C. I. Lewis,Kant, and the reflective method of philosophy

ABSTRACT

If it seems unquestionable that C. I. Lewis is a Kantian in important respects, it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, is original about his Kantianism. For it might be argued that Lewis’ Kantianism simply reflects an approach to the a priori which was very common in the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the effort to make the a priori relative. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ Kantianism does present original features. The latter can be detected by focusing on Lewis’ account of the method of philosophy in the first chapter of Mind and the World Order. In that context, Lewis argues that the method of philosophy should be reflective and critical. It will be my contention that this understanding of philosophy involves a therapeutic perspective, which bears important resemblances to Kant’s account of transcendental reflection in the Amphiboly of the Critique of Pure Reason. I will illustrate how this therapeutic application of reflection works in Lewis’ metaphysics. In this context, reflection can correct errors of reasoning that occur when we are operating within a particular conceptual scheme and use the criteria of reality that are appropriate in another.     

Meaning and Interpretation. I

The paper is an attempt at a logical explication of some crucial notions of current general semantics and pragmatics. A general, axiomatic, formal-logical theory of meaning and interpretation is outlined in this paper.In the theory, accordingto the token-type distinction of Peirce, language is formalised on two levels: first as a language of token-objects (understood as material, empirical, enduring through time-and space objects) and then – as a language of type-objects (understood as abstract objects, as classes of tokens). The basic concepts of the theory, i.e. the notions: meaning, denotation and interpretation of well-formed expressions (wfes) of the language are formalised on the type-level, by utilising some semantic-pragmatic primitive notions introduced on the token-level. The paper is divided into two parts.In Part Ia theoryof meaningand denotation is proposed, and in Part II - its expansion to the theory of meaning and interpretation is presented.The meaninga wfe is defined as an equivalence class of the relation possessing the same manner of using types (cf. Ajdukiewicz [1934], Wittgenstein [1953]). The concept of denotation is defined by means of the relation of referring which holds between wfe-types and objects of reality described by the given language. Presented by Wojciech Buszkowski     

C. I. Lewis on Intensional Predicate Logic: A Letter Dated May 11, 1960

The idea of an ‘inversion principle’, and the name itself, originated in the work of Paul Lorenzen in the 1950s, as a method to generate new admissible rules within a certain syntactic context. Some fifteen years later, the idea was taken up by Dag Prawitz to devise a strategy of normalization for natural deduction calculi (this being an analogue of Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem for sequent calculi). Later, Prawitz used the inversion principle again, attributing it with a semantic role. Still working in natural deduction calculi, he formulated a general type of schematic introduction rules to be matched – thanks to the idea supporting the inversion principle – by a corresponding general schematic Elimination rule. This was an attempt to provide a solution to the problem suggested by the often quoted note of Gentzen. According to Gentzen ‘it should be possible to display the elimination rules as unique functions of the corresponding introduction rules on the basis of certain requirements’. Many people have since worked on this topic, which can be appropriately seen as the birthplace of what are now referred to as “general elimination rules”, recently studied thoroughly by Sara Negri and Jan von Plato. In this study, we retrace the main threads of this chapter of proof-theoretical investigation, using Lorenzen's original framework as a general guide.     

C. S. Lewis and the Rejection of the Tao

When asking about the worldview and ethics behind such stories as The Chronicles of Narnia, readers should try to understand C.S. Lewis's work in light of the Tao or moral Natural Law. Even though our modern culture affirms a relativism in values, Lewis affirms a non-relativist universal ground for moral judgment. Lewis's theological work, Mere Christianity, provides the clue for this interpretation. Despite the apparent negativity or violence in even some of the most memorable scenes in the Chronicles, the underlying moral is hopeful and positive, reflecting a 'mere Christian' worldview.     

Weighing evils: the C. S. Lewis approach

It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would, and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases. Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails.     

C. S. Lewis Surprised and Humanized by Joy

Abstract : C. S. Lewis' views on sexuality and the relationship between men and women changed radically through his relationship with Joy, his friend and later wife. Lewis makes a sharp distinction between love and friendship in his writings. This article shows how his concrete experience of love and grief with Joy transformed his understanding of relationships between men and women, and, eventually, the meaning of being human and its implications for Christianity.     

Death,Myth and Reality in C.S. Lewis

C.S. Lewis's life and writings were profoundly shaped by his childhood experience of his mother's death. It is significant that the young hero's dying mother is mentioned at the very beginning of the first book of the Narnia sequence (seeThe Magician's Nephew.)., which in more general terms offers a mythopoeic version of the Christian interpretation of death. Lewis had a keen awareness of the power of myth (he would not have denied that the Christian gospel is myth). However, it was in the experience of the death of his wife (recounted inA Grief Observed) that he felt confronted by reality in a way that shook his faith to its foundations. This article will explore the tension between myth and reality in Lewis's attempts to write, as a Christian, of the experience of death.     

In defense of Joy: C. S. Lewis and psychoanalysis

The imaginative experience of Joy, as he calls it, was central to the career of C. S. Lewis: it informed his work as literary scholar, writer, and religious thinker. Cognizant that psychoanalytic concepts held implications for the meaning of this experience, Lewis offers a critical commentary on these implications and their presuppositions with regard to literary imagery. His commentary suggests possible conflicts between a view of humankind that is psychoanalytically-derived and one which is aesthetically informed.     

C. S. Lewis: The Question of Multiple Incarnations

Formulated by Aquinas, commented on by post‐Copernican philosophers and theologians, analysed in depth by C.S. Lewis, and deliberated by some contemporary writers, the question of multiple incarnations either within humanity or amongst extra‐terrestrial sentient species is all too intermittently examined: ‘Can the Christ be incarnated more than once in our reality, or somewhere else in the universe, or another reality?’ In this paper, we examine the debate and the conclusions: that is, Lewis’s position within his philosophical theology and his analogical narratives; also, some contemporary philosophers of religion and theologians (Karl Rahner, with Christopher L. Fisher and David Fergusson; Sjoerd L. Bonting and William B. Drees; E.L. Mascall and Brian Hebblethwaite; Oliver Crisp and Keith Ward). How do they relate to Aquinas’s handling of the question and how do they compare with Lewis’s approach based on a theology of the imagination (grounded in Augustine and Alice Meynell)? Can Lewis resolve the argument? Could alien species have witnessed wholly different acts, equally unique, costly to God, and necessary to the process of salvation? Any answer or explanation relates to the function and purpose of the incarnation: the Fall, original sin—therefore, how we define the boundaries, limits, of atonement.     

A Negationless Interpretation of Intuitionistic Theories. I

The present work contains an axiomatic treatment of some parts of the restricted version of intuitionistic mathematics advocated by G. F. C. Griss, also known as negationless intuitionistic mathematics. Formal systems NPC, NA, and FIM ^N for negationless predicate logic, arithmetic, and analysis are proposed. Our Theorem 4 in Section 2 asserts the translatability of Heyting's arithmetic HAinto NA. The result can in fact be extended to a large class of intuitionistic theories based on HAand their negationless counterparts. For instance, in Section 3 this is shown for Kleene's system of intuitionistic analysis FIMand our FIM ^N . This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Lewis vs Lewis on the problem of the many

Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each one can assist the other. This paper has two aims: to give some reasons against the first of these two solutions, but then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary.