Contents Just Aren't in the Head

A. Horowitz has recently argued againstsemantic externalism. Inthis paper, I will show thathis arguments are unsuccessful,owing to misconceptions regardingthe nature of that semanticview.     

The Ethics of Economic Sanctions: Why Just War Theory is Not the Answer

Res Publica - On 24 December 2017, the UN Security Council imposed its toughest sanctions yet on North Korea. The measures, intended to thwart nuclear ambitions, are some of the most extensive...     

Contents Just Are In The Head

The purpose of the paper is to show that semanticexternalism – the thesis that contents are notdetermined by ``individualistic' features of mentalstates – is mistaken. Externalist thinking, it isargued, rests on two mistaken assumptions: theassumption that if there is an externalist wayof describing a situation the situation exemplifiesexternalism, and the assumption that cases in which adifference in the environment of an intentional stateentails a difference in the state's intentional objectare cases in which environmental factors determine thestate's content. Exposing these mistakes leads to seethat the conditions that are required for thetruth of externalism are inconsistent.     

Why Experience Told Me Nothing about Transparency 1

The transparency argument concludes that we're directly aware of external properties and not directly aware of the properties of experience. Focusing on the presentation used by Michael Tye (2002) I contend that the argument requires experience to have content that it cannot plausibly have. I attribute the failure to a faulty account of the transparency phenomenon and conclude by suggesting an alternative understanding that is independently plausible, is not an error‐theory and yet renders the transparency of experience compatible with mental‐paint style views.     

Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects

Philosophical Studies -     

祛邪术就是骗人术

祛邪术是巫术的一种,花样繁多,源远流长.时至今日,在一些地方、一些人群中,祛邪活动还严重地存在着,甚至花样翻新.其手段虽各不相同,但有一点是相同的,那就是想祛邪却除不了害,想求福却反而遭灾.     

The Bias Paradox: Why it's Not Just for Feminists Anymore

The bias paradox emerges out of a tension between objectivism and relativism.If one rejects a certain the conception objectivity as absolute impartiality and value-neutrality (i.e., if all views are biased), how, then, can one hold that some epistemic perspectives are better than others? This is a problem that has been most explicitly dealt with in feminist epistemology, but it is not unique to feminist perspectives. In this paper, I wish to clearly lay out the nature of the paradox and the various attempts to avoid it. I also intend to show why it is a problem for any epistemological view that rejects absolute objectivity. Finally, I wish to briefly outline a possible solution to the paradox, a solution that requires recognizing that rationality necessarily requires both objective and subjective elements.     

Why the Capability Approach is Justified

abstract   Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach has in the past twenty years become an increasingly popular and influential approach to issues in global justice. Its main tenet is that when assessing quality of life or asking what kind of policies will be more conducive to human development, we should look not to resources or preference satisfaction, but to what people are able to be and to do. This should then be measured against a more or less narrow conception of what any human being should be able to be and do, i.e. which functions are essentially human. To have a capability is to be able to function in that way. Thomas Pogge has recently argued that despite its many attractions, the capability approach did not present a sufficiently strong challenge to Rawlsian resourcism. In this paper, I address Pogge's criticisms of the capability approach, and I argue that from the point of view of Nussbaum's Aristotelian version of the approach, his objections are not successful.     

Why Skinner is difficult

Skinner's views are commonly misrepresented. One reason for this difficulty is that changes in the way that Skinner formulated his views occurred in a gradual evolution over time throughout Skinner's career, and the changes and their significance were not as conspicuously marked as they might have been. Among these changes were a movement from a two-term necessity to a three-term contingency; a movement from discriminative stimulus to setting as the first term in his three-term contingency; and a movement from determinism to random variation as a foundational principle in his selectionist behaviorism. When not seen in their historical development over time, a sample reading of Skinner's views may readily result in misleading or inaccurate interpretations, particularly in respect to his later work. Seen in historical context, however, the accounts that survived after the changes Skinner made are well integrated in a selectionist theory of behavior.     

公正世界信念与心理健康关系的综述

公正世界信念是人格心理学和社会心理学中的一个重要概念,也是生物心理社会医学模式所涵盖的一个重要变量.结合近年来的研究热点,从积极的自我感知,愉快或满意,关心他人的能力,高效与创造性工作的能力等四个方面对公正世界信念和心理健康的关系进行了评估.对现有研究中的不足进行了评述,对今后研究的内容、方法和方向进行了展望.