问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响

本研究以240名大学生为被试,探讨了问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响。结果表明：(1)问题类型对贝叶斯推理有影响;(2)情绪状态对贝叶斯推理有影响;(3)问题类型与情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响存在交互作用。具体地,在经典乳癌问题中,被试在消极情绪状态下比在积极情绪状态下做出更高的概率估计,而在中彩问题中,被试在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下概率估计更高。     

概率的不同表征对贝叶斯推理的影响的研究

该研究以贝叶斯推算、判断为实验任务,探讨了三种概率表征(百分比、自然频率、概率词)、三种概率规则认识水平对贝叶斯推理的影响,结果表明:1)概率词表征的贝叶斯推算实质是判断过程。2)在三种概率表征中,频率表征更适合于正确完成贝叶斯推理,但存在学科背景的差异。3)贝叶斯推理使用的策略有正确规则、错误规则、命题知识、概率简捷式、直觉和个人意愿六种。4)贝叶斯判断的正确率高于贝叶斯推算,个体在贝叶斯判断上使用的正确规则多于贝叶斯推算过程。     

“直觉调整差误”偏向对贝叶斯推理成绩的影响

采用贝叶斯推理问题作为实验材料,探讨被试解决贝叶斯推理问题的启发式策略,从认知偏向的角度分析该问题的困难原因。结果发现:(1)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中的可得性启发与后验概率估计过程中的直觉调整差误密切相关;(2)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中文、理科被试都同样会产生直觉调整差误偏向;(3)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中的后验概率估计值和对推理问题中包括虚报率信息的命题的可得性测量所得主观概率之间存在显著的负相关。     

贝叶斯推理中的“自击中率参照抑制”

本文旨在研究贝叶斯推理中基础比率、击中率起作用的机制。通过设置肝炎情境、中彩情境的贝叶斯推理问题,同时操作基础比率和击中率的水平,考察449名大学生被试的概率估计情况。结果表明,总体上,贝叶斯推理中的基础比率和击中率均起作用,表现为后验概率估计值随基础比率水平的提高而增加,随击中率水平的提高而增加。然而,在低基础比率的中彩情境中,后验概率估计值先随击中率的增加而增加;之后却随击中率水平的继续提高而显著降低,出现自击中率参照抑制。这似乎说明,击中率在贝叶斯推理中并非一致地起作用,而可能与推理者的知识经验对击中率加工的调节有关。     

基础概率在贝叶斯推理中的作用

针对贝叶斯推理研究中基础概率忽略现象的争论,直接操纵基础概率水平,考察被试在贝叶斯推理时是否加工了基础概率信息。结果表明,低基础概率组后验概率估计显著低,无基础概率组后验概率估计反应时显著短于有基础概率组。被试在各种条件下估计的正确率都较低,说明对基础概率在贝叶斯推理中的作用考虑不充分。     

主体关联性对贝叶斯推理概率估计的影响

用贝叶斯推理问题为实验材料,探讨了主体关联性对贝叶斯推理概率估计的影响。结果表明,当估计的事件与主体有关时,被试对消极事件概率估计较低,对积极事件概率估计值;当估计的事件与主体无关时,被试对消极事件和积极事件的概率估计无显著差异。反应时分析表明,被试对消极事件的概率估计比对积极事件的概率估计时间显著地长,当消极事件与主体有关时概率估计时间就更长;而对积极事件的概率估计,与主体有关和与主体无关时反应时差异不显著。这表明,被试对消极事件的概率估计(特别是消极事件与己有关时)更为慎重。     

任务情境和证据信息对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响研究

采用生活情境测查任务和经典测查任务探讨了任务情境对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响,以及生活情境测查任务中不同证据信息对青少年贝叶斯判断的影响作用.结果表明:(1)在生活情境测查任务中,从小学六年级到大学二年级,被试的贝叶斯推理能力稳步缓慢提升(相邻的两个被试组之间差异不显著,而不相邻的两个被试组之间差异更容易达到显著水平),发展没有出现加速期,而经典测查任务情境下没有表现出年龄差异;(2)贝叶斯推理作为条件概率的判断不仅受任务情境的影响,而且同一任务情境中不同证据信息也会影响贝叶斯判断.当证据信息与先验信念一致时,被试可以充分利用线索进行推理.     

