The roles of associative and executive processes in creative cognition

How does the mind produce creative ideas? Past research has pointed to important roles of both executive and associative processes in creative cognition. But such work has largely focused on the influence of one ability or the other—executive or associative—so the extent to which both abilities may jointly affect creative thought remains unclear. Using multivariate structural equation modeling, we conducted two studies to determine the relative influences of executive and associative processes in domain-general creative cognition (i.e., divergent thinking). Participants completed a series of verbal fluency tasks, and their responses were analyzed by means of latent semantic analysis (LSA) and scored for semantic distance as a measure of associative ability. Participants also completed several measures of executive function—including broad retrieval ability (Gr) and fluid intelligence (Gf). Across both studies, we found substantial effects of both associative and executive abilities: As the average semantic distance between verbal fluency responses and cues increased, so did the creative quality of divergent-thinking responses (Study 1 and Study 2). Moreover, the creative quality of divergent-thinking responses was predicted by the executive variables—Gr (Study 1) and Gf (Study 2). Importantly, the effects of semantic distance and the executive function variables remained robust in the same structural equation model predicting divergent thinking, suggesting unique contributions of both constructs. The present research extends recent applications of LSA in creativity research and provides support for the notion that both associative and executive processes underlie the production of novel ideas.     

The role of executive processes in prospective memory tasks

Prospective remembering refers to remembering and acting on behavioural intentions. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that prospective remembering requires the availability of executive processes. It was expected that this is more important when intentions are stated in categorical terms. Type of instruction (specific versus categorical), typicality of the cue in relation to the category specified, and executive load were manipulated. Results showed a general benefit of specific instructions. Furthermore, with categorical instructions, performance was better with typical cues. Although the data suggested that executive processes are responsible for the processing of cues, the load manipulation had no significant effect on the prospective memory measure. Thus, no evidence was found for the hypothesis that prospective remembering requires the availability of executive processes. It is argued that it is a matter of strategic choice whether executive processes are deployed: One does not need to monitor for cues but can choose to rely on bottom‐up processes. Monitoring may be sufficient, but not necessary for successful prospective remembering.     

Characterizing cognition in ADHD: beyond executive dysfunction

The hypothesis that Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) reflects a primary inhibitory executive function deficit has spurred a substantial literature. However, empirical findings and methodological issues challenge the etiologic primacy of inhibitory and executive deficits in ADHD. Based on accumulating evidence of increased intra-individual variability in ADHD, we reconsider executive dysfunction in light of distinctions between 'hot' and 'cool' executive function measures. We propose an integrative model that incorporates new neuroanatomical findings and emphasizes the interactions between parallel processing pathways as potential loci for dysfunction. Such a reconceptualization provides a means to transcend the limits of current models of executive dysfunction in ADHD and suggests a plan for future research on cognition grounded in neurophysiological and developmental considerations.     

Sex, lies, and strategic interference: the psychology of deception between the sexes

The desires of one sex can lead to deceptive exploitation by the other sex. Strategic Interference Theory proposes that certain "negative" emotions evolved or have been co-opted by selection, in part, to defend against deception and reduce its negative consequences. In Study 1 (N = 217) Americans reported emotional distress in response to specific forms of deception. Study 2 (N = 200) replicated the results in a German sample. Study 3 (N = 479) assessed Americans' past experiences with deception and conducted additional hypothesis tests using a procedure to control for overall sex differences in upset. Each study supported the hypothesis that emotions track sex-linked forms of strategic interference. Three clusters of sex differences proved robust across studies-emotional upset about resource deception, commitment deception, and sexual deception. We discuss implications for theories of mating and emotion and directions for research based on models of antagonistic coevolution between the sexes.     

