Levinas and the euthanasia debate

The philosophers' tendency to characterize euthanasia interms of either the right or the responsibility to die is, in some ways, problematic. Stepping outside of the analytic framework, the author draws out the implications of the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas for the euthanasia debate, tracing the way Levinas's position differs not only from the philosophical consensus but also from the theological one. The article shows that, according to Levinas, there is no ethical case for suicide or assisted suicide. Death cannot be assumed or chosen—not only because suicide is a logically and metaphysically contradictory concept but also because in the choice of death ethical responsibility turns into irresponsibility. However, since Levinas holds that one must be responsible to the point of expiation, he can be said to approve certain actions that may have the consequence of hastening death.     

The example of Christ and voluntary active euthanasia

The Christian church's aversion to suicide need not inform its position on voluntary active euthanasia any more than it informs its understanding of the role Jesus played in securing his own death. When the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny is kept in balance and is in agreement spontaneously and independently, culpability for the death of Jesus should be assigned neither to him nor to those who sought his crucifixion. This correspondence of freedom and destiny results in a theonomous moment, transcending all guilt. Similarly, when one elects to die because that choice best corresponds with one's self-image, it is extremely doubtful that this act of faith can be made intelligible or justified to others. If Jesus is example and not merely redeemer, this understanding implies that all people should be afforded the same freedom in death that jesus was without incurring moral guilt.