贝叶斯推理研究的三个层次

从纵向发展来看, 近年来贝叶斯推理研究从重推理问题轻推理者因素(关注频率信息和图表呈现的促进效应, 推理问题内容对推理的影响, 生态效度等), 逐渐转向重视推理者因素(知识背景, 主体关联性程度等)和推理过程, 最后发展到将推理问题、推理者和推理过程整合的趋势; 从横向发展来看, 各个纵向发展的阶段内部也有横向发展阶段, 整个研究结构呈立体状。未来的研究应进一步结合推理材料、推理过程考察推理者因素如焦虑、认知风格、元认知和工作记忆等对贝叶斯推理的影响, 并利用新的研究手段如ERP、眼动仪等探索和验证贝叶斯推理的影响因素及其认知加工过程。     

认知风格对大学生不确定条件下判断和决策的影响

通过3个实验,研究了认知风格对大学生不确定条件下判断和决策的影响。结果表明:(1)认知风格影响大学生在不确定条件下的判断和决策,表现在概率推理中,场依存型比场独立型更容易受“代表性启发”影响。在赌徒推理中,场独立型更少受“赌徒谬误”影响。在风险决策中,场独立型倾向选择受益大、风险也大的决策,场依存型倾向选择稳妥、风险较小的决策。(2)大学生在概率推理、赌徒推理和风险决策时存在显著的性别差异。(3)概率知识学习有助于克服“代表性启发”,但对“赌徒谬误”影响不大。     

大学生数字运算能力对贝叶斯推理的影响

本文采用两个贝叶斯推理问题和一个数字运算能力量表对102个大学生进行了调查,结果表明:(1)数字运算能力对贝叶斯推理有影响,具体表现为高数字运算能力被试比低数字运算能力被试的贝叶斯推理成绩要好;(2)自然频数表征对贝叶斯推理的影响是有条件的,只有高数字运算能力被试才出现自然频数表征促进效应,而低数字运算能力被试并没有出现自然频数表征促进效应。这可能表明,即使是对自然频数的理解和操纵也需要一定程度的数字运算能力,而且自然频数表征促进效应并没有以前认为的那么普遍。     

Expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in the legal domain

Little research has been conducted on expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in law, even though this type of knowledge is prerequisite for correctly interpreting and reasoning about legal cases, and differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge structures between students and between students and teachers, might lead to miscommunication. This study investigated the extent and organisation of conceptual and ontological knowledge of novices, advanced students, and experts in law, using a card-sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. The results showed that novices used more everyday examples and were less accurate in their elaborations of concepts than advanced students and experts, on top of that, the organisation of their knowledge did not overlap within their group (i.e., no “shared” ontology). Experts gave more judicial examples based on the lawbook and were more accurate in their elaborations than advanced students, and their knowledge was strongly overlapping within their group (i.e., strong ontology). Incorrect conceptual knowledge seems to impede the correct understanding of cases and the correct application of precise and formal rules in law.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for people's assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologists), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices as defined by education were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for peoples' assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologisis), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices, as defined by education, were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Investigating reasoning in maternity-care scheduling

How do expert schedulers reason? One view states that experts generally reason by applying rules; another, that their reasoning is mainly based on cases. This paper constitutes the first results of an ongoing project designed to analyze the acquisition and representation of the knowledge of expert and novice schedulers in the context of these two views. It is concluded that the reasoning of the analyzed maternity-care scheduling experts can best be described as based on rules, and that the reasoning of novices in maternity-care scheduling is primarily case based.     

Tough guys finish last: the perils of a distributive reputation

Reputations are socially constructed labels that provide representations (or schema), which organize our images of another person. We look at how reputations influence negotiations by examining their impact on negotiator cognitions, behaviors, and subsequent outcomes. We randomly paired relative novices with relative experts to negotiate over email, telling half the novices that their counterparts were experts in distributive negotiation (i.e., the art of claiming value). Findings supported our predictions that novices whose counterparts had a distributive reputation judged these counterparts' intentions in a more negative light and used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than the control group novices. This resulted in lower joint gains in the distributive reputation condition than in the control condition. Notably, the more experienced negotiators were able to extract more individual value from the deal, but not when they had a reputation for being distributive. In other words, the fictitious distributive reputation prevented participants from capitalizing on their real negotiation expertise advantage.     

