走向模型论的模态逻辑

增加特定的基数量词,扩张一阶语言,就可以导致实质性地增强语言的表达能力,这样许多超出一阶逻辑范围的数学概念就能得到处理。由于在模型的层次上基本模态逻辑可以看作一阶逻辑的互模拟不变片断,显然它不能处理这些数学概念。因此,增加说明后继状态类上基数概念的模态词,原则上我们就能以模态的方式处理所有基数。我们把讨论各种模型论逻辑的方式转移到模态方面。     

因果模型构建的特点和新思路

因果模型构建作为心理学研究的一项中心任务,主要包括因果关系理论模型的构建和验证、因果关系数据模型的构建和验证,理论模型和数据模型之间进行匹配的因果关系推论过程,文章讨论了因果模型构建的基本条件。因果模型构建时所面临的问题及解决的策略,包括如何确定因果模型的类型,如何在不同层次进行建模、如何进行因果模型的验证。另外,文章还讨论了一种因果建模的新思路及发展趋势。     

因果影响与函数式依赖:从逻辑的视角分析

近年来,关于如何刻画系统中变量间的相互依赖和相互影响在计算机以及哲学研究中激起了广泛讨论。其中非常经典的工作包括Pearl、Gales以及Halpern等逻辑学家和计算机科学家提出的因果模型和基于因果模型的因果逻辑。而最新Baltag与van Benthem的工作又提出了通过函数式依赖这一概念分析变量间影响的模型。本文将介绍并探讨这两种路径之间的关系,并且提出,在对Halpern等人的因果模型和逻辑做认知方面的扩充之后,我们能在这两种路径中找到更多共通之处。     

观察因果学习和自主探索对学前儿童因果推理的影响

本研究采取单因素完全随机实验设计,以94名学前末期儿童(66-74月龄)为被试,在控制证据顺序的条件下探究观察因果学习结果和自主探索结果对儿童因果推理的影响,结果发现:(1)在只获得观察学习结果或自主探索结果一种证据条件下,绝大多数儿童依据所获证据推断因果关系;(2)在获得观察学习结果和自主探索结果两种证据条件下,儿童能综合两类证据推断因果关系,其中自主探索结果对儿童因果推理的影响力大于观察学习结果。     

高职生因果定向与学业表现的关系

为了考察高职生因果定向的特点及因果定向与学生学业表现(学业成绩和专业技能)的关系。该研究以修订的一般因果定向量表为工具,在济南和淄博的三所高职抽取505名学生作为被试进行调查。结果发现:1)修订后的一般因果定向量表具有良好的信效度;2)高职生在因果定向的三个维度上得分差异显著,由高到低依次为自主定向、控制定向和非个人定向;3)自主定向显著正向预测学业表现,控制定向显著负向预测学业表现,而非个人定向对学业表现的预测作用不显著。我国高职生与国外被试的因果定向特点基本一致,说明因果定向具有一定的文化普适性。同时,不同因果定向对学业表现具有不同的预测作用,教育者有必要对学生进行因果定向的教育和引导。     

关于pCI与因果判断的实验研究

本研究通过三个实验,检验了pCI公式对人类因果判断预测的准确性。实验结果发现,被试的判断与pCI的预测趋势基本一致,但（a＋d）／n的预测似乎更加准确;被试的判断较pCI而言波动较小,且可能在开始判断时需要一段时间形成自己的判断标准或方法,之后的判断与精密的数学计算有共同之处;不同个体判断方式有比较大的差异,但是仍能归为一些类型。     

有限模型下的模态概率逻辑

模态逻辑语义学是经典逻辑语义学的一个扩张,对"可能"、"必然"等词进行了刻画,而概率从某个角度来说是对"可能"的更加精确的表示。本文试图在模态逻辑语义学的基础之上,形式化地刻画如下直观思想:每一个在某一世界上有一定概率发生的事件都一定会在其可通达的某个(或者某些)可能世界上发生。     

急性心肌梗死发病年轻化的因果分析

越来越多的中青年人因急性心肌梗死住院甚至猝死,其发病具有原因和结果的必然联系。过劳、不良生活习惯、吸烟、大量饮酒等原因都会使冠状动脉内斑块形成或冠状动脉痉挛而诱发急性心肌梗死。患者及医务工作者都应针对病因及发病机制积极治疗并有效预防,从而提高全民的心血管健康水平。     

关于语境的一个逻辑模型

本文从对一元价值谓词“好”、“坏”和二元价值谓词“更好”之间的关系出发,首先回顾了偏好逻辑中用二元价值谓词定义一元谓词的各种方案。然后,文章介绍了vanBenthem利用语境从一元谓词定义二元谓词的工作。文章着重分析了在这一背景下语境的概念和性质,并提出了两种逻辑的方法刻画语境。本文重点给出了语境的模态语言、语义模型,并对涉及语境变化的三条有效规则进行了深入讨论。     

On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth

I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth that it expands the class of logical truths beyond what is sanctioned by the model-theoretic account. Briefly, I argue that at best the criticism is shallow and can be answered with slight alterations in Quine's account. At worse the criticism is defective because, in part, it is based on a misrepresentation of Quine. This serves not only to clarify Quine's position, but also to crystallize what is and what is not at issue in choosing the model-theoretic account of first-order logical truth over one in terms of substitutions. I conclude by highlighting the need for justifying the belief that the definition of first-order logical truth in terms of models is superior to its definition in terms of substitutions.     

A Deliberative Approach to Causation

Fundamental physics makes no clear use of causal notions; it uses laws that operate in relevant respects in both temporal directions and that relate whole systems across times. But by relating causation to evidence, we can explain how causation fits in to a physical picture of the world and explain its temporal asymmetry. This paper takes up a deliberative approach to causation, according to which causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Tamsin's taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is adequate grounds for believing she'll stay dry. This correspondence explains why causation matters: knowledge of causal structure helps us make decisions that are evidence of outcomes we seek. The account also explains why we can control the future and not the past, and why causes come before their effects. When agents properly deliberate, their decisions can never count as evidence for any outcomes they may seek in the past. From this it follows that causal relations don't run backwards. This deliberative asymmetry is itself traced back to asymmetries of evidence and entropy, providing a new way of deriving causal asymmetry from temporally symmetric laws.     

A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons

Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic (David Lewis's system VC), conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for believing p in Dretske's sense, and if p logically implies q, and if p and q satisfy one additional condition, it follows that r is a conclusive reason for believing q. After introducing this additional condition, I explain its intuitive import and use the condition to shed new light on Dretske's response to scepticism, as well as on his distinction between the so-called ‘lightweight’ and ‘heavyweight’ implications of a piece of perceptual knowledge.     

A Logical Foundation for Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy

Rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT) depends on the implications A ? B and B ? C where A is an activating event, B is a belief and C is an emotional consequence. We use this idea to present a logical theory for REBT, and show how it can be used to create a computer program that can be used as a therapist’s aid.