Processes underlying deception: an empirical analysis of truth and lies when manipulating the stakes

The aim of the present experiment was to examine to what extent participants experience attempted control, cognitive load and arousal when they lie and tell the truth under lower‐stakes and higher‐stakes conditions. We expected both differences and similarities between truth tellers and liars. We expected that participants would experience these processes to a higher degree when they lied compared to when they told the truth (differences), but we also expected that both liars and truth tellers would be keen to make a convincing impression; and that raising the stakes would affect liars and truth tellers in a similar way (similarities). A total of 128 participants lied and told the truth during an interview (lying and truth telling was counterbalanced). Stakes were manipulated by informing half of the participants that their interviews would be recorded on videotape and would be analysed and evaluated by police officers. The predictions were supported. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Detecting deception in a bluffing body: The role of expertise

Studies of deception detection traditionally have focused on verbal communication. Nevertheless, people commonly deceive others through nonverbal cues. Previous research has shown that intentions can be inferred from the ways in which people move their bodies. Furthermore, motor expertise within a given domain has been shown to increase visual sensitivity to other people’s movements within that domain. Does expertise also enhance deception detection from bodily movement? In two psychophysical studies, experienced basketball players and novices attempted to distinguish deceptive intentions (fake passes) and veridical intentions (true passes) from an observed individual’s actions. Whereas experts and novices performed similarly with postural cues, only experts could detect deception from kinematics alone. These results demonstrate a link between action expertise and the detection of nonverbal deception.     

The contribution of executive control to semantic cognition: Convergent evidence from semantic aphasia and executive dysfunction

Semantic cognition, as described by the controlled semantic cognition (CSC) framework (Rogers et al., 2015 , Neuropsychologia, 76, 220), involves two key components: activation of coherent, generalizable concepts within a heteromodal ‘hub’ in combination with modality‐specific features (spokes), and a constraining mechanism that manipulates and gates this knowledge to generate time‐ and task‐appropriate behaviour. Executive–semantic goal representations, largely supported by executive regions such as frontal and parietal cortex, are thought to allow the generation of non‐dominant aspects of knowledge when these are appropriate for the task or context. Semantic aphasia (SA) patients have executive–semantic deficits, and these are correlated with general executive impairment. If the CSC proposal is correct, patients with executive impairment should not only exhibit impaired semantic cognition, but should also show characteristics that align with those observed in SA. This possibility remains largely untested, as patients selected on the basis that they show executive impairment (i.e., with ‘dysexecutive syndrome’) have not been extensively tested on tasks tapping semantic control and have not been previously compared with SA cases. We explored conceptual processing in 12 patients showing symptoms consistent with dysexecutive syndrome (DYS) and 24 SA patients, using a range of multimodal semantic assessments which manipulated control demands. Patients with executive impairments, despite not being selected to show semantic impairments, nevertheless showed parallel patterns to SA cases. They showed strong effects of distractor strength, cues and miscues, and probe–target distance, plus minimal effects of word frequency on comprehension (unlike semantic dementia patients with degradation of conceptual knowledge). This supports a component process account of semantic cognition in which retrieval is shaped by control processes, and confirms that deficits in SA patients reflect difficulty controlling semantic retrieval.     

The legal self: executive processes and legal theory

When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content itself. This makes executive processes more important to the law than consciousness, since they are responsible for channelling conscious decision-making into intentions and actions, or inhibiting action. We provide a summary of the current state of our knowledge about executive processes, which consists primarily of information about which portions of the prefrontal lobes perform which executive processes. Then we describe several examples in which legal principles can be understood as tacitly singling out executive processes, including principles regarding defendants' intentions or plans to commit crimes and their awareness that certain facts are the case (for instance, that a gun is loaded), as well as excusatory principles which result in lesser responsibility for those who are juveniles, mentally ill, sleepwalking, hypnotized, or who suffer from psychopathy.     

Me, myself, and lie: The role of self-awareness in deception

Deception has been studied extensively but still little is known about individual differences in deception ability. We investigated the relationship between self-awareness and deception ability. We enlisted novice actors to portray varying levels of deception. Forty-two undergraduates viewed the videotaped portrayals and rated the actors’ believability. Actors with high private self-awareness were more effective deceivers, suggesting that high self-monitors are more effective at deceiving. Self-awareness may lead to knowledge of another’s mental state (i.e., Theory of Mind), which may improve an individual’s deception ability.     

Cognitive processes supporting episodic memory formation in childhood: The role of source memory,binding, and executive functioning

Episodic memories contain various forms of contextual detail (e.g., perceptual, emotional, cognitive details) that need to become integrated. Each of these contextual features can be used to attribute a memory episode to its source, or origin of information. Memory for source information is one critical component in the formation of episodic memories. Likewise, the establishment of episodic memories also requires binding, which reflects the process of encoding the relations among stimuli and provides the experience that certain features of a memory episode belong together. The aims of the present review are to explore the roles of (1) cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in source memory and binding and how the development of these cognitive processes relates to episodic memory formation in childhood and (2) other higher-order cognitive processes, namely executive functioning, in early episodic memory development. We conclude by examining the challenges within this field of research, highlighting the role of other cognitive processes (e.g., sense of self, language, use of strategies) that may contribute to episodic memory formation, addressing areas that can be improved with additional research, and exploring directions for future work.     

