Psychological evidence in the courtroom: critical reflections on the general acceptance standard

The increasing ties between psychology and law have familiarized psychologists with the standards by which law admits scientific evidence into the courtroom. In the USA, these include the general acceptance standard and the Daubert guidelines and, in the UK, the Turner Rule. However, the psychological literature has largely failed to make clear the degree of legal debate that exists concerning the clarity and effectiveness of such standards. This paper will focus on the general acceptance standard, examining key problems of this standard and placing them in a specifically psychological context. Such consideration is important precisely because the standard has become so well known within the psychological literature and because insufficient attention has been given to the way in which it operates implicitly within jurisdictions outside the USA. The authors argue that it is the responsibility of psychologists to become more involved in the debate concerning admissibility standards, given the credibility and authority that law accords to psychology when admitting it into the courtroom. In particular, psychologists need to become more self-reflective about their role in creating and maintaining such standards. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reflections on intersections between cognitive and social psychology: A personal exploration

I appreciate the opportunity offered by the editor to reflect on the relationship between cognitive and social psychology. This topic has interested me my entire professional life, because I was admitted to graduate school to study social psychology and then eventually migrated to cognitive psychology. The organization of this paper is as follows: I first relate my (somewhat puzzling) personal experiences that led me to wonder about relations between cognitive and social psychology. I suggest that, for many topics, the placement of a topic of study in one field or the other is arbitrary. Next I selectively review some common historical influences on the development of both fields, ones that have made them similar. Both grew from common seeds, which include Gestalt psychology as it became applied to a wider array of topics, experimental psychologists becoming interested in attitude change during and after World War II, and Bartlett's famous book on Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Next I review some research from my lab that picked up themes from Bartlett's work and that, in some aspects, combines cognitive and social approaches. I also discuss the issue of memory conformity or the social contagion of memory, and conclude with thoughts about how social and cognitive psychologists might collaborate on an exciting new arena, creating empirical studies of collective memory. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Law Says Corporations are Persons,but Psychology Knows Better

Psychologists interested in law and public policy have begun to examine the nature of corporations in American society and the serious consequences of corporate irresponsibility. The dominant trend identifies areas where corporate behavior falls short of ethical standards or leads to unacceptably risky decisions and suggests ways to reform corporations or the laws that regulate them. This well-intentioned approach is consistent with psychology's liberal reformist tendency. Unfortunately, it neither challenges the flawed psychological underpinnings of the legal fiction that corporations are legal persons nor compensates sufficiently for the dynamics of individual behavior in corporate settings. Instead, psychologists should advocate fundamental restructuring of our corporate society.     

An editorial overview

Now is an excellent time to be doing research at the intersection of psychology and law. In the last few years, both the legal system and the legal academic community have taken more and more interest in the empirical findings of cognitive and social psychologists. Much of this interest has been provoked by the large number of convicted people who have been exonerated by DNA evidence. Examination of their cases reveals that most are associated with one (or more) of the following problems: bad eyewitness testimony, a false confession, or flawed forensic evidence. These issues are ones that psychologists have been investigating for years. For those of you new to this area, we recommend Elizabeth Loftus’s foundational work on so many areas of memory, Gary Wells’s work on eyewitness identification, Saul Kassin’s work on false confessions, and Reid Hastie’s work on jury decision making. All have written for both psychological and legal audiences.     

How objectivity undermines the study of personhood: Toward an intersubjective epistemology for psychological science

As a science, psychology embraces the value of objectivity. An objective observation is one that is (a) based upon publically observable phenomena (i.e., overt behavior); (b) unbiased, in the sense that it records only what was observed, without either adding or taking away from the observation, and (c) an accurate representation of the world as it truly is. To understand the person, however, it is necessary to come to grips with seemingly elusive concepts such as agency, symbolism, experience, meaning, inter-subjectivity, and morality. Such concepts make reference to phenomena that are not observable in way that one can observe objects in the physical world of space and time. In this paper, I examine how psychology's commitment to objectivity obscures our ability to understand persons. A remnant of the Cartesian distinction between a mind and body, the principle of objectivity forces psychologists to seek “objective” indicators of “subjective” processes. Following Wittgenstein and recent research on the mirror resonance system, I argue that psychological knowledge arises neither from within (subjectively) nor from without (objectively), but instead from between (intersubjectively). To understand what it means to be a person, we must abandon the false distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, and embrace an epistemology based on intersubjectivity.     

