Temporal contiguity and the judgement of causality by human subjects

Three experiments examined the role of the degree of temporal contiguity between an action and an outcome in human causality judgement. In all the experiments subjects were required to perform an action—pressing a key on a computer keyboard—and to judge the extent to which the action caused an outcome on the computer screen to occur. The action and outcome occurred on a free-operant schedule. In the first experiment a 2-sec delay between the action and outcome reduced causality judgements relative to a situation in which there was no delay. In the second experiment judgements in conditions with delays of 0, 4, 8, and 16 sec were compared with judgements in conditions in which the same pattern of outcomes occurred non-contingently with respect to the subjects' responding. In both of these experiments the events were controlled by random ratio schedules, following the procedure of Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber (1983), in which each condition was divided into 1-sec intervals. In the third experiment judgements in conditions with delays of 0, 2, 4, or 8 sec were compared in a continuous procedure rather than one divided into 1-sec intervals. In all experiments the increasing delays led to progressively lower judgements of causality. The results are related to three accounts of the mechanism underlying human causality judgement and are also compared with results from analogous animal conditioning studies.     

Behavioral parameters of drug action: signalled and response-independent reinforcement

Four pigeons were initially trained under a multiple variable-interval 1-min variable-interval 1-min schedule of food reinforcement. For two of the pigeons, a signal was then presented whenever the reinforcer was available in one component; this resulted in positive contrast. For the other two pigeons, the reinforcer was presented independently of responding on a variable-time schedule in one component; this resulted in negative induction. After 30 to 50 sessions, however, a similar degree of differential responding occurred under both multiple schedules, i.e., high rates in the variable-interval component and low rates in the other component. Reinforcement frequency remained about the same in each of the schedule components. The stable performances then served as baselines for studying drug effects. In the high-rate component of both multiple schedules, small doses of d-amphetamine increased responding, whereas larger doses decreased responding. In the low-rate component of both multiple schedules, there was no rate-increasing effect at any dose of d-amphetamine; such an effect was found, however, with phenobarbital at a dose that decreased responding in the high-rate component. The drug effects thus depended on the interaction of pharmacologic variables (specific drug and dose) with behavioral variables (schedule components).     

Effect of local context of responding on human judgment of causality

Two experiments examined the effect of various relationships between a response (pressing the space bar of a computer) and an outcome (a triangle flashing on a screen) on judgments of the causal effectiveness of the response. In Experiment 1, when responses were required to be temporarily isolated from each other prior to an outcome, ratings of the causal effectiveness of the responses were higher than in a condition in which the probability of an outcome following a response was the same but in which no temporal isolation was required. In Experiment 2, when a number of responses were required to be emitted temporally close to the outcome, ratings of the causal effectiveness of the responses were lower than in a condition in which the probability of an outcome following a response was the same but in which no temporal proximity was required. These results suggest that, in addition to the overall probability that an outcome will follow a response, the local context of responding at the time an outcome is presented is critical in influencing ratings of causal effectiveness.     

Effect of perceived choice,expected outcome,and observed outcome of an action on the causal attributions of actors

An experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that actors' causal attributions for success and failure would be affected by the degree of perceived choice they had in taking an action. Actors either were assigned, or selected one of four therapeutic outlines which were expected to have either a positive or a negative effect, and which actually had either a positive or negative outcome on a purportedly phobic person. For negative outcomes, it was predicted that perceived choice would induce a sense of personal responsibility when a positive outcome was expected, and lead actors to attribute more responsibility to themselves as a result. Results supported this prediction. For positive outcomes, however, actors attributed responsibility to themselves regardless of expectancy or choice. Actors were also found to attribute generally more responsibility to themselves for positive than negative outcomes. Results were discussed in terms of self-esteem motivation and the information available to the actor.     

