesses. Study 1 presented preschoolers through 5th graders and adults with "switched-at-birth" scenarios for various disorders. Study 2 presented preschoolers with the same disorders but used contagion links in a contagion context. Studies 3 and 4 presented preschoolers and adults with novel (fictitious) illnesses to determine which cues participants would use to differentiate the modes of transmission. In the presence of kinship cues, children distinguished genetic disorders from contagious illnesses, but in the presence of contagion cues, preschoolers selectively applied contagious links primarily to contagious illnesses. With novel illnesses, preschoolers and adults inferred that permanent illnesses were more likely to be transmitted by birth parents than by contagion. These results suggest that by the preschool years, children recognize that not all disorders are transmitted exclusively through germ contagion.     

The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis

In this paper we shall argue that mentalistic action explanations, which form an essential component of a mature theory of mind, are conceptually and developmentally derived from an earlier and purely teleological interpretational system present in infancy. First we summarize our evidence demonstrating teleological action explanations in one-year-olds. Then we shall briefly contrast the structure of teleological vs. causal mentalistic action explanations and outline four logical possibilities concerning the nature of the developmental relationship between them. We shall argue for the view that causal mentalistic action explanations are constructed as useful theoretical extensions of the earlier, purely teleological, nonmentalistic interpretational stance.     

True or false: do 5-year-olds understand belief?

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children's explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N=24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant "explanation advantage" for children's reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Do children think that inheritance determines height and weight?

Three studies were conducted to investigate if children think that physical growth is determined by inheritance. All three studies employed the “switched‐at‐birth” task. Study 1 investigated if children and adults thought that height and weight were determined by parentage. Study 2 examined preschoolers and elementary school children's and adults' understanding of the role of parentage and nutrition in determining weight. Study 2a examined children's and adults' understanding of the role of parentage and nutrition in determining height. Results indicate that overall, preschoolers and third graders have more of an inheritance bias for height than for weight. However, when nutrition was introduced, apart from third graders, all other grades reasoned that nutrition played a greater role in determining weight. Overall, these results indicate that even young children have a rudimentary but differentiated theory of the role of inheritance in determining height and weight.

Highlights

• Participants were presented with switched‐at‐birth tasks to determine if they thought that parentage and/or nutrition influences height and weight.
• Young children viewed height as determined more by parentage than weight, suggesting that they have a differentiated and autonomous theory for the determination of height.

     

Inhibition of return can be associated with object identity but not with object category

In this study, pre-schoolers and a comparison sample of fifth graders and high school students were presented with prediction tasks that varied by content of the base rate information (perceptual vs semantic) either presented alone (simple task) or accompanied by individuating data (complex task). Base rate choices, confidence scores, and explanations of the choices were registered. It is assumed that the presence of content effects in the processing of the base rates is in favour of a mental model account. Results indicated that pre-schoolers are able to build one-dimensional models with perceptual base rates in simple tasks. Fifth graders and high school students are able to build one-dimensional models with both types of content in simple tasks, as well as two-dimensional models in complex tasks. There is a local facilitation effect of semantic contents for fifth graders that disappears for high-school students. Consistency between subjects' choices, confidence scores and rationales depends on the subjects' grade, the number of sources involved, and the base rate content. Developmental trends are discussed in the light of previous research within formal, heuristic, and mental model approaches.     

Developmental trends in the understanding of perceptual adaptation

In the first of three studies, kindergartners, third graders, and sixth graders were questioned to determine whether they comprehend five types of perceptual adaptation or contrast effects. The results indicated little consistency among kindergartners, but there were strong improvements by the third-grade level, and at the sixth-grade level almost all of the children were showing perfect performance, demonstrating comprehension of the five forms of perceptual adaptation. In the second and third studies, children and adults were placed in a situation in which adaptation to temperature and weight could occur, and they were asked to predict subsequent perceptions. Correct performance in these studies generally occurred at later ages than in Study 1 with even college students showing incorrect performance in some cases. However, the age trends shifted quite markedly depending upon the nature and structure of the task. The results were consistent with a theory stressing the relation of early formed schemas in the form of memory traces of experiences to later appearing and more abstract schemas. The results show the importance of studying older children when considering developing theories of mind.     

Putting motion in emotion: Do dynamic presentations increase preschooler's recognition of emotion?