Good governance,law and social reality: Problematic relationships

This article examines the ways in which the linkage between good governance and economic development has originally developed as alegal discussion constrained by the constitution of the World Bank. This normative character of the linkage has subsequently shaped discussions about good governance. It is here argued that this tends to lead these discussions to focus on selective and normative aspects of the interrelations between economic, political and legal-administrative structures and institutions. While the role of law is increasingly acknowledged in more recent debates and policy statements, law tends to be approached from a normative economic or legal perspective that does not provide much insight into the social significance of law. Too little attention is given to anthropological or sociological approaches to legal pluralism in society. These factors combine to detract attention from the fact that governance issues in reality deal withbad rather than with good governance. Franz von Benda-Beckmann is professor in the department of Agrarian Law of the Agricultural University Wageningen and teaches on law and rural development in Third World states and anthropology of law. He holds a doctorate in law and aHabilitation in anthropology. His primary research interests are issues of property rights and social security in rural development, legal pluralism and legal anthropological theory. This is a revised version of a paper presented in the 1993 RAWOO (Advisory Council for Scientific Research in Development Problems) lecture series.     

Benevolent Sexism in the Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP): A Case Study of Texas House Bill 2

Benevolent sexism takes a subjectively positive view of women in traditional gender roles, revering them as gentle, nurturing, and in need of protection by men. While studies show that people who express attitudes of benevolent sexism are willing to restrict women’s choices at an individual level, limited research exists on the impact of benevolent sexism in social policy. Using a single-case study method and benevolent sexism as a conceptual framework, I examined the introduction, passage, and legal defense of Texas House Bill 2 (TX HB2), a targeted regulation of abortion providers (TRAP) law. HB2 was passed by the Texas legislature in 2013 and ruled on by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2016 case of Whole Woman’s Health et al. v. Hellerstedt. Primary source legislative and court documents were analyzed to explore whether and how benevolent sexism ideologies were reflected in the introduction, passage, and legal defense of HB2 as a TRAP law. Four themes emerged: The State has the Right to Protect Women, Women Need Protection from “Bad Players,” Women are Emotional, and Women are Mothers/Vessels. Results confirm that language consistent with benevolent sexism was used in the context of policy making to justify restricting women’s access to pre-viability abortion.

     

Keeping (Direct) Reference in Mind

This paper explores the psychological analogues of a cluster of arguments that have played an important role in motivating a now widespread, reference‐based approach in philosophy of language. What I will call the psychological analogues of Kripke‐style arguments provide a substantial motivation for a reference‐based approach to concepts. Insofar as such an approach is rarely given serious consideration, the availability of these arguments suggests the need for a rethinking of some foundational assumptions in philosophy of mind and other branches of the cognitive sciences.     

Personality, person, subject in Russian legal philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century

The problem of the legal person is a central issue in legal philosophy and the theory of law. In this article I examine the semantic meaning of the concept of the person in Russian philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century, considered to be the “Golden Age” of Russian legal thought. This provides an overview of the conception of the personality in the context of different legal approaches (theory of natural law, legal positivism, the psychological legal doctrine, and the sociological school of law). I indicate a polemic among the theories of the person and attempts to create an integral concept of the legal subject. In addition I present an analysis of the relation between the concepts of the legal subject and the moral person, which personify fundamental features of law and morality. In order to demarcate the notions of individual and the legal subject, I focus on doctrines of the artificial person or the juridical person.     

认知神经科学的心理学理论价值

从认知神经科学面临的三个挑战--(1)神经科学是“还原” 的,不能完全解释一个人的心理活动过程;（2）认知神经科学无法真正解释人的心理与行为;（3）认知神经科学只能揭示出神经事件与认知活动或行为活动的相关性--入手来讨论其心理学理论价值,阐明认知神经科学在心理学研究中的重要地位及主流趋势。同时指出,认知神经科学只是心理学学科门类中的一种,它能解决的问题也只限于特定的范围,对它要有科学理性的认识和定位。     

Population psychology in perspective(1)

Many aspects of population, from fertility regulation to migration, may be viewed as examples of human behavior occurring within a particular socio-economic and environmental context, and thus appropriate for psychological research. Especially considered in this paper are (1) the current status of population growth and the importance of population processes as research topics for psychologists; (2) basic assumptions concerning the complementarity of behavioral and biomedical sciences in population research; (3) behavioral science contributions, specifically from psychology; and (4) recommendations for cooperative multidisciplinary efforts.     

From the individual to the collective: The emergence of a psychological approach to collective memory

Throughout much of the 20th century, psychologists have largely examined mnemonic processes through an individualistic lens at the expense of social influences. However, this perspective began to change toward the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, when psychologists began to better appreciate the social nature of remembering. In the present paper, we focus on a relatively recent and important evolution of this line of research: the emergence of a psychological approach to collective memory. Using an epidemiological approach to collective memory, we attempt to distil the extant and relevant psychological research and focus on how (collective) memories transmit, converge, and remain stable over time while considering the bidirectional relationship between collective memory and a mnemonic community's identity. We conclude with a discussion of research areas that psychologists should examine moving forward, which will ultimately provide a more holistic understanding of how collective memories emerge, remain stable, and/or change over time.     

