The Freudian superego

Beginning psychotherapists tend to judge themselves in terms of their Freudian superego, their idea of how a stereotypical classical analyst is supposed to work. This Freudian superego derives from culturally prevalent negative stereotypes about the nature of Freudian psychoanalysis.     

The superego, narcissism and Great Expectations

The author notes that the concepts of the superego and narcissism were linked at conception and that superego pathology may be seen as a determining factor in the formation of a narcissistic disorder; thus an examination of the superego can function as a 'biopsy', indicating the condition of the personality as a whole. Charles Dickens's novel Great Expectations is presented as a penetrating exploration of these themes and it is argued that in Pip, the central character, Dickens provides a perceptive study of the history of a narcissistic condition. Other key figures in the book are understood as superego representations and, as such, integral to the vicissitudes of Pip's development. In particular, the lawyer Jaggers is considered as an illustration of Bion's notion of the 'ego-destructive superego'. In the course of the paper, the author suggests that Great Expectations affirms the psychoanalytic understanding that emotional growth and some recovery from narcissistic difficulties necessarily take place alongside modification of the superego, allowing for responsible knowledge of the state of the object and the possibility of realistic reparation.     

The implication of the sadistic superego in anorexia

Based on our clinical experience with anorexia, we propose to distinguish two paradoxical aspects of this disorder. On the one hand, anorexia may serve as a shield and support to open up a space for subjectivity, promoting a separation from the mother. Eros is responsible for this defense of subjectivity and of the assumption of one's own wish. But the anorexic individual may, on the other hand, be subjected to the death drive and to the voice of a sadistic and ferocious superego that demands immediate obedience. The death drive, present in different combinations with Eros, is an obstacle to the work of the psychoanalyst.     

Narcissism and superego development

To elucidate the role of the superego in th maintenance of narcissistic equilibrium, we reviewed Freud's ideas about narcissism and the superego as well as the relevant theories of Kohut, Kernberg, and certain ego psychologists. These latter authors offer an alternative mode of understanding narcissism more consistent with Freud's structural theory, one in which signal affects and superego functioning play a central role in normal development and in the pathogenesis of narcissistic disturbances. Early steps in superego formation were then examined schematically to elucidate the interaction of environmental influences and emerging psychic structure. We suggested that the first step in a developmental line toward superego formation is based on the affective qualities experienced in the course of self-object differentiation. Subsequent steps examined were introject and ego-ideal formation; compliance with th object; compliance with the introject; identification with the introject and the ego ideal; and finally, with oedipal resolution, the integration of superego nuclei into a progressively structuralized autonomous superego system. This system achieves growing independence from the drives and from pressures from early introjects during the course of latency, and functions to maintain the demands of the conscience and the standards of the ego ideal; rewards or punishments result when these demands and standards are or are not met. The final stage briefly considered here was the revision, modification, and elaboration of moral codes and the ego ideal as part of the adolescent process. Narcissistic vulnerabilities at various stages were pointed out in an attempt to stress that a particular clinical picture in later phases of development or adulthood may derive from any of several development points of origin and from one or more etiological factors.     

The superego and its vicissitudes in contemporary society

Assuming that psychic reality and social phenomena are two sides of the same social totality, this article attempts to discuss the building up of the concept of superego in the Freudian text emphasizing its social roots and the function it performs as the representative of the symbolic law. Critical turning points in the development of the concept are presented and possible theoretical consequences of Freud's argument in “Civilization and its Discontents” are questioned when considered against the background of our present society determined by globalization and consumption. The author concludes by suggesting that the contemporary superego may represent an erractic reaction against the conditions prevalent in the social realm. Thus it appears to be rather the heir to the initial state of helplessness than the result of a paternal identification. That could account for its role as the representative of the symbolic law.     

Happiness theories of the good life

The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory.     

The quest for the good life in Rousseau's Emile: an assessment

Rousseau's Emile has attracted an avalanche of critical responses. His theme of negative education, or as he defines it, well-regulated freedom, has been denounced as outright manipulation in disguise, which instead of respecting the child's autonomy and dignity, places him at the whim of the teacher's machinations and stratagems. His recommendation that the child's imagination be curtailed (that he may not acquire desires which cannot be satisfied) is widely held to militate against one of the most cherished goals of education: the fostering of the natural curiosity of the child. Rousseau is also accused of professing an ideology of childhood which ignores the real needs of children. In the sterilized environment which Rousseau proposes for the growing child, affection, praise and approval, are some of the sacrifices made to this ideology. Furthermore, his views on women are considered degrading, outrageous and blatantly sexist.Yet despite the myriad criticisms leveled against his work, Rousseau's Emile highlights one of the most exacting challenges for education — how to educate the child without alienating him. Rousseau connects this issue with the larger problem of alienation: namely, that experienced by man within the modern social order. Rousseau's views anticipate the contemporary debate between virtue-based and deontological ethics.The purpose of this paper is (i) to describe Rousseau's diagnosis of the problem of alienation as it arises in the various spheres of human life, paying special attention to the moral domain, and (ii) to assess the solutions he offers to the problem of alienation. These solutions are based on a conception of the good life which, I argue, is unacceptable. I also argue that this conception dissipates one form of alienation only at the expense of creating another.The paper begins by tracing the changes which the concept of alienation has undergone, and consequently I draw a distinction between two kinds of alienation — conscious and unconscious. I demonstrate that even if Rousseau is successful in offering a remedy for conscious alienation, this very remedy itself gives rise to unconscious alienation.