In prior research, preschoolers were surprisingly poor at naming the emotion purportedly signaled by prototypical facial expressions—when shown as static images. To determine whether this poor performance is due to the use of static stimuli, rather than dynamic, we presented preschoolers (3-5 years) with facial expressions as either static images or dynamic audiovisual clips. Dynamic clips presented face alone (Study 1, N = 48) or face, body movement, and vocal intonation (Study 2, N = 72). Contrary to expectations, dynamic presentation did not increase children's naming of the emotion in either study and decreased it in Study 1.     

The Limits of Attention for Visual Perception and Action in Aging

ABSTRACT

This study aimed to investigate whether aging results in an increased attentional blink effect in older adults as compared to young adults. A rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm was employed in which participants were asked to identify two targets (dual-task condition) presented in rapid succession. These targets were separated by various intervals in a stream of stimuli. The performance for identifying the second target was normally diminished as compared to identification of a single-task target. Various combinations of tasks, such as two perceptual tasks or one perceptual and one action task, as well as different types of pointing action, such as pointing to a displaced target, pointing to a stationary target or pointing to a disappeared target, were manipulated in this study to see if aging may further impact these variables. The results of this study showed that in young adults, successful identification of the first target interfered with identifying the second target, as well as the initiation time (action planning) of pointing to the second target. However, identification of the first target did not interfere with pointing movement time and pointing accuracy, even when the target was displaced, which required online control of action. Conversely, for older adults, successful central identification not only interfered with identifying the second target and with the pointing initiation time, but also interfered with pointing movement time for a displaced target. This suggests that older adults seem to be unable to concurrently identify the first target and correct their already-initiated pointing movement compared to young adults.     

Young children's understanding of diversity in pretense

Four studies probed preschoolers' understanding of diversity in the domain of pretense. In Study 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown video skits in which two characters pretended different things with the same object. To assess preschoolers understanding that the mind is involved in pretense, thought bubbles were superimposed over the actors' heads. Results of this study indicated that both 3- and 4-year-olds appreciate the potential for diversity in pretense, and understand pretense to be a mental activity. Results of Study 2 replicate Study 1, and argue against alternative explanations for participants' good performance in that study. Studies 3 and 4 compared the unique contributions made by dialogs and thought bubbles and revealed that 3-year-olds relied more on actors' mental contents than on their actions or dialogs when reasoning about pretense. Results of the studies are discussed in terms of children's developing understanding of the subjective and mental aspects of pretense, and the implications of this understanding for the development of their understanding of mind more generally.     

Reward and number of choices in children's probability learning: An attempt to reconcile conflicting findings

Five event schedules (75:0, 75:25, 75:0:0, 72:25:0, 75:12.5:12.5) were examined in a size discrimination task with penny rewards and plastic token markers. The subjects were 100 fourth graders (mean age = 9.4 years) and 100 undergraduates of both sexes. Whether or not the event probabilities summed to unity proved to be a more important determiner of terminal performance than the number of response alternatives in the task (p < .01). Females maximized more than males (p < .001) and college students more than fourth graders (p < .001). Greater maximization was exhibited by fourth graders in the reward condition (p < .01). These reward effects appeared to be more consistent with a detrimental-effects-of-reward interpretation than either utility or expectancy interpretations.     

Developing domain-specific causal-explanatory frameworks: the role of insides and immanence

Two studies investigate children's knowledge of internal parts and their endorsement of immanent causes for the behaviors of living and non-living things. Study 1, involving 48 preschoolers, showed that domain-specific knowledge of internal parts develops between ages 3 and 4. Study 2 included 43 4-year-olds, 30 8-year-olds, and 35 adults and showed that preschoolers do not endorse these internal parts as causally responsible for familiar biological events (e.g., movement, growth). Like adults and older children, however, preschoolers endorse an abstract cause, “its own energy,” for animals but not for machines. The results suggest that children recognize domain-specific internal parts as early as age 4 but that their causal attributions are not yet anchored in a detailed biological theory. Findings are discussed in terms of theory change and an essentialist assumption.     

“I just talk with my heart”: the mind–body problem,linguistic input,and the acquisition of folk psychological beliefs

This study adds to the literature addressing the input preschool children receive regarding mental state language by systematically investigating input that is metaphoric in nature. An analysis of the frequency of five body-part terms in adult speech and in storybooks directed to children reveals that the term heart is regularly used in figurative expressions to reflect a variety of emotions, both positive (e.g., love, kindness) and negative (e.g., hatred, sadness), especially in storybook text. Other salient body-part terms (i.e., brain, eye, foot, stomach) are used metaphorically much less frequently in speech or stories directed to preschoolers. The role of this input for children’s acquisition of mentalistic language and for their emerging theories of psychology and biology is discussed.