Roots of the Pavlovian Society’s missions of the past and present: The Pavlov dimension

This paper offers an interpretation of the relation between Pavlov’s life and work and the missions of the Pavlovian Society, both past (“observation and observation”) and present (“interdisciplinary research on the integrated organism”). I begin with an acount of Pavlov's life and his influence on contemporary thought. I then indicate the relation of some of Pavlov's attitudes (e.g., his motto, his epistemological stance) to the Society's past mission. In the concluding and most controversial section, I argue for six guiding principles derived from Pavlov, to be applied to the Society’s mission. These are: (a) a confident methodological behaviorism; (b) a significant role assigned to both physiological and psychological factors in the prediction and control of the integrated organism; (c) approximately equal taxonomic precision of physiological and psychological explanatory concepts; (d) distrust of toleological explanatory concepts; (e) rejection of psychology’s instrumentalist “cognitive paradigm shift”; and (f) rejection of the representational theory of knowledge.     

Following the law because it’s the law: obedience,bootstrapping, and practical reason

Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs about practical reason – in particular, it’s due to the belief that it’s impossible for reasons to be “bootstrapped” into existence. I argue, though, that a plausible account of practical reasoning should allow that reasons can be bootstrapped into existence, and so there’s no reason to be suspicious about the possibility of a person’s being justified in following the law because it’s the law. I end by suggesting that this conclusion opens up important new avenues of inquiry for philosophers working on topics related to legal obedience.     

Character: The Prospects for a Personality‐Based Perspective on Morality

In the early parts of the 20th century, character made up a major part of psychology, specifically of personality psychology. However, an influential observational study of children's moral behavior, conducted by Hartshorne, May, and colleagues in the 1920s, suggested that consistency in morality‐related behavior was lower than many people expected. Some psychologists interpreted such results to mean that there was no consistency in moral behavior and thus that there were no stable, meaningful individual differences in moral behavior – character did not exist. Recent years have witnessed a reinvigoration of character, ethics, and morality as objects of psychological study. Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to this reinvigoration by reviewing the use of the concept of “character” within psychology, considering whether the evidence supports the notion of moral character as a psychological construct, and suggesting new prospects for research on moral character.     

Theory of mind: The state of the art*

Abstract

In this article, I reflect on theory of mind as a field (ToM), how it has developed over the years, and focally on the state of current research and theory. Having begun with preschoolers’ understanding of beliefs and desires, the field now includes research from infancy through late life, contributions and contributors from around the world, research on behavior, conversation, neural correlates, gene-environment contributions, evolution, and the social-behavioral antecedents and consequences of the unfolding trajectories of ToM understanding. Several topics in particular portray the current state of the art and my sense of where theory-of-mind research is likely to head in the near future: progressions of theory of mind achievement; cultural experiences plus experiential influences that shape developmental trajectories; developmental cognitive neuroscience; infant ToM insights; research on ToM developments beyond preschool, including children’s increasing interest in and wrestling with extraordinary minds, such as those of God and super-heroes.     

Experimental psychology and the courtroom

Experimental social and cognitive psychology cover a range of topics such as attitudes, attribution, decision making, perception, memory, comprehension, and reasoning. The relevance of these topics to the law is apparent in such domains as jury selection, jury behavior, plea bargaining, eyewitness testimony, sentencing, and police investigation strategies. Despite early attempts to apply experimental psychology to law (circa 1900–1920), it was not until the mid 1970s that a robust law-relevant literature in experimental psychology began to unfold. The experimental psychology/law interface continues to experience some problems in (1) generalizing from specific research experiments to real-world conditions, and (2) identifying solutions rather than just problems.     

The syntax of English idioms: Can the dog be put on?

An idiom is a collection of words whose meaning as a whole cannot be determined from the meanings of the individual words. As such, idioms pose a problem for the psychological process of interpretation, but psychologists have shown interpretation of idioms to be fast. A hallmark of idioms is their resistance to syntactic variation, and some idioms are more resistant than others. Idioms that are low in resistance are termedflexible, and they tend to be more familiar to users of the language, combinedr=.401, combinedp=.02. Some syntactic variations are moredisruptive than others are, and the disruptiveness of variations agrees well with a prediction by Fraser (1970), combinedr=.897,p<.01. Furthermore, 86% of the judgments of the acceptability of 41 idioms in 7 to 8 syntactic variations by 103 Harvard undergraduates agree with a strong proposal by Fraser (1970) that if a particular syntactic variation of an idiom is acceptable, then all relevant variations equally or more disruptive are also acceptable. The localization of the 14% disagreement in either competence or performance will have considerable implications for cognitive psychology and linguistics.This research was funded in part by a graduate student research fund provided by the Department of Psychology, Harvard University. The article is a short version of the author's doctoral thesis with the same title. I am sincerely grateful to Keith Holyoak, Donna Jo Napoli, Miriam Schustack, and Roger Brown for their advice on various stages of experimental design. I am also grateful to Roger Brown, Monica Harris, Robert C. Crowder, Peter C. Gordon, Eliott Mordkowitz, and Elizabeth Weiss for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Douwe Yntema, Robert Rosenthal, and Don Rubin graciously provided helpful suggestions on data analysis for which I am also grateful.