Engagement with beauty: appreciating natural, artistic, and moral beauty

The Engagement With Beauty Scale (EBS), designed from the aesthetics of I. Kant (1790/1987), G. W. F. Hegel (ca. 1835/1993), and T. Aquinas (ca. 1260/1947) and the psychological work of J. Haidt (J. Haidt & D. Keltner, 2004), measures engagement with natural, artistic, and moral beauty. In Studies 1 and 2, the authors describe scale construction, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, internal consistency, and temporal stability. In Studies 1 and 2, the authors also establish concurrent validity with the Appreciation of Beauty and Excellence subscale of the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (C. Peterson & M. E. P. Seligman, 2004), the Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test (P. C. Watkins, K. Woodward, T. Stone, & R. L. Kolts, 2003), and the Spiritual Transcendence Scale (R. L. Piedmont, 2004). In Study 3, the authors used the EBS Artistic Beauty subscale to differentiate students engaged in the arts from those who were not.     

Response to: divine responsibility without divine freedom

Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: “We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism.” In this response I argue that while it makes sense for believers to be thankful that God exists, it makes no sense for them to thank him for doing the best act he can, given the circumstances.     

Contra Tooley: divine foreknowledge is possible

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Michael Tooley’s latest argument against the possibility of divine foreknowledge trades on the idea that, whichever theory of time is true,...     

Middle knowledge and divine control: Some clarifications

Conclusion What then have we discovered? The general issue under discussion, remember, is whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous for the theist to affirm MK, especially as this form of knowledge relates to God's control over earthly affairs. As we have seen, both proponents and opponents of MK have claimed that this form of knowledge gives God significant power over earthly affairs, including control over the (indeterministically) free choices of humans.We have seen, though, that such a contention is dubious. There are similarities between a God with MK and the God of Theological Determinism. But, generally speaking, the providential capacities of a God with MK have been greatly overstated. A God with MK is simply not as powerful as has been thought. And thus those recent attempts to encourage or discourage the affirmation of MK that are based on this exaggerated conception of power are on the whole not very helpful. What is needed are new discussions, discussions based on the actual providential capacities inherent in MK.     

Who you could have known: divine hiddenness,epistemic counterfactuals,and the recalcitrant nature of natural theology

We argue there is a deep conflict in Paul Moser’s work on divine hiddenness (DH). Moser’s treatment of DH adopts a thesis we call SEEK: DH often results from failing to seek God on His terms. One way in which people err, according to Moser, is by trusting arguments of traditional natural theology to lead to filial knowledge of God. We argue that Moser’s SEEK thesis commits him to the counterfactual ACCESS: had the atheist sought after God in harmony with how God reveals himself, she would have had access to filial knowledge of God. By failing to incorporate arguments or propositional evidence for God’s existence, Moser’s account leaves the doubting seeker without any evidential reason to think that either SEEK or ACCESS is true. Without this rational motivation in place, the doubting seeker is unlikely to seek after God in the way ACCESS describes. We argue that natural theology provides an evidential epistemic aid to motivate persons to seek God the way ACCESS describes. Thus, Moser is mistaken. Such arguments can be evidentially helpful in coming to know God. In conclusion, we explain how our reply naturally fits how we form and maintain trusting interpersonal relationships with others.     

Satisfactory accounts of divine creation

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Multiverse theorists provide controversial, unique but unified accounts of divine creation that result in the Anselmian God creating a best world....     

Divine authority and divine perfection

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Skeptical theism and divine permission: a reply to Anderson

Skeptical theism (ST) may undercut the key inference in the evidential argument from evil, but it does so at a cost. If ST is true, then we lose our ability to assess the all things considered (ATC) value of natural events and states of affairs. And if we lose that ability, a whole slew of undesirable consequences follow. So goes a common consequential critique of ST. In a recent article, Anderson has argued that this consequential critique is flawed. Anderson claims that ST only has the consequence that we lack epistemic access to potentially God-justifying reasons for permitting a prima facie “bad” (or “evil”) event. But this is very different from lacking epistemic access to the ATC value of such events. God could have an (unknowable) reason for not intervening to prevent E and yet E could still be (knowably) ATC-bad. Ingenious though it is, this article argues that Anderson’s attempted defence of ST is flawed. This is for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the consequential critique does not rely on the questionable assumption he identifies. Indeed, the argument can be made quite easily by relying purely on Anderson’s distinction between God-justifying reasons for permitting E and the ATC value of E. And second, Anderson’s defence of his position, if correct, would serve to undermine the foundations of ST.     

From darkness to light: children speak of divine encounter

Abstract

Studies have shown that children share both positive and dark spiritual experiences. The former dominates the literature but whilst the need to address the dark side of spirituality has been raised it has not, as yet, been dealt with as widely as the more positive aspects. This paper draws on an empirical study with 44 children aged 8–11 who were interviewed in school after visiting a sacred space. Three key themes arising from their conversations are covered in this paper: divine encounter; physical feelings and fear. It is argued that the most appropriate way of understanding these phenomena is to draw on different fields and disciplines, notably although not exclusively, theology, psychoanalysis, psychology and neuroscience. The paper concludes that it is important to recognise both the light and dark and the blurred boundaries between them, in addition to different ways of perceiving them, in order to understand the whole child.