明确嵌套集合关系对贝叶斯推理的促进效应

以经典的乳癌问题作为实验任务,通过两个实验分别探讨了有助于明确嵌套集合关系的逐步提问、树图表征等外部表征方式以及元认知调控和被试类型等因素对贝叶斯推理的影响。结果发现：(1)逐步提问对改善贝叶斯推理的成绩没有显著作用;(2)完整和不完整的树图表征显著地促进了推理成绩,但简约的树图表征的促进作用不显著;(3)叙述理由引发的元认知监控显著地促进了推理成绩。(4)文科和理科两组被试的推理成绩没有显著差异     

Decision making and professional experience: an experimental study of generating, evaluating and modifying diagnostic hypotheses

Experimental investigations on generation, evaluation, and modification of diagnostic hypotheses in symptom pattern classification revealed in different domains (e.g. clinical decision making) that reasoning in non-experts and experts differ in the 'content' (e.g. issue-directed substance of concepts) rather than in the 'form' of reasoning (e.g. number, specificity of hypotheses). These results are essentially accounted for by the experts' upper-level flexibility in the interpretation of data. In a two-factorial design (competence x predictive value of data), patients' clinical data with varying predictive value were given singularly in succession to two groups (experts and novices; n = 20) of subjects. The task of the subjects was (a) to name their assumptions and (b) give a summarizing decision on the--probable--diagnostic category of hypothetical cases. Results: Between experts and novices no difference was found in the number and degree of specification of hypotheses; in summarizing decisions, experts considered more categories as plausible than novices; on patient data with low predictive value, experts considered more specific categories. The moment of hypothesis formation depends not on the competence level but on the predictive value of the patient's clinical data.     

The relation between problem categorization and problem solving among experts and novices

These investigations were conducted to examine the relationship between problem-solving ability and the criteria used to decide that two classical mechanics problems would be solved similarly. We began by comparing experts and novices on a similarity judgment task and found that the experts predominantly relied on the problems' deep structures in deciding on similarity of solution, although the presence of surface-feature similarity had a clear adverse effect on performance. The novices relied predominantly on surface features, but were capable of using the problems' deep structures under certain conditions. In a second experiment, we compared groups of novices, at the same level of experience, who tended to employ different types of reasoning in making similarity judgments. Compared to novices who relied predominantly on surface features, novices who made greater use of principles tended to categorize problems similarly to how experts categorized them, as well as score higher in problem solving. These results suggest that principles play a fundamental role in the organization of conceptual and procedural knowledge for good problem solvers at all levels.     

Cognitive Load During Problem Solving: Effects on Learning

Considerable evidence indicates that domain specific knowledge in the form of schemas is the primary factor distinguishing experts from novices in problem-solving skill. Evidence that conventional problem-solving activity is not effective in schema acquisition is also accumulating. It is suggested that a major reason for the ineffectiveness of problem solving as a learning device, is that the cognitive processes required by the two activities overlap insufficiently, and that conventional problem solving in the form of means-ends analysis requires a relatively large amount of cognitive processing capacity which is consequently unavailable for schema acquisition. A computational model and experimental evidence provide support for this contention. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Development of categorization and reasoning in the natural world: novices to experts,naive similarity to ecological knowledge

Two experiments investigate the role of similarity and causal-ecological knowledge in expert and novice categorization and reasoning. In Experiment 1, university undergraduates and commercial fishermen sorted marine creatures into groups; although there was substantial agreement, novices sorted largely on the basis of appearance, whereas experts often cited commercial, ecological, or behavioral factors, and systematically subdivided fish on the basis of ecological niche. In Experiment 2, experts and novices were asked to generalize a blank property or novel disease from a pair of marine creatures. Novices relied on similarity to guide generalizations. Experts used similarity to reason about blank properties but ecological relations to reason about diseases. Expertise appears to involve knowledge of multiple relations among entities and context-sensitive application of those relations.