What’s philosophically interesting about engineering ethics?

What makes a subject philosophically interesting is hard-to-resolve confusion about fundamental concepts. Engineering ethics suffers from at least three such fundamental confusions. First, there is confusion about what the “ethics” in engineering ethics is (ordinary morality, philosophical ethics, special standards, or something else?) Second, there is confusion about what the profession of engineering is (a function, discipline, occupation, kind of organization, or something else?) Third, there is confusion about what the discipline of engineering is. These fundamental confusions in engineering ethics connect with philosophically interesting work in moral theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of science. Work in these areas may help with the philosophical problems of engineering ethics. But, equally important, work in engineering ethics may help with the philosophical problems in these others fields.     

Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?

Virtue ethics is standardly taught and discussed as a distinctive approach to the major questions of ethics, a third major position alongside Utilitarian and Kantian ethics. I argue that this taxonomy is a confusion. Both Utilitarianism and Kantianism contain treatments of virtue, so virtue ethics cannot possibly be a separate approach contrasted with those approaches. There are, to be sure, quite a few contemporary philosophical writers about virtue who are neither Utilitarians nor Kantians; many of these find inspiration in ancient Greek theories of virtue. But even here there is little unity. Although certain concerns do unite this disparate group (a concern for the role of motives and passions in good choice, a concern for character, and a concern for the whole course of an agent's life), there are equally profound disagreements, especially concerning the role that reason should play in ethics. One group of modern virtue-theorists, I argue, are primarily anti-Utilitarians, concerned with the plurality of value and the susceptibility of passions to social cultivation. These theorists want to enlarge the place of reason in ethics. They hold that reason can deliberate about ends as well as means, and that reason can modify the passions themselves. Another group of virtue theorists are primarily anti-Kantians. They believe that reason plays too dominant a role in most philosophical accounts of ethics, and that a larger place should be given to sentiments and passions -- which they typically construe in a less reason-based way than does the first group. The paper investigates these differences, concluding that it is not helpful to speak of virtue ethics, and that we would be better off characterizing the substantive views of each thinker -- and then figuring out what we ourselves want to say.     

Recentering Christian Ethics as Comparative Religious Ethics

The filial relationship between Christian ethics and Comparative Religious Ethics (CRE) need not be perniciously distortive and can be salutary for comparative work. I suggest that the suspicions about CRE as a disguised form of a “Christian ethical enterprise” are overstated and that we can appreciate the value of the legacy of Christian ethics for comparative work in the focal themes of emancipatory criticism and common morality. Both of these themes, even if influenced by Christian ethics, reflect more universal social‐moral problems that can be discerned in cross‐cultural contexts.     

解读现代版希波克拉底誓言

随着医学的飞速发展,医学伦理学、医学哲学被赋予了新的科学内涵。这一内涵在现代版"希波克拉底誓言"中得以具体体现。从行善原则、生命价值原则、尊重自主原则、公平公益原则、有利与不伤害原则、医疗最优化原则、医疗保密原则等方面对该誓言进行了全面阐述,其中蕴涵着丰富的社会哲学、价值哲学、道德哲学等哲学思想。     

关于伦理道德与智慧

伦理道德与智慧的关系是一个有着重要的理论和现实意义的课题。伦理、道德与智慧都有联系,但本身都不是智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧相通,但两者不是同一种意义上的智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧具有多方面的社会价值,提倡伦理智慧和道德智慧有助于当代中国的社会改革和全面进步,为此需要对中国传统伦理思想和道德价值进行批判性的反思。     

The importance of meta-ethics in engineering education

Our shared moral framework is negotiated as part of the social contract. Some elements of that framework are established (tell the truth under oath), but other elements lack an overlapping consensus (just when can an individual lie to protect his or her privacy?). The tidy bits of our accepted moral framework have been codified, becoming the subject of legal rather than ethical consideration. Those elements remaining in the realm of ethics seem fragmented and inconsistent.Yet, our engineering students will need to navigate the broken ground of this complex moral landscape. A minimalist approach would leave our students with formulated dogma—principles of right and wrong such as the National Society for Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code of Ethics for Engineers—but without any insight into the genesis of these principles. A slightly deeper, micro-ethics approach would teach our students to solve ethical problems by applying heuristics—giving our students a rational process to manipulate ethical dilemmas using the same principles simply referenced a priori by dogma. A macro-ethics approach—helping students to inductively construct a posteriori principles from case studies—goes beyond the simple statement or manipulation of principles, but falls short of linking personal moral principles to the larger, social context. Ultimately, it is this social context that requires both the application of ethical principles, and the negotiation of moral values—from an understanding of meta-ethics.The approaches to engineering ethics instruction (dogma, heuristics, case studies, and meta-ethics) can be associated with stages of moral development. If we leave our students with only a dogmatic reaction to ethical dilemmas, they will be dependent on the ethical decisions of others (a denial of their fundamental potential for moral autonomy). Heuristics offers a tool to deal independently with moral questions, but a tool that too frequently reduces to casuistry when rigidly applied to “simplified” dilemmas. Case studies, while providing a context for engineering ethics, can encourage the premature analysis of specific moral conduct rather than the development of broad moral principles—stifling our students’ facility with meta-ethics. Clearly, if a moral sense is developmental, ethics instruction should lead our students from lower to higher stages of moral development.     