The role of social cognition in emotion

Although recent research has shown that social cognition and emotion engage overlapping regions of the brain, few accounts of this overlap have been offered. What systems might be commonly or distinctively involved in each? The close functional relationship between social cognition and emotion might be understood in terms of a central role for mental state attribution in the understanding, learning and regulation of emotion. In each of these cases, mental state attributions might be supported by either stimulus-driven or more reflective processes.     

The role of executive control in tool use

Comparing cognitive functions between humans and nonhuman primates is helpful for understanding human tool use. We comment on the latest insights from comparative research on executive control functions. Based on our own work, we discuss how even a mental function in which non-human primates outperform humans might have played a key role in the development of tool use.     

The role of the executive system in visuo-spatial memory functioning

Participants were presented with a spatial sequence in which between 4 and 10 cells were highlighted. On each trial list length was unknown to the participant who was required to serially recall the last four cells. Processing of longer lists is assumed to call upon the executive system, which is thought to be involved in updating the contents of the short-term visuo-spatial store. Study 1 revealed that loading the executive system with concurrent random letter generation impaired performance on the spatial task especially recall of the early serial positions. However, contrary to expectation the degree of impairment was no greater on the longer lists, where it had been assumed that updating would be occurring. Study 2 confirmed this finding and demonstrated that relative to sequences of known length, under conditions of uncertainty when the list length was unknown, spatial recall was impaired even on short sequences. The present results support the growing consensus, which is suggestive of closer links between visuo-spatial and executive processes. However, it remains unclear whether or not updating is actually occurring on the longer sequences, and if it is, what specific executive processes are involved.     

欺骗判断与欺骗行为中自我控制的影响

欺骗判断与欺骗行为有着不同的心理机制, 正确认识二者之间的关系有助于增强人际间的信任和团队的长远利益。采用行为学实验从两种视角下考察自我控制对欺骗的影响。实验1采用材料评定的方法考察了识别他人自我控制能力状况对欺骗判断的影响, 结果发现对比高自我控制能力的人, 被试更倾向于认为低自我控制能力的人更有可能为了自己的利益产生欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。实验2采用颜色Stroop任务考察了识别他人自我控制资源衰竭状况对欺骗判断的影响, 结果发现当识别他人自我控制资源衰竭时, 在评价他人为自己利益去欺骗、为他人利益去欺骗以及在特定情境中欺骗倾向上, 没有发现任何显著的主效应或交互作用。实验3采用视觉−感知任务来考察不同水平的自我控制能力对欺骗行为的影响, 结果发现, 对比高自我控制组, 低自我控制组有更多的欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。实验4采用颜色Stroop任务和视觉−感知任务来考察自我控制资源对欺骗行为的影响, 结果发现, 对比控制组, 自我控制资源衰竭组有更多的欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。这些研究结果表明, 在进行欺骗判断时, 相比自我控制资源状况, 个体会优先识别他人的自我控制能力水平来判断其是否具有欺骗动机或欺骗倾向。在欺骗行为中, 高自我控制能力的个体, 能够更好地抑制自私动机, 更多的考虑长远利益, 出于自身利益去欺骗的可能性会更小; 自我控制资源充足的个体, 更有可能会经得住诱惑, 自私自利的欺骗行为发生的可能性也会更小。     

Retrieval processes in distance cognition

Two studies were performed to evaluate the role of information retrieval in the cognition of traversed distance. In Study 1, subjects walked a pathway containing intersections that were labeled with either high-frequency or low-frequency proper names. The pathway with high-frequency names was estimated as longer than the pathway with low-frequency names. Subsequent tests of memory for names indicated that high- and low-frequency names were recognized equally well, but that the former were recalled more easily. Prompting subjects with intersection names eliminated the difference in distance estimation between highand low-frequency name conditions. A second study demonstrated that category prompts that increased information recall also increased estimated distance. Results were interpreted as suggesting a significant role of information retrieval in distance cognition.