共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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Sarah Buss 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1997,78(1):13-44
My chief aim is to explain how someone can act freely against her own best judgment. But I also have a second aim: to defend a conception of practical rationality according to which someone cannot do something freely if she believes it would be better to do something else. These aims may appear incompatible. But I argue that practical reason has the capacity to undermine itself in such a way that it produces reasons for behaving irrationally. Weakness of will is possible because it is possible to conclude that one has sufficient reason to reject the verdicts of one's own reason. 相似文献
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BONNIE KENT 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2007,75(1):70-91
Aquinas's admirers, reacting against Donald Davidson's criticisms of him, commonly argue (a) that the will does play a role in Aquinas's account of incontinence, and (b) that his explanation of incontinent action turns on the weakness of the will. The first part of this paper argues that they are correct about (a) but wholly mistaken about (b). Aquinas rarely even mentions the weakness of the will, and he never invokes it to explain why someone acts counter to her own better judgment. In his view, such a person has the capacity for self-control but fails to exercise it.
The second part of the paper considers Gary Watson's account of incontinence, including and especially his objections to analyzing it as the failure to exercise one's capacity for self-control. Here I argue that Aquinas's account better serves the purposes of moral discourse and that it should not be expected to provide the kind of causal explanation Watson seeks. 相似文献
The second part of the paper considers Gary Watson's account of incontinence, including and especially his objections to analyzing it as the failure to exercise one's capacity for self-control. Here I argue that Aquinas's account better serves the purposes of moral discourse and that it should not be expected to provide the kind of causal explanation Watson seeks. 相似文献
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Philosophia - This paper shows that our popular account of weakness of will is inconsistent with dilemmas. In dilemmas, agents judge that they ought to do one thing, that they ought to do something... 相似文献
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Edmund Henden 《Erkenntnis》2004,61(1):53-74
The problem of weakness of the will is often thought to arise because ofan assumption that freely, deliberately and intentionally doing something must correspondto the agent's positive evaluation of doing that thing. In contemporary philosophy, a verycommon response to the problem of weakness has been to adopt the view that free, deliberateaction does not need to correspond to any positive evaluation at all. Much of thesupport for this view has come from the difficulties the denial of it has been thought togive rise to, both with respect to giving an account of weakness, as well as explaining thefuture-directed nature of intentions. In this paper I argue that most of these difficulties onlyarise for one particular version of the view that free, deliberate action must correspond toa positive evaluation, a version associated with Donald Davidson's account of weakness.However, another version of this view is possible, and I argue that it escapes the standardobjections to the Davidsonian account. 相似文献
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John J. Davenport 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(3):235-259
This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak. 相似文献
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What are the differences between hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will? Each typically involves a gap between word and deed, yet they do not seem morally equivalent. Moreover, they are intuitively different concepts, even though the conceptual boundaries between them are fuzzy. This paper explores diverse examples, attempting to identify elements which may be distinctive of each concept, with special attention to hypocrisy. It also provides a discussion of the appropriateness of such use of examples in moral philosophy. 相似文献
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Alfred Mele 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):391-404
Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. 相似文献
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Philosophia - I argue that free will is a nominal construct developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to provide cohesive narratives in support of a priori moral-judgmental dispositions. In a... 相似文献
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Voin Milevski 《Philosophical Psychology》2017,30(1-2):44-57
The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them. 相似文献
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