孙中山经济伦理思想探析

孙中山的经济伦理思想始终把伦理道德现象建立在对民众生计的考察和认识上,认为民生问题是一切社会活动的中心,社会伦理道德是由民生问题引发的。主张以国家和人民利益作为道德标准,在调节个人和国家经济利益之间的矛盾时,强调以自我牺牲、“替众人来服务”为准则。强调权利平等就是民权、民族实现;民权、民族问题解决了,经济发展才能从根本上解决问题。认为人类要求得道德的进步和经济的发展,就必须以“互助”为原则,减少兽性,发展人性,造就高尚的人格。     

有关西方心理学中生物学化思潮的质疑与思考

从基因的角度认识人的社会行为,以遗传决定论的观点看待心理和行为的产生和发展,这种生物还原论的观点近年来在西方心理学中有着很大的市场。社会生物学、进化心理学和对行为遗传学研究成果的错误理解和解释是这一思潮的主要代表。实际上,基因的作用是有限的,它并不能决定个体的行为选择。个体发展是基因和环境共同作用的产物,心理与行为是受文化制约的,文化决定了个体心理的发展过程。     

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向,一是基于研究重心由“应当”问题转换为“德行之所以然”的问题,二是基于研究范式上由目的论、德性论、义务论等转换为价值论。作为传统伦理学的集大成者,康德伦理学一方面因其浓烈的价值论色彩而成为舍勒和N．哈特曼价值伦理学的前奏,另一方面因其“实质”内容缺失而致的形式主义又为后者的拓展提供了空间。舍勒,尤其是N．哈特曼的实质价值伦理学正是在康德伦理学的理论平台上得以建立的。     

From Normative Spheres to Normative Practices: New Prospects for Normative Theory after Habermas

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Jürgen Habermas’s theoretical dualism between ethics and morality. I do this by showing how his account of normativity is vitiated by an unnecessary superposition of a social-evolutionary and a theoretical-linguistic account of normativity, and that this brings about theoretical problems that in the end cannot be overcome. I also show that Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s distinction is equally doomed to failure, but that his attempt nevertheless invites new and more fruitful avenues for normative theory that are worth exploring. The conclusion of this paper is that traditional notions of ethics and morality can be preserved provided we heavily redefine their meanings and release them from some of the theoretical work they have been expected to accomplish, but that to complete this transition we also need to supersede Forst’s pluralization of normative contexts toward a theory of normative practices that in the end makes the distinction between ethics and morality workable but useless. I begin by first locating the debate about ethics and morality within the context of recent normative theory (§1), and proceed to examine the two main strategies through which Habermas has elaborated his idea of a sharp dualism between ethics and morality (§2). I then introduce a theoretical distinction between what I call a horizontal and a vertical integration of ethics and morality (§3) and contend that whilst only the horizontal is viable, Habermas decidedly prefers the idea of a vertical integration (§4). With this work done, I proceed to complete my critique of Habermas’s argument and show how, by recovering the pragmatist roots of his thought, an alternative solution based on a functionalist understanding of morality could be envisaged (§5). I then conclude by examining Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s account, and show that the failure of Forst’s attempts opens the way for new and more fruitful approaches to normative theory which are more likely to recover the pragmatist roots of Habermas’s thought (§6).     

The common morality in communitarian thought: reflective consensus in public policy

I explore the possible meanings that the notion of the common morality can have in a contemporary communitarian approach to ethics and public policy. The common morality can be defined as the conditions for shared pursuit of the good or as the values, deliberations, traditions, and common construction of the narrative of a people. The former sense sees the common morality as the universal and invariant structures of morality while the second sense is much more contingent in nature. Nevertheless, the communitarian sees both aspects as integral in devising solutions to public policy problems. I outline how both meanings follow from communitarian philosophical anthropology and illustrate how they work together when addressing a question such as that of providing universal health insurance in the United States. The common morality forms the basis of building an implicit consensus that is available to and reaffirmed by the shared reflections of the citizenry.     

SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND ETHICS: THE BOYLE LECTURE 2019

How do we and should we decide what is morally right and what is morally wrong? For much of human history, the teachings of religion were presumed to provide either the answer, or much of the answer. Over time, two developments challenged this. The first was the establishment of the discipline of moral philosophy. Foundational texts, such as Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the growth of coherent, nonreligious approaches to ethics, notably utilitarianism, served to marginalize the role of religion. And then, second, the twentieth century saw the rapid growth of evolutionary biology with an enthusiastic presumption that biology was the source of ethics. Here, I begin by discussing these developments and then examine the extent to which religion is still needed for a coherent account of ethics.     

Future directions in engineering ethics research: microethics, macroethics and the role of professional societies

Three frames of reference for engineering ethics are discussed—individual, professional and social—which can be further broken down into “microethics” concerned with individuals and the internal relations of the engineering profession and “macroethics” referring to the collective social responsibility of the engineering profession and to societal decisions about technology. Few attempts have been made at integrating microethical and macroethical approaches to engineering ethics. The approach suggested here is to focus on the role of professional engineering societies in linking individual and professional ethics and in linking professional and social ethics. A research program is outlined using ethics support as an example of the former, and the issuance of position statements on product liability as an example of the latter. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium on Technology and Society 2000 (ISTAS 2000), Rome, Italy, 7 September 2000. Joseph R. Herkert directs a dual-degree program in engineering and humanities/social sciences and is editor of Social, Ethical, and Policy Implications of Engineering (Wiley/IEEE Press).     

Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy

In the past thirty years environmental ethics has emerged as one of the most vibrant and exciting areas of applied philosophy. Several journals and hundreds of books testify to its growing importance inside and outside philosophical circles. But with all of this scholarly output, it is arguably the case that environmental ethics is not living up to its promise of providing a philosophical contribution to the resolution of environmental problems. This article surveys the current state of the field and offers an alternative path for the future development of environmental ethics toward a more publicly engaged model of applied philosophy.     

“Ethics wars”: Reflections on the Antagonism between Bioethicists and Social Science Observers of Biomedicine1

Social scientists often lament the fact that philosophically trained ethicists pay limited attention to the insights they generate. This paper presents an overview of tendencies in sociological and anthropological studies of morality, ethics and bioethics, and suggests that a lack in philosophical interest might be related to a tendency among social scientists to employ either a deficit model (social science perspectives accommodate the sense of context that philosophical ethics lacks), a replacement model (social scientists have finally found the “right way” of doing ethics), or a dismissal model (ethics should be abandoned all together as a misconstrued veil of power). Increased awareness of differences in styles of reasoning and objects of research interest might help to overcome the hostility, and an anthropological project is presented as an invitation to a dialogue informed by awareness of such differences.This paper was first presented at the 4S/EASST Conference in Paris, August 25–28,2004 in a panel co-convened with Richard Tutton, who came up with ‘‘Ethics Wars’’ as the appropriate title for the state of affairs we wanted to discuss. Bryn William-Jones contributed to the panel and provided detailed and very useful comments to the paper. The project on which the article reports was financially supported by the Swedish Ethics in Healthcare Programme (Grant 2000/56) and the Danish Social Science Research Council (Grant 24-03-0219).     

DARWINISM: STILL A CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY

Charles Darwin died in 1882—more than a hundred years ago. His doctrine, however, is still alive. Recently there has been particular interest in his ideas among philosophers. These ideas are indeed a challenge to (traditional) philosophy: To take Darwin seriously means to revise—or even to destroy—some positions in (traditional) philosophy. Among the philosophical disciplines which have been affected by Darwin's ideas are epistemology and moral philosophy (ethics). In the present paper I shall discuss the epistemological and ethical consequences of Darwin's doctrine from the point of view of contemporary philosophy of biology; I shall give a brief outline of evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics which both have caused many controversies.     

Some methodological aspects of ethics committees’ expertise: The Ukrainian example

Today local, national and international ethics committees have become an effective means of social regulation in many European countries. Science itself is an important precondition for the development of bioethical knowledge and ethics expertise. Cultural, social, historical and religious preconditions can facilitate different forms and methods of ethics expertise in each country. Ukrainian ethics expertise has some methodological problems connected with its socio-cultural, historical, science and philosophy development particularities. In this context, clarification of some common legitimacies or methodological approaches to ethics committee (EC) phenomena such as globalization, scientization and the prioritization of an ethics paradigm are very important. On the other hand, elaborate study and critical analysis of international experience by Ukraine and other Eastern European countries will provide the integration of their local and national ethics expertises into a world bioethics ethos. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 6th International Bioethics Conference entitled ‘The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research’, held in Warsaw, Poland, 3–4 June 2005.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.