Core mechanisms in "theory of mind"

Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The "theory of mind" mechanism (ToMM) is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief-desire attribution but effective reasoning about belief contents depends on a process of selection by inhibition. This selection process (SP) develops slowly through the preschool period and well beyond. By modeling the ToMM-SP as mechanisms of selective attention, we have uncovered new empirical phenomena. We propose that early "theory of mind" is a modular-heuristic process of domain-specific learning.     

History and theory in "applied ethics"

Robert Baker and Laurence McCullough argue that the "applied ethics model" is deficient and in need of a replacement model. However, they supply no clear meaning to "applied ethics" and miss most of what is important in the literature on methodology that treats this question. The Baker-McCullough account of medical and applied ethics is a straw man that has had no influence in these fields or in philosophical ethics. The authors are also on shaky historical grounds in dealing with two problems: (1) the historical source of the notion of "practical ethics" and (2) the historical source of and the assimilation of the term "autonomy" into applied philosophy and professional ethics. They mistakenly hold (1) that the expression "practical ethics" was first used in a publication by Thomas Percival and (2) that Kant is the primary historical source of the notion of autonomy as that notion is used in contemporary applied ethics.     

三论宗的"二智"理论

本文通过对嘉祥吉藏著述的考察,系统研究了长期为学术界所忽视的三论宗的"二智"理论,具体探讨了"二智"的种类、"二智优劣"、"二智相即"、"二智即解脱"等内容.     

荀子性恶论的多维解读

在传统思想研究中,苟子是以性恶论而与孟子、老庄一同构成了中国古典人性论。其实,深入阅读苟子读本,笔者发现荀子对人性的评判较为复杂。传统性恶论远不能揭示荀子人性论思想的丰富性和多元性。笔者现从苟子之“性”的中性色彩、苟子之“恶”的真实解释、苟子人性论中的向善和知善、人和环境的互动四个层面予以展开论述。     

Freud's "Project" and its relationship to psychoanalytic theory

Sigmund Freud wrote the "Project for a Scientific Psychology" in 1895. Although the "Project" is essential a neurological model of mind, it will be shown that major concepts in psychoanalytic theory can be traced to this work. These include libido, primary process and the pleasure principle, secondary process and the reality principle, wish fulfillment, the ego, consciousness, and repression. The "Project" signifies a transition in Freud's thinking from a neurological to a psychological realm of discourse.     

对阿尔都塞的马克思理论反人道主义思想的质疑

阿尔都塞以1845年为界把马克思的思想割裂为人道主义的意识形态和以反人道主义为核心的历史科学,认为只有后者才是真正的马克思.这种划分在凸现马克思的哲学革命在哲学史上的颠覆性意义的同时却割裂了马克思思想的内在统一性.本文以阿尔都塞极力推崇的<德意志意识形态>为文本依据,指出:作为中心和目的的自由的人与作为生产关系载体的现实的人在<形态>中是不可分割的,1845年之后马克思的思想是科学的人道主义.文章最后以马克思的人道主义思想为基础指出其当代价值.     

Freud's "Project": a theory for Studies on Hysteria

The controversy about the place of Sigmund Freud's unfinished draft of 1895, "Project for a Scientific Psychology," in the history of his thought, is addressed. It is argued that the "Project" may be understood as a suppressed response to the theory of hysteria presented by Josef Breuer in his and Freud's joint work, Studies on Hysteria. It is suggested that the "Project" may be read, in part, as a substitute for Breuer's theory. The timing and circumstances of the "Project's" composition are discussed. Its substantive and formal congruence with Studies on Hysteria is brought out. Freud's comments on scientific hypotheses are discussed, and it is shown that they constitute an implicit criticism of Breuer's theory.