Influence of the schedule of outcome presentation on causality judgements

Experiments examined the effect of various relationships between a response (pressing the space bar of a computer) and an outcome (a triangle flashing on a screen) on judgements of the causal effectiveness of the response. As the mean number of responses required per outcome on a variable-ratio (VR) schedule (Experiment 1) or the mean temporal interval on a variableinterval (VI) schedule (Experiment 2) increased, ratings of causal effectiveness of that response decreased. In Experiment 3, yoking procedures matched either the number of responses required per outcome or the temporal distributions of outcomes on a VI and a VR schedule, and responses on the VI schedule were rated more causally effective. In Experiment 4, the overall feedback function on a tandem VI VR and a tandem VR VI schedule was matched, and responses performed on the tandem VR VI schedule were rated as more causally effective.     

Laws,causality and the intentional explanation of action

Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.     

Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality

Two experiments investigated Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects appears to evoke an immediate perception that the first motion caused the second, as in a collision. Launching was embedded in event sequences where a third event (a colour change of the second object) was established as a competing predictor of the second motion, in an attempt to see whether subjects' learning of alternative predictive relationships would influence their causal impressions of launch events. In Experiment 1 subjects saw launch events in which temporal contiguity at the point of impact was varied so that an impact was varied so that an impact itself did not reliably predict when the second object would move. Half of these scenes, however, contained a colour change of the second object which did reliably predict when it would move. In accordance with Michotte's theory, subjects' ratings of the degree of perceived causality were not affected by the colour change. In Experiment 2 subjects saw scenes that contained launch events with or without temporal contiguity and a colour change. These were interspersed with events in which a colour change alone did or did not precede the second motion. Thus, movement of the second object was either contingent on or independent of the impact. Subjects repeatedly (a) rated perceived causality in single launch events and (b) judged the necessity of collisions for movement in the overall set of events. These responses dissociated, in that ratings type (a) showed only a substantial contiguity effect, whereas judgements of type (b) showed both a contingency and a much smaller contiguity effect. These results appear to support a distinction between judged and perceived causality and are discussed with respect to Michotte's theory of direct causal perception.     

Information availability,goodness of outcome,and attributions of causality

H. H. Kelley's (American Psychologist, 1973, 28, 107–128) framework for studying attribution processes is introduced as a means of accounting for characteristic asymmetries in success/failure attributions. It is argued that while success/failure asymmetries should occur in the presence of single-observation information, asymmetries should be eliminated when individuals are allowed to observe the covariation between their own actions and outcomes. Subjects participated in a 15-trial stock market simulation in which type of information (single-observation or covariation) and goodness of outcome (relative success or failure) were manipulated. The obtained results supported the experimental hypotheses. Given single-observation information, subjects were more likely to accept personal responsibility for good than for poor outcomes. However, subjects' attributions were not affected by goodness of outcome when they were provided with covariation information. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the current debate between motivational and information-processing explanations of asymmetries in success/failure attributions.     

10‐month‐old infants’ inference of invisible agent: Distinction in causality between object motion and human action1

Abstract: Two habituation experiments investigated 10‐month‐old infants’ interpretation of events where a stationary object began to move without any visible causes. During habituation, infants saw that an object partly hidden by an occluder began to move away from the occluder. Then, they were tested with three test events without the occluder: the ?rst event showed a hand pushing the object, the second event showed a hand failing to touch the object, and the last event had no agent. The objects were a ball in Experiment 1, and a person in Experiment 2. The test event that the infants looked at for the shortest duration in Experiment 1 was where the hand pushed the ball, whereas they looked at the three test events almost equal amounts of time in Experiment 2. These results indicate that 10‐month‐old infants responded to the events in terms of causality and could infer the presence of the agent behind the occluder only when they saw the habituation event featuring the ball.     

Fast and frugal versus regression models of human judgement

Following Brunswik (1952), social judgement theorists have long relied on regression models to describe both an individual's judgements and the environment about which such judgements are made. However, social judgement theory is not synonymous with these compensatory, static, structural models. We compared the characterisations of physicians' judgements using a regression model with that of a non-compensatory process model (called fast and frugal). We found that both models fit the data equally well. Both models suggest that physicians use few cues, that they disagree among themselves, and that their stated cue use is discrepant with the models' stated cue use. However, the fast and frugal model is easier to convey to physicians and is also more psychologically plausible. Implications for how social judgement theorists conceptualise the process of vicarious functioning are discussed.     

Rethinking temporal contiguity and the judgement of causality: effects of prior knowledge, experience, and reinforcement procedure.

Time plays a pivotal role in causal inference. Nonetheless most contemporary theories of causal induction do not address the implications of temporal contiguity and delay, with the exception of associative learning theory. Shanks, Pearson, and Dickinson (1989) and several replications (Reed, 1992, 1999) have demonstrated that people fail to identify causal relations if cause and effect are separated by more than two seconds. In line with an associationist perspective, these findings have been interpreted to indicate that temporal lags universally impair causal induction. This interpretation clashes with the richness of everyday causal cognition where people apparently can reason about causal relations involving considerable delays. We look at the implications of cause-effect delays from a computational perspective and predict that delays should generally hinder reasoning performance, but that this hindrance should be alleviated if reasoners have knowledge of the delay. Two experiments demonstrated that (1) the impact of delay on causal judgement depends on participants' expectations about the timeframe of the causal relation, and (2) the free-operant procedures used in previous studies are ill-suited to study the direct influences of delay on causal induction, because they confound delay with weaker evidence for the relation in question. Implications for contemporary causal learning theories are discussed.     

Effect of arousal and retention delay on memory: a meta-analysis

Two meta-analyses were conducted to examine the magnitude of the interaction between arousal and retention delay on various types of memory, e.g., verbal, visual, etc., as initially reported by Kleinsmith and Kaplan in 1963 and 1964. Results of the first meta-analysis (29 studies, N = 2,637) indicated that the interaction was robust (d = .779), with low arousal leading to better immediate memory than high arousal, whereas high arousal led to better delayed memory than low arousal. Incorporating additional studies, a subsequent meta-analysis (48 studies, N = 3,143) on the effect of arousal on memory, taking retention delay as a moderator, provided further support. At a 2-min. delay, low arousal led to better immediate memory than high arousal (d = -.459). This difference decreased at a 20-min. delay (d = .106), when directions of high and low arousal effects on memory appeared to reverse. At longer delays than 20 min., high arousal led to better delayed memory than low arousal (ds = .753, .219, and .472, for delays of 45-min., 1-day, and more than 1-day, respectively).     

Effects of social context and predictive relevance on action outcome monitoring

Outcome monitoring is crucial for subsequent adjustments in behavior and is associated with a specific electrophysiological response, the feedback-related negativity (FRN). Besides feedback generated by one's own action, the performance of others may also be relevant for oneself, and the observation of outcomes for others' actions elicits an observer FRN (oFRN). To test how these components are influenced by social setting and predictive value of feedback information, we compared event-related potentials, as well as their topographies and neural generators, for performance feedback generated by oneself and others in a cooperative versus competitive context. Our results show that (1) the predictive relevance of outcomes is crucial to elicit an FRN in both players and observers, (2) cooperation increases FRN and P300 amplitudes, especially in individuals with high traits of perspective taking, and (3) contrary to previous findings on gambling outcomes, oFRN components are generated for both cooperating and competing observers, but with smaller amplitudes in the latter. Neural source estimation revealed medial prefrontal activity for both FRN and oFRN, but with additional generators for the oFRN in the dorsolateral and ventral prefrontal cortex, as well as the temporoparietal junction. We conclude that the latter set of brain regions could mediate social influences on action monitoring by representing agency and social relevance of outcomes and are, therefore, recruited in addition to shared prediction error signals generated in medial frontal areas during